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2000 DIGILAW 530 (PAT)

Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. State Of Bihar

2000-04-04

S.K.KATRIAR

body2000
Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), passed by the Chief Licensing Officer-cum-Chief Drug Controller, Govt. of Bihar, Patna (respondent no. 3), whereby the petitioner company was prohibited from sale and purchase of Glycodin Terp Vasaka (Glycodin, for short), one of its medicinal products. It is further directed against the order dated 8.6.98 (Annexure 17), passed by respondent no. 3, whereby the petitioners licence Nos. 266 and 266A, issued in Forms 20B and 21B, have been cancelled from the date of the order, meaning thereby that it would thereafter be illegal for the petitioner to sell and purchase all its medicinal products in Bihar. The writ petition is also directed against the appellate order dated 14.5.99 (Annexure 26), whereby the petitioners appeal has been rejected. It is lastly directed against an incidental order dated 7.8.97 (Annexure 4), whereby 6000 phials of Glycodin has been impounded by the petitioner company, and for the consequential relief to release the same. 2. The petitioner is public limited company having its registered office in Gujarat, which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of large number of medicines all over India for about 100 years. The company has its manufacturing unit at Baroda in the State of Gujarat. It holds two licences to sell its products on wholesale basis in Bihar, issued by respondent no. 3. Glycodin is one of the products manufactured by the petitioner in its manufacturing unit at Baroda, and for which it holds a drug manufacturing licence No. G-10, issued in Form 25, as per the formulation mentioned in the licence, which position is manifest from the certificate dated 5.3.97, issued by the authorities under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The Govt. of India promulgated the Drugs and Cosmetics (8th Amendment) Rules, 1996 (1996 Rules, for short), whereby, inter alia, Schedule H of the 1945 Rules has been replaced by a new Schedule H. The new schedule H now includes Codeine, its salt and derivatives, the significance of which would be discussed at the appropriate stage. 3. The 1996 Rules were published in the Gazette of India Extra-ordinary on 16.7.1996, and the same was enforced forthwith. 3. The 1996 Rules were published in the Gazette of India Extra-ordinary on 16.7.1996, and the same was enforced forthwith. The authorities under the Act had conducted a surprise inspection of the petitioners establishment in Patna on 20.6.97, and found that inspite of the fact that Codeine is an ingredient of a medicinal preparation, the company had sold 5780 phials of Glycodin to one Swastik Distributor, Muzaffarpur, without printing the statutory warning in terms of Rule 97(1) (b) with respect to Schedule H medicines, which amounts to selling a misbranded product within the meaning of Section 18(a)(i) of the Act. The petitioner was directed to withdraw Glycodin completely from the market, and was also called upon to show cause as to why appropriate action be not taken. Thereafter the respondent authorities had seized in terms of Section 23 (1) (c) of the Act, 600 phials of glycodin from the petitioners premises in Patna and kept in custody of the petitioner itself with the direction not to dispose of the same. There was another surprise inspection of the business premises of the petitioner on 9.9.97, and the authorities found that Glycodin was still being marketed without the statutory warning with regard to Schedule H drugs in terms of Rule 97 (1) (b). Forced by the circumstances, respondent no. 3 issued notice dt. 9.1.98 (Annexure-9) to the petitioner, calling upon to show cause as to why the petitioner continued to market Glycodin without the requisite statutory warning, and also that the product in question includes Vasaka as one of its ingredients which is in the prohibited list of ingredients issued by the Govt. of India. Cause was shown by letter dated 23.3.98 (Annexure 10). On consideration of the entire materials, respondent no. 3 issued the impugned order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), whereby the provisions of Section 18 of the Act was held to have been violated, sale and purchase of Glycodin was banned in Bihar in terms of Rule 66 (1) of the Rules. The petitioner company was, therefore, directed to withdraw all the phials of Glycodin from the market within 15 days, and to dispose of the same only after obtaining prior permission of the Controller. It is of the greatest importance in the present context to state that the impugned order stated that stern action in accordance with law shall be taken in the event of violation of the order. It is of the greatest importance in the present context to state that the impugned order stated that stern action in accordance with law shall be taken in the event of violation of the order. This was followed by another surprise inspection on 6.5.98. In its report dated 6.5.98, the respondent authorities, inter alia, noted that the company had received a copy of the aforesaid impugned order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), per registered post on 21.4.98, but phials of Glycodin had not been received from the market at all. Large stocks of Glycodin had been transferred to Howrah and Indore on 20.4.98. It is obvious that the surprise inspection on 6.5.98 was to ensure compliance of the impugned order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12). 4. It appears that feeling dissatisfied with the petitioners recalcitrant approach and its failure to carry out the terms of the impugned order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), respondent no. 3 issued another show-cause notice dated 25.6.98 (Annexure 14) that instead of removing the defect of misbranding Glycodin, it had transferred the stocks of Calcutta which appeared to the authorities to be a mere paper transaction and the stocks were really not transferred in order to show a nil stock of Glycodin in Bihar. It further alleged that no effort at all had been made to withdraw Glycodin from the market. This notice further alleged that the petitioner had not submitted compliance report inspite of repeated surprise inspections and directions, and Glycodin has been found on sale at Gaya, Giridih, Ranchi and other places in Bihar. The petitioner was, therefore, called upon to show cause as to why it continued to market a misbranded product which also included a prohibited ingredient. Cause was shown by the petitioner company by its letter dated 4.6.98 (Annexure 15). On consideration of the entire materials, respondent no. 3 passed the impugned order dated 8.6.98 (Annexure 17), whereby the petitioners licence No. 226 and 266A, issued in Forms 20B and 21B, were cancelled from the date of the order, as a result of which it would be illegal for the petitioner to sell and purchase its medicines in Bihar. The petitioner was further called upon to disclose its entire stock position to respondent no. 3. 5. The petitioner was further called upon to disclose its entire stock position to respondent no. 3. 5. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the petitioner submitted its memorandum of appeal under rule 66(2) of the Rules on 7.7.98 (Annexure 19), to the Minister, Department of Health and Family Welfare, Govt. of Bihar, which was registered as Appeal No. 3/98. The same has been rejected by the appellate order dated 14.5.99, and impugned herein. Hence the writ petition. 6. While assailing the impugned action of the respondent authorities, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the show-cause notices dated 9.1.98 (Annexure 9), and 26.5.98 (Annexure 14), were in violation of rule 66 of the Rules and, therefore, the consequent action is bad in law. Rule 66 to the extent it is relevant in the present context is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "66. Cancellation and suspension of Licences.(1) The licensing authority may, after giving the licensee an opportunity to show cause why such an order should not be passed by an order in writing stating the reasons therefor, cancel a licence issued under this part or suspend it for such period as he thinks fit, either wholly or in respect of some of the substance to which it relates, if in his opinion, the licensee has failed to comply with any of the conditions of the licence or with any provisions of the Act or Rules thereunder : Provided that, where such failure or contravention is the consequence of an act or omission on the part of an agent or employee, the licence shall not be cancelled or suspended if the licensee proves to the satisfaction of the licensing authority ............." The petitioners contention is that in view of the expression such occurring in Rule 66, it was incumbent on the respondents to indicate in the show-cause notice the proposed punishment indicated therein. Counsel submits that rule 66 provides four different kinds of punishment in the alternative which can possibly be inflicted by the licensing authority and are cancellation of a licence, cancel it for any duration that he thinks fit, wholly, or in respect of the some of the substances to which it relates. Counsel submits that rule 66 provides four different kinds of punishment in the alternative which can possibly be inflicted by the licensing authority and are cancellation of a licence, cancel it for any duration that he thinks fit, wholly, or in respect of the some of the substances to which it relates. He relies on the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1980 Rajasthan 252 (Union of India vs. Wazir Singh), wherein expression such was interpreted in the context of the Rajasthan High Court Rules. 6.1. The contention is stated only to be rejected. The authorities cannot be expected to make up their mind even provisionally without consideration of the cause yet to be shown by the petitioner. It does not appear to me to be possible to indicate the proposed punishment in the show-cause notice on the basis of the unilateral version of the authorities. If it were permitted, then the authorities may be criticised for bias and a pre-disposed mind. This may be possible in service jurisprudence where the second show- cause can be issued on the question of proposed punishment on the basis of the findings of culpability which have already been recorded. This is also possible in criminal courts where there is provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to hear the accused on the question of sentence, but that too takes places after the conviction has been recorded. However, even in the two instances I have given, the delinquent/accused person can be heard separately on the question of sentence, but there is no obligation on the employer or the Criminal Court to indicate the proposed punishment beforehand. 6.2. It is not possible to put the construction suggested by the petitioner on a plain reading of the relevant portion of rule 66. The judgment of the Rajasthan High Court (supra) relied on by the petitioner was rendered in a wholly different context, related to the interpretation of a particular provision of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, and is of no assistance at all in the present context. Furthermore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is wholly inapplicable to the show-cause notice dated 9.1.98 (An- nexure 9), because no punishment was inflicted by the impugned order dt. 6.4.98 (Annexure 12). The petitioner was directed only to stop the sale and purchase of Glycodin in view of the mandate of law. Furthermore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is wholly inapplicable to the show-cause notice dated 9.1.98 (An- nexure 9), because no punishment was inflicted by the impugned order dt. 6.4.98 (Annexure 12). The petitioner was directed only to stop the sale and purchase of Glycodin in view of the mandate of law. In my view, this is no punishment, and surely none within the meaning of rule 66. The contention of the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. 7. It was next contended on behalf of the petitioner that the licensing authority in the case of the petitioner is the Regional Licensing Authority, whereas the impugned order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12) has been passed by the Chief Licensing Authority and is in violation of rule 59 of the Rules. In his submission, there are eight Regional Licensing Authorities in the State and, therefore, the impugned order marked Annexure 12 could have been passed only by the concerned Regional Licensing Authority. 7.1. The contention is once again stated only to be rejected. The Chief Licensing Authority has surely the authority to pass any order which can be passed by the Regional Licensing Authority, being a superior authority. The position may possibly have been different if an appeal lay before the Chief Licensing Authority against an order of the Regional Licensing Authority. In the scheme of the Act, the appeal against the order of the Regional Licensing Authority or the Chief Licensing Authority lies before the State Government under Rule 66(2) of the Rules, as has actually happened in the present case. In any case, the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice in this connection. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 8. It was next submitted on behalf of the petitioner that it has been subjected to double jeopardy, inasmuch it has twice been punished for the same violation, once vide Annexure 12, and again vide Annexure 17, for the same dereliction. I am unable to accede to this contention for the reason that no punishment was inflicted by the order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), whereby the petitioner was only prohibited from sale and purchase of Glycodin because it was a misbranded product within the meaning of Sec. 18 read with rule 66 (1). It was open to the petitioner to market the same phials after affixing the proper labels with the clearly printed statutory warning. It was open to the petitioner to market the same phials after affixing the proper labels with the clearly printed statutory warning. The punishment has really been inflicted by the later order dt. 8.6.98 (Annexure 17), whereby the petitioners two licenses for marketing and sale of its products in the State of Bihar have been cancelled. In fact, the earlier order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12) had clearly given the warning to the petitioner that in case the directions therein were violated, stern action in accordance with law shall be taken against the petitioner. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has not been subjected to double jeopardy. As stated above, only one punishment has been inflicted on the petitioner by order dt. 8.6.98 (Annexure 17). 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submited that Vasaka has been included in the product in question as one of its ingredients only. In his submission, Vasaka being an ayurvedic item, the petitioner would have incurred the wrath of Section 3(a) read with Rule 66, if the petitioner had manufactured an exclusively Ayurvedic drug in accordance with the formula described in the authoritative books of Ayurved specified in the first schedule to the Act, inter alia, for the reason the petitioner does not have the licence to manufacture Ayurvedic drugs. Section 3(a) defines Ayurvedic, Siddha, or Unani drug, and is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "3. Definitions.In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (a) "Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drug" includes all medicines intended for internal or external use for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease or disorder in human beings or animals, and manufactured exclusively in accordance with the formulae described in the authoritative books of Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani Tibb system of medicine, specified in the First Schedule." The First Schedule adverted to in the aforesaid Section 3 (a) includes Ayurvedic Formulary of India (Part I). Chapter 3 of the same is headed "List of single drugs of plant origin", item no. 290 of which is Vasaka. It is thus manifest that Vasaka is a purely Ayurvedic drug. It is evident from the Scheme of the Act and the Rules that an allopathic drug with an ayurvedic component is prohibited. Chapter 3 of the same is headed "List of single drugs of plant origin", item no. 290 of which is Vasaka. It is thus manifest that Vasaka is a purely Ayurvedic drug. It is evident from the Scheme of the Act and the Rules that an allopathic drug with an ayurvedic component is prohibited. In the scheme of the Act and the Rules Ayurvedic, Siddha or Unani drug, i.e. indigenous system of medicine, on the one hand, and other systems of medicines including Allopathic on the other, have been differently treated and have different provisions of law governing them. Section 3(a) defines Ayurvedic, Siddha, or Unani drug, and a separate Drugs Technical Advisory Board for the same is constituted in terms of Section 3(aa) (i) read with Section 33-C of the Act, whereas a separate Drugs Technical Advisory Board has been constituted in relation to any other drug or cosmetic in terms of Section 3 (aa) (ii) read with Section 5 of the Act. Similarly, separate Government Analyst and Inspector have been appointed under the provisions of the Act. Chapter IV A of the Act contains the provisions relating to Ayurvedic, Siddha, and Unani drugs. Part XVI of the Rule contains provisions relating to manufacture for sale of Ayurvedic (including Siddha) or Unani drugs, Part XVII provide for labelling, packing and limit of alcohol in Ayurvedic (including Siddha) or Unani drugs, Part XVIII of the Rules relate to Government Analysts and Inspectors for Ayurvedic (including Siddha) or Unani drugs, Part XIX of the Rules provides for standards of Ayurvedic, Siddha, and Unani Drugs. It is manifest from Schedule A to the Act that the prescribed forms relating to the indigenous medicines are different. Schedule E(1) to the Act is the List of Poisonous Substances under the indigenous systems. Thus, Vasaka is an exclusively ayurvedic drug, is a single drug of plant origin, and it is impermissible for the petitioner to manufacture Glycodin with Vasaka as one of its ingredients. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the two show-cause notices dated 9.1.98 (Annexure 9), and 26.5.98 (Annexure 14), do not really specify the allegations made against the petitioner, do not specify the nature of the violations, and it was, therefore, precluded from effectively putting up its defence before the authorities. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the two show-cause notices dated 9.1.98 (Annexure 9), and 26.5.98 (Annexure 14), do not really specify the allegations made against the petitioner, do not specify the nature of the violations, and it was, therefore, precluded from effectively putting up its defence before the authorities. He relies on a Division Bench judgment of the Gauhati High Court reported in AIR 1977 Gauhati 18 (Saleha Khatun Bewa vs. State of Assam), paragraph 16 of which is relevant in the present context and is set out hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference : "16. The first question that crops up for consideration is as to whether the petitioner was served with a notice as required under rule 66 of the Rules. The rule as amended is quoted hereinafter: "66. Cancellation and suspension of licence. The first question that crops up for consideration is as to whether the petitioner was served with a notice as required under rule 66 of the Rules. The rule as amended is quoted hereinafter: "66. Cancellation and suspension of licence. (1) The licensing authority may, after giving the licensee an opportunity to show cause why such an order should not be passed, by an order in writing stating the reasons thereof, cancel a licence issued under this part or suspend it for such periods as he thinks fit either wholly or in respect of some of the substances to which ft relates, if in his opinion, the licensee has failed to comply with any of the conditions of the licence or with any provisions of the Act or rules thereunder : Provided that, where such failure or contravention is the consequence of an act or omission on the part of an agent or employee, the licence shall not be cancelled or suspended if the licensee proves to the satisfaction of the licensing authority : (a) that the act or omission was not instigated or connived at by him or, if the licensee is a firm or company, by a partner of the firm or a director of the company, or (b) that he or his agent or employee had not been guilty of any similar act or omission within twelve months before the date on which the act or omission in question took place, or where his agent or employee had been guilty of any such act or omission the licensee had not or could not reasonably have had knowledge of that previous act or omission, or (c) if the act or omission was a continuing act or omission, he had not or could not reasonably have had knowledge of the previous act or omission, or (d) that he has used due diligence to ensure that the condition of the licence or the provisions of the Act or the rules thereunder were observed. (2) A licensee whose licence has been suspended or cancelled may appeal to the State Government within three months of the date of the order." The rule provides that before cancelling a licence, an opportunity must be given to the licensee to show cause why an order of cancellation or suspension of the licence should not be made. (2) A licensee whose licence has been suspended or cancelled may appeal to the State Government within three months of the date of the order." The rule provides that before cancelling a licence, an opportunity must be given to the licensee to show cause why an order of cancellation or suspension of the licence should not be made. In order to give the opportunity, in our opinion, it is absolutely essential that the licensee must be informed as to what are the real allegations made against the licensee, and he should be furnished not only with the statements of allegation, but the nature of violation so that the licensee can show cause against them. From the show cause notice, we find that an allegation was made against the petitioner that she "stocked and exhibited huge quantity of alcohol 90% I.P. .......and she has failed to produce purchase records in respect of alcohol 90% .......in violation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945". Now the question arises as to whether she was asked to show cause for violating the terms and conditions as contained in the conditions of licence or she was asked to show in respect of the violation of the provisions contained in the Rules. Although allegations have been made that she did violate the rules, there is nothing in the notice to show as to which rule was violated by the petitioner. In the show cause notice also, no provision of the rule was quoted under which the action was taken. In our view, in a case of this nature, in order to enable a petitioner to show cause, it is the duty of the licensing authority to specify clearly the Rule or Rules said to have been violated by the licensee and also the provisions under which the Drugs Controller wants to take action. Unless the rules which are violated are quoted, it may very well be said that the petitioner did not get a real opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. Unless the rules which are violated are quoted, it may very well be said that the petitioner did not get a real opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. If in such a show cause notice, no provision is mentioned under which the action is proposed to be taken and the power is exercised, the licensee cannot satisfy the authority without knowing the provisions that his case is not covered by that provision under which the power is sought to be exercised." I am unable to accede to the contention for the reason that the proposition enunciated by the Gauhati High Court has been fully observed and applied in the present case. It is manifest from a plain reading of the two show-cause notices that the same clearly stated the alleged violations on the part of the petitioner, and the relevant provisions of law are indicated therein. This Court is convinced that the show-cause notices cannot be faulted for law allegedly being violated. Furthermore, the impuged order dated 8.6.98 (Annexure 17), was clearly adumbrated in the earlier order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), giving reasonable details as to the violations committed by the petitioner in relation to the provisions of law. On the contrary, this Court is of the view that the two show-cause notices were very well drafted, in fact thoughtfully and with proper application of the mind. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that the appellate order is bad in law because its finding on the question of inclusion of Vasaka as one of the ingredients in the product in question and its legal consequence is half-baked. Furthermore, there is lack of adequate discussion and finding with respect to cancellation of the petitioners two licences as per the impugned order dated 8.6.98 (Annexure 17). He relied on the judgment of the Gauhati High Court (supra), wherein, in his submission, it has been laid down that the appellate authority acting under rule 66(2) is a quasi-judicial authority and it is, therefore, incumbent on him to pass a speaking order. I am unable to accede to the contention. He relied on the judgment of the Gauhati High Court (supra), wherein, in his submission, it has been laid down that the appellate authority acting under rule 66(2) is a quasi-judicial authority and it is, therefore, incumbent on him to pass a speaking order. I am unable to accede to the contention. I am convinced on a perusal of the appellate order dated 14.5.99 (Annexure 26), that it is a well-discussed order expected of a quasi-judicial authority, all the contentions of the parties have been noted, and the findings and the conclusion are indicated towards the end of the order. The reasons indicated therein for rejection of the appeal are that there is lack of adequate evidence before the authorities about the petitioner having withdrawn Glycodin from the market after 16.7.96. It, therefore, follows as a matter of natural corollary that the petitioner had been marketing misbranded product after 16.7.96, and quite doggedly refused to withdraw the product from the market in spite of being repeatedly asked by the respondent authorities. The second reason assigned by the appellate authority is that Glycodin is in the prohibited category of medicines and, therefore, could not have been marketed and sold in Bihar. This has to be read with the two show-cause notices which had led to the two impugned orders wherein this aspect of the matter was indicated and discussed in detail. In the estimation of this Court, the appellate authority has exercised its quasi-judicial functions appropriately. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 12. Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh, learned Govt. Counsel, submitted that the impugned action is fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He has rightly submitted that there was deliberate and persistent attempt on the part of the petitioner to flout the mandate of law as well as the orders of the authorities under the Act. As stated above, Codeine was included in Schedule H with effect from 16.7.96. If a medicine for internal use contains a substance specified in Schedule H, then the product has to be labelled with the symbol Rx and conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the label with the following warning "Schedule H drug : Warning To be sold by retailer on the prescription of Registered Medical Practitioner only," failing which it becomes a misbranded product within the meaning of Sec. 17 (b) of the Act. Failure to observe the provisions of rule 17 (b) read with Rule 97 (1) (b) attracts the provisions of Section 26-A of the Act which is set out hereinbelow : "26-A. Power of Central Government to prohibit manufacture, etc. of drug and cosmetic in public interest. Without prejudice to any other provision contained in this Chapter, if the Central Government is satisfied, that the use of any drug or cosmetic is likely to involve any risk to human beings or animals or that any drug does not have the therapeutic value claimed or purported to be claimed for it or contains ingredients and in such quantity for which there is no therapeutic justification and that in the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do, then, that Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, prohibit the manufacture, sale or distribution of such drug or cosmetic." It is manifest that the petitioner acted in a most recalcitrant manner with no respect to the mandate of law and the orders of the respondent authorities who have been vested with the authority to administer the provisions of the Act. The respondent authorities acted with restraint and gave repeated opportunities to the petitioner to rectify the mistakes it was committing. The petitioner purposely refused to realise that Codeine was included in Schedule H drugs with effect from 16.7.96 and, therefore, its obligation to properly brand the product in question in terms of Rule 97 (1) (b) read with Section 23 (5), commenced on that date itself. Thereafter surprise inspection was conducted on 26.9.97 and the petitioner was asked to market the products in question after properly branding it which it failed to carry out in spite of repeated opportunities. The impugned order dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), had only prohibited sale and purchase of misbranded products and also prohibited its sale and purchase in Bihar in view of inclusion of Vasaka as one of the ingredients. In the estimation of this Court, as held hereinabove, this was no punishment at all, and was only enforcing the prohibition mandated by law. Thereafter, more than one year was given to the petitioner to carry out the mandate of law and the lawful directions of the authorities, whereafter the impugned order dated 6.9.98 was passed, cancelling its two licences. In the estimation of this Court, as held hereinabove, this was no punishment at all, and was only enforcing the prohibition mandated by law. Thereafter, more than one year was given to the petitioner to carry out the mandate of law and the lawful directions of the authorities, whereafter the impugned order dated 6.9.98 was passed, cancelling its two licences. This Court is thus convinced that the petitioner appeared to be absolutely ungovernable, showed no respect for law, and the lawful orders of the authorities under the Act, and the conduct of the petitioner was such that it would try the patience of a saint. Has the petitioner to be reminded that it is a question of drugs and medicines and utmost compliance and vigilance is needed in terms of the Act. Therefore, learned Govt. Counsel is right in his submission that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to protect the violators of law, particularly in a case like the present one where the health and life of the citizens are at stake. 13 In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. By order dt. 13.7.99, passed by this Court, operation of the impugned orders were stayed which hereby automatically stand vacated as a result of which the impugned orders dated 6.4.98 (Annexure 12), 8.6.98 (Annexure 17), and dt. 14.5.99 (Annexure 26), come into operation forthwith.