Judgment : 1. Thedefendant who had lost before the both courts below, has come forward with the instant second appeal. .2. This second appeal has arisen in this way: .The respondent/plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of certain amounts purported to be due under two promissory notes alleged to have been executed by the defendant/appellant. According to the respondent/plaintiff, on 12. 1987, the defendant/appellant borrowed Rs.6,000 from the respondent/plaintiff for his family expenses and executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the said sum with an interest at 18% p.a., on demand or to the order of the respondent/plaintiff. So also the appellant/respondent borrowed Rs.36,760 on 7. 1988 from the respondent/plaintiff and executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the said sum with an interest at 24% p.a. to the respondent/plaintiff or his order. Towards the first promissory note, the appellant/defendant paid interest upto 2. 1990. The appellant/defendant paid Rs.15,000 towards the second promissory note and made an endorsement on the promissory note itself. Despite issuance of notice demanding payment, the appellant/defendant had not made payment which prompted the respondent/plaintiff to institute the suit in O.S.No.88 of 1993 on the file of the Principal Sub Judge, Tiruchirappalli. .3. The appellant/defendant admitted the claim of the respondent/plaintiff so far as the first promissory note is concerned, but refuted the claim of the second promissory note. According to him, there is want of consideration for the second promissory note. According to the appellant/defendant, the respondent/plaintiff, defendants wife and certain other twelve persons were partners of the finance concern known as ‘Sri Vajravel Finance’, that he recommended the respondent/plaintiff to advance loan to certain persons, that the quantum of loan advanced is Rs.30,760, that the respondent/plaintiff wanted the appellant/defendant to execute a promissory note as a security for prompt payment of the loan disbursed to the three persons, by name Natarajan, Kethamma and Periaswamy, and thus, no consideration was passed on the promissory note. .4. Thetrial court has observed as follows: .Both the courts below have concurrently held that the promissory note is supported by consideration and accordingly decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the finding of both the courts below, the defendant has come forward with the instant second appeal. .5. I am conscious that when there are concurrent findings of fact, this Court may not interfere with such findings of the fact under Sec.100 of Code of Civil Procedure. Aggrieved by the finding of both the courts below, the defendant has come forward with the instant second appeal. .5. I am conscious that when there are concurrent findings of fact, this Court may not interfere with such findings of the fact under Sec.100 of Code of Civil Procedure. But it is settled law that if there is misconstruction of a basic document which is the foundation of rights of the parties, then necessarily a question of law arises. In Irudayasamy, A. v. Perumal Naidu Irudayasamy, A. v. Perumal Naidu Irudayasamy, A. v. Perumal Naidu, (1997)1 MLJ. 360 : (1997)1 L.W. 474 S.S.Subramani, J. has observed as under: .“The High Court under Sec.100, C.P.C. is entitled to take into consideration the question whether the material evidence and relevant circumstances were considered by the lower courts. This Court is also entitled to consider whether the finding of the lower appellate court is based on evidence, and whether that evidence is based on pleadings.” 6. In the instant case, the question of law that arises is whether both the courts have considered the evidence in proper perspective to hold that a debtor and creditor relationship is created between the plaintiff and the defendant and whether the promissory note was executed for a valuable consideration as security for moral obligation. That is why, my learned predecessor has framed the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the courts below are right in ignoring the admission of P.W.1 that the pro-note had been executed only for the purposes of ensuring prompt repayment of the loans by persons introduced by the defendant and should it not have held that it cannot constitute a consideration for attracting civil liability. 2. Whether the courts below are right in decreeing the suit in the absence of debtor-creditor relationship. 3. Whether the courts below should not have drawn adverse inference against the plaintiff for nonproduction of the best evidence namely Book of accounts.” .7. Question Nos.1 and 2: It is not in dispute that Ex.A-4 promissory note had been executed by the appellant/defendant. In a suit, on a promissory note, the burden initially rests upon the plaintiff/respondent. The burden of proving consideration stands discharged as soon as the execution is proved and the rule of presumption laid down under Sec.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act steps into helping the plaintiff to shift the burden on the other side. In a suit, on a promissory note, the burden initially rests upon the plaintiff/respondent. The burden of proving consideration stands discharged as soon as the execution is proved and the rule of presumption laid down under Sec.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act steps into helping the plaintiff to shift the burden on the other side. But, it should not be lost sight of that the presumption that is raised under Sec.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not in respect of consideration mentioned in the negotiable instrument. The presumption is, in favour of there being a consideration for the negotiable instrument, the consideration is a valid consideration in the law. There is no presumption as to nature of consideration. .8. In the instant case, it is admitted that the appellant/defendant had executed the promissory note. But, it should be pointed out that so far as the nature of consideration is concerned, the respondent/plaintiff had been hesitating and meditating. Regarding the first promissory note, the respondent/plaintiff had unambiguously pleaded that the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.6,000 from the plaintiff, but so far as Ex.A-4, the disputed promissory note is concerned the respondent/plaintiff has not come forward with such clear pleading, but would plead “the defendant executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff on 7. 1988 for a sum of Rs.36,760 promising to repay the money borrowed on demand. Reference to the promissory not would show as to what is the recited consideration. It recites as under: .It would thus appear that the respondent/defendant is not definite as to the nature of the consideration. In the plea, it is stated that the defendant borrowed the amount, whereas according to the promissory note, when the accounts were settled, if the defendant was found to debit Rs.36,760. 9. Both the plaintiff and defendant have examined themselves P.W.1 and D.W.1. It is admitted that the defendants wife was a partner in the Finance Company and the appellant/defendant was not a partner. Therefore, statement of accounts between the partners had nothing to do with the appellant/defendant. It is settled law that in a suit for money due on a negotiable instrument, if the defendant shows that the cash consideration originally pleaded for the negotiable instrument did not pass, he must be taken to have discharged the onus which lay upon him for proving the lack of consideration. It is settled law that in a suit for money due on a negotiable instrument, if the defendant shows that the cash consideration originally pleaded for the negotiable instrument did not pass, he must be taken to have discharged the onus which lay upon him for proving the lack of consideration. This has been reiterated in Krishna & Co. v. Bhagat Ram Girdhari Lal , A.I.R. 1968 P. & H. 552. 10. I have observed that once execution is proved, the burden of rebutting the presumption shifts to the defendants. But the moment, the respondent/plaintiff has his own witness, and details an entirely different story regarding passing of the consideration, he eo instanti takes upon himself the burden of proving that the consideration which had been alleged in the promissory note had in reality passed on. In this case, careful perusal of evidence of both P.W.1 and D.W.1 would go to show that the defendants wife Parvatham was a partner of Vajravel Finance Company, that the appellant/defendant recommended for grant of loans to three persons, by name, Natarajan, Kethamma and Periaswamy, and that as per the bye-laws of the partnership, the person who recommends for grant of loan should undertake the responsibility of collecting the money and towards that responsibility, he had to execute a promissory note as a document of security. This version has been accepted by both the courts below, in that the trial court has observed, This finding has been accepted by the first appellate court. The first appellate court has stated as under: It is thus evident that both the courts below have misread the evidence and misinterpreted the recital of the document and came to the erroneous conclusion that the defendant has incurred debt and that Ex.A-4, the promissory note is supported by consideration. On their own findings, it is evident that the promissory note was executed as a security for recommending grant of loans to certain third persons. 11. The appellant/defendant was not a partner of the firm. Therefore, even if there are bye-laws fastening responsibility upon the partner recommending the loan, the bye-laws are not binding on the appellant/defendant, since he was not a partner. 11. The appellant/defendant was not a partner of the firm. Therefore, even if there are bye-laws fastening responsibility upon the partner recommending the loan, the bye-laws are not binding on the appellant/defendant, since he was not a partner. If the defendants wife had recommended for grant of such loan, it would appear that she ought to have stood as surety and executed a promissory note for the due repayment of the loan incurred by Natarajan, Kethamma and Periaswamy. Unfortunately, she is not the executant of Ex.A-4 document. But mere fact that the appellant/defendant had recommended for grant of loan to certain persons would not by itself create any legal obligation on him, though it may create a moral obligation. A moral obligation per se is not actionable and it would thus appear that both the courts below have not accepted the plea of the appellant/defendant that there is want of consideration for the promissory note. On the admitted facts, both the courts below erred in misreading the evidence and misconstruing the evidence. 12. Of course, both the courts below were carried away by one simple fact that the appellant/defendant has paid Rs.15,000 on 16. 1990 and made an endorsement of part payment in Ex.A-4, for them to hold that Ex.A-4 is supported by consideration. Even here, both the courts have misconstrued the evidence. According to the appellant/defendant, the three persons who had borrowed moneys from the finance corporation had paid Rs.15,000 to him and that he had made over payment to the respondent/plaintiff and made an endorsement in Ex.A-4. According to him, no further payment was made by the borrowers for him to make further payment. It would thus appear that the payment made on 16. 1990 was not by the appellant/defendant, but he had only acted as a Post Office and handed over the moneys to the respondent/plaintiff, which he had received from the original borrowers. Both the courts below have misread the evidence and that has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice, which warrants interference by this Court. 13. Once there is want of consideration for a promissory note, Sec.43 of the Negotiable Instruments Act comes into operation which reads as under: “ 43. Negotiable Instrument made, etc., without consideration: A negotiable instrument made, drawn, accepted, endorsed, or transferred without consideration, or for a consideration which fails, creates no obligation of payment between the parties to the transaction. 13. Once there is want of consideration for a promissory note, Sec.43 of the Negotiable Instruments Act comes into operation which reads as under: “ 43. Negotiable Instrument made, etc., without consideration: A negotiable instrument made, drawn, accepted, endorsed, or transferred without consideration, or for a consideration which fails, creates no obligation of payment between the parties to the transaction. But if any such party has transferred the instrument with or without endorsement to a holder for consideration, such holder, and every subsequent holder deriving title from him, may recover the amount due on such instrument from the transferor for consideration or any prior party thereto. Exception I: No party for whose accommodation a negotiable instrument has been made, drawn, accepted or endorsed can, if he has paid the amount thereof, recover thereon such amount from any person who became a party to such instrument for his accommodation. Exception II: No party to the instrument who has induced any other party to make, draw, accept, endorse or transfer the same to him for a consideration which he has failed to pay or perform in full shall recover thereon an amount exceeding the value of the consideration (if any) which he has actually paid or performed.” Thus, when the negotiable instrument has been made without consideration, it creates no obligation of payment between the parties, that is, between the maker and the promisee. 14. It is evident that there is no debtor and creditor relationship between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant. The appellant/defendant had only recommended for grant of loans to some third parties and had executed the promissory note, which creates only a moral obligation and recommending a loan would not create a legal obligation, for there respondent/plaintiff to enforce the promissory note. Both the courts below erred in holding that the promissory note is supported by consideration. 15. In view of my findings of the first two points, I consider that it is not necessary to go into the third point. 16. In the result, this second appeal is allowed. The claim of the respondent/plaintiff so far as the second promissory note, Ex.A-4, is concerned has not be disallowed. The judgment of both the courts below are modified to that extent. No costs.