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2000 DIGILAW 54 (RAJ)

R. S. Gehlot v. State of Rajasthan

2000-01-17

ARUN MADAN

body2000
Honble MADAN, J.–Dr. R.S. Gehlot and S.S. Gehlot (petitioners) have filed this writ petition seeking declaration as to their land bearing Khasra Nos. 237/513, 238, 240, 240/514, 241, 242, 243 and 250 measuring 10 bighas & 1 biswa situated in village Shak Sudarshanpura (Tonk Road) Tehsil and District Jaipur that acquisition proceedings under notification dt. 13.5.1960 published in Rajasthan Gazette dt. 6.6.1960 issued under Sec. 4 of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short Raj. Act) so also under notification dt. 18.4.1961 published in Rajasthan Gazette dt. 11.5.61 issued under Sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Act stand lapsed by virtue of mandatory provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Central Act) and thereby the respondents be restrained from interfering in possession over their land ibid. (2). The facts having been complexed and complicated at the instance of the petitioners leading to this writ petition are epitomised hereunder with a view to resolve long standing controversy under misconception for their own lapses. (3). Undoubtedly the land in dispute originally stood in the name of Ram Prakash Gehlot (father of the petitioners) vide Ann. 2 and 3600 sq. yards of land having been sold by erstwhile State of Jaipur to said Shri Ramprakash Gehlot for construction of houses has been abadi land vide order/Patta dt. 28.2.1946 (Ann.1) for a sum of Rs. 2295/-. Ramprakash Gehlot died on 28.1.1983, in whose life time, the proceedings for acquiring the land in dispute were initiated by issuing notification on 3.5.1960 under Sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Act on being published in Raj. Gazette on 6.6.1960 and thereupon a declaration under Sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Act by notification was issued on 18.4.1961 and then published in Rajasthan Gazette on 11.5.1961. (4). It is the case of the petitioners as has been averred in their present writ petition that they had filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 976/1972 (Ram Prakash and ors. vs. State) (for short, writ of 1972) against the acquisition proceedings and therefore, this Court on 26.5.1972 passed following stay orders (Ann. 3):- ``Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Deputy Govt. Advocate. The petitioner shall not be dispossessed of the land in question till the decision of the writ petition. vs. State) (for short, writ of 1972) against the acquisition proceedings and therefore, this Court on 26.5.1972 passed following stay orders (Ann. 3):- ``Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Deputy Govt. Advocate. The petitioner shall not be dispossessed of the land in question till the decision of the writ petition. It will however be open to the State to take all proceedings in connection with the acquisition of land in question but the petitioner shall not be dispossessed. List this case for hearing with the connected case i.e. S.B. Civil Writ No. 923/72. (5). Second petition for grant of stay (SB Civil Misc. IInd Stay Petition No. 1138/73) was also filed in aforesaid writ petition No. 976/72 wherein this Court after hearing both the parties directed in its order dt. 11.7.72 (Ann.4) the Land Acquisition Officer (for short ``LAO) not to pass an award till disposal of that writ petition and liberty was given to him (LAO) to record the evidence if he chooses to do so. (6). The petitioners admitted that the writ of 1972 stood dismissed in default for non-appearance of either of the petitioners or their counsel by order dt. 6.4.79 (Ann. 5). Without disputing the proceedings drawn by the Land Acquisition Officer cum Collector Jaipur (respondent No.3) in their case, the petitioners placing such proceedings drawn from 10.8.61 to 8.7.1998 (Ann.6) have drawn attention of this Court to some of the proceedings of 29.8.1987 and 8.10.1992. It is their case that on 29.8.87 the respondent No.3 drew order sheet that the Director (Law) was informed of their writ petition having been dismissed on 9.6.87 and therefore it has been urged that despite the fact of dismissal of writ of 1972 having come to the notice of the respondent No.3 on 29.8.87 inasmuch as there was no stay order since 6.4.1979 when writ of 1972 had already been dismissed in default, the Jaipur Development Authority (respondent No.2) had been sleeping over these proceedings, the respondent No.3 did not make or pass award, rather he dragged these acquisition proceedings by sending a letter to the Deputy Secretary Urban Development seeking guidance as to the question of the acquisition proceedings being lapsed under Section 11A of the Central Act and in this regard the petitioners referred to proceeding drawn on 8.10.1992. In para 13 of the present writ petition the petitioners specifically admitted by averring. ``However, the petitioners had also no knowledge of the dismissal of the writ petition. (7). The petitioners also admitted that they had earlier filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4240/94 (for short ``second petition) claiming regularisation of their land in dispute in the light of the decision/the circular dt. 18.2.94 of the State Govt. taken in cases of other land owners like them. The second writ petition was filed on 23.5.94 also seeking declaration of 14 items under caption JDA and two items under caption Rajasthan Avasan Mandal in item S (1) of circular dt. 18.2.94 as discriminatory and since 23.5.94 that petition continued to be adjourned for admission and on one occasion on 9.1.95 it was dismissed in default but restored to its original number on 5.9.95 in Restoration Application No. 39/95 and then again it was got adjourned many a times at the request of the petitioners learned counsel and that petition was withdrawn on 22.4.99 by the petitioner learned counsel Shri G.L. Pareek and so second writ petition also stood dismissed as withdrawn. (8). The present writ petition was filed on 2.9.98. Notice was issued on 3.3.99 to the respondents. On 12.5.99 Shri R.N. Mathur, Additional Advocate General on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 3 and Shri A.K. Gupta on behalf of respondent No.2 put appearance and they were granted adjournment to file their reply to this writ petition. The respondent Nos. 1 and 3 filed reply on 29.7.99 while respondent No.2 presented reply on 3.8.99. Thereafter on 4.8.99 and 17.8.99 the case was listed but adjourned at the request of the parties. However, on 25.8.99 learned counsel for the petitioners as well as respondents did not appear and Dr. R.S. Gehlot petitioner appeared in person and sought adjournment on the ground of non-availability of his counsel but for the reasons stated in order dt. 25.8.99 the adjournment was declined so the petitioner who appeared in person was called upon to argue the case to which he was ready to argue. Similarly, Shri Girraj Agrawal, Asstt. R.S. Gehlot petitioner appeared in person and sought adjournment on the ground of non-availability of his counsel but for the reasons stated in order dt. 25.8.99 the adjournment was declined so the petitioner who appeared in person was called upon to argue the case to which he was ready to argue. Similarly, Shri Girraj Agrawal, Asstt. Commissioner of the JDA, who claimed to be officer in charge in this writ petition, appeared in person and stated that despite due information to the learned counsel for the JDA and his name having been notified in the daily cause list so in his absence, Shri Agrawal was left with no option except to assist this Court and argue the case in person for the respondent No.2. Therefore, this court having no option but to take up the matter in the absence of the advocates for the parties and consequently heard the petitioner and officer in charge for the respondents in person. I have also perused the writ petition, reply thereto and the record produced by Shri Agrawal at the time of hearing. (9). Referring to the provisions contained in Sections 11A and 56 of the Central Act Dr. Gehlot urged that the Central Act was extended to the Rajasthan State for being applied w.e.f. 24.9.84 and the Rajasthan Act stood superseded but the Land Acquisition Rajasthan Amendment Act 1987 upon assent by the President of India stood to have come into force on 3.11.1987 and thereby Section 56 was inserted to the Central Act and on the basis of these provisions, Dr. Gehlot contended that by virtue of sub-Section (4) to Sec. 56 (newly inserted to the Central Act) the respondent No.2 could have made an award in their matter within two years from the date of application of Sec. 56 i.e. 4.1.87 and two years expired on 2.1.1989, and even otherwise, if two years period is counted from the date 28.8.87 when the respondent No.2 came to have knowledge as to the date 6.4.79 i.e. dismissal of their earlier writ of 1972 wherein the passing of the award was directed to be stayed then it expired on 28.8.89 but till date no award having been made by the respondent No.2, so the entire acquisition proceedings for their acquired land stand lapse by dint of mandatory provisions contained in Sec. 11A of the Central Act. (10). (10). In reply to the writ petition so also at the time of hearing, the case of the respondents is that even the petitioners had also no knowledge as to dismissal of their earlier writ of 1972 as would be evident from their own letters dated 29.4.81 (Ann. R1/1), 24.5.89 (Ann.R1/2) and 6.2.92 (Ann. R1/3) whereby they have been persistently requesting to the authorities not to further proceed in the acquisition proceedings in the light of the Courts order and moreover, as is evidence from the proceedings drawn by the respondent No. 2 (which have been produced by the petitioners as Ann. 6) for the period from 10.8.61 to 8.7.98, either the petitioners or their father or their counsel representing for them before the respondent No.2 have been remaining absent on almost dates and whenever appeared but gave impression of holding stay order passed in their favour in the matter and which has resulted in delaying the proceedings for making the award, and which shows their conduct that they were not interested in getting award passed rather they themselves lingering the acquisition proceedings on one pretext or the other but with oblique motive and that being so, they were persisting to file one after another writ petition with no persistent prosecution which ultimately came to be either dismissed for non prosecution/default or dismissed as withdrawn. Shri Agrawal therefore contended that for their own laches and lapses besides acquiescence, the petitioners cannot be benefited in any manner atleast not in extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. (11). In reply, the respondents pleaded that the possession of the acquired land in dispute was taken on 10.8.61 and despite acquisition proceedings pending, the petitioners admittedly entered into an agreement to sale, and thereby sold the land in dispute on 1.6.1972 to one Pathik Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti whereas the land in dispute could not have been sold by them inasmuch as once it is the case of the petitioners that they have sold the land to aforesaid Samiti then how could they be said to have right or interest over the land thereby they have no locus standi to even file the present writ petition. (12). (12). Shri Agrawal then urged that by insertion of Section 56 of the Central Act for making it applicable to Rajasthan lately, the time to make award was also extended as would be clear from a bare reading of both Sections 11A and 56 conjointly. Lastly, it is the case of the respondents that this writ petition be dismissed on the ground of the delay which remained unexplained inasmuch as in their earlier writ petition of 1994 they have not only suppressed the material fact of their writ of 1972 having been dismissed but also in 1994 they did not come with the case of the proceedings being lapsed w.e.f. 2.1.89 or 28.8.89 as is being pleaded in the present writ petition filed on 2.9.98, after inordinate delay and moreso, in the writ of 1994, itself, the petitioners have been admittedly claiming of their earlier writ of 1972 having been pending in due course, as pleaded in para 20 of writ No. 4240/94 (filed on 23.5.94) wherein also they had filed an additional affidavit on 31.1.97 specifically admitting in para 5 that after the death of Ram Prakash Gehlot they had no knowledge as to the fate of that writ petition of 1972 so they presumed that the same was pending in due course. (13). I have considered the rival contentions canvassed during hearing and in the pleadings of the parties. The only question arises for consideration of this court is, whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in dispute stand lapsed either u/s 11A or 56 of the Central Act on account of the delay as alleged by the petitioners having occurred in making the Award? (14). Let me first epitomise here the facts labyrinthically placed in the jargon of hosts of petitions filed before this court one after the other with a view to show the conduct of the petitioners. (15). At para 17, the writ petition of 1994 (which was connected to this writ petition at hand by order dated 12.4.99) which was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated. 22.4.99, the petitioners briefly described the events on which their earlier writ of 1972 came to be filed. (15). At para 17, the writ petition of 1994 (which was connected to this writ petition at hand by order dated 12.4.99) which was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated. 22.4.99, the petitioners briefly described the events on which their earlier writ of 1972 came to be filed. According to it, acquisition proceedings commenced on the notification being issued on 13.5.1960 u/s. 4 of the Rajasthan Act and published in Rajasthan Gazette on 29.6.1960, and followed by declaration having been issued on 18.4.1961 u/s 6 of the Rajasthan Act and published in Rajasthan Gazette on 11.5.61. During proceedings of acquisition pending before the Land Acquisition Officer (respondents No.2) Ram Prakash Gehlot (predecessor in interest/father of the petitioners) is said to have filed a representation on 14.8.61 to the State Government claiming exclusion of all khasras except Khasra No. 243 and 250 of the land in dispute from the drawing No.43, lay out plan of Lal Kothi Scheme. Ram Prakash Gehlot himself being a Chartered Accountant had been successful in getting his representation dated 14.8.61 pursued with the Secretary Urban Improvement Trust (erstwhile institute of JDA-respondent No.2) through Chief Town Planner PWD Jaipur and even from the LAO, who by his letter dated 11.4.62 is also alleged to have written to the Chairman of the UIT for exclusion and release of the land u/s 48 of the Act 1953 but could not succeed in getting its exclusion approved by the UIT and the State Government and, therefore, the LAO started acquisition proceedings calling upon the petitioners to submit their claim for compensation and fixed the date as 8.5.1972. (16). The facts stated above being not disputed rather admitted by the petitioners on being referred by themselves in earlier writ of 1994, make it explicitly clear that they themselves are responsible for the delay caused by filing representation for one reason or the other being not interested in getting acquitision compensation settled but interested for prolonging the acquisition proceedings from 14.8.1961 rather slept over the matter and no claim for compensation was filed and that being so, Ram Prakash Gehlot was called upon to submit his claim on 8.5.1972. But, Ram Prakash Gehlot instead of submitting claim and pursuing the matter before LAO, preferred SB Civil Writ Petition No. 976/1972 before this Court which was admitted for hearing and wherein the respondents were restrained from dispossessing the petitioners from the land in dispute. (17). Para 20 of the writ of 1994 is reproduced hereunder: ``20. That so being aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the non-petitioners the late Shri Ram Prakash Gehlot and the petitioners Dr. R.S. Gehlot and S.S. Gehlot and others filed a writ petition in this Honble Court which has been admitted and registered as S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 976 of 1972 in which the opposite parties have been restrained from dispossessing the petitioners from the land in question. This writ petition is in due course for hearing and has not been disposed off and the status quo is maintained. (18). As stated above, admittedly another stay order came to be passed in SB Civil Misc. 2nd Stay application No. 1138/1972 in earlier writ of 1972 in the following manner (which is reproduced from additional affidavit of Dr. Gehlot dated 12.11.97 produced in writ of 1994) ``4. That during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition my father Shri Ram Prakash Gehlot had expired on 28.1.1983. In the said writ petition, the following confirmed order had been passed: ``Heard learned counsel for the parties, respondent No.3 is hereby directed that he shall not pass an award in this case till the disposal of the writ petition. He, however, record the evidence, if he chooses to do so. 5. That after the death of my father, myself and the other petitioners have no knowledge regarding the fate of the said writ petition. However, they presumed that the same is pending in due course. (19). It appears that after getting stay order, quoted above, Ram Prakash Gehlot not only forbade acquisition proceedings but also pendency of his writ of 1972, and he never bothered as to find out final outcome but, went on taking benefit of confirmation of stay order, ibid, thereby whenever appeared before LAO, insisted not to proceed further in acquisition proceedings. (19). It appears that after getting stay order, quoted above, Ram Prakash Gehlot not only forbade acquisition proceedings but also pendency of his writ of 1972, and he never bothered as to find out final outcome but, went on taking benefit of confirmation of stay order, ibid, thereby whenever appeared before LAO, insisted not to proceed further in acquisition proceedings. On 8.5.1972 and thereafter none appeared for Ram Prakash Gehlot till 26.10.1972 when copy of aforequoted stay order was produced with the prayer not to proceed further and subsequently Ram Prakash Gehlot or his representative continued to be absent till 29.4.1981 and on 29.4.1981 R.S. Gehlot (present petitioner) s/o Ram Prakash Gehlot (claimant) appeared with an application praying for staying the proceedings of making award in the light of order of this court dated 11.7.1972. Again thereafter none appeared on subsequent dates and the petitioners continued to remain absent from 29.4.1981 and it is only upon notice having been issued by the LAO u/s 9 and 10 on 8.5.89, Dr. R.S. Gehlot (present petitioner) s/o Ram Prakash Gehlot appeared on 24.5.89 and submitted an application that his father Ram Prakash Gehlot died on 28.1.83 and again requested that since by order dated 11.7.72 in stay application No. 1138/72 in writ of 1972, there has been stay to make an award in acquisition proceedings and that apart, their land stand free from ceiling of acquisition under order dated 4.10.82 of the competent authority, therefore, the LAO directed on 7.6.89 the petitioners to produce relevant orders alongwith copy of writ of 1972 with progress therein. However, subsequently on 7.6.89, 16.6.89, 27.6.89, 29.6.89, the petitioners continued to appear before LAO but again on 29.6.89, Dr. R.S. Gehlot stated that there has been stay of making award. Again thereafter on 21.7.89 none appeared but appeared on 25.8.89, 15.9.89 and 20.10.89 insisting for stay of making award. Subsequently, the petitioners continued to remain absent till 24.3.92 when the LAO issued notice to the petitioners to appear with copy of the writ. They appeared on 9.4.92 and submitted same application and subsequently disappeared till date before LAO. (20). As stated above, to establish the conduct of the petitioners who time and again giving incorrect information as to the pendency of writ of 1972 and having stay order for making an award, the respondents have produced alongwith reply to the writ petition, three letters (Ann. (20). As stated above, to establish the conduct of the petitioners who time and again giving incorrect information as to the pendency of writ of 1972 and having stay order for making an award, the respondents have produced alongwith reply to the writ petition, three letters (Ann. R/1/1 to R.1/3) of Ram Prakash Gehlot, and Rajendra Singh Gehlot having been written to the LAO on 29.4.81, 24.5.89 and 6.2.92. Alongwith these letters (Ann. R/1/1 to R1/3) photo copy of certified copy of stay orders dt. 11.7.72 and 26.5.72 was produced by the petitioners before the LAO praying therein not to proceed further in the light of the orders of this Court. (21). Despite direction by the LAO issued on 7.6.89, the petitioners did not produce progress report or the final decision of their earlier writ of 1972, rather they went on submitting letters dt. 29.4.81, 24.5.89 and 6.2.92 (Ann. R/1/1 to R1/3) to the LAO furnishing absolutely incorrect information and that being so, after 6.2.92 they did not appear before the LAO till date and in their earlier writ of 1994, they furnished incorrect information in its para 20 quoted above as to the pendency of writ of 1972 and existence of stay orders dt. 26.5.72 and 11.7.72. Obviously, in these circumstances, the LAO had no option but to restrain from making an award under bonafide belief and he cannot be blamed for delay, if any, caused in making award. The belief was given under the orders of this Court by the petitioners by their persistent requests made whenever they appeared before the LAO right from 1961 till 6.2.92 when they lastly appeared before the LAO and thereafter disappeared, and further till they filed writ of 1994 and present writ petition on 2.9.98 when they came with a case of the proceedings having lapsed by virtue of Section 11A of the Central Act. (22). (22). The contention of the petitioners before this Court that the LAO had written on 20.8.87 in order sheet of acquisition proceedings that the Director (Law) had informed that there has been order of the Court in favour of the JDA, so it had already come to the notice of the LAO as to the final disposal but he did not make final award, benefit of which be given to them by reckoning period of two years from 29.8.87, is perse preposterous and false as would be evident from their own letters submitted by them on 6.2.92 (Ann. R1/3) and then in their writ of 1994 till they filed their affidavit on 12.1.97 wherein for the first time they merely asserted that by virtue of death of their father (original landlord) their writ stood abated but in that affidavit also they did not state as to the dismissal of their writ of 1972 in default on 6.4.79 and it is for the first time when present writ petition has been filed on 2.9.98 stating that their writ of 1972 had already dismissed long back on 6.4.79. In fact the petitioners can not be permitted to blow hot and blow cold by approbating and reprobating in the same breathe. It is totally a peculiar case where lapses, laches, mis-statements and suppression of significant material on the part of the petitioners stand proved and established from their own pleadings on record. Thus viewed on merits, no benefit can be given to the petitioners at least for their case as to the proceedings being lapsed, and the LAO cannot be saddled with or blamed with any inaction on his part for making no award. The circumstances narrated above wrung out from the pleadings on record reasonably tend to infer that the petitioners by not cooperating with the LAO in the proceedings rather disappearing on almost dates of proceedings inasmuch as furnishing misstatement of facts, were indulged and interested in not getting award passed with an oblique motive to get the proceedings itself lapsed by creating circumstances or the evidence for such lapse. (23). I must hasten to add that litigants must realise that courts cannot be forced by pressure tactics to decide pending cases in the manner in which the party concerned desires and it will be a negation of the rule of law if the courts were to act under such pressure. (23). I must hasten to add that litigants must realise that courts cannot be forced by pressure tactics to decide pending cases in the manner in which the party concerned desires and it will be a negation of the rule of law if the courts were to act under such pressure. In the circumstances the petitioners have no equity on account of their own conduct in this writ petition and acquisition proceedings which were being prolonged and lingered on by indulging in playing game of delay tactics with an oblique motive to get its benefit, which cannot be allowed by this Court in its extra ordinary jurisdiction and the petitioners by acquiescence are also estopped from blaming the LAO for not making any award since 1961 or any subsequent date pleaded by the petitioners or otherwise also in any circumstance. (24). Now I advert to have a brief resume of the provisions referred to by the petitioners so as to get relief of acquisition proceedings for being lapsed. Firstly I quote Section 11-A of the Central Act as follows: ``11A. Period within which as award shall be made -The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within the period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse; Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation.-In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. (25). Section 4 of the Central Act requires the publication of a notification that it appears to the appropriate Government that certain land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose. Section 5 requires the payment of estimated compensation to the owner for damage done in entering upon the land and doing such acts as are necessary to ascertain whether it can be used for the public purpose. Under the provisions of Section 5-A any person interested in the land may raise objections to the proposed acquisition. Section 5 requires the payment of estimated compensation to the owner for damage done in entering upon the land and doing such acts as are necessary to ascertain whether it can be used for the public purpose. Under the provisions of Section 5-A any person interested in the land may raise objections to the proposed acquisition. Upon considering the report of Collector who hears such objections, if the Government is satisfied that the land is needed for the public purpose, a declaration to that effect shall be made under the provisions of Section 6. Section 9(1) contemplates the issue of a notice that the Government intends to take possession of the land and it must invite claims for compensation for all interests in the land. The Collector must inquire into the claims under the provisions of Section 11 and make an award of compensation in favour of the persons found interested in the land. Section 16 states that the Collector may, after he has made an award under Section 11, ``take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. (26). Upon taking possession of the land vests in the Government, meaning thereby, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what section 16 states. Section 17(1) enables the appropriate Government to take possession of the land concerned on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) notwithstanding the fact that no award has been made in respect of it. Taking possession of the land concerned and its vesting absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances does not depend upon an award to be made under Section 11, making of which award alone in the case of ordinary acquisition of land could have empowered the Collector to take possession of the land under Section 16 and the taking of which possession would have made the land vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. (27). Section 11-A was inserted in the Central Act by Act 68 of 1984. Section 48(1) may also be noted and it states that the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (27). Section 11-A was inserted in the Central Act by Act 68 of 1984. Section 48(1) may also be noted and it states that the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. Provisions of Section 11 A are, no doubt, intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years of the date of declaration under Section 6, but, when the possession of the land concerned is once taken as provided for thereunder and such land is made to vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances, as has happened in the case at hand wherein as is evident from the order sheet drawn by the LAO on 10.8.1961 when Ram Prakash Gehlot (original claimant/land owner & father of the present petitioners) was also present, the possession of the land in dispute was taken on 10.8.1961, itself, then clearly section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisition like the present one under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government by virtue of having taken the possession of the land in dispute and the petitioners are divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government, inasmuch as there is no provision in the Central Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. My view is fortified by the observations made in Satendra Prasad Jain vs. State of U.P. (1) which was followed in Awadh Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar (2) and P.Chinnanna vs. State of Andh. Pradesh (3). (28). In Awadh Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar (supra), the subject matter at issue related to the proceedings of land acquisition which were pending for over 37 years and on facts like the present one the delay was held to have caused because of non-traceability of files attributed to the destruction of the relevant files by interested parties and, therefore, expressing anguish in the entire episode, the Apex Court direc-ted the State to complete the proceedings in the quickest possible time. However, the Apex Court while interpreting provisions of Secs. However, the Apex Court while interpreting provisions of Secs. 6 & 17 of the Central Act, held in para 11 that once possession of the land was taken by the Government, even if the owner of the land entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment, such act does not have effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. On facts of the case, the Apex Court held that the land acquisition proceedings did not lapse. (29). In Chinnanna vs. State of A.P. (supra), second declaration made under Section 6(1) in 1984 was challenged on ground that it was made beyond the time prescribed by first proviso to Sec. 6(1) as inserted by Amending Act of 1984, and on facts, the Apex Court held that second declaration and enquiry under Section 5-A were superfluous proceedings and inconsequential as the land already vested in the Government and therefore, acquisition proceedings could not be set aside on the ground that 2nd declaration made beyond the time prescribed by first proviso to Sec. 6. And, on the issue of laches and delay, the Apex Court observed as under: ``In relation to acquisition proceedings involving acquisition of land for public purposes, the court concerned must be adverse to entertain writ petitions involving the challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay or laches, since such acquisition, if set aside, would not only involve enormous loss of public money but also cause undue delay in carrying out projects meant for general public good. When a fresh ground of attack to acquisition proceedings is raised, even if it involves purely a question of law, its entertainment cannot be governed by a principle different from that which governs entertainment of writ petitions before the High Court or proceedings arising therefrom before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. However, in the present case though the Supreme Court examined the fresh ground of challenge in respect of Section 6(1) declaration raised on behalf of the appellants nearly seven years after it had become available to them, the same had been done solely to decide on the scope and applicability of the first proviso to Section 6(1) and its explanation, inserted into the L.A. Act by the L.A. (Amendment) Act, 1984. Such examination cannot, therefore, be understood as laying down that notwithstanding the lapse of time of laches in raising a legal ground in a proceeding under Article 226 or under Article 136 of the Constitution there is an obligation on the part of the court concerned to examine such fresh ground. (30). In Ramchand and others vs. Union of India (4), notifications u/s 4 issued in 1959/1965, declaration u/s 6 made in 1966/1969 and award of compensation made in 1980/1981/1983 without any jurisdiction for the delay, the writ petitions filed by land owners before High Court and Supreme Court 14/21 years after issuance of notifications u/s 4 challenging the acquisition proceedings on ground that the delay in award of compensation was intended to peg the market value of the lands resulting in great injury to the petitioners, a Three Judges bench of the Apex Court held that Section 11-A will not be applicable to land acquisition proceedings where awards had been made as in that case prior to September 24, 1984 when the Amending Act of 1984 came in force, and on facts, proviso to Section 11-A was held to be not applicable at all to the proceedings therein. Their Lordships further held as under:- ``By not questioning the validity of the acquisition proceedings for a long time since the declarations has become inappropriate, because in the meantime, the lands notified have been developed and put to public use. The lands are being utilised to provide shelter to thousands and to implement the scheme of a planned city, which is a must in the present set up. The outweighing public interest has to be given due weight. ``Therefore, it shall not be proper exercise of discretion on the part of the Supreme Court to quash the proceedings because in that event, it shall affect the public interest. Moreover, third party interests created in the meantime are also likely to be affected and such third parties are not impleaded. The relief of quashing the acquisition proceeding having become inappropriate due to the subsequent events, the grant of modified relief, considered appropriate in the circumstances, would be the proper course to adopt. (31). Moreover, third party interests created in the meantime are also likely to be affected and such third parties are not impleaded. The relief of quashing the acquisition proceeding having become inappropriate due to the subsequent events, the grant of modified relief, considered appropriate in the circumstances, would be the proper course to adopt. (31). In Murari vs. Union of India (5), the Apex Court held that delay in making award of compensation and taking possession of the land, both land owners as well as the authorities are responsible and on facts held principle enunciated in Ramchand case applicable and it cannot be distinguished merely because possession not taken from some of the land owners. On the question of delay in completion of acquisition proceedings, the Apex Court held that Delhi being an ever-expanding cosmopolitan city, its development is a continuous unending process for which no terminal point for completion of such process can be visualised and since large tracts of land were sou-ght to be acquired for the purpose of constructing huge residential colonies and com-mercial areas, simply because there was a delay which in the facts and circumstances of the case was bound to occur, it cannot justifiably be contended that the notifications issued were rendered ineffective. It was also held that hence there is no substance in the argument that the life span of the master plan being 20 years but the acquisition proceedings having not yet been complete, the notifications for acquisition lost their value and acquisition should be quashed. Even the Apex Court held that for withdrawal from acquisition must be by a notification denotifying the acquisition of land and in absence of such notification mere communication of the Government sent to the land owners purporting to be an order u/s 48 is invalid and acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on that basis and further, assuming that there was release of certain areas of land belonging to certain land owners, the entire notification could not be rendered invalid. The Apex Court also held that where large extent of land sought to be acquired for planned development of the city it would not be proper to leave out some small portions here and there over which some structures are said to be constructed and that the land reserved in the master plan for recreational facilities also forms part of the planned development and therefore, can be legitimately acquired irrespective of few constructions thereon which if raised by the landowner without sanction/approval of the competent authority would be regarded as unauthorised. (32). Section 56 was added after Section 55 of the Central Act, which reads as under:- ``56. Provisions consequential to the extension of this Act to the State of Rajasthan. (1) Consequent on this Act having been extended to the State of Rajasthan on the 24th day of September, 1984, hereinafter referred to as the date of extension, the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act 24 of 1953), hereinafter referred to as the State Act, shall be deemed to have been repealed on the date of extension. (2) Where, in any proceeding under the State Act pending on the date of extension, the State Government, the Collector or the Court has on or after the said date and before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987, done anything, taken any action or made any order which is at variance with that as is provided in this Act, such thing, action or order shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, be deemed to have been done, taken or made under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and such proceeding shall not be re-opened or reviewed or liable to be challenged on the ground of not being in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (3) All things done, action taken or orders made in regard to acquisition of any land for the Union or after the date of extension and before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under the direction of the Union. (3) All things done, action taken or orders made in regard to acquisition of any land for the Union or after the date of extension and before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under the direction of the Union. (4) Where, in any proceeding pending under the State Act on the date of extension or instituted after the said date, a declaration under Section 6 or an award under Section 11 has been made after any of the respective periods as specified in Section 6 or Section 11-A, as the case may be, has expired, the said period or the periods, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have been extended up to the date of such declaration or award. In a proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987, such period or periods shall be deemed to have been extended upto, and the declaration or the award as the case may be shall be made within one year and two years respectively after such commencement. (5) When the Collector has, before taking possession of any land on or after the date of extension and before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 not tendered and paid eighty per centum of the compensation in accordance with sub-section (3-A) of Section 17, such possession shall not be liable to be challenged on that ground in any Court. The Collector shall in such a case tender and pay that amount within three months after such commencement. (6) Any person convicted and punished under that State Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 shall not be liable to enhanced punishment as provided in Section 46. (7) Notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in a proceeding pending on the date of extension the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the order under Section 4 of the State Act shall be taken into consideration. (7) Notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in a proceeding pending on the date of extension the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the order under Section 4 of the State Act shall be taken into consideration. (8) In a proceeding where the amount of compensation has been determined before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987, whether the Collector or by the Court the amounts in addition to the market value of the land as specified in sub-section (1-A) and sub-section (2) of Section 23 shall be further paid, after adjustment of any sum paid earlier under the said sub-section, by the Collector to the persons to whom compensation was payable or paid. The amounts shall be payable in every proceeding and in regard to every award as specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 39 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984). (9) Where, in the cases as specified in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) interest is payable or has been paid under Section 28 or Section 34, the amount of such interest shall be re-determined and paid after adjustment of any sum paid earlier under the said sections by the Collector at the respective rates specified in and in accordance with the provisions of the said sections as amended by the said Act. (10) In a matter where award has been made after the date of extension and Section 28-A is applicable, an application under the said section, if not made earlier, may be made within three months from the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987. (11). Notwithstanding the coming into force of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11 shall become applicable in the State of Rajasthan on the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987. (33). As per provisions contained in sub-section (1) to Section 56, consequent on the Central Act having been extended to the State of Rajasthan on the 24th day of September, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the date of extension), the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 stands repealed on the date of extension. (33). As per provisions contained in sub-section (1) to Section 56, consequent on the Central Act having been extended to the State of Rajasthan on the 24th day of September, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the date of extension), the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 stands repealed on the date of extension. Provisions contained in Sub-section (4) to Section 56 of the Central Act apply to all pending proceedings not only on the date of extension of the Central Act but also on the date of commencement of the Rajasthan Amendment Act as held in Chain Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (6). (34). A careful analysis of the provisions contained in sub-section (4) to Section 56, quoted above, makes it again explicit that in any proceeding pending under the State Act on the date of extension (24.9.1984), a declaration u/s 6 or an award u/S. 11 has been made after any of the respective periods as specified in Section 6 or Section 11-A, as the case may be, has expired, then the said period shall be deemed to have extended upto the date of such declaration or the award. In the instant case on the date of extension (24.9.84), the acquisition proceedings were pending under the State Act and the Award u/S. 11 has not yet been made and has yet to be made after expiry of the periods as specified in Section 11-A, therefore, the said period prescribed u/s 11-A shall be deemed to have extended upto the date of the Award. (35). Applying the principles of law enunciated in the decisions (supra) to the facts and circumstances of the present case, referred to above, I hold that the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case did not lapse because, of course, there was a delay but in the facts and circumstances of the present case was bound to occur on account of the lapses and laches on the part of the petitioners, themselves, as already held above by me and, therefore, it cannot justifiably be contended that the acquisition proceedings stand lapsed by virtue of Section 11-A of the Central Act or Section 56 newly inserted to the Central Act making it applicable to the Rajasthan. That apart, explanation to Section 11-A, quoted above, makes it explicitly clear that the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded. (36). Before parting with this order, it is distressing to note that the land acquisition proceedings which initiated more than forty years ago is not yet complete. Though I have held that petitioners themselves responsible for the delay, but I am constrained to observe that apparently the hands of the interested parties seem to be still active, may be at the instance and inaction on the part of the respondents authorities, a noble, cause is delayed for more than three decades under one pretext or the other. I express my anguish in the entire episode. I, therefore, direct the State of Rajasthan, its officials, the authorities and other persons concerned who are concerned with subject matter of the instant land acquisition proceedings to complete the proceedings in the quickest possible time. (37). As a result of the above discussion, this writ petition being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. A copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary of the State and Commissioner of the Jaipur Development Authority to expedite the completion of the acquisition proceedings as directed above.