JUDGMENT The Court: By judgment dated 11.1.2000 passed by the learned trial court, appellant/petitioner was convicted under section 302-IPC and was sentenced thereunder to suffer imprisonment for life and pay certain amount of fine. By an order dated 17.2.2000, we admitted this appeal against the said judgment of conviction and sentence. 2. Now under section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appellant has prayed for suspension of execution of sentences and to release him on bail pending disposal of appeal. 3. We heard Mr. S. Bose, learned Counsel for the appellant and also learned Public Prosecutor. 4. This is a sensational case as it relates to murder of a police officer at midnight when the deceased was traveling on a motor-bike as a pillion rider along with P.W. 1 (informant) who is also a police officer. We consider it necessary to pass a reasoned order in view of sub-section (1) of section 389 read with sub-section (4) thereof. Sub-section (1) of section 389 provides that pending any appeal by a convicted person, the appellate court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. Sub-section (4) thereof further provides that the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced. Therefore, a combined reading of sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 389 of the Code makes the legislative intention abundantly clear that if there are good reasons for suspending the sentences including imprisonment for life, such order suspending the sentence can certainly be passed pending disposal of the appeal. Of course, the reasons must be recorded in writing in the order itself. This is the only statutory requirement which must be satisfied before such an order can be passed by the appellate Court. Traditional approach of the courts to intutively reject such a prayer for bail merely because the application has been sentenced to life imprisonment without giving due regard to other relevant factors like prima facie merit of the appeal, our inability to dispose of such appeal for a decade or more it must be abundoned now. Traditional approach of the courts to intutively reject such a prayer for bail merely because the application has been sentenced to life imprisonment without giving due regard to other relevant factors like prima facie merit of the appeal, our inability to dispose of such appeal for a decade or more it must be abundoned now. Apex Court in Babu Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 579 , has cautioned us by observing that "Courts have often acted intutively or reacted traditionally, so much so the fate of applicants for bail at the High Court level and in the Supreme Court, has largely hinged on the hunch of the bench as an expression of 'Judicial discretion.' A scientific treatment is the desideration." 5. Learned counsel for the appellant took us through the impugned judgment and also certified copy of the evidence. 6. He contended that in this case only P.W. 1 and P.W. 12 are the alleged eyewitnesses of the occurrence. P.W. 1 also lodged the FIR. He is a police officer being Sub-Inspector of Police. P.W. 1 could not give the names of the assailants in the FIR. However, appellant was placed on T.1. Parade where he was identified by P.W.1. But P.W. 1 stated in his examination in chief that before the T.1. Parade was held, appellant was arrested by the police and brought to the police station where P.W. 1 saw him and could identify him as one of the assailants. Relying upon aforesaid circumstances, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that no credence can be given to the evidence of P.W. 1 as regards identification of the appellant. 7. So far as evidence of the other eyewitness, namely, P.W. 12 is concerned, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it would be evident from the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 12 and P.W. 41 (I.O.) that P.W. 12 remained at the P.O. for a considerable time even after the occurrence and P.W. 1 (Sub-Inspector of Police) contacted P.W. 12 and another immediately after the occurrence at the P.O. itself and yet P.W. 12 did not divulge anything about the occurrence or the names of the assailants to P.W.1. A little thereafter, P.W.1 brought P.W. 41 (I.O) and other police personnel at the place of occurrence with a police vehicle. A little thereafter, P.W.1 brought P.W. 41 (I.O) and other police personnel at the place of occurrence with a police vehicle. P.W. 12 even saw deceased being removed from place of occurrence in that police vehicle to a nursing home and yet he did not divulge anything about the occurrence or the names of the assailants to all these police officers though he claimed to be the eye-witness and recognised the assailants including the appellant by face and name. After removal of the deceased to nursing home, P.W. 12 went to his residence and divulged the incident to his grandmother only. His grandmother instructed him not to divulge the incident to anybody. So, he did not disclose the incident to anybody except on the next day when I.O. recorded his statement. His grandmother was not examined in this case as a witness. His further evidence is that in the night of occurrence he came to P.O. at about 12 in the midnight to guard the rickshaws as on an earlier occasion a rickshaw was stolen. Incident occurred 12-10 A.M. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that in the aforesaid circumstances no reliance can be placed on the testimony at P.W. 12. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant further pointed out that only other place of evidence relied upon by the prosecution against the appellant is the alleged recovery of a "ramda" (a sharp cutting weapon) at the instance of the appellant under section 27 of Evidence Act. But there is nothing on record that this weapon was used in the commission of the crime inasmuch as it was not alleged by the prosecution that this weapon had any blood stain. Relying upon aforesaid circumstances appearing in evidence on record, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the appellant has at least made out a good prima facie case in this appeal for serious consideration and hence it would be travesty of justice to deny bail to the appellant pending disposal of appeal when this court is unable to dispose of large number of similar appeals for a decade or more. 9. 9. However, learned P.P. contended that when trial court found appellant guilty under section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to life imprisonment, a presumption is available against the appellant that he is indeed guilty of the offence under section 302 so long as his conviction is not set aside. Learned Public Prosecutor further contended that instead of releasing him on bail at this early stage of the appeal, a direction may be issued to prepare the paper book expeditiously and thereafter appeal may be heard and disposed of. 10. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contentions of the learned P.P. for the simple reason that if we at all issue any such direction to prepare the paper book of this appeal out of turn, preparation of paper book of other older appeals will be correspondingly delayed. This will amount to injustice to the appellants of other older appeals. In the name of doing justice to the present appellant by giving a direction to prepare the paper book of the present appeal and thereafter to hear this appeal out of turn, we will be doing great injustice to the appellants of still older appeals inasmuch as preparation of paper book and final hearing of such older appeals will be correspondingly delayed. This reminds us the proverb "what is one man's meat is another man's poison.' We have come across large number of appeals pending in this court for more than a decade and a half and yet the appellants of such appeals are still languishing in jail even today. In such circumstances we cannot issue any such direction to prepare the paper book expeditiously and to hear this appeal out of turn. 11. With regard the merit of this appeal, we are unable to express final opinion as we are not hearing the main appeal now. However, we can certainly observe here that the appellant has made aprima facie case in this appeal for serious consideration. 11. With regard the merit of this appeal, we are unable to express final opinion as we are not hearing the main appeal now. However, we can certainly observe here that the appellant has made aprima facie case in this appeal for serious consideration. Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of its judgment in Kashmira Singh vs. State of U.P., (1977) 4 SCC 291 , observed as follows :- "The very fact that this court has granted to the appellant special leave to appeal against his conviction shows that, in the opinion of this court, he has prima facie a good case to consider and in the circumstances it would be highly unjust to detain him in jail any longer during the hearing of the appeal." This prima facie merit of the appeal was inferred by the Supreme Court in the above-noted case from the fact that the convicted person was granted special leave to appeal against his conviction. If Supreme Court could draw such inference from the fact that special leave was granted, this court can also, if possible, draw similar inference as to the prima facie merit of the appeal on the basis of the impugned judgment and the evidence on record. We cannot afford to act mechanically without applying our mind to the facts of the case particularly when we are unable to hear the appeal of the appellant even in a decade or more. We find that appellant has indeed made out a good prima facie case in this appeal. We are fully fortified here by what was observed by the Apex Court in paragraph 2 of its judgment in Kashmira Singh (supra) and we quote the same hereunder :- "The appellant contends in this application that pending the hearing of the appeal he should be released on bail. Now, the practice in this Court as also in many of the High Courts has been not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The question is whether this practice should be departed from and if so in what circumstances. It is obvious that no practice however sanctified by usage and hallowed by time can be allowed to prevail if it operates to cause injustice. Every practice of the court must find its ultimate justification in the interest of justice. The question is whether this practice should be departed from and if so in what circumstances. It is obvious that no practice however sanctified by usage and hallowed by time can be allowed to prevail if it operates to cause injustice. Every practice of the court must find its ultimate justification in the interest of justice. The practice not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in the High Courts and in this court on the basis that once a person has been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he should not be let loose, so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside, but the underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, he would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationals of this practice can have no application where the court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for five or six years. It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found to be unjustified? Would it be just at all for the court to tell a person; "We have admitted your appeal because we think you have prima facie case but unfortunately we have no time to hear your appeal for quite a few years and therefore, until we hear your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be innocent? "what confidence would such administration of justice inspire in the mind of public? It may quite conceivably happen, and it has in fact happened in a few cases in this court, that a person may serve out his full term of imprisonment before his appeal is taken up for hearing. Would a Judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling condition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Would a Judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling condition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the practice which this court has been following in the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should ordinarily unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases where a special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction and sentence." 12. Above quoted observation of the Apex Court in the case of Kashmira Singh found favour and was in fact relied upon by the same Court in two subsequent decisions in Gudikanti Narasimhulu vs. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 and Babu Singh vs. State of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579 . 13. In the aforesaid cases Supreme Court observed that bailor its refusal at the pretrial or post-conviction stage "belongs to the blurred area of criminal justice system and largely hinges on the hunch of the Bench, otherwise called judicial discretion. The Code is cryptic on this topic and the Court prefers to be tacit, be the order custodial or not. And yet, the issue is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process." Supreme Court further desired that the "subject is disposed of on basic principle, not improvised brevity draped as discretion. Personal liberty, deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21 that the curial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community." It is further stated that the personal liberty of an accused or convict, after all, is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse in terms of procedure established by law. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right. In the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu, while discussing about the true nature of 'judicial discretion' quoted the following words of Benjamin Cardozo in the Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press (1921):- "The Judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spusmodie sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence..." It is, therefore, needless to mention here that we cannot exercise the discretion vested in us according to our private ideas of what is good or bad. So, the discretion vested in a Judge must not be turned into a "law of tyrants, making it always unknown or unpredictable, different in different men depending upon constitution, temper and passion of the individual Judge. In the aforesaid case law, Apex Court reminded us that discretion when applied to a court of justice, I means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular." 14. We are, therefore, of the view that discretion vested to us must not be turned into a law of tyrants. Our decision must be based on known principles. It must be predictable to the extent possible. It must not be different in different Judges depending upon our individual constitution, temper and passion. If we fail to keep in our mind the aforesaid principle of law as to the manner of exercise of discretion vested in us by law, we will fail to perform our duty in accordance with the trust reposed in us by law of the land. 15. It must further be noted here that it was never alleged in course of hearing of this matter that the appellant might abscond and he may not be available to take punishment in case his appeal ultimately fails. This is another' relevant factor in favour of the appellant which we cannot overlook. 16. 15. It must further be noted here that it was never alleged in course of hearing of this matter that the appellant might abscond and he may not be available to take punishment in case his appeal ultimately fails. This is another' relevant factor in favour of the appellant which we cannot overlook. 16. In view of the aforesaid legal position and prima facie merit of the case of the appellant and as we are unable to hear the appeal within a reasonable period of time before the appellant serves out substantial part of the sentence, we are left with no option but to allow the prayer of the appellant for suspension of the sentence. 17. We, therefore, allow the prayer and direct that the appellant shall be released on bail of Rs. 10,000/- with one surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Howrah, and he shall remain on such bail during the pendency of the appeal. Appeal allowed with direction of bail.