JUDGMENT : A.S. Naidu, J. - The plaintiff has filed this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the legality of the order dated 29-7-98 passed by the learned District Judge, Puri in Civil Revision No. 31 of 1998 by which he has confirmed the order of the trial court, rejecting his application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). 2. Bereft of all unnecessary details, the uneontroverted facts of the case are as follows : The disputed property is a lease-hold land situated in Puri town. Opposite party No. 1 was the lessee in respect of the said land under the Puri Municipality. He entered into an agreement to alienate the said property in favour of the petitioner and received a sum of Rs. 20,000/- towards part performance. Later, on the request of the petitioner, opp. party No. 1 agreed to sell the property to his son accordingly an application was filed before the Puri Municipality to accord permission. Coming to know that opp. party No, 1 has sold the suit land in favour of opp. party No. 2. the plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 376 of 1993 in the court of the Subordinate Judge (now Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Puri for specific performance of contract, inter alia, praying for following reliefs : (a) to pass a decree for specific performance of contract against the defendant directing him to accept the balance consideration money of Rs. 18,000/- (Rupees Eighteen thousands only) from the plaintiff and to execute the registered deed of sale in respect of suit property in favour of plaintiff's son Sri Rama Ballav Mahapatra (for whom the defendant had already applied before Puri Municipality for obtaining permission to transfer) or in favour of the plaintiff himself within a period stipulated by the Court failing which the sale deed be executed by the Court either in favour of plaintiff's son or plaintiff himself on deposit of the balance amount of consideration money. (b) pass a decree for permanent injunction against the defendant restraining him from transferring the suit land in favour of any other person or persons. (B-1) pass a decree declaring the sale deed dt. 21-12-93 (Twenty-first December Ninety-three) executed by the defendant No. 1 (one) in favour of the defendant No. 2 Two is illegal, collusive and inoperative and not binding against him. (B-1) pass a decree declaring the sale deed dt. 21-12-93 (Twenty-first December Ninety-three) executed by the defendant No. 1 (one) in favour of the defendant No. 2 Two is illegal, collusive and inoperative and not binding against him. (B-2) pass a decree permanently injuncting the defendant No 2 Two to construct building over the suit land. (c) award cost of the suit against the defendant. (d) grant such other relief as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the case. 3. The petitioner had impleaded opp. party No. 1 and opp. patty No. 2 only as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit. Both the opp. parties 1 and 2 appeared and filed their written statement repudiating the allegations made in the plaint. 4. In the year 1997, the petitioner filed a petition under Order 1, Rule 10. C. P. C. to implead Puri Municipality as a defendant in the suit. The said petition was rejected by the trial court. Against the said rejection order, he preferred civil Revision No. 93 of 1997 before the District Judge, Puri, who confirmed the order. Thereafter, petitioner filed a writ application beating O. J. C. No. 17693 of 1997. This Court also declined to interfere with the older of rejection passed by the courts below. Thereafter, the suit proceeded and the evidence on behalf of the petitioner was closed. At that relevant time, the petitioner filed another petition under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code (Annexure-1) praying to amend the plaint by inserting Puri Municipality represented by its Chairman and the Executive Officer, Puri Municipality as defendants 3 and 4 respectively. He also wanted to add two more paragraphs to the original prayer apart from certain additional averments. The reliefs sought to be introduced by way of amendment are as follows : (1) direct the defendants 3 and 4 to withdraw their permission granted in favour of the first defendant to the second defendant. (2) direct the defendants 3 and 4 to grant necessary permission to the first defendant to transfer the subject matter of dispute in favour of the plaintiff. 5. The trial court by its order dated 16-3-98 rejected the petition for amendment of the plaint mainly on the ground that notice as required u/s 349 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 having not been issued, plaintiff cannot be permitted to add Puri Municipality as a defendant. 5. The trial court by its order dated 16-3-98 rejected the petition for amendment of the plaint mainly on the ground that notice as required u/s 349 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 having not been issued, plaintiff cannot be permitted to add Puri Municipality as a defendant. It was also held that even otherwise, the prayer is barred under Article 58 of the Limitation Act and that allowing amendment after lapse of six years when the suit is at the final stage, would cause prejudice to the defendants. 6. The petitioner preferred Civil Revision No. 31 of 1998 before the learned District judge, Puri, challenging the order dated 16-3-98 referred to above and the Revisibhal Court after discussing the facts and law, declined to interfere With the order passed by the trial court and dimissed the said Revision. As stated earlier, both the orders are impugned in the present writ application. 7. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the application for amendment of the plaint can be filed at any stage of the suit. It is further Submitted that, by the proposed amendment, the Municipality which is a necessary party, is sought to De added to avoid multiplicity of litigation inasmuch as in case the suit for specific performance is decreed then in the absence of Puri Municipality, it would be difficult to execute the decree. It is submitted that if the prayer to set aside permssion dated 18-12-93, granted by Puri Municipality, permitting opp. party No. 1 to execute the sale deed is rejected, irreparable injury would be caused to him and that the said prayer being ancillary cannot be barred by time. Mr. Padhi, learned counsel for the opp. parties on the other hand, inter alia, contended that the prayer i. e. to set aside the permission granted by the Municipality in favour of the first defendant to alienate the property to the second defendant having been granted as long back as on 18-12-93, the petition for adding the said prayer by way of amendment in the year 1998 is grossly barred by time and cannot be entertained. It is further submitted that riling of the petition under Order 6, Rule 17, C. P. C. is a camouflage attempt to make the earlier order passed by the courts below rejecting the prayer to add Puri Municipality as a defendant under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. nugatory. Thus, the said prayer should not be entertained. It is further submitted that the question of according permission by Puri Municipality in favour of the petitioner to alienate the property would arise only if the suit is decreed. Thus, the said prayer is based on surmises and conjectures and is hypothetical in nature depending upon future events, and therefore, such amendment should not be allowed. He further submitted that the suit was filed as long back as in the year 1993 and this Court in Civil Revision No. 10 of 1995, which was disposed on 16-1-1996, has specifically directed to dispose of the suit preferably by end of June, 1996. The evidence of plaintiff's witnesses are already over and the defendants have to adduce their evidence. In that view of the matter, addition of two new parties would greatly prejudice the defendants inasmuch as by such addition, hearing of the suit has to again start de novo. Relying upon a decision of this Court in Harekrushna Sahoo v. District Judge, Cuttack and others 83 1997 CLT 796, Mr. Padhi submitted that the scope of interference in a certiorari proceeding being limited, this court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below and the question of amendment being discretionary and trial court as well as the revisional court having exercised their jurisdiction in proper manner, the said orders should not be interfered with in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. 8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions made by the counsel for the parties. While dealing with an application for amendment of pleadings, the predominant consideration is as to whether the amendment sought for is at all necessary for determining the real questions of controversy arising inter se between the parties and whether the amendment can be allowed without causing injustice and/or prejudice to the other side. 9. While dealing with an application for amendment of pleadings, the predominant consideration is as to whether the amendment sought for is at all necessary for determining the real questions of controversy arising inter se between the parties and whether the amendment can be allowed without causing injustice and/or prejudice to the other side. 9. In the present case, so far as addition of Puri Municipality as well as the Executive Officer of Puri Municipality as defendants 3 and 4 is concerned, at the cost of repetition it is reiterated that the same prayer made under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. has been turned down by both the courts below as well as this Court in O. J. C. No. 17693 of 1997. Be that as it may, it is to be examined as to whether Puri Municipality is a necessary party in the present suit. The contention that Puti Municipality being the paramount owner of the suit land, is a necessary party, cannot be sustained in view of the nature of the suit which is one for specific performance of a contract. Admittedly, Puri Municipality is not a party to the contract nor is it bound by the same. Even though Puri Municipality is the paramount owner of the property, in a suit for specific performance of contract, the Municipality cannot be said to be a necessary party. A similar question arose in the case of Krushna Chandra Patnaik v. Biswanath Agarwalla 69 1990 CLT 529 . The said case was also one for specific performance of contract in respect of Khasmahal lands of which, admittedly, the State Government was the paramount owner and prior permission of the Collector was necessary for alienation of the said property. This Court in paragtaph-10 of the said judgment held as follows : ".....In a suit for specific performance of contract in respect of the property in question, State cannot be held to be a necessary party merely because the land in question is a Khasmahal land. In directing specific performance, State has no role to play, nor the decree would become unenforceable in the absence of State as a party to the litigation....." 10. In directing specific performance, State has no role to play, nor the decree would become unenforceable in the absence of State as a party to the litigation....." 10. In view of what has been stated above, I have no hesitation to hold that Puri Municipality is not a necessary party to tbe present suit which is one for specific perforance of contract, moreso because similar attempt of the petitioner to implead Puri Municipality invoking the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. has been rejected by the courts below as well as by this Court earlier. 11. Now coming to the first relief sought to be introduced by way of amendment as paragraph-12 (d) in item No. IV of the amendment petition, it may be seen that admittedly, permission was accorded, rightly or wrongly, in favour of the first defendant to alienate the property to the second defendant as long back as on 18-12-93. Further, admittedly, the suit was filed thereafter and this relief was available to be asked for at the very beginning when the suit was filled, but the same was not made. The period of limitation for setting aside and/or annulling any order is three years from the date when cause of action accrued as prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The cause of action in the present case for setting aside and/or annulling the permission granted by the Municipality accrued on 18-12-93. Thus, in the year 1998, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to amend the plaint and introduce a relief wbich has become barred by limitation during the pendency of the suit. Considering from this angle also, I hold that the courts below have rightly refused the prayer for amendment so far as it relates to item No. IV of the amendment petition. On this point, I am fortified with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Muni Lal Vs. The Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. and another, 12. Considering from another angle, in the present suit for specific performance of contract, a prayer is made to declare the sale deed dated 21-12-93 executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 as illegal, collusive, not operative and not binding. In case the plaintiff succeeds in the suit, then automatically the permission granted by the Municipality for alienating the property becomes invalid. In case the plaintiff succeeds in the suit, then automatically the permission granted by the Municipality for alienating the property becomes invalid. Thus, the prayer sought to be introduced by way of amendment is redundant and cannot be allowed being consequential to the original prayer. 13. So far as the relief sought to be introduced as paragraph-12(f) under item No. IV of amendment petition is concerned, in view of the clear position of law that in a suit for specific performance of contract the Municipality is not a necessary party, such an amendment is uncalled for. Further, the said prayer is hypothetical in nature depending upon several factors which may happen in future. In that view of the matter, I hold that the courts below have rightly rejected the petition for amendment so far as the above prayer is concerned. 14. Admittedly, the suit is of the year 1993 and the evidence of the plaintiff is almost closed and 7 years have elapsed in the meanwhile. Permitting addition of parties at this stage would definitely amount to de novo trial and the same would cause great prejudice to the defendants. The submission that the amendment should be allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits, is also not correct, inasmuch as once a decree is passed, the same will bind all the necessary parties and the apprehension of the petitioner is unfounded. 15. Perusal of the orders passed by the trial court as well as revisional court, clearly reveals that after discussing the facts and circumstances of the case and after going through the materials on record, they rejected the petition for amendment. It is to be borne in mind that while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court would be extremely reluctant to reverse the findings recorded by the courts below unless the same are found to be flgarantly illegal and/or have been passed in excess of jurisdiction. The order passed by the court below has to be allowed to stand unless it occasions failure of justice, warranting interference. This Court, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding, can interfere where there is patent violation of law or any perversity manifest in order. The order passed by the court below has to be allowed to stand unless it occasions failure of justice, warranting interference. This Court, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding, can interfere where there is patent violation of law or any perversity manifest in order. This Court can exercise its jurisdiction only when the impugned orders, if allowed to stand, will occasion failure of justice and the party against whom it is made would not suffer irreparable injury. 16. Keeping in view the limited scope for interference in a certiorari proceeding, I do not think the present is a case where extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court should be invoked. The views expressed by the courts below do not appear to be absurd or perverse, On the materials available, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that the courts below have committed any error of law apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 17. The suit is of the year 1993. Meanwhile, seven years have elapsed. It would have been over by now had not the petitioner filed such an untenable application, I would, therefore, direct the trial court to dispose of the suit latest by February, 2001. 18. In the result, the writ application fails and the same is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 19 Writ application dismissed.