Judgment Ghosh, J.: 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 23rd September, 1988 passed in the writ petition, registered as C.O. No. 14174(W) of 1986, whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge allowed the petition and quashed the order of dismissal or the order removing the name of the petitioner from the roll of the appellant and directed to treat the petitioner as on duty for the entire period and to pay all arrear salaries and service benefits to him. 2. Short facts of the case are that the petitioner, a permanent employee of the appellant, was working at the office of the appellant at Calcutta. On 14th March, 1985, the petitioner was transferred to the office of the appellant at Hyderabad. The office of the appellant at Hyderabad was in charge of the Oil Field Equipment Division of the appellant at Assam. In the order of transfer dated 14th March, 1985, it was mentioned that the petitioner is being transferred to the Hyderabad office of the appellant for being posted at the office of the appellant at Jorhat, Assam. On 1st April, 1985, the petitioner was released from the Calcutta office of the appellant. By a letter dated 18th April, 1985, the petitioner represented that he is not keeping well and, accordingly, it would not be possible for him to report at the Hyderabad office. On 27th April, 1985, the petitioner wrote another letter and in that stated that he had gone to Hyderabad but had to come back without reporting since he fell sick and his baby son became seriously ill. Then on 16th June, 1985, the petitioner made a representation to post him anywhere else in India. On 15th September, 1985, the petitioner once again wrote a letter and in that stated that he is still lying ill. On 9th October, 1985 by a letter, the petitioner requested the authority concerned to intimate him as to where he can join immediately. In all these letters the petitioner requested for approval of his leave of absence. Ultimately, however, on 30th October, 1985, the petitioner reported at the Hyderabad office of the appellant when he was advised to report to the corporate office of the appellant at New Delhi. In all these letters the petitioner requested for approval of his leave of absence. Ultimately, however, on 30th October, 1985, the petitioner reported at the Hyderabad office of the appellant when he was advised to report to the corporate office of the appellant at New Delhi. In the circumstances, the petitioner made a representation on 15th November, 1985, and therein requested the authorities to permit him to join his duty at the earliest. On 3rd December, 1985 and on 27th January, 1986, he received a letter from the appellant dated 27th January, 1986 to the effect as follows :- "Having failed to report for duty at Ramchandrapuram, Hyderabad consequent on being transferred office and relieved from R.O.D., Calcutta, on 1st April, 1985 vide office order No. RE: PER: 216: 17, dated 1st April, 1985 Shri S. K. Halder, Staff No. 1841785, Senior Commercial Engineer, is deemed to have left the services of the Company of his own accord in accordance with the Leave Rules of the Company as applicable, at the relevant time. His name is, accordingly, struck off the rolls of the Company, w. e. f. 16th April, 1985." 3. The petitioner by letters dated 31st January, 1986 ; 20th February, 1986; 6th June, 1986; 7th July, 1986; 16th August, 1986 and 20th August, 1986 made representations for revocation of the order dated 27th January, 1987 whereupon in reply to his letter dated 20th August, 1986, the appellant informed the petitioner that in accordance with the Leave Rules of the appellant as applicable at the relevant time, the name of the petitioner has been struck off from the rolls of the appellant. In the circumstances, the writ petition was filed. 4. The Leave Rules which was in force prior to 22nd January, 1986 provided that if an employee fails to resume duty on the expiry of the maximum period of extraordinary leave granted to him or where an employee, who has been granted a lesser amount of extraordinary leave than the maximum amount admissible to him, remains absent from duty for a period exceeding the leave granted to him together with the extraordinary leave which could have been granted to him, he shall, unless the C.M.D. in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case otherwise determine, be deemed to have left hi:: appointment and shall accordingly cease to be in the service of the appellant. Such rule further provided that if an employee, who remains absent from duty without leave or permission or in excess of the period of leave originally sanctioned or subsequently extended, and where such period of absence exceeds 15 consecutive days, he shall be liable to disciplinary proceedings for unauthorised absence. 5. It is not the case of the appellant in the affidavit-in-opposition that the petitioner overstayed extraordinary leave, which could have been granted to him. There is no dispute that no disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner for his unauthorised absence. 6. On 22nd January, 1986 an amendment was effected to the rules whereby it was provided that if an employee who remains absent from duty without leave or permission or in excess of the period of leave originally sanctioned or subsequently extended and where such period of absence exceeds 15 days consecutively, he shall be presumed to have left the services of the appellant of his own accord without notice and his name will be accordingly struck off from the rolls of the appellant. A proviso was added to the said substituted rule wherein it was provided that if the concerned employee proves to the satisfaction of the management that his absence was on account of sickness or other valid reasons, the management may, at their discretion convert his absence into leave without pay. 7. This amended rule came into effect on 22nd January, 1986. Prior to 22nd January, 1986, the petitioner reported at the Hyderabad office of the appellant where he was transferred. The name of the petitioner was struck off from the rolls of the appellant as mentioned in the impugned office order of the appellant dated 27th January, 1986 with effect from 16th April, 1985 when the amended rule introduced on 21st January, 1986 was not even there. The order dated 27th January, 1986 was passed not after expiry of 15 days from 22nd January, 1986, i.e., the date when the amended rule was introduced. The order dated 22nd January, 1986, therefore, cannot on facts stand. 8. In case of provisions as that of the amended rule, natural Justice demands that while giving effect to the provisions of the said rule, the person to be affected be given an opportunity of hearing. The order dated 22nd January, 1986, therefore, cannot on facts stand. 8. In case of provisions as that of the amended rule, natural Justice demands that while giving effect to the provisions of the said rule, the person to be affected be given an opportunity of hearing. The amended rule itself provides that if the employee proves to the satisfaction of the management that his absence was on account of sickness or other valid reasons, his such absence may be converted into leave without pay. That itself shows that on opportunity was intended to be given to the person concerned to prove that he had reason to be absent from his duty. In the instant case, admittedly, where the petitioner made representations and sought to prove his absence was for reasons, that was not considered. Even after the order was passed the representations made by the petitioner with appropriate certificates were not taken into consideration. 9. The impugned order, therefore, could not be sustained on any ground whatsoever and accordingly, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge rightly allowed the writ petition. 10. A contention was raised that this Court has no jurisdiction. The fact that the impugned order which in effect was an order of termination though ostisibly recording striking off the name of the petitioner from the rolls of the appellant de hors the applicable rules, was served upon the petitioner at Calcutta, we are of the view that the Court at Calcutta had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. , 11. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but at the same time slightly modify the order of the learned Single Judge having regard to the fact that the petitioner is presently engaged in another place, although at a much lower remuneration than what he would have been entitled to if he had not been unceremoniously removed by the appellant and accordingly direct that the petitioner shall be paid 50% of what be was otherwise entitled to but for the impugned order and shall be entitled to all other service benefits as directed by the learned Single Judge. There shall be no order as to costs. Mathur, C. J.: I agree. Later-As prayed for, let xerox certified copy be supplied on proper compliance. S. K. G.