JUDGMENT 1. :- The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition, for quashing his suspension order dated 6.1.2000, Annexure-1, passed by State Government, suspending him from the office of Chairman, Municipal Board, Newai, on the ground, inter alia, that the impugned suspension order is per se illegal, void ab initio, arbitrary and unjust, within the meaning of Section 63-A of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "Act No.38 of 1959). The impugned order of suspension is also challenged on the ground of mala fides alleged in the writ petition. It is also averred in the writ petition that the impugned suspension order, Annexure-1, dated 06.1.2000, is based on stale charges, therefore, it is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 2. The brief facts, necessary for disposal of the instant writ petition, are that during the term of Municipal Board of 1982-86, the petitioner was initially elected as Vice-Chairman, but sometime in the year 1984, the then Chairman had been suspended, therefore, as a consequence thereof, the petitioner was elected as Vice-Chairman, and thereafter, became Chairman for the rest of the term, in the year 1985-86, till the appointment of an Administrator, as no election was held within time. It is averred that during the period beginning from 1986 to 1990, the Municipal Board, Newai, District-Tonk, was functioning under the Administrator, appointed by State Government. 3. It is averred in the writ petition that election took place on 31.8.90, when the petitioner was elected as Chairman of the said Municipal Board. He continued to hold the office of Chairman upto 23.8.95. 4. It is further averred in the writ petition that fresh elections of the Municipal Board took place in the year 1995, for a term beginning from 31.8.95 to 31.8.2000. The petitioner was elected as Ward Member and thereafter again as Chairman of Municipal Board, Newai, District-Tonk. It is averred that the petitioner was served with a show-cause notice dated 28.8.99, along with a letter bearing No. 2876, of the said date by the Respondent No.2, copies whereof are filed and marked as Annexures 2 and 3 respectively. 5. A dose scrutiny of Annexures 2 and 3 reveal that show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner under Section 63, for purposes of showing cause against certain irregularities, allegedly committed by him as Chairman during the previous term of the Board. 5. A dose scrutiny of Annexures 2 and 3 reveal that show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner under Section 63, for purposes of showing cause against certain irregularities, allegedly committed by him as Chairman during the previous term of the Board. The aforesaid letter, Annexure-2, speaks about certain allotment having been made, without realisation of some penalities, interests and late payments of the said year. The allegations also relate to no-objection certificates, issued by the petitioner, on the main original applications, required for electricity connections from the Rajasthan State Electricity Board. 6. It appears from perusal of Annexure-6 to the writ petition that in meantime, the respondents have issued another show-cause notice dated 9.12.99, to the petitioner, alleging therein some misconduct relating to previous term of the office of Chairman of the petitioner. 7. The writ petition was admitted on 03.3.2000 and time was granted to the learned Additional Advocate General, to file reply; and the learned counsel for the petitioner, was also granted time to file rejoinder, if so advised, within a period of three days thereafter. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition was directed to be listed for final hearing on 13.3.2000. 8. When the petition was posted on 13.3.2000, the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the respondents, was directed to keep ready the original record of documents, i.e., NOCs Nos. 1, 2 and 3, obtainable from the office of Assistant Enginner (0 & M), RSEB, Newai, for Court's perusal on the next date of hearing. The purpose of summoning the aforesaid original record was to be satisfied about the authenticity of these NOCs, as the petitioner challenged veracity of NOC issued to Abdul Alim, son of Babu Khan, on 19.9.95, pertaining to present term of his office. Other two NOCs relate to term of his office as Chairman of the previous Board. 9. The learned Additional Advocate General has filed a supplementary affidavit, stating therein that NOC alleged to have been issued by the petitioner, to Abdul Alim, son of Babul Khan, on 19.5.95, which relates to the present term of office of Chairman of the petitioner, is not available in the office of the Assistant Engineer (0 & M), RSEB, Newai. A copy of the report of the aforesaid Engineer, is annexed with the supplementary affidavit and marked as Annexure-AA 1. A copy of the report of the aforesaid Engineer, is annexed with the supplementary affidavit and marked as Annexure-AA 1. It is averred in the supplementary affidavit that the Assistant Engineer had telephonically informed to the learned Additional Advocate General on 29.4.2000 that although, the files pertaining to other NOCs mentioned at Sr. Nos. 1 and 2 (pertaining to previous term of the Board) were available in his office, but the file of NOC, mentioned at Sr. No.3, alleged to have been issued to Abdul Alim, by the petitioner, during the present term of his office, was not traceable. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the materials available on record. 11. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the expiry of the term of the Board, within the meaning of Section 63-A of Act No.38 of 1959, although, an enquiry can be continued, but suspension under sub-section (4) of Section 63 of the said Act, after termination of term of the previous Board, is not permissible. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, within the meaning of Section 63-A, read with sub-section (4) of Section 63, suspension of the petitioner from the office of Chairman of new Board, to which he is re-elected, is unjust, unreasonable, unfair and arbitrary, as the misconduct alleged against him relates to his term of the office of Chairman of the previous Board. There was only one negligible allegation of issuing NOC to Abdul Alim, son of Babu Khan, at Sr. No.3 of Annexure-AA 1, filed by the respondents, along with the supplementary affidavit against the petitioner, which relates to his present term of office of Chairman of Board, but that too could not be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, all the charges levelled against the petitioner, pertain to his term of office of Chairman of the previous Board, for which, he cannot be placed under suspension. 12. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the charges levelled against the petitioner, are stale charges, therefore, on these stale charges, his suspension is unreasonable, unjust and unfair. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision, rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court, in the case of (1) Sohanlal Vs. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision, rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court, in the case of (1) Sohanlal Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1965 RLW 166. The learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance on an unreported decision, rendered in (2) SB Civil Srit Petition No. 3413/98, decided on 14.9.98, interpreting scope of Section 63-A, read with Section 63(4) of At No. 38 of 1959. It is held in the aforesaid case that a member re-elected to the present Board, cannot be placed under suspension under sub-section (4) of Section 63 of Act No.38 of 1959, on account of an enquiry held under Section 63-A of the said Act, in respect of a matter relating to his term of office of the previous Board. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on another unreported decision, rendered in (3) SB Civil Writ Petition No. 287/2000, decided on 28.1.2000, by another learned Single Judge of this Court, holding that a member or office-bearer of a Board cannot be placed under suspension, for stale charges. 13. It is urged by Shri Mohd. Rafiq, the learned Additional Advocate General, that in the present case, sub-section (4) of Section 63 and Section 63-A cannot be read in isolation of Section 63(1)(d) and sub-section (10) of Section 65 of the said Act. It is submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that the aforesaid sections are to be interpreted in such a way that all of these sections remain workable. According to Shri Rafiq, the rule of interpretation requires that while interpreting two inconsistent, or, obviously repugnant provisions of an Act, the courts should make an effort to so interpret the provisions as to harmonise them so that the purpose of the Act may be given effect to and both the provisions may be allowed to operate without rendering either of them otiose. It is submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General, Shri M. Rafiq that statute has to be read as a whole to find out the real intention of the legislature. It is the duty of the courts to avoid head-on dash between two sections of the Act. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on decisions rendered by Hon'ble The Supreme Court, in the cases of (4) Sultana Begum Vs. It is the duty of the courts to avoid head-on dash between two sections of the Act. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on decisions rendered by Hon'ble The Supreme Court, in the cases of (4) Sultana Begum Vs. Prem Chand Jain, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 373 (5) Utkal Constructions and Joinery Pvt Ltd. and others Vs. State of Orissa and others etc., reported in (1987) 3 SCC 279 ; and (6) Pushpa Devi and others Vs. Milkhi Rant (Dead) By his LRs, reported in (1990) 2 SCC 134 . 14. It is further submitted by learned Additional Advocate General that the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge, in case of Sohanlal (supra) to the effect that Section 63-A of Act No. 38 of 1959 does not authorise suspension of the person of the new Board to which he may have been re-elected is an obiter dicta, which is not binding upon this Court as precedent. It is submitted that unreported decisions rendered in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 3413 of 1998 and SB Civil Writ Petition No. 287 of 2000, require re-consideration by larger Bench of this Court. 15. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, raised at the Bar. I am of the view that in the present writ petition, the question of conflict between Section 63(1)(d), 63(4), 63-A and 65(10), does not arise. There is no quarrel with the submission of learned Additional Advoctae General relating to rule of harmonious interpretation based on decisions renderd by Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, the facts and circumstances of the cases, cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. The controversy involved in the present case, is squarely covered by three decisions, rendered by three learned Judges of this Court, sitting singly, from time to time. The law laid down by the learned Single Judge, in the case of Sohanlal (supra), even if treated to be obiter dicta for argument sake, is occupying the field on the subject for more than 34 years, is to be given highest respect. I respectfully concur with the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge, in the case of Sohanlal (supra), and the ratio dicidendi of the decisions in the other two cases, rendered by the learned Single Judges of this Court, sitting singly. I respectfully concur with the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge, in the case of Sohanlal (supra), and the ratio dicidendi of the decisions in the other two cases, rendered by the learned Single Judges of this Court, sitting singly. Suffice it to say in this regard that if a person is re-elected either as a member of Board or as Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the newly constituted Board, then he cannot be placed under suspension for his misconduct for his term of office of the previous Board, on stale charges. I am of the view that the three decisions rendered by learned Single judges of this Court, sitting singly, do not require re-consideration by larger Bench of this Court. 16. At the risk of repetition, it is reiterated that in the present case, all the charges levelled against the petitioner, for which enquiry under Section 63-A of Act No.38 of 1959, is initiated against him, relate to the term of office of Chairman of previous Board, except issuing of one NOC in favour of Abdul Alim aforesaid, on 19.9.95, the veracity of which is challenged by the petitioner. In spite of sufficient opportunity afforded to the respondents, they failed to establish authenticity of NOC, issued by the petitioner on 19.9.95, to Abdul Alim, which relates to the present term of his office as Chairman of the new Board. I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner cannot be placed under suspension after long interval on stale charges of misconduct during the pendency of an enquiry under Section 63-A of Act No.38 of 1959 in respect of misconduct relating to his term of office of Chairman of the previous Board after his re-election to the said office in newly constituted Board. 17. It is to be imbibed that public representatives, elected by people to manage their affairs in Local Bodies Institutions cannot be equated for purposes of their suspension, with Government servants. In case of Government servants, suspension is no punishment because if they are exonerated they are entitled to get their full salaries and other consequential benefits, whereas, suspension of public representative of Local Bodies Institutions, is matter of serious concern. In case of Government servants, suspension is no punishment because if they are exonerated they are entitled to get their full salaries and other consequential benefits, whereas, suspension of public representative of Local Bodies Institutions, is matter of serious concern. To my mind, suspension of elected representative of Local Bodies Institutions, ant amounts to de-grading his status and lowering down his reputation in the estimation of public during the period of his suspension, causing irreparable loss to his public life which cannot be compensated in terms of money. In such a situation, the statutory authorities are expected to place an elected representative of people under suspension, with great care, caution and circumspection, strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions contemplated under Section 63, 63-A, read with sub-section (10) of Section 65 of Act No. 38 of 1959. 18. It is urged by the learned Additional Advocate General with emphasis that even if Section 63-A does not authorise supsension of a re-elected member or office-bearer of newly constituted Board, even then, the intention of the State Legislature is to be gathered from conjoint reading of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 63, sub-section (4) of the said section, Section 63-A, read with sub-section (10) of Section 65 of Act No. 38 of 1959, which indicate that State Legislature intended to suspend re-elected members of Board or its office-bearers for their misconduct committed by them while holding office in the previous Board. The aforesaid argument of the learned Additional Advocate General, is not acceptable for the reasons given here in below. 19. It is to be noticed that State Legislature deliberately avoided to extend the applicability of sub-section (4) of Section 63 of Act No.38 of 1959 (the provisions relating to suspension during enquiry), to Section 63-A of the said Act, which provides an enquiry held or continued after expiry of term of office of the previous Board to which it relates. 20. The State Legislature does not make any law, authorising an statutory authority to suspend re-elected members of newly constituted Board or its office-bearers for the misconduct committed in previous Board during the pendency of enquiry under Section 63-A of Act No. 38 of 1959. Reasons are not far to seek. 20. The State Legislature does not make any law, authorising an statutory authority to suspend re-elected members of newly constituted Board or its office-bearers for the misconduct committed in previous Board during the pendency of enquiry under Section 63-A of Act No. 38 of 1959. Reasons are not far to seek. In democratic policy, sovereignty lies with the people and once members of Board or its office-bearers are re-elected and a new Board is constituted, the State Legislature does not think it fit and proper to suspend such re-elected members of the new Board or its office-bearers. To my mind, in garb of interpretation, this Court cannot afford to legislate upon a law, making suspension of re-elected members of the new Board or its office-bearers lawful, which is omitted by State Legislature. I am of the view that if such, exercise is undertaken by this court, it would amount to usurping legislative power which is legally and philosophically impermissible under our Constitution wherein powers of Legislature, Executive' and Judiciary, three organs of State are well-demarcated. 21. It is settled principle of law that no social legislation and no economic legislation can be interpreted by a court of law, without taking into account the principle of social and economic justice enshrined under Preamble of our Constitution and encoded thereafter. Similarly, no political legislation, dealing with removal and suspension of elected members of Board or its officer-bearers can be interpreted without applying the principle of political justice, guaranteed to all citizens, in the Preamble of our Constitution and thereafter encoded in it by its founding fathers. An elected representative of people cannot be removed or suspended, otherwise than in accordance with law and procedure which can be said to be reasonable, just and fair enacted by legislature. The Courts of law are expected to interpret the statutory provisions enacted by legislature in this regard without importing its own logic and its own concept of equity. 22. Judicial propriety does not permit me to speculate in the case on hand that State Legislature intended by enacting Section 63, 63-A and sub-section (10) of Section 65 of Act No.38 of 1959 that re-elected members of the newly constituted Board or its office-bearers are to be suspended for the enquiry held or continued, after expiry of the term of office of previous Board. The aforesaid suggestion made by the learned Additional Advocate General would lead to violence to the language used under Section 63, 63-A and sub-section (10) of Section 65 of the aforesaid Act. Therefore, I decline to give effect to the presumed intention of State Legislature, as suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. 23. 1 am of the view that provisions relating to removal and suspension of re-elected representative of people, as members of newly constituted Board or its office-bearers under Section 63, 63-A and sub-section (10) of Section 65 of Act No.38 of 1959, cannot be interpreted differently from that the words used in the said provisions. If there is gap on the aforesaid subject under the sections mentioned above of Act No.38 of 1959, it is not the function of this Court to rectify the error of legislature and in the garb of interpretation, to fill up the gap. This Court cannot afford to fill up the gap under the guise of interpretation. If State Legislature has committed error in not enacting provisions for suspension of re-elected members of newly constituted Board or its office-bearers during the pendency of an enquiry relating to previous Board under Section 63-A of the said Act, then, it has to rectify its own mistake by making the law on the subject, to meet the contingency, as suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. 24. In the instant case, serious allegations of tnala fides have been made by the petitioner, against the respondents, making averments in the writ petition that the petitioner belongs to Bharatiya Janata Party and is acting member of the same. He had been elected as Vice-Chairman and is now Chairman as a candidate of the Bharatiya Janta Party, and he is being harassed on non-existent grounds. It is observed that it is easy to allege mala fides against any one, but it is very difficult to prove. Although, serious allegations of mala fides are made against the respondents, but f refrain from going into the details of mala fides, alleged in the writ petition and denied by the respondents, in their return. From the affidavits and counter-affidavits, filed by the parties, although, mala fide is not established, yet, element of bias is inferable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. 25. From the affidavits and counter-affidavits, filed by the parties, although, mala fide is not established, yet, element of bias is inferable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. 25. It is observed that no other points are urged before me, except the points discussed here in above.The upshot of the aforesaid discussion, is that the instant writ petition is allowed and order dated 6.1.2000, Annexure-1 to the writ petition, placing the petitioner under suspension, during the pendency of enquiry initiated against him, is hereby quashed, and the respondents are directed to complete the enquiry against the petitioner, expeditiously, preferably, within four months from today. The petitioner is also directed to co-operate with the enquiry. In the circumstances of the case,the parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition Allowed *******