DEEPAK VERMA, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER is aggrieved by the appellate order passed by Board of Revenue on 22. 8. 1979 in an appeal, preferred by petitioner under section 77 (2) of the M. P Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (for short the Act ). ( 2 ) BRIEF facts, material for deciding the said petition, are mentioned hereinbelow. Respondent No. 1 was working with the petitioners Bank on the post of Samiti Sewak. On account of certain alleged irregularities and illegalities committed by this employee, after holding a departmental enquiry, his services were terminated by an order dated 1. 5. 1981. Respondent No. 1 was also prosecuted for commission of certain criminal offenses by a criminal Court of j. H. F. C. , Sitamau. However, he was exonerated of the criminal charge levelled against him, by giving benefit of doubt. On pronouncement of the judgment of acquittal, in his favour he requested the petitioners to take him back in service. The petitioners did not oblige the respondent employee mainly on the ground that pursuant to the departmental enquiry held against him, in which charges were found to have been proved, his service stood terminated in the year 1981 itself, whereas the employee never challenged the order of termination by raising a dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Act. According to them acquittal of respondent employee of a criminal charge would not entitle him to be taken back in service as the order of termination passed by petitioners pursuant to the findings recorded by departmental enquiry, would still come in his way for giving the said benefit to him. ( 3 ) ON account of this attitude of the petitioners, respondent No. 1 raised a dispute before the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies by filing an application under Section 55 (2) of the Act. In this application he challenged riot only the order of termination passed against him in the year 1981, but also the indifferent attitude of the petitioner for not taking him back in service after his acquittal in the criminal Court. Notice of the said application was issued to the petitioners. In this application he challenged riot only the order of termination passed against him in the year 1981, but also the indifferent attitude of the petitioner for not taking him back in service after his acquittal in the criminal Court. Notice of the said application was issued to the petitioners. Petitioners contested the same and submitted that the order of termination of the petitioner passed in the year 1982 cannot be subject matter of challenge at a belated stage as respondent employee did not take any action against the termination order, instead preferred to wait until an order of acquittal was passed in his favour. ( 4 ) IT was further contended that both orders were separate in nature in as much as the first order of termination was passed on account of proved charges against him whereas the order of acquittal has been passed by a criminal Court but that alone would not be sufficient to reinstate the petitioner. Parties lead evidence before the Deputy Registrar, On appreciation of the evidence available on record, Deputy Registrar directed that the matter be remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration of the same as according to him the said order of dismissal came to be passed without affording any opportunity of hearing. However, the order of dismissal passed against the respondent No. 1 was not quashed. This order was subject matter of challenge in an appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 employee under section 77 (1) of the Act before the Joint Registrar. The Joint Registrar in the appeal held that since the employee stood acquitted by a Criminal Court, therefore, he would be entitled for his reinstatement but he also did not quash the first order of termination which was passed against respondent No. 1, before the Judgment of the Criminal Court was passed in his favour. It was further held that employee would not be entitled for any backwages on the principles of no work no pay . ( 5 ) THIS order was challenged by the petitioners employee by preferring second appeal under Section 77 (2) of the Act, before the Board of Revenue. However, it may be clarified that respondent No. 1 employee did not prefer any appeal or cross-appeal against the order/findings recorded by Joint Registrar. ( 5 ) THIS order was challenged by the petitioners employee by preferring second appeal under Section 77 (2) of the Act, before the Board of Revenue. However, it may be clarified that respondent No. 1 employee did not prefer any appeal or cross-appeal against the order/findings recorded by Joint Registrar. The Board of Revenue after haying heard the parties has passed the following order: (1) The first order passed by Deputy Registrar dated 15. 7. 1992 stands quashed. (2) The dismissal order passed against the respondent No. 1 by the petitioners on 1. 5. 1981 also stands quashed. (3) As regards back wages it has been directed to hold a fresh enquiry after parties are given opportunity to lead evidence and to draw a definite conclusion if the respondent No. 1 was unemployed during the period he was out of employment. Since according to the petitioners the Board of Revenue has transgressed his power and jurisdiction in granting the reliefs to respondent No. 1 employee, where there was no appeal/cross- appeal/cross objection by respondent No. 1 employee, therefore, the said order was wholly unjustified and cannot be sustained in law. ( 6 ) RESPONDENTS were noticed. Respondent No. 1 submitted his return in oppugnation. It has been contended that no illegality can be found out in the appellate order of the Board of Revenue and in the larger interest of justice the Board of Revenue has granted relief the employee even though the same had not been claimed specifically. It has also been contended that with regard to delay the point has already been set at rest by an order passed by the High court in W. P. No. 145 of 90 decided on 21. 2. 1991 wherein it has been held that the question of limitation for challenging the order of termination passed in the year 1981 would not arise. Accordingly, respondent No. 1 contended that the petition being devoid of any merit or substance deserved to be dismissed. ( 7 ) I have, accordingly, heard them at length and perused the record. Critical examination of the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue appears to be illegal and erroneous. Accordingly, respondent No. 1 contended that the petition being devoid of any merit or substance deserved to be dismissed. ( 7 ) I have, accordingly, heard them at length and perused the record. Critical examination of the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue appears to be illegal and erroneous. In an appeal preferred by petitioners either the same should have been allowed or the same should have been dismissed on merits, But a direction to hold fresh enquiry after parties are given opportunity to lead evidence with regard to unemployment of respondent No. 1, was wholly unwarranted. It is so as respondent No. 1 employee had not preferred any appeal/cross-appeal/cross-objection against the findings of joint Registrar wherein it was held that respondent No. 1 employee would not be entitled to any backwages on the principles of no work no pay . Secondly only that relief could have been granted to respondent No. 1 employee which he had claimed, but any relief which was not claimed by the respondent employee could not have been granted by the Board of Revenue. ( 8 ) AFTER having examined the said impugned order, I find, that the submission as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners have merit and substance. The Board of Revenue has transgressed the powers conferred on it while deciding an appeal under Section 77{2) of the Act. Since there was no appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 employee, against the order of Joint Registrar, the question of granting relief to the employee did not arise. Thus, looking the impugned order from all angles I deem it fit to remand the matter for rehearing by the Board of Revenue on merits. The impugned order Annexure P-17 of the Board of Revenue stands hereby quashed. Parties agree that they shall appear before the Board of Revenue on 8. 9. 2000 for further participation in the matter. It is expected that the Board of Revenue shall give opportunity of hearing to the parties and shall thereafter pass an order. It is further expected that the said appeal shall be decided within a period of 6 months from the date of first appearance of the parties. ( 9 ) WITH the aforesaid observation this petition stands disposed of, but with no order as to costs. Security cost deposited by them shall be refunded after due verification. Petition disposed of