E.Padmanabhan, J.: Subramanian alias Sivasubramaniam has been detained by the orders of the first respondent in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec.3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 as a goonda. His next friend has filed the present habeas corpus petition. 2. Heard Mr.K.Manivasakam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.C.M. Gunasekaran, learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the respondents. 3. First of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner requires to be mentioned and rejected as there is no substance. The representation submitted on 17.9.1999. As seen from the files and as seen from the materials placed, there is no delay at all in considering the representation. Hence this point deserves to be rejected. 4. The second contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not only substantial but also deserves to be accepted. The order of detention refers to three adverse cases. The first adverse case was alleged to have been committed on 8.11.1991; the second adverse case was alleged to have been committed on 7.2.1996; and the third adverse case was alleged to have been committed on 19.12.1996. The ground case, it is stated, was committed by the detenu on 2.8.1999. Learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to the three adverse cases, the grave allegations and the charges has stated that in the ground case which is dated 2.8.1999, there is no material at all to hold that the detenu is a goonda as defined in Sec.2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. The expression ‘goonda’ has been defined in Sec.2(f) which reads thus: "Goonda" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offence punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the India Penal Code (Central Act XLV of 1860). From the said definition it is clear that to hold a person to be a goonda, he should have either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offence, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code. From the said definition it is clear that to hold a person to be a goonda, he should have either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offence, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code. In the present case though the adverse cases are punishable under any one of those chapters, those adverse cases, as already pointed out, were alleged to have been committed respectively on 8.11.1991, 7.2.1996 and 19.12.1996. A reference to those adverse cases, it is clear that the modus operandi is not identical, but they are totally different. As regards the ground case, which is alleged to have been committed on 2.8.1999, being a solitary incident, it cannot be said that the detenu has habitually committed or attempts to commit any one of those offences falling under Chapters XVI or XVII or XXII of I.P.C. There is a wide gap between the third adverse case and the ground case. 5. In this respect, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 361, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the expression "habitually" as has been defined in Sec.2(d) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981. In para 31 Venkataramiah, J. speaking for the Bench held thus: "The expression ‘habitually’ means ‘repeatedly’ or ‘persistently’. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar respective acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word ‘habitually’ separately in sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (iv) of Sec.2(d) and not in sub-clauses (iii) and (v) of Sec.2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Sec.2(d) was sufficient to make a person an ‘anti-social element’. the definition would have run as ‘anti-social element’ means "a person who habitually is...". If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Sec.2(d) was sufficient to make a person an ‘anti-social element’. the definition would have run as ‘anti-social element’ means "a person who habitually is...". As Sec.2(d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub-clause (iii) or subclause (v) of Sec.2(d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an ‘anti-social element’, in the case of sub-clause (i), subclause (ii) or sub-clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an ‘anti-social element’. Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an ‘anti-social element’. A single act or omission falling under sub-clause (i) and a single act or omission falling under sub-clause (iv) of Sec.2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterised as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea of ‘habit’ involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts of omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones. "[Italics Supplied] This pronouncement of the Apex Court squarely applies to the fact of the present case. Per contra, learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 1986 S.C.C. (Crl.) 481. In this case their Lordships referred to the earlier decision in Vijay Narain Singh’s case, 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 361. and on the facts of the case distinguished the dictum in Vijay Narain Singh’s case. In Raj Kumar Singh’s case, it has been held thus: "11. We have noted who is an anti-social element under the Act. The petitioner/appellant has not yet been convicted under any of these sections referred to hereinbefore. and on the facts of the case distinguished the dictum in Vijay Narain Singh’s case. In Raj Kumar Singh’s case, it has been held thus: "11. We have noted who is an anti-social element under the Act. The petitioner/appellant has not yet been convicted under any of these sections referred to hereinbefore. So far the incidents referred to hereinbefore betray criminal propensity. The first incident is of a case which was one year prior to the date of the detention order and the other incident was of the same date. If in this background, an appropriate authority charged with the implementation of the Act comes to the satisfaction that the petitioner/appellant is one who is habitually committing or abetting the commission of offences. Such a conclusion is neither irrational nor unreasonable. 12. .........We only reiterate that what the majority of the learned Judges said was that while adequacy or sufficiency was no ground of a challenge, relevancy or proximity were grounds of challenge. We may respectfully add that proximity would be relevant in order to determine whether an order of detention was arrived at irrationally or unreasonably." The emphasis being proximity, it is relevant to determine whether the order of detention arrived at was irrational or unreasonable. 6. In Fitrat Raza Khan v. State of U.P., 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 472, A.P.Sen, J. had occasion to consider propensities of the detenu to instigate the particular community to communal violence and on the facts of the case the propensity was being repetitive, which is an annual feature in that case, it was held that there is nexus and propensity. This is not the case here. 7. Under these circumstances, while following the Vijay Narain Singh’s case, 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 361. we are of the considered view that on the facts it cannot be said that the detenu is a goonda as defined in Sec.2(f) of the Act and on this ground the order of detention is quashed. This. H.C.P. is allowed. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless his presences is required in connection with any other case.