JUDGMENT - Dr. PRATIBHA UPASANI, J.:---This Criminal Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner/original accused No, 1, being aggrieved by the order dated 10th October, 1994 passed by the Special Judge, Solapur in C.R. No. 300 of 1993 against the petitioner and three others. By the impugned order, the learned Special Judge, Solapur, rejected the prayer made by the investigating agency to the grant of 'A' Summary and further directed the Investigating Officer to obtain necessary sanction from the competent authority for filing charge-sheet against the petitioner/accused. The learned Special Judge accordingly directed the Investigating Officer to take necessary steps in that behalf. The petitioner is particularly aggrieved by that part of the impugned order, whereby, after rejecting grant of 'A' Summary, the Special Judge directed the Investigating Officer to obtain necessary sanction from the competent authority for filing charge-sheet against the accused, directing thereby to take necessary steps in that behalf. 2.To appreciate the controversy involved in the matter, few facts are required to be stated, which are as follows: The petitioner R.N. Raje is original accused No. 1 in C.R. No. 300 of 1995 registered by the Anti Corruption Bureau (A.C.B.), Solapur under sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. At the relevant time, he was attached to the Vijapur Naka Police Station as Sub-Inspector of Police. Accused No. 2 Shivshankar N. Chendke, P.C. No. 1345 was also attached to the same Police Station, while accused No. 3 Raghunath D.Survase is a pan shop owner. 3.The petitioner has stated in his petition that one Nagnath Mallikarjun Kalburgi, a resident of Kamala Nagar, Solapur, was a history sheeter and was involved in several cases with various police stations of Solapur. According to the petitioner, on 26th November, 1993, the said Kalburgi approached Dy. S.P. Shri B.R. Chavan of A.C.B., Solapur, and complained that on 25th November, 1993, he learnt that a complaint against him was lodged at the Audyogik Vasahat Police Chowki, and that, investigation in that respect was entrusted to the petitioner R.N. Raje. According to the petitioner, the said Kalburgi is alleged to have met the petitioner, and pleaded with him not to take any action against him. He allegedly also told him to hush up the complaint and the petitioner allegedly demanded Rs. 5,000/- for hushing up the said complaint, but later on, agreed to accept Rs. 2,000/-. According to the petitioner, the said Kalburgi is alleged to have met the petitioner, and pleaded with him not to take any action against him. He allegedly also told him to hush up the complaint and the petitioner allegedly demanded Rs. 5,000/- for hushing up the said complaint, but later on, agreed to accept Rs. 2,000/-. The said Kalburgi, thereafter, allegedly gave Rs. 200/- to accused No. 2 Chendke, and promised to pay Rs. 1,800/- on the next day. Thereafter, he went to the said Dy. S.P. Chavan of A.C.B. and lodged his complaint. Chavan then arranged a trap and along with Kalburgi and panchas came to the Police Chowki. It was further alleged that at the police chowki , the petitioner Raje and the said Chendke allegedly demanded the money, and Chendke and the said Kalburgi went to accused No. 3, who was a pan shop owner. Kalburgi handed over a sum of Rs. 1,800/- to him. The police then apprehended all the three accused and F.I.R. came to be filed vide C.R. No. 300 of 1993. Panchnama was conducted and after investigation in the case, A.C.B. submitted report to the learned Special Judge, Solapur, stating therein, that in view of the fact that the said Kalburgi did not take panch from the police chowki till he handed over money to the accused No. 3, there was no independent evidence available to the police, except the fact that the said amount of Rs. 1,800/- was found with the pan shop owner, who was made accused No. 3. They, therefore, applied for 'A' Summary in the matter. The learned Special Judge, however, by his letter dated 10th October, 1994, addressed to Dy. S.P., A.C.B., Solapur, disagreed with the police report and rejected the prayer of the police for 'A' summary. The learned Special Judge further directed the A.C.B. to obtain necessary sanction from the competent authority for filing charge-sheet against the accused. It is against this part of the order that the present petitioner/accused No. 1 has approached this Court by filing this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the proceedings in C.R. No. 300 of 1993, initiated by A.C.B., Solapur. It is submitted by Mr. It is against this part of the order that the present petitioner/accused No. 1 has approached this Court by filing this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the proceedings in C.R. No. 300 of 1993, initiated by A.C.B., Solapur. It is submitted by Mr. Mundargi, the learned Advocate for the petitioner/accused No. 1 Raje that the learned Special Judge was well within his rights in rejecting the prayer of grant of 'A' Summary, if he did not agree with the said Report submitted by police. But that, directing the Investigating Officer to obtain necessary sanction from the competent authority for filing charge-sheet against the accused, and directing the police to take necessary steps in this behalf, was absolutely improper. To substantiate his argument, he relied upon A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 117 (Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra)1. 4.Mr. Mundargi for petitioner submitted that the learned Special Judge had no authority to direct the police to file charge-sheet, that functions of the Magistrate (in this case, the Special Judge) and the functions of the police are entirely different and though, the Magistrate or the Judge may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot impinge upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view. Mr. Mundargi therefore, forcefully argued that though the Special Judge was well within his jurisdiction and discretion to reject the grant of 'A' summary report, he had no authority to compel the police to file the charge-sheet, when they had filed 'A' Summary report, and therefore, the action of the Special Judge was erroneous, and the same should be quashed. 5.I have heard Mr. Mundargi for petitioner at length. I have also heard Mr. Salvi, the learned A.P.P. for respondent/State. I have also perused the proceedings. I have also gone through the decision of the Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha's case (supra). 5.I have heard Mr. Mundargi for petitioner at length. I have also heard Mr. Salvi, the learned A.P.P. for respondent/State. I have also perused the proceedings. I have also gone through the decision of the Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha's case (supra). In this case, the Supreme Court has elaborately discussed the powers of the police, while conducting investigation and after they file charge-sheet, and has considered the point whether the Magistrate can call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet when they have sent a report under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 though there is no case made out for sending upon an accused for trial. The Supreme Court in this case has observed that the function of the Magistracy and the police are entirely different, though, the Magistrate may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot impinge upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view. It is observed that the formation of an opinion by the police is a final step in the investigation, and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority. The Supreme Court has, at length, discussed the provisions of sections 157, 159, 168, 169, 170, 173 and 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (old Code), and has concluded in para 20 of the said judgment that there is no power, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a report under section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up an accused for trial. The Supreme Court has further held in para 12 as follows: "But, we may make it clear, that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless, because, as will be indicated later, it is open to him to take cognizance of an offence and proceed, according to law". In para 17 again, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "There is certainly no obligation, on the Magistrate, to accept the report, if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police. In para 17 again, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "There is certainly no obligation, on the Magistrate, to accept the report, if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police. Under those circumstances, if he still suspects that an offence has been committed, he is entitled, notwithstanding the opinion of the police, to take cognizance, under section 190(1)(c) of the Code. That provision in our opinion, is obviously intended to secure that offences may not go unpunished and justice may be invoked even where persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute, or the police, either wantonly or through bona fide error, fail to submit a report, setting out the facts constituting the offence. Therefore, a very wide power is conferred on the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence, not only when he receives information about the commission of an offence from a third person, but also where he has knowledge or even suspicion that the offence has been committed. It is open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, under section 190(1)(c), on the ground that, after having due regard to the final report and the police records placed before him, he has reason to suspect that an offence has been committed. Therefore, these circumstances will also clearly negative the power of a Magistrate to call for a charge-sheet from the police, when they have submitted a final report. The entire scheme of Chapter XIV clearly indicates that the formation of the opinion, as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused for trial, is that of the officer in-charge of the police station and that opinion determines whether the report is to be under section 170, being a charge-sheet, or under section 169, a final report. It is no doubt open to the Magistrate, as we have already pointed out, to accept or disagree with the opinion of the police and, if he disagrees, he is entitled to adopt any one of the courses indicated by us. But he cannot direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, because the submission of the report depends upon the opinion formed by the police, and not on the opinion of the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot compel the police to form a particular opinion, on the investigation, and to submit a report, according to such opinion. But he cannot direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, because the submission of the report depends upon the opinion formed by the police, and not on the opinion of the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot compel the police to form a particular opinion, on the investigation, and to submit a report, according to such opinion. That will be really encroaching on the sphere of the police and compelling the police to form an opinion so as to accord with the decision of the Magistrate and send a report either under section 169, or under section 170, depending upon the nature of the decision. Such a function has been left to the police under the Code". 6.Thus, from the above discussion, it is clear that though the Magistrate cannot compel the police to file a charge-sheet when they have submitted the final report, and the final report says that there is no case against the accused for sending him for trial, the Magistrate can still take cognizance under section 190(1)(c) of the Code, obviously, intending to secure that offenders may not go unpunished and it is obvious that he is not powerless to do so. Undoubtedly, investigation is the arena of the police, and the Magistrate is not empowered to impinge upon that arena. However, if he is not satisfied with the final report, he may give direction to the police for further investigation and may take cognizance, if he has got even a suspicion that offence has been committed. Therefore, it has to be said that though the Magistrate cannot force the police to change their opinion, and cannot force them to file a charge-sheet, the Magistrate can still adopt either of the above courses, and is not powerless to do so. 7.In the present case at hand also, the Special Judge rejected the 'A' Summary report. He was obviously well within his powers to do so. He was, however, satisfied after perusing the report, documents filed along with report, successful trap panchnama, and the complaint on record, that the evidence was not insufficient evidence. This was the reason for rejecting prayer of the petitioner for grant of 'A' Summary. The learned Special Judge had a very strong suspicion that the offence was indeed made out, and that, it would otherwise go unpunished. This was the reason for rejecting prayer of the petitioner for grant of 'A' Summary. The learned Special Judge had a very strong suspicion that the offence was indeed made out, and that, it would otherwise go unpunished. Since the alleged offender was a Sub-Inspector of Police, for taking cognizance, sanction was a must, without sanction, he could not have taken cognizance of the offence. Obtaining sanction was obviously not his job, therefore, he directed the police, not be file charge-sheet, not to change their opinion, but to take necessary steps to enable the learned Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence. This necessary step was obtaining sanction from the competent authority. This was the only direction given by the Special Judge to the police. This was as good as giving them direction for further investigation because obtaining sanction is a part of investigation only. This comes necessarily in the arena of the police. The exact words used by the Special Judge in the impugned order are that "I further direct the Investigating Officer to obtain necessary sanction from the competent authority for filling charge-sheet against the accused. Hence, you are hereby directed to take necessary steps in this behalf". The words which are pricking to the petitioner are filing charge-sheet against the accused. According to the petitioner, the Special Judge was not empowered to give this direction. 8.If an overall view of the order is taken, and if it is correctly interpreted, the Special Judge probably did not mean that. Probably and unfortunately, that part of the order is not happily worded. Hence, it will have to be clarified that no such authority vested with the Special Judge to direct the police to file the charge-sheet against the accused. For this purpose, the matter will have to be remanded back, to pass the order in accordance with law, keeping in mind the ratio of the Supreme Court's judgment in Abhinandan Jha's case (supra). Hence, the following order: The impugned order dated 10th October, 1994 of the Special Judge, Solapur is hereby set-aside, as far as his direction to the Investigating Officer to file the charge-sheet is concerned. The matter is remanded back to the Special Judge, Solapur for taking all the necessary steps for taking cognizance of the alleged offences, after his rejection of the 'A' summary report. The matter is remanded back to the Special Judge, Solapur for taking all the necessary steps for taking cognizance of the alleged offences, after his rejection of the 'A' summary report. Criminal Writ Petition No. 158 of 1995 is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly. -----