JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 9th February, 1984 passed by Sri M. R. Mullick, District Judge, Howrah whereby and whereunder the said learned Judge allowed the suit for divorce filed by the respondent herein. 2. Having regard to the nature of the controversy it is not necessary to state the fact in great detail. Suffice it to point out that the parties were married according to Hindu Rites and had started living together at village Pantihal. The respondent herein brought out the aforementioned suit for divorce, inter. alia, on the ground that the appellant herein was leading an adulterous life with one Dilip Das and again with one Manick Khara. By an amendment the ground of cruelty had also been taken. The appellant herein in her written statement as also additional written statement denied and disputed the aforementioned allegations. The learned Judge having regard to the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues :- 1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 2. Is the respondent guilty of adultery? 3. Is the petitioner entitled to get a decree of divorce as parayed for? 4. To what other relief or reliefs, if any, is the petitioner entitled? 5. Is the suitbad for non-joinder of parties? 6. Is the respondent No.1 guilty of cruelty? 3. The only issue pressed before the learned trial Judge was whether the suit should have been decreed on the ground of cruelty of the appellant or not? 4. The learned trial Judge with regard to the Issue No.2 held that the respondent had failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant herein was engaged in sexual interecourse with Dilip Das, Manick Khara or Shibsankar Majhi. 4. The learned trial Judge with regard to the Issue No.2 held that the respondent had failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant herein was engaged in sexual interecourse with Dilip Das, Manick Khara or Shibsankar Majhi. With regard to Issue No.6, as indicated hereinbefore, the petitioner-respondent brought the said ground by way of amendment of plaint, the material allegations in relation whereto are follows:- "The respondent No.1 misbehaved with the petitioner since the petitioner met her for close acquaintance on the Fulsajjya Day i.e. on 25th Jaistha, 1382 B.S, but instead of matrimonial connections expected from a wife and exchange of mutual cordial relations and affections as expected from a newly married couple of a middle class Bengali family, the respondent disclosed her mind about her unhappiness and dissatisfaction for her forced marriage without her consent inasmuch as the marriage was alleged to have taken place, without her consent, on the insistance of her brother-in-law (Bhagnipati) named Sachin Mal and, thus, avoided to establish the matrimonial connections and asked the petitioner not to touch her body and to expect any affectionate treatment by sexual connections in any manner. Such treatment of the respondent-wife shocked the petitioner and he was confused as to what he was to do under such cricumstances as his life would be barren with mental agonies and sufferings for the refusal of the respondent No.1, to lead a happy conjugal life. Shortly thereafter on the 9th day after marriage the respondent No.1 was taken to her father's house and the petitioner was advised to visit the father-in-law's place on the day. The petitioner tried to have sexual intercourse during the period of her stay for 7 days after Fulsajjya but the petitioner was not happy on account of cold attitude of the respondent-wife who was found frigid and threatened to teach the petitioner a lesson in due course. As a matter of fact when the petitioner visited his father-in-law's house on the 10th day after marriage in the morning he had a sad experience of very cold reception and the respondent No.1 did not even care to meet throughout the day and he was insulted with abusive language by the members of her father's family including her father and the petitioner had to return back with mental agonies. Practically no connection was kept and respondent even did not care to send any information for a long period of two months when on or about two months the respondent with her father came to the petitioner's house and asked for apology from the petitioner's mother who out of kindness and to avoid remark from para people and society allowed the respondent to stay in the house, but the petitioner started to show her obstinacy and frigidity as before and openly said before family members about her ill-luck for marrying the petitioner when she intended to marry her one fiance. The respondent-wife's conduct was cruel to the petitioner since the marriage as the petitioner was not liked by her and she would lead such life of her choice which will compel the petitioner to severe all connections with her. On account of respondent No. 1's cold attitude and insulting behaviour refusing to do any house-work for the petitioner even refusing to give a glass of water when asked for, the petitioner with serious mental sufferings had to engage himself for his service and for convenience of attendance used to stay at her sister's place at Howrah town and only on holidays and on occasions used to visit his own residence at Pantihal where his old mother, suffering from less eye sight and the eldest unmarried sister who used to attend sewing class at Domjur and agricultural lands at Pantihal." 5. It was further stated that taking advantage of the respondent's absence in house, the appellant picked up close intimacy with some friend of the locality. 6. The learned trial Judge while holding the Issue No.6 in favour of the respondent principally relied upon letters (Exbts. 1 and 1A) addressed to Manick Khara. The said two letters were admittedly written by the appellant herein but it was alleged that the same was done at the instance of her sister-in-law. In one of the letters she had invited Manick Khara to her room during the period of absence of her husband. The only defence taken by the appellant herein that the said letters had been written at the dictation of her sister-in-law. In one of the letters she had invited Manick Khara to her room during the period of absence of her husband. The only defence taken by the appellant herein that the said letters had been written at the dictation of her sister-in-law. The learned Judge having regard to the evidence of one Madan Bag as also his brother and sister has come to the finding that when the former protested against the behaviour of Dilip Das and Manick Khara, they threatened with dire consequence and even assaulted him. The learned trial Judge further relied upon the evidence of Biswanath Pal who had stated that Dilip Das and Manick Khara used to visit the appellant frequently. 7. It is borne on record that the appellant came to live with the respondent two months after the marriage. It has further been found that at her instance Dilip Das and Manick Khara assaulted him. He lived in his native village with his sister and mother. A Criminal Case was also lodged in relation to the said incident. The conduct and behaviour of the appellant with her husband had also been condemned by the learned Trial Judge. The appellant herein, the learned trial Judge found, failed to give any satisfactory explanation as to why the respondent had to leave matrimonial house and to live elsewhere with all other members of the family. She, on her own, stayed back all along. It was held:- "It is clear from the evidence that Archana has been living with her husband's house alone with the help of some persons against whom her husband has much to say. This behaviour of the respondent cannot be tolerated by a husband. She is expected to be devoted to husband after marriage. It is well settled that in order to prove whether the respondent treated the petitioner with cruelty the whole matrimonial relations must be considered as a whole and this rule is of special value when the cruelty does not consist of violent acts. In this case even though there is no satisfactory proof of physical violence by the respondent to the husband, but if the whole conduct of the respondent towards the petitioner is considered as a whole I have got no doubt in my mind that the respondent treated the petitioner with cruelty." 8. Before us the respondent did not appear. 9. Mrs. Before us the respondent did not appear. 9. Mrs. Smritikana Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of -the appellant, inter alia, submitted that in the wedlock the appellant has given birth to a son and she has been living still at her in law's place. According to the learned Counsel, it was really Sandhya Rani, her sister-in-law (husband's sister) who had an illicit relation with Manick Khara and it was at the instance of some designing persons that the respondent had been living elsewhere. It was submitted that the learned Trial Judge having regard to his findings to the effect that the charge of adultery against the appellant had not been proved, ought not to have granted a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty, inter alia, on the self-same allegations. It was submitted that no pleading with regard to the aforementined two letters had been raised in the plaint and as such the same is not admissible. The learned Counsel strongly relied upon a decision of this Court in Sri Pranab Biswas vs. Smt. Mrinmayee Dassi & Anr., reported in AIR 1976 Cal. 156 . According to the learned Counsel, the mental cruelty suffered by the respondent was required to be pleaded and proved which has not been done in the instant case. Rliance in this connection has been placed on Jyotsna Mukherjee vs. Utpal Mukherjee, reported in 1998(1) CRN 318 and V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat, reported in AIR 1994 SC 710 . Mrs. Mukherjee further submitted that the petitioner-respondent has not paid any amount to the appellant for her maintenance for a long time. 10. The learned Trial Judge has granted a decree for divorce after considering the evidences on record. It is now a settled principle of law that normally a court of First Appeal would not set aside the findings of fact particularly which are based on the oral evidence unless a case of non-consideration of some material evidence and taking into consideration of some inadmissible evidence is made out. 11. In Kalipada Saha vs. Sm. Lila Rani Saha, reported in 1995(1) CRN 284, I speaking for the Division Bench, inter alia, noticed :- "Moreover the learned Court below upon appraisal of the evidences brought on records accepted the plea of marriage. Such a finding based on oral testimonies of the witnesses shall not be ordinarily interfered with by the Appellate Court. Lila Rani Saha, reported in 1995(1) CRN 284, I speaking for the Division Bench, inter alia, noticed :- "Moreover the learned Court below upon appraisal of the evidences brought on records accepted the plea of marriage. Such a finding based on oral testimonies of the witnesses shall not be ordinarily interfered with by the Appellate Court. In Mandholal vs. Official Assignee of Bombay, reported in AIR 1950 Federal Court page 21, it has been observed: "It is true that a Judge of first instance can never be treated as infallible in determining on which side the truth lies and like other Tribunals he may go wrong on question of fact but on such matters if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at, the Appeal Court should not lightly interfere with the judgment." , 12. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhusudan Das vs. Narayani Rai, reported in AIR 1983 SC 114 . In this case, the learned trial Court had considered the testimonies of the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff relating to the fact at issue. I find that the findings arrived at by the trial court are reasonable and as such there is no reason as to why this court would differ with the said findings on the aforementioned point. 13. In Rajbir Kaur & Anr. vs. M/s. S. Chokosiri and Co., reported in AIR 1988 SC 1845 , the Apex Court upon consideration of a large number of decisions observed as follows :- "18. Reference on the point could also usefully be made to A.L. Goodhard's Article (71 LQR 402 at 405) in which the learned author point out: 'A judge sitting without a jury must perform dual function. The first function consists in the establishment of the particular facts. This may be described as the perceptive function. It is what you actually perceive by the five senses. It is a datum of experience as distinct from a conclusion.' 'It is obvious that, in almost all cases tried by a Judge without a jury, an Appellate Court, which has not had an opportunity of seeing the witnesses, must accept his conclusions of fact because it cannot tell on what ground he reached them and what impression the various witnesses made on him'." (Emphasis supplied) 14. The following is the statement of the same principle in 'The Supreme Court Practice' (White Book 1988 Edn. Vol. 1) 'Great weight is due to the decision of a Judge of first instance whenever, in a conflict of testimony, the demeanour and manner of witnesses who have been seen and heared by him are material elements in the consideration of the truthfulness of these statements. But the parties to the cause are nevertheless entitled as well on questions of fact as on questions of law to demand the decision of the Court of Appeal, and that Court cannot excuse, it self from the task of weighing conflicting evidence, and drawing its own conclusions, though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect.' (pp. 85455). "...... Not to have seen witness puts appellate Judges in a permanent position of disadvantage against the trial Judge, and unless it can be shown that he had failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage for-for example has failed to observe inconsistencies or indisputable fact or material probabilities (ibid. and Tuill (1945)/15; Watt vs. Thomas (1947) AC 484).- the higher Court ought not to take the responsibilities of recersing conclusions so arrived at merely as the result of their own comparisons and criticisms of the witnesses, and of their view of the probabilities of the case" (p. 855). "..... But while the Court of Appeal is always reluctant to reject a finding by a Judge of the specific or primary facts deposed to by the witnesses, especially when the finding is based on the credibility or bearing of a witness, it is willing to form an independnet opinion upon the proper inference to be drawn from it........" (p. 855). A consideration of this aspect would be incomplete without a reference to the observations of B.K. Mukherjee, J., in Sarju Pershad vs. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, 1950 SCR 781 at p. 783: AIR 1951 SC 120 p. 121) which as a succinct statement of the rule cannot indeed be bettered: "The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case. In such cases, the appellate Court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is- and it is nothing more than a rule of practice-that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decisions hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interefere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact." 19. The area in which the question lies in the present case is the area of the perceptive functions of the trial Judge where the possibility of errors of inference does not ply a significant role. The question whether the statement of the witnesses in regard to what was amendable to perception by sensual experience as to what they say and heard is acceptable or not is the area in which the well-known limitation on the powers of the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence falls. The appellate Court, if it seeks to reverse those findings of fact, must give cogent reasons to demonstrate how the trial Court fell into an obvious error." 15. Can it be said, having regard to the finding of the learned trial Judge, that he misconstrued the evidences on record? The answer to the aforementioned question must be rendered in negative. 16. Mrs. Mukherjee has strongly relied upon the well known decision of the Appex Court in Dr. N.O. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1534 , wherein the Apex Court has held: "But does the law require, as the High Court has held, that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt? 16. Mrs. Mukherjee has strongly relied upon the well known decision of the Appex Court in Dr. N.O. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1534 , wherein the Apex Court has held: "But does the law require, as the High Court has held, that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt? In other words, though burden lies on the petitioner to establish the cahrge of cruelty, what is the standard of proof to be applied in order to judge whether the burden has beep discharged?" 17. Although, it is true that unless a fact is pleaded, no amount of evidence is admissible but here it is a case where the allegations of cruelty had been pleaded. It was not necessary for the petitioner-respondent to plead evidence. Exbts. 1 and 1A aforementioned were brought on record by way of evidence in support of proof of the allegation of cruelty and/or adultery. The learned Trial Judge might not have relied upon those documents for the purpsoe of holding that the appellant had been living in adultery but it is also beyond any doubt that the appellant had not denied or disputed the genuiness thereof. She had taken a defence that it was at the instance of her sister-in-law that those two letters were written by her. Onus probandi in relation thereto was upon her. She failed to discharge the said onus. Furthermore, we have gone through the said letters and are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the same had been written at the dictation of somebody. Had those letters been written at the dictation of her sister-in-law against whom she had made allegations, the writing would have been different. Furthermore, the general conduct of the appellant must also be taken into consideration for arriving at the aforementioned fact of cruelty. On the appellant's own showing Sandhya, her sister-in-law was the route cause of the trouble. Why then should she obey the dictation of her sister-in-law is the question which arose for consideration but has not been answered by the appellant. 18. The materials on record clearly bear out that those two letters came to the hand of the respondent per chance. Why then should she obey the dictation of her sister-in-law is the question which arose for consideration but has not been answered by the appellant. 18. The materials on record clearly bear out that those two letters came to the hand of the respondent per chance. We, therefore, having regard to the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Trial Judge, are of the opinion that it is not a fit case in which the finding of the learned Trial Judge should be interefered with. 19. In Jyotsna Mukherjee vs. Utpal Mukherjee, reported in 1998(1) CHN 318 , this court noticed the decision of the Supreme Court in V. Bhagat (supra) wherein it has been held that while scrutinising the evidence on record to determine whether the grounds alleged are made out and in determining the relief to be granted, the circumstances inviting the Court to hold that the marriage has irretrievably broken down can certainly be borne in mind. The said decision, therefore, runs counter to the submission of the learned Counsel. 20. In this case also the parties are living separately for a long time. The fact that the marriage has broken down permanently is not in dispute. Things had come to such an extent that the respondent had to leave his native village with all his family members leaving the appellant alone in his house. It is no use, at the argument stage in the appeal, (having regard to the fact that the suit was filed in the year 1981) to say that appellant intends to live with her husband. She never exprssed such desire at the relevant time inasmuch as, she had never gone to her husband even after he had to live his native village. 21. In Jyotsna Mukherejee (supra), the Division Bench itself held:- "In order to prove cruelty, the general rule in case of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered and the court should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the parties as well as their social status and should also consider the impact of the conduct of one spouse in the mind of the other. It is now well settled law that where a divorce is sought on the ground of cruelty, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has treated him with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him or her to live with the defendant. [See: Dr. N. G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, 1981(1) DMC 293(SC).]. The incidence that the wife had returned to her father's house and continued to stay there even today cannot be taken as too trivial. In the present case, the admitted position is that since the marriage which took place in the year 1984, the wife had been staying apart from her husband. In view of such conduct of the wife, the husband might feel irritated. In our view, the conduct of the wife in the present case must be considered to be 'cruel' within the meaning of section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Admittedly within 25 days from the date of marriage, the wife left the matrimonial home and since then has been residing with her father without showing any intention of coming back." The said decision therefore also supports the case of the respondent. 22. In the instant case the fact of the matter is far more serious. The appellant herself started quarreling with her husband on the very first day and stated that she had been forced to marry. She left her matrimonial home immediately and come back only after two months. She, as the evidences on record show, had been a constant source of irritation of the family members. Rightly or wrongly even a criminal case had to be instituted because of her association with some other youngmen of the locality. Having regard to the aforementiond factual position, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where the finding of the learned trial Judge should be interfered with. 23. The application for maintenance had also been filed after the matter was heard in part and not immediately after filing the appeal. 24. For the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in this appeal. For the self-same reasons, no case has been made out to allow the application for maintenance at this stage and accordingly the application and the appeal are dismissed. 24. For the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in this appeal. For the self-same reasons, no case has been made out to allow the application for maintenance at this stage and accordingly the application and the appeal are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.