Judgment Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This revisional application is at the instance of a substituted decree holder and is directed against order No. 109 dated August 17, 1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, 4th Court, Alipore in Title Execution Case No. 15 of 1988 thereby directing restoration of possession in favour of the opposite party. 2. The following questions arise for determination in this revisional application:- a) If an interim order of stay of all further proceedings of execution case is granted by a revisional court till the disposal of an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but if the suit, out of which the said revisional application arises, abates on the death of the defendant, whether the interim order granted in the civil revisional application continues inspite of abatement of the main suit? b) If an interim order as stated above is granted by a revisional court till the disposal of the revisional application but the said revisional application is dismissed for default and subsequently, the same is restored at a point of time when the opposite party in the revisional application is dead, whether the order of restoration should be treated to be a valid order of restoration ? c) If at the time of dismissal of the revisional application for default it is specifically recorded that all interim orders will stand vacated but at the time of restoration of such revisional application simply the earlier order dismissing the revisional application is recalled whether the revisional application will revive with the interim order? 3. The fact giving rise to the instant revisional application may be summarized thus: One Sukhlal filed a suit for eviction of the opposite party No.1 herein viz. Amar Krishna Ghosh and the said suit was decreed on February 13, 1976. The said decree was put into execution thereby giving rise to Title Execution Case No. 54 of 1976. In the year 1977, opposite party No.2, the son of opposite party No.1 filed a suit against Sukhlal for declaration that the decree passed in favour of Sukhlal was not binding upon him as he was the real tenant not his father. The said suit was dismissed on September 30, 1985 and the appeal preferred against such order of dismissal was also dismissed on February 21, 1988. The said suit was dismissed on September 30, 1985 and the appeal preferred against such order of dismissal was also dismissed on February 21, 1988. In the meantime, in the year 1983 another suit was filed by opposite party No.3, the daughter of opposite party No.1 being Title Suit No. 135 of 1983 claiming the similar relief prayed for by her brother that her father was not the real tenant but she was the real tenant and the said suit was also dismissed and such decree was confirmed by the first appellate court below. In the meantime, Sukhlal took possession of the disputed property through the help of police on January 6, 1983 but on the self-same night the opposite party No.1 took forcible possession of the property. 4. The opposite party No.1 subsequently filed another suit against Sukhlal being Title Suit No.9 of 1983 for declaration that the deed of conveyance in favour of Sukhlal was a loan in substance not out and out sale. Sukhlal, on the other hand, filed a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against all the opposite parties being Title Suit No. 84 of 1983 and ultimately the said Title Suit No. 84 of 1983 was decreed on contest on August 17, 1988. Sukhlal put the said decree into execution thereby giving rise to Title Execution Case No. 15 of 1988. The opposite party No.1 filed another suit being Title Suit No. 89 of 1988 against Sukhlal thereby making his son and daughter as proforma defendants for declaration that the decree passed in Title Suit No. 84 of 1983 was not binding upon him and in the said Title Suit No. 89 of 1988 opposite party No.1 filed an application for temporary injunction restraining Sukhlal from interfering with his possession by executing the decree passed in Title Suit No. 84 of 1983. The learned trial Judge allowed such application granting temporary injunction till the disposal of Title Suit No. 89 of 1988. Sukhlal preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 306 of 1991 and the learned first appellate court below set aside the order of temporary injunction granted by the learned trial Judge. Against such order of the learned first appellate court in Misc. Sukhlal preferred an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 306 of 1991 and the learned first appellate court below set aside the order of temporary injunction granted by the learned trial Judge. Against such order of the learned first appellate court in Misc. Appeal No. 306 of 1991, opposite party No. 1 preferred a revisional application before this court being C.O. No. 3242 of 1993 and on April 7, 1993 this court granted stay of all further proceedings of Title Execution Case No. 15 of 1988 until further order. 5. During the pendency of the aforesaid revisional application Sukhlal died on January 11, 1996 but no application for substitution was made either in C.O. No. 3242 of 1993 or in the Title Suit No. 89 of 1988 out of which the said revisional application has arisen. On July 9, 1996 the said civil revisional application was dismissed for default with a specific order that the interim order granted earlier shall stand vacated. However, on July 17, 1996 the said revisional application was restored but no specific order for restoration of interim order was passed. It may be mentioned here that when the aforesaid orders were passed on July 9, 1996 or on July 17, 1996, Sukhlal, the opposite party No.1 in the revisional application and defendant No.1 in the original suit was dead. On January 14, 1997 when the said civil application came up for hearing, the learned Judge recorded an order of abatement against the opposite party No.1 therein, as the petitioner of the said revisional application did not take any step for susbtitution of the heirs of Sukhlal in the said revisional application. In the meantime on February 20, 1997 the present petitioner, the heir of Sukhlal filed an application in Title Execution Case No. 15 of 1988 for substitution and the same was served upon the learned advocate for the opposite party No.1 on March 25, 1997 and on April 24, 1997 the application for substitution was allowed by the learned executing court. Ultimately, the present petitioner filed an application for police help in the execution case and possession was obtained by dispossessing the present opposite party No.1 through the help of police on March 6, 1999. 6. Ultimately, the present petitioner filed an application for police help in the execution case and possession was obtained by dispossessing the present opposite party No.1 through the help of police on March 6, 1999. 6. Thereafter, the opposite party No.1 filed an application for restoration of possession before the learned executing court on the ground that inspite of existence of the order of stay of all further proceedings of the said execution case by this court in the revisional application filed by the opposite party No. 1, the present petitioner had dispossessed him. 7. By the order impugned herein, the learned executing court has allowed such application thereby directing restoration of possession on the ground that it was the duty of the present petitioner to disclose to the executing court that the civil revisional application filed at the instance of opposite party No.1 was pending wherein there was order of stay of all further proceedings of execution case which was restored after dismissal of the said revisional application for default. Being dissatisfied, the heir of Sukhlal has come up in revisions. 8. Mr. Roychowdhury, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that his client got possession of the property at a point of time when there was no order of stay of execution case. According to Mr. Roychowdhury, once the suit out of which the earlier revisional application arose had abated on April 10, 1996 for not substituting the heir and legal representative of Sukhlal, who died on January 11, 1996, from that date, the connected revisional application pending before this court had also become infructuous and as such the interim order stood vacated. Mr. Roychowdhury further submits that apart from the aforesaid fact, when the revisional application was dismissed for default, Sukhlal was dead and as such the said revisional application could not be restored without substituting the heir of Sukhlal as a party in the said revisional application and the order of restoration was invalid. Mr. Roychowdhury further contends that assuming for the sake of argument that order of restoration was valid, there being no specific order restoring also the interim order, the original order of stay granted while entertaining the revisional application was not restored. Mr. Roychowdhury, therefore, prays for setting aside the order impugned in this application. 9. Mr. Mr. Roychowdhury further contends that assuming for the sake of argument that order of restoration was valid, there being no specific order restoring also the interim order, the original order of stay granted while entertaining the revisional application was not restored. Mr. Roychowdhury, therefore, prays for setting aside the order impugned in this application. 9. Mr. Sarkar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.1 has on the other hand supported the order passed by the learned executing court and has contended that the present petitioner, the heir of Sukhlal, did not disclose the death of Sukhlal and the names of his heir and legal representative, as a result, his client could not file any application for substitution within the period of limitation in the suit or in the revisional application. According to Mr. Sarkar, in view of amended provision of Order 22 Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, a duty was cast upon the learned advocate for Sukhlal to disclose the names of heirs and legal representative of his deceased client and as such his client should not suffer for not disclosing the name of the heir, as a result of which his client could not file any application for substitution. Mr. Sarkar relies upon two decisions of Supreme Court in the case of Gangadhar and Anr. vs. Rajkumar, reported in AIR 1983 SC 1202 and in the case of Sital Prosad vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1 and contends that in the absence of any communication of death by the learned advocate for Sukhlal in the previous revisional application, this court should not interfere with the order of executing court directing restoration of possession. 10. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties and after going through the materials on record I find that the fate of this revisional application depends on the answer to the question whether on March 6, 1999, the date of dispossession of the opposite party No.1, there was any valid order of stay of all further proceedings of the Title Execution case concerned. For appreciating the aforesaid question we should bear in mind the well settled position of law relating to abatement of suit and proceeding and its effect. 11. For appreciating the aforesaid question we should bear in mind the well settled position of law relating to abatement of suit and proceeding and its effect. 11. There is no dispute with the proposition of law that if on the death of a party to a suit right to sue survives but no application for substitution of the heirs and legal representative is filed within ninety days from the date of death of such a party, the suit shall abate so far as the deceased party is concerned. If at the time of death of such a party, a revisional application is pending and an application for substitution has been filed in the pending revisional application within the said period and is allowed, such order will save the suit from abatement notwithstanding the fact that no separate application for substitution is filed in the suit. But if no application is filed within the aforesaid period either in the revisional application or in the suit, the suit shall abate immediately on the expiry of ninety days from the date of death. Such abatement is automatic even in the absence of any formal order recording abatement. 12. The effect of abatement is the death of the suit for the time being so long such abatement is not set aside by a court after being satisfied that the application for setting aside abatement was prevented by sufficient cause from filing application for substitution within the period of limitation. 13. In the instant case, Sukhlal, the defendant against whom the relief was claimed by the opposite party No.1 died on January 11, 1996 and as no application for substitution of his heir and legal representative was filed either in the suit or in the pending civil revisional application arising out of such suit, from April 10, 1996 the suit had abated and in view of abatement of the suit itself, the pending revisional application had become infructuous and the interim order passed therein lost its force. 14. Over and above, as indicated earlier, the previous revisional application was dismissed for default on July 9, 1996 with a specific direction vacating all interim order. The said order dated July 9, 1996 was however recalled on the prayer of the opposite party No.1 herein who was the petitioner of the said revisional application. 14. Over and above, as indicated earlier, the previous revisional application was dismissed for default on July 9, 1996 with a specific direction vacating all interim order. The said order dated July 9, 1996 was however recalled on the prayer of the opposite party No.1 herein who was the petitioner of the said revisional application. But on July 17, 1996 at the time of recall of order dated July 9, 1996, Sukhlal, the opposite party therein, was admittedly dead. Therefore order dated July 17, 1996 was passed against a dead man. It is needless to mention here that an order against a dead-man is a nullity and is not binding upon the heirs and legal representatives of such a dead person except under the circumstances mentioned in Order 22 Rule 4(4) of the Code. Thus, the heir of Sukhlal may take advantage of the order dated July 9, 1996 which was passed in favour of his predecessor' but he is not bound by the latter order dated July 17, 1996 passed against the interest of Sukhlal without giving him opportunity of being heard. 15. At any rate, after April 10, 1996 there was no valid order to stay of execution case by virtue of operation of law and the heir of Sukhlal added himself in the execution case at a time when there was no order of stay and consequently got possession in March, 1999. Even at that point of time, there was no impediment to proceed with the title execution case. 16. The two Supreme Court decisions cited by Mr. Sarkar arose out of a proceeding for setting aside abatement where the High Court while considering the question of sufficient cause for setting aside abatement ignored the provision contained in Order 22 Rule 10A of the Code. Under the aforesaid circumstances the Apex Court set aside the orders of the High Court and found that the applications were ignorant of the death of the deceased party and accepted such a ground as a valid one for setting aside abatement. In my opinion, those decisions cannot be of any avail to the opposite party No.1 for deciding the questions whether the suit abated and whether there was a valid order of stay inspite of such abatement. 17. In my opinion, those decisions cannot be of any avail to the opposite party No.1 for deciding the questions whether the suit abated and whether there was a valid order of stay inspite of such abatement. 17. The opposite party No. 1 has by filing a supplementary affidavit informed this court that he has filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code only on January 10, 2000 when this revisional application was being heard. I fail to understand how an application under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code can be filed after four years from the date of death of the defendant. The only course now open to the opposite party is to file an application under Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code along with a prayer for condonation of delay. Be that as it may, if any such application has been filed, the same will be decided in accordance with law but the fact remains that the heirs of Sukhlal have taken possession in execution of a decree not in violation of any valid and effective order passed by this court and thus the learned executing court acted illegally and with material irregularity in directing restoration of possession. 18. I thus answer question Nos. (a) and (b) formulated above in negative. In view of the aforesaid answer, I decide not to enter into the question (c) as the same is redundant. 19. The revisional application is thus allowed. Order impugned is set aside. I have not gone into the question whether the opposite party No.1 has made out a sufficient cause for setting aside abatement of Title Suit No. 89 of 1988 or C.O. No. 3242 of 1993. No costs. Revisional application allowed.