CHINNAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two Petitioners were dismissed from service during the year 1987 and they were members of Bangalore Newspapers employees' Union. This Union raised a dispute regarding the demands of the workmen in the 1st respondent, against the 1st respondent Management and the same was referred to the Industrial tribunal, Bangalore, for adjudication in I. D. No. 5/1985. The 1st respondent did not file any approval application under Section 33 (2) (B) of the Industrial Dispute Act, or sought permission from the tribunal before dismissing the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners and others filed complaints before the Tribunal and the same were numbered as complaint Nos. 3/87 and 14/87. The Tribunal tried the issue after domestic enquiry in favour of the workmen as per annexure B. The petitioners filed applications for interim relief and the Tribunal was pleased to pass an order granting 50% of the last drawn wages as an interim relief to both the petitioners as per annexure C. The Management was not complying with the interim order regularly as on 15. 9. 1995 and the interim lelief was not paid for six months continuously, the petitioners filed yet another application for enhancement of interim relief from 50% to 75% and asked for interest at 12% per annum for delayed payment. The tribunal after hearing the parties, passed an order on 7. 12. 1996 allowing the application enhancing the interim relief from 50% to 75% of the last drawn wage to both the petitioners along with other complainants and also granted 12% interest P. A on delayed payments as per Annexure D. After the order dated 7. 12. 96 the petitioners brought to the notice of the Tribunal on every day of hearing that the management was deliberately not complying with the orders of interim relief. In other words, it was pointed out that even the 50% interim relief was not being paid regularly and that it further did not comply with the order of the Tribunal enhancing the interim relief from 50% to 75% dated 7. 12. 96. ( 2 ) THE Management was dragging on the matter of proving the alleged misconduct by independent evidence before the Tribunal. Though the dismissal took place in the year 1987 and the complaint came to be filed in the same year, the domestic enquiry claimed to have been held was set aside in the year 1991. 12. 96. ( 2 ) THE Management was dragging on the matter of proving the alleged misconduct by independent evidence before the Tribunal. Though the dismissal took place in the year 1987 and the complaint came to be filed in the same year, the domestic enquiry claimed to have been held was set aside in the year 1991. The Management examined one witness in support of the allegation for the first time on 29. 10. 97. So far a large number of hearings have taken place since the complaint was filed. Inspire of it, the Management is not expediting in disposing of the matter despite efforts made and the management failed to settle the matter though the misconduct is not at all serious which is only with the main object of tiring out the workers and weakening their union. It was pointed out before the tribunal that the non-compliance of the order of the Tribunal would amount to contempt of the Tribunal. In fact, applications were also filed in this behalf as per Annexure E and the management filed its objections to the said application as per Annexure F. It is contended that it was also suggested that the Tribunal had not given permission to the Management to lead evidence to comply with the order. This course could have been adopted by the Tribunal in order to put an end to the agony of the workers/petitioners who have'been struggling to get justice from 1987. But however, the Tribunal did not appreciate the sufferings of the workmen and took a different view and rejected the application. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Industrial tribunal dated 15. 12. 98 in complaint Nos. 3 and14/1987 as per annexure A these two Writ Petitions are filed. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT filed counter statement contending inter alia that the order passed by the Tribunal is without jurisdiction and no such direction could be issued as an interim order of relief in favour of the petitioners. The Writ Petition is not maintainable as the same is filed against the Interlocutory order passed by the Tribunal. The order passed by the Tribunal is not an award as defined under Section 2 (b) of the I. D. Act. The dispute in I. D. 5/85 is in no way connected to the respondents and points of reference referred to for adjudication. The order passed by the Tribunal is not an award as defined under Section 2 (b) of the I. D. Act. The dispute in I. D. 5/85 is in no way connected to the respondents and points of reference referred to for adjudication. Therefore the question of seeking an approval under Section 33 (2) (B) does not arise. Though evidence has been adduced in complaint No. 3/87, for want of co-operation from the petitioners, the matter is being protracted under one pretext or the other. They somehow want the main matter to be kept alive. The Tribunal has no power to review or recall its own order passed earlier. The petition is otherwise unsustainable in law. Therefore, the respondents submit that the petition may be dismissed. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri. M. C. Narasimha and Sri. K. B. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri. S. V. Sastry and Sri R. V. Hegde, learned Counsel for the respondent. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that the petitioners filed their petitions under Section 33-A of the I. D. Act. They were dismissed from service during 1987. The management ought to have filed application under Section 32 (2) (b) since the charter of demands and other service conditions were pending. Therefore, the petitioners filed complaint under Section 33-A. The Tribunal passed an order on 18. 6. 91 setting aside the domestic enquiry. Thereafter, the workers filed application for interim relief. The Tribunal by order dated 18. 12. 1991 passed an interim relief granting 50% of wages last drawn by the petitioners. This order was not complied with. Hence, the petitioner filed the application before the Tribunal for enhancement of the wages from 50% to 75%. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal passed an order as per annexure D dated 7. 12. 96. Since then, the Management has not complied with the orders. Thus, the Management continuously disobeyed the order. Even 50% wages granted on earlier occasion has not been paid and no interim relief was given to the petitioners. Therefore, interim application was filed for contempt of the Court and the management filed objections contending that different forum is available for the petitioners. Purpose of granting interim relief is for sustenance of the petitioners. Therefore, they claimed that further proceedings will have to be stopped. Therefore, interim application was filed for contempt of the Court and the management filed objections contending that different forum is available for the petitioners. Purpose of granting interim relief is for sustenance of the petitioners. Therefore, they claimed that further proceedings will have to be stopped. In support of these arguments, they placed reliance on a decision reported DEBABRATA SEN vs state OF WEST BENGAL wherein the Calcutta High Court has held that if an interim relief is granted by the Tribunal, the compliance therewith can be enforced by the Tribunal by making payment of interim relief as condition precedent for employer to participate in adjudication proceedings. Writ Court also is empowered of Art. 226 to order compliance of order of Tribunal. ( 6 ) IN M/s. DARSHAK LTD. , BANGALORE vs PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE AND ANOTHER this Court has held that the Tribunal has power to grant interim relief but it should not be in the form of an award. Requirement of section 17 regarding publication of award is not attracted. Section 33-C can be invoked for enforcement of interim order. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel Sri Sastry has vehemently argued that any order passed by the Labour Court is an 'award' as contemplated under Sub-sec. (b) of Section 2. Sub-sec, (b) of Section 2 defines "award" as follows: "award" means an interim or a final determination of any Industrial dispute or any question relating thereto by any Labour Court industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A; the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the award passed by the Tribunal should be published as contemplated under Section 17 of the Act. Since this order was not published, the same is unenforceable in the Court of law and the Tribunal was right in dismissing this application. ( 8 ) IT is no doubt true that according to Section 17 of the Act, anaward has to be published in the official gazette and it will become effective only from the date of publication of the award and award also includes interim or final award. The question is the order which came to be passed by the Industrial Tribunal is an "award" as defined under Sub-section (b) of Section 2 of the I. D. Act. The question is the order which came to be passed by the Industrial Tribunal is an "award" as defined under Sub-section (b) of Section 2 of the I. D. Act. Our High Court in the decision referred to above has held that the Labour Court has ample power to pass interim orders. All interim orders cannot be construed as "awards" and such being the case, the interim orders need not be published as they do not come within the definition of "award". Same is the view of the Calcutta High Court in the decision referred to above. Therefore, the order passed by the Industrial tribunal cannot be construed as an award as defined under Section 2 (b) of the Act and hence no publication under Section 17 is required. ( 9 ) THE next question is whether the Tribunal could pass the order granting interim relief. This order was not questioned by the respondent and the same has become final arid conclusive. Even otherwise, I hold that the Court has ample power to pass interim orders dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The order of the nature passed in this case is in a way sustenance amount as the matter has been pending for several years without any progress. In this case, the relationship of the parties was not in dispute. Equally, there was no dispute that when the matter was pending in the Court, these petitioners were dismissed from service and without permission of the Court, etc. The inordinate delay leads to misery and jeopardize the life of the petitioner. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that it is open to the petitioners either to approach the Labour Court under Section 33-C (1) to find out as to whether any money was due, etc. or under Section 33-C (2) for declaration of entitlement or approach the competent authority under Section 29 of the Act. This argument would have been well founded if the interim order passed by the Court is to be treated as provided under Section 2 (b) of the act but the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal has to be implemented through the same Court, and it is only an interim relief and not an award. Hence, this argument is rejected. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, Court or Tribunal has its in built inherent power. Hence, this argument is rejected. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, Court or Tribunal has its in built inherent power. The Tribunal is presided by a senior Dist. Judge and considering the plight of the workers the interim relief was granted and the same was never questioned by the Management. Hence, this order being not an award, does not require any notification under Section 17 of the Act, The petitioner need not approach the Labor Court or Tribunal under Section 33-C (1) or (2) or under Section 29. The Tribunal can take suitable action to compel the Management to comply with the order passed by the Tribunal, ( 12 ) THE Industrial Tribunal which passed the interim order should have made the payment of money as a condition precedent. However, the order was made without any conditions. Further, the respondent contends that they made contempt in not complying with the order of the Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal frustrated its own orders saying that it has no jurisdiction. It is the duty of the Court/tribunal to give effect to its orders. Therefore, I hold that the orders which are impugned herein are liable to be set aside. ( 13 ) IN these petitions they have sought for two reliefs, one is inregard to the striking off of the defence set forth by the respondents and another to proceed against the respondents for contempt. As indicated above, since the interim relief granted by the Tribunal was not made a condition precedent, it cannot be said that the defence put forth by the respondents will have to be struck off when there is a dispute with regard to the compliance of the orders passed by the industrial Tribunal. However, at this stage it cannot be said that the management has violated the orders passed by the Tribunal calling for proceeding against it for contempt. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner however argued that the Writ Petition is not maintainable as against the order passed by the Tribunal on I. As. This argument cannot be accepted for the reasons stated above as the parties will be without any remedy and under extraordinary circumstances, the interference of this Court is required to enforce the order passed by the Tribunal. In addition to that, this Court has extraordinary jurisdiction to redress the grievance of the parties under exceptional circumstances. This argument cannot be accepted for the reasons stated above as the parties will be without any remedy and under extraordinary circumstances, the interference of this Court is required to enforce the order passed by the Tribunal. In addition to that, this Court has extraordinary jurisdiction to redress the grievance of the parties under exceptional circumstances. ( 15 ) UNDER those extraordinary circumstances, I proceed to pass the following: order the petitions are disposed of setting aside the order dated 15. 12. 98 in I. D. Nos 3 and 14/87 passed by the 2nd respondent herein as per Annexure A directing the respondent/management to comply with the order dated 28. 12. 96 within one month from the date of receipt of this order failing which the Tribunal shall strike off the defence and proceed to pass the orders in accordance with law. The payment of the amount of 75% of the last drawn wages is made a condition precedent. However, the request to proceed for contempt by the Tribunal is rejected as it does not arise for consideration at this stage. --- *** --- .