JUDGMENT - A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---This writ petition, although filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, however, is pressed under Article 227 of Constitution at the time of hearing, is directed against the judgment and order dated 4th June, 1990, passed by Resident Deputy Collector, Yavatmal in the Case No. R.A. No. 15-71-1988-89 of Yavatmal. 2. Briefly stated, the respondent/landlord filed an application under Clauses 13(3)(vi) and 13(3)(iii) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rent Control Order" for the sake of brevity) before the Rent Controller, Yavatmal on 9th June, 1983, seeking permission to terminate the tenancy of the petitioners/tenants in respect of the suit premises situated at Plot No. 22, Sheet No. 50-B commonly known as "Kolhe's Chawl" situated at Tilakwadi/Awadhutwadi, Yavatmal. 3. In the original application the respondent/landlord sought permission on the ground of subletting, however, the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord has made a statement, on instructions, that the respondent is not pressing the said ground and would be content with the ground within the meaning of Clause 13(3)(vi), viz. bona fide requirement. 4. The aforesaid application was filed by the respondent on the averment that the suit property was owned and possessed by joint family of the respondent. That partition was effected between the family members and the same was registered on 4-8-1961 whereby the suit property was allotted to the share of Vithal Paikaji Kolhe. That subsequently there was family partition on 27-3-1967 whereby Block No. 5, which is the suit premises, occupied by the petitioners herein, has come to the share of the respondent. In other words, the respondent has become absolute owner of the suit premises. The respondent/landlord has further averred in the said application that besides the suit premises, he has no other premises, which are owned or possessed by him in the city of Yavatmal. The respondent has further stated that the suit premises is required by him for his own bona fide occupation. The reason indicated by respondent was that, at the relevant time, he was staying alongwith his uncle-Gunwantrao Kolhe in Block No. 8 alongwith his two other brothers and the family of his above named uncle. It was further stated that the respondent got married on 31st May, 1983 and, therefore, he wanted to stay separately in the suit premises. The reason indicated by respondent was that, at the relevant time, he was staying alongwith his uncle-Gunwantrao Kolhe in Block No. 8 alongwith his two other brothers and the family of his above named uncle. It was further stated that the respondent got married on 31st May, 1983 and, therefore, he wanted to stay separately in the suit premises. On these assertions, the aforesaid application was filed before the Rent Controller. 5. While dealing with the case made out by the respondent, the petitioners, in reply filed before the Rent Controller, have vaguely denied the assertions made by the respondent in the said application. No specific stand was taken by the petitioners in the said reply. Para No. 6 of the reply deals with the ground of bona fide requirement. The only plea taken was that the respondents was residing at Khadkisukali, Tq. Ralegaon with his family and was cultivating lands at that village and that he has no title in respect of the suit premises. On this basis, it was prayed that the application be dismissed with costs. 6. The respondent/landlord, besides the case made out in the application, led oral evidence. The respondent examined himself and stated on oath before the Rent Controller that at the relevant time, he was staying alongwith his uncle in the premises, which were owned by his uncle. He also stated on oath that he got married on 31st May, 1983, therefore, required the suit premises for his personal use and occupation. The petitioners/tenants did not challenge this aspect of the matter at all, nor did they lead any evidence to indicate that besides the suit premises, the respondent/landlord was in occupation or owner of any other premises in the city of Yavatmal. 7. As aforesaid, the only case made out by the petitioners was that the respondent was staying at some other village and was cultivating agricultural lands in that village. This stand, however, has been negatived by the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller while dealing with the case of bona fide requirement in his decision dated 22nd December, 1988, has referred to the aforesaid facts and held that the respondent had proved that there was partition between his family members and he became owner and landlord of the suit premises. The Rent Controller further held that it was for the respondent to decide as to where he should reside. The Rent Controller further held that it was for the respondent to decide as to where he should reside. The Rent Controller further held that it was an admitted position in evidence that the respondent was residing in Block No. 8 in the chawl, which premises were owned and possessed by his uncle. In the circumstances, the Rent Controller preferred to accept the stand taken by the respondent and granted permission as prayed for by the respondent. 8. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the Rent Controller, the petitioners went in appeal bearing No. R.A. No. 15/71/1988-89 of Yavatmal, before the Resident Deputy Collector, Yavatmal. The Appellate Authority affirmed the finding recorded by the Rent Controller and was of the view that the respondent had made out a case of bona fide requirement and, therefore granted permission in favour of the respondent with regard to Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. 9. The petitioners, being aggrieved, have taken exception to the abovesaid decision by way of present writ petition. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioners mainly contended that there was no pleading at all with regard to the ground of bona fide requirement. It is thus contended that the application as presented did not furnish any requisite particulars with regard to bona fide requirement of the respondent and, therefore, the courts below were in error in granting the said permission. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court, reported in (Ganpat v. Rameshwar)1, 1974 Mh.L.J. 774 (para 4) and (Janba Daulatrao Borkar v. Rajeshkumar Ramjiwan Agarwal)2, 1975 Mh.L.J. 746 (paras 11 to 13). The next point addressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that it was the duty of the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority to examine the entire evidence, which has not been done in the present case. It was, therefore, submitted that the finding arrived at by the courts below is not based on the evidence on record. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that there is no independent adjudication and application of mind by the Appellate Court, which is evident from the impugned order. It was, therefore, submitted that the finding arrived at by the courts below is not based on the evidence on record. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that there is no independent adjudication and application of mind by the Appellate Court, which is evident from the impugned order. The next point pressed into service on behalf of the petitioners is that on reading the provisions of Clause 13(3)(vi) read with Clause 13(8) of the Rent Controll Order, the position that would emerge is that it is the duty of the Rent Controller to enquire into the question as to whether permission can be granted only in respect of portion of the suit premises, but the same has not been done in the present case. In this context, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Apex Court reported in (Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ramchand)3, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 413 and another decision of Gujarat High Court), reported in (1966 Guj.L.R. 1039)4. 11. When the dictation of this judgment was on, at this stage, the learned Counsel for the petitioners withdraws the earlier statement made to the effect that the writ petition is filed under Article 227 only and asserts that the writ petition is also pressed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He points out that writ, under Article 226 of the Constitution, could be issued for any other purpose and in this context, has referred to the prayer Clause (A) of the writ petition to contend that the petitioners have sought writ of certiorari for calling for the record and for quashing and setting aside the impugned order. 12. Before I proceed to deal with the merits of the contentions, it would be necessary to deal with this preliminary aspect of the matter. It would be essential to point out that although the title of the writ petition denotes that it has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and that the prayer clauses also indicate that prayer of issuance of writ of certiorari is made, however, none of the grounds mentioned in the writ petition nor the submission which were advanced across the Bar, would indicate that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was sought to be invoked. The ground which was mainly addressed was that the courts below did not appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective. In the circumstance, I am more than convinced that this writ petition would only be maintained under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; as there is no ground made out which would even remotely suggest that the petition is one under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondent, at the outset, rightly points out that the plea that there is no pleading as regards bona fide requirement is being raised for the first time before this Hon'ble Court. Neither before the trial Court nor before the Appellate Court this point was ever pressed into service. Moreover, even in the writ petition there is not even slightest suggestion that the impugned order cannot be sustained on the ground that there was no pleading with regard to bona fide requirement. On the other hand, on examining the pleadings, as presented before the Rent Controller, it would be evident that the respondent had not only given material facts, but also given particulars as to why he was entitled to seek permission on the ground of bona fide requirement. In the circumstances, I am inclined to accept the stand taken by the respondent. In my view, it is not open to the petitioners to raise the said contention for the first time before this Court that too in writ jurisdiction. In any case, the pleadings, as presented before the Rent Controller, were adequate and clearly gave necessary particulars as to why the respondent required the suit premises for bona fide use and occupation. The respondent not only asserted that he was the absolute owner in respect of suit premises by virtue of the partition, but has also averred that he got married on 31st May, 1983 and, therefore, the application was presented on 9th of June, 1983. There is clear assertion that the respondent has no other house in city of Yavatmal and that at the relevant time was staying with his uncle's family. All the assertions were sufficient compliance of the requirements which are necessary to maintain application on the ground of bona fide requirement. There is clear assertion that the respondent has no other house in city of Yavatmal and that at the relevant time was staying with his uncle's family. All the assertions were sufficient compliance of the requirements which are necessary to maintain application on the ground of bona fide requirement. The decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners reported in (1974 Mh.L.J. 746)5, and 1975 Mh.L.J. 746 are of no avail, having regard to the facts of the present case. In the said decisions, this Court has held that it will depend on facts of each case and the test will have to be applied having regard to the nature of pleadings in each case. As observed above, there is clear pleading with regard to bona fide requirement and, therefore, this contention is totally misplaced and untenable. 14. With regard to the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that neither the trial Court nor the Appellate Court have examined the evidence on record in its proper perspective, I am afraid, even this contention deserves to be rejected inasmuch as two courts below have appreciated the evidence on record and have taken into consideration all the relevant circumstances to hold that the respondent made out a case of bona fide requirement and personal use. In my view, if all the circumstances are taken into account, no other conclusion can be reached except that the suit premises were required by the respondent for his bona fide requirement and personal use. At one stage it was suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that since the Appellate Court has not considered the matter independently by adverting to the evidence on record, which submission was based on the ratio of the decision reported in 1975 Mh.L.J. 746, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Court deserved to be set aside. I was initially impressed by the said submission. But, after having given my anxious consideration, I find that no fruitful purpose would be served by remanding the matter to the Appellate Court or for that matter to the trial Court to re-examine the matter as suggested by the learned Counsel. It is seen that the respondent not only pleaded and made out the case of bona fide requirement, but also led evidence in support of the said case. It is seen that the respondent not only pleaded and made out the case of bona fide requirement, but also led evidence in support of the said case. On the other hand, the petitioners did not lead any independent evidence to rebut the case made out by the respondent. If all the circumstances indicated by the trial Court as well as Appellate Court are kept in mind, I am more than convinced that no fruitful purpose would be served by remanding the matter. There is additional reason for adopting this approach inasmuch as the present application was filed by the respondent for permission to terminate the tenancy of the petitioners as back as on 9th June, 1983 on the ground that he got married in May 1983 and he wanted the premises for his personal use. More than 17 years have rolled by, but the matter is still pending in Court only at the stage whether the permission ought to have been granted or not and at this belated stage, all sorts of contentions are being raised by the petitioners, which are obviously of technical nature. It is possible to contend that the orders passed by two courts below are not properly articulated but the substance remains that the case has not only be pleaded, by the respondent but has also been established by adducing evidence. On the other hand, the petitioners not only failed in asserting or making out any case in the pleadings but also did not adduce any evidence in support of their stand, and it is at this belated stage that they want the matter to be remanded back for deciding afresh. I am afraid this approach should not only be rejected but seriously depricated. The respondent is waiting for seeking permission since year 1983 and it is only hereafter that he would become entitled for getting relief of possession, which, undoubtedly, would take another couple of years. It is well settled that delay defeats equity and justice. In the circumstances, it is not possible to accept the plea of the petitioners of remanding the matter on this technical plea. 15. The next submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that it was the duty of the Rent Controller to consider the question as to whether permission could have been granted in respect of portion of the suit premises. 15. The next submission advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that it was the duty of the Rent Controller to consider the question as to whether permission could have been granted in respect of portion of the suit premises. The decision, which has been relied upon in support of this contention, of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 413, has been considered in the decision of this Court reported in (Mahadeo Baruji Parsive v. Resident Deputy Collector, Chandigarh)6, 1994 Mh.L.J. 716. This Court has already taken the view that the provisions of Rent Control Order is only an enabling provision, giving discretion to the Rent Controller to examine the said aspect, provided the same is raised at the instance of the tenant. This Court, had, therefore, rejected the stand taken by the tenant that it was mandatory on the part of the Rent Controller to examine the said contention. The petitioners have not pointed out any other contrary view. I am in agreement with the view taken by this Court in the said decision, particularly, in para 16 thereof. The said view applies with full force to the facts of the present case. As observed above, the petitioners have not pleaded as to whether there was any possibility of making decree in respect of portion of the suit premises only. Besides lack of pleading, no evidence has been adduced by the petitioners in support of the plea inasmuch as no suggestion has been made either to the respondent or any independent evidence adduced by the petitioners to that effect. It is easy to find fault with the failure of the Rent Controller to examine the possibility of permission in respect of part of the suit premises, however, when the petitioners have failed to assert such plea it is not open for them to criticise the courts below. In my view, the petitioners having failed to raise this point before the Rent Controller or even before the Appeal Court have waived the same, therefore, it is not open for them to contend that the impugned orders are bad on that count. I am of the view that since there is no pleading, nor any evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of the said contention, it is not possible to permit the petitioners to urge the said point at this belated stage. I am of the view that since there is no pleading, nor any evidence adduced by the petitioners in support of the said contention, it is not possible to permit the petitioners to urge the said point at this belated stage. Moreover, this point has been advanced only across the bar and no ground or even slightest suggestion has made in the grounds of Memo of writ petition. In the circumstances, I would prefer to reject the said plea made by the petitioners that the matter deserves to be examined with regard to possibility of permission being accorded in respect of portion of the suit premises. 16. What is distressing is that the matter which did not merit interference has remained pending in this Court for almost 10 years. More than that, the application for permission was filed as back as in the year 1983. Even after 17 years, the respondent has not be able to enjoy the fruits of the property, which is owned by him and in natural course was entitled to enjoy the same during his life time. Taking into account all the circumstances and the vehemence with which the learned Counsel for the petitioners argued and pressed this matter, I think this is a fit case where exemplary costs should have been imposed, for, not only the respondent had to wait to enjoy the fruits of the suit property for such a long time, but this Court's valuable time has been invested on this matter which was devoid of any merits. 17. Writ petition stands dismissed with costs. 18. Rule stands discharged. Writ petition dismissed. -----