D. P. SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application for quashing of a proceeding being Special Case No. 2 of 1978 (arising out of R. C. 3/77 dated 14. 1. 77) under section 120b of the Indian Penal Code read with section 5 (1) (d) and 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 pending in the Court of the learned special Judge, 3rd Court, Calcutta. ( 2 ) ON 21. 7. 78 one Ranjit Kr. Sarkar, Inspector of police, CBI/spe/calcutta filed a complaint against one D. P. Chowdhury and 2 others, including the present petitioner, under section 120b IPC and section 5 (1) (d) and 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The allegation made in the complaint was that Sri D. P. Chowdhury, Superintendent of Workshop, Light Houses and Light Ships, Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Calcutta, placed a purchase order on 14. 11. 73 for supply of 510 numbers of Leather Diaphram @ Rs. 17. 50 with M/s. Subarban Supply Service, of which the present petitioner is the sole proprietor. The articles supplied were subsequently found to be substandard resulting loss to the department. It was further alleged that the accused D. P. Chowdhury purchased 9 Sft. of S. S. wire gauge from M/s. Subarban Supply Service 7on 18. 8. 73 at an excessive rate on the recommendation of accused S. C. Biswas, Assistant Engineer (M) who was working under accused Chowdhury. It was alleged that the accused D. P. Chowdhury in conspiracy with his subordinate accused S. C. Biswas, Asstt. Engineer, (Mechanical) and his brother accused S. N. Chowdhury (petitioner herein), purchased the aforesaid materials at a higher rate by abusing his official position and thereby obtained pecuniary advantage to the tune of Rs. 13,384/- and causing loss to the Government. ( 3 ) ON receipt of the aforesaid complaint the learned Judge, Special Court by His order dated 21. 7. 78 took cognizance of the offence and issued process against the accused persons under aforesaid section. ( 4 ) ON 24. 8. 78 all the accused persons, including the present petitioner appeared in Court and they were granted bail. The learned Judge fixed 6. 12. 78 and 7. 12. 78 for evidence. On the said two dates one witness was examined in part and next date was fixed on 27. 1. 79. On 27. 1. 7. ( 4 ) ON 24. 8. 78 all the accused persons, including the present petitioner appeared in Court and they were granted bail. The learned Judge fixed 6. 12. 78 and 7. 12. 78 for evidence. On the said two dates one witness was examined in part and next date was fixed on 27. 1. 79. On 27. 1. 7. 79 the case was adjourned as the learned Judge was under order of transfer. The next date was fixed on 28. 2. 79, when the case was again adjourned on the prayer of prosecution and the next date was fixed on 2. 5. 79. On 2. 5. 79 the case was again adjourned on the prayer of the learned P. P. It appears from the ordersheet that at the instance of the prosecution several adjournments were taken and on 17. 7. 79 the learned Judge recorded an order to the effect that as a last chance time was allowed on the prayer of the prosecution. It appears from the order dated 4. 5. 84 that the prosecution examined 35 witnesses and the rest were yet to be examined. On the said date a prayer for time was made on behalf of the prosecution. Such prayer for time was allowed and the learned Judge recorded an order as follows:-"keeping in my mind the age of the case as well as the peculiar circumstances of the case I am to state that the prosecution is not deligent and also indifferent in conducting the case because the case is extremely old one as I have already observed. It is to be further noted that no adjournment would be granted on any ground whatsoever even including the present ground". ( 5 ) THE next dates were fixed on 27. 6. 84 and 28. 6. 84. On the said dates also adjournment was prayed for on behalf of the prosecution, which was allowed and the next date was fixed on 30. 7. 84. It also appears from the order sheet dated 12. 8. 86 that although date was fixed on 24. 11. 86 for consideration of charge, such charge could be framed on 10. 4. 92. It also appears that during this period of about 6 years (24. 11. 86 to 10. 4. 92) prayers for time were made on number of occasions and such prayers were allowed by the Court. 8. 86 that although date was fixed on 24. 11. 86 for consideration of charge, such charge could be framed on 10. 4. 92. It also appears that during this period of about 6 years (24. 11. 86 to 10. 4. 92) prayers for time were made on number of occasions and such prayers were allowed by the Court. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the prosecution examined 38 witnesses before charge, which took about 15 years, as a result of which the petitioner suffered from mental agony during the said period. The learned Advocate further points out from the ordersheet that the principal accused being accused No. 1 D. P. Chowdhury died before framing of charge and the case against him was filed by an order dated 13. 11. 91. He further points out that accused No. 2 S. C. Biswas also died after framing of charge and the case against him was filed by an order dated 23. 11. 92. The learned Advocate further submits that after the charge was framed on 10. 4. 92, the case was adjourned on number of occasions on the ground of non-availability of the learned P. P. , illness of the learned P. P and/or witnesses etc. , the learned Advocate further submits that the delay in holding trial is not due to any fault of the petitioner, who almost on all dates was present in Court, but such delay was mainly caused at the instance of the prosecution. ( 7 ) IT appears from the order dated 27. 3. 96 that the present petitioner filed an application praying for discharge from the case. Said prayer for discharge was rejected by the learned Judge by his order dated 22. 4. 96. The present petitioner thereafter preferred an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cri. Revn. No. 1276 of 1996) praying for quashing of the proceeding. The said revisional application came up for final hearing before this Court on 12. 12. 96. Hon'ble Justice S. K. Tiwari (As His Lordship then was) refused the prayer for quashing and directed the trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order. The said revisional application came up for final hearing before this Court on 12. 12. 96. Hon'ble Justice S. K. Tiwari (As His Lordship then was) refused the prayer for quashing and directed the trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order. ( 8 ) THE Present petitioner thereafter filed an S. L. P. in the Hon'ble Supreme Court (S. D. P (Ori.) No. 1246 of 1997) on 5. 3. 97 which came up for final disposal on 17. 8. 99 (Criminal Appeal No. 791 of 1999 ). The Hon'ble Apex Court by the order dated 17. 8. 99 allowed the Criminal Appeal, set aside the order dated 12. 12. 96 passed by the High Court and the Criminal Revision No. 1276 of 1996 was restored to the file of the High Court for fresh disposal. While disposing of the appeal it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:-"in Raj Dee Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998)7 SCC 507 a Bench comprising three Judges of this Court in which one of us (Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Srinivasan) was a party, laid down the guidelines to dispose of matters in which there is an inordinate delay in conducting the criminal trial. The judgment is in furtherance of the principle laid down already in the 'common Cause' case. That judgment was not available to the High Court when it dismissed the application under section 482, Cr. PC. As per that judgment, several factors have to be taken into account before a trial is quashed. Such matters depend upon the facts of each case. In the circumstances, the interests of justice require that we set aside the order of the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar (supra ). We request the High Court to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from the date on which the records are received by the said Court. The Criminal appeal is allowed accordingly and the order of the High Court dated 12. 12. 96 in Criminal Revision No. 1276 of 1996 is set aside. The said Criminal Revision is restored to the file of the High Court for fresh disposal as aforesaid. The Criminal appeal is allowed accordingly and the order of the High Court dated 12. 12. 96 in Criminal Revision No. 1276 of 1996 is set aside. The said Criminal Revision is restored to the file of the High Court for fresh disposal as aforesaid. " ( 9 ) IT appears from the ordersheet that although the Appeal was pending hearing in the Hon'ble Apex Court, the learned Special Judge proceeded with the trial as there was a direction from this Court to conclude the trial within three months. It also appears from the ordersheet that thereafter the matter was adjourned on several dates at the instance of the prosecution on different grounds. It also appears that from 21. 6. 97 the case was adjourned on the prayer of the accused on several dates for production of the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court. ( 10 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that continuation of the present proceeding since July, 1978 is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice the instant proceeding is liable to be quashed. ( 11 ) THE learned Advocate of the petitioner relied upon a judgment of this Court reported in 1996 Calcutta Criminal Law Reporter 131 (Subhas Chandra Bose v. The State of W. B.), wherein it was held by the learned single Judge of this Court as follows:-"as stated by the Apex Court there cannot be any manner of doubt that not only in public interest but also in the interest of the Society, the guilt or innocence of the accused is to be determined as quickly as possible so as to save the accused from unnecessary worries, anxieties, expenses and disturbance to his vocation and peace resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry and trial. It has further been stated that under delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. Though it is obligatory for the State which includes judiciary, as well as to ensure a speedy trial, in this case due to the inordinate delay in lodging complaint, investigation and commencement of trial the accused have been seriously prejudiced and interest of justice demands that the proceedings should be quashed. Though it is obligatory for the State which includes judiciary, as well as to ensure a speedy trial, in this case due to the inordinate delay in lodging complaint, investigation and commencement of trial the accused have been seriously prejudiced and interest of justice demands that the proceedings should be quashed. The impugned proceedings pending before the learned Judge, Calcutta 4th Special Court are, therefore, quashed and the Criminal Revision is accordingly disposed of" ( 12 ) THE next judgments relied upon by the learned Advocate of the petitioner are reported in 1996 Cal. Cr. L. R. (Cal) 140 (Ashutosh Ghosh and Ors. v. State of W. B.); 1999 Cal. Cr. L. R. (Cal) 486 (Monoranjan Hor v. The State of Anr.) and 1999 Cal. Cr. L. R. 393 (V. Z. Job v. The State of W. B. ). The ratio of an all the aforesaid judgments is that speedy trial is the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. ( 13 ) IN a landmark judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1992 SC 1701 (A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak) the principles laid down by the Apex Court are that (i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 creates a right in the accused to have a speedy trial in public interest (ii) right to speedy trial encompasses all stages, viz. stages of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision, retrial, (iii) the concerns underlying the right to speedy trial, from the point of view of the accused are not to subject the accused to unnecessary incorporation before Trial not to expose him to the anxiety, worry and expense of a prolonged investigation or trial, etc. stages of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision, retrial, (iii) the concerns underlying the right to speedy trial, from the point of view of the accused are not to subject the accused to unnecessary incorporation before Trial not to expose him to the anxiety, worry and expense of a prolonged investigation or trial, etc. (iv) in every case of alleged infringement of the right to speedy trial the first question to be put and answered is who is responsible for the delay after considering the extenuating circumstances like proceedings taken in good faith to vindicate the rights and interest of the parties, (v) in considering the aspect of delay and must have regard to all the attending circumstances including the nature of the offence the number of accused persons and witnesses, the work load of the Court concerned prevailing local conditions and so including systematic delay, (vi) delay does not prejudice the accused, but inordinate delay may be taken as presumative proof of prejudice. (vii) ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors and determine whether the right to speedy trial has been violated, (viii) when the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial has been violated, generally, the charges or conviction should be quashed. But this is not the only course open; (ix) it is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for trial of offences. ( 14 ) IN a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1998 Calcutta Criminal Law Reporter (SC) 385 (Rajdeo Sharma v. The State of Bihar) the Hon'ble Apex Court proceeded to supplement the propositions laid down in A. R. Antulay's case (supra) with the following directions:-" (I) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, in the trial Court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice the Court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time limit. (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no Court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii ). (v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of Court or by operation of law such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing prosecution evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in "common Cause" v. Union of India, as modified by the same bench through the order reported in "common Cause" a registered Society v. Union of India. " ( 15 ) I have heard Mr. S. L. Hazra, the learned Advocate appearing for the CBI. According to Mr. Hazra there is no doubt that there is inordinate delay in concluding the trial, it is also evident from records that after the case was sent back by this Court to the trial Court for concluding the trial, the trial Court proceeded with the trial and as such one more chance should be given to the prosecution to conclude the trial. ( 16 ) I have heard the submissions made by the learned Advocates of the respective parties. ( 16 ) I have heard the submissions made by the learned Advocates of the respective parties. I have perused the Lower Court records. I have also carefully gone through the judgments referred to by the learned Advocate of the petitioner. In the present case it appears from the record that cognizance of offence was taken by the learned Special Judge on 21. 7. 78. Thereafter it took about 15 years to complete the recording of evidence before charge. It also appears that evidence before charge was complete on 8. 8. 86 and a date was fixed on 24. 11. 86 for consideration of charge. But it is really unfortunate that charge could be framed on 10. 4. 92, i. e. , after about 6 years from the date of completion of evidence before charge. After charge was framed date was fixed for cross examination of P. Ws. But again same thing happened and the trial was dragged mainly at the instance of the prosecution. It is really unfortunate that during pendency of the trial the accused No. 1 died before framing of charge and accused No. 2 also died after the charge was framed. The present petitioner is only facing the trial and he has already suffered from mental agony for the last 22 years. There is complete unanimity in judicial opinions in India that Article 21 of our Constitution confers a right to speedy trial of an accused. The sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is wide enough to include all the stages since the accusation is levelled. ( 17 ) IN view of the fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India it is a fit and proper case in which the proceeding should be quashed on this score alone. In the result the revisional application succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned proceeding being Special case No. 2 of 1978 pending in the Court of learned Judge, 3rd Special Court, Calcutta is quashed, but an urgent xerox certified copy of the order be given to the learned Advocate of the petitioner at an early date, of applied for. Application succeeds