Judgment R.L.Anand, J. 1. Appellants were defendants in the trial court. Their names are M/s. Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd., M/s. Vimal Marketing Syndicate and Anil Kumar Gupta, Director/Partner of the above said two companies. These three defendants have filed the present appeal and it has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 27.8.1999, passed by the Addl. Distt. Judge, Chandigarh, who dismissed the appeal of the appellants by affirming the judgment and decree dated 5.9.1997, passed by the Sr. Sub Judge, Chandigarh, who decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents. The trial court granted a decree for possession of the demised premises. 2. The brief facts of the case can be noticed in the following manner :- 3. Vide allotment letter dated 7.5.1990, the commercial site/building described as SCO 82-83, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh, was allotted to the plaintiffs and the sewerage connection to his building was given by the Chandigarh Administration on 28.2.1992. After the allotment of the site in question, the plaintiffs, as per the sanctioned plan, constructed the building thereon and after the grant of sewerage connection on 28.2.1992, the ground floor of this building was let out to the defendants in the month of August, 1992. The defendants also executed a rent deed in favour of the plaintiffs and the rent settled was Rs. 12,210-00 but for the period from 15.8.1992 to 31.7.1993 a rebate @ Rs. 1,210-00 was to be given to the defendants from the rent so fixed. It was further alleged by the plaintiffs that for the period from 1.8.1994 to 31.7.1995, the rebate of Rs. 660/- was to be given to the defendants from the total rent of Rs. 12,210-00. According to clause-13 of the rent deed, the tenancy created was terminable at the option of either of the parties by giving two months clear notice to the other party. Plaintiff No. 1 signed the rent deed for and on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs with their consent. Vide notice dated 29.5.1995, the plaintiffs terminated the tenancy of the defendants and asked them to hand over the vacant possession of the premises on or before 31.7.1995 but instead of handing over the vacant possession of the tenanted premises, the defendants sent a cheque for Rs. 12,210-00 which was accepted by the plaintiffs as damages/compensation for illegal use and occupation of the demised premises. 12,210-00 which was accepted by the plaintiffs as damages/compensation for illegal use and occupation of the demised premises. The plaintiffs vide another registered letter dated 16.8.1995 asked the defendants to vacate the demised premises within 15 days from the issue of the letter. To the utter surprise of the plaintiffs, the defendants in response to the notices dated 29.5.1995 and 16.8.1995, issued the said cheque. It was further alleged by the plaintiffs that the defendants are also guilty of raising illegal and unauthorised construction in the demised premises. With these broad allegations, the plaintiffs filed the suit for possession by terminating the tenancy of the defendants. 4. Notice of the suit was given to the defendants who filed the written statement and took a preliminary objection that the suit for ejectment was liable to be dismissed as the plaintiffs have not validly terminated the lease of the defendants. Moreover, no notice was served upon defendant No. 2 qua the termination of the tenancy. Even otherwise, the plaintiffs had waived their earlier notice dated 29.5.1995 by their act and conduct and as such no cause of action survives to the plaintiffs in respect of the alleged notice dated 29.5.1995. The rent deed dated nil is not only unregistered but the same is unstamped. Therefore, it is not admissible in evidence. Even otherwise, no permanent sewerage connection has been granted to the SCO in question inas much as the sewerage connection was granted on 28.2.1992 for a specific period of three months and, as such, the suit of the plaintiffs on the basis of the sewerage connection is not maintainable for the ejectment of the defendants. 5. On merits, it was averred by the defendants that the sewerage connection granted to the plaintiffs was only on temporary basis and that too for three months. The defendants, however, admitted that the ground floor was leased out to them but the plaintiffs inducted other tenants on the basement, first floor and second floor much before the grant of sewerage connection on 28.2.1992 and, as such, the sewerage connection was in existence much prior to the alleged date of grant of sewerage connection, i.e. 28.2.1992. The period of lease was for three years starting from 25.8.1992 to 24.8.1995. The period of lease was for three years starting from 25.8.1992 to 24.8.1995. In short, the defendants denied the validity of the notices as well as the date of completion of the building and prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 6. The plaintiffs filed a rejoinder to the written statement of the defendants in which they reiterated the averments made in the plaint by denying those of the written statement. 7. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial court :- 1. Whether the tenancy stands terminated by a legal and valid notice dated 29.5.1995 ? OPP. 2. Whether the notice of termination of tenancy stands waived as alleged ? OPD 3. Whether the civil court has got the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit ? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future damages ? If so, for what period and at what rate ? OPP. 5. Relief." 8. The parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their case and on the conclusion of the trial, issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, issue No. 2 was decided against the defendants, issue No. 3 was decided in favour of the plaintiffs and issue No. 4 was partly decided in favour of the plaintiffs. Resultantly, the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed and a decree for possession by way of ejectment of the defendants from the ground floor of the demised premises was passed against the defendants and it was further held by the trial court that the plaintiffs shall also be entitled to get damages for the illegal use and occupation @ Rs. 12,210-00 from the date of filing of the suit till the vacant possession is delivered to them by the defendants. This decree was passed by the trial court on 5.9.1997. While deciding issue No. 3, the trial court observed in para 12 as follows :- "The property in question is situated at Chandigarh. A perusal of the letter, copy Ex. P2 shows that the sewerage connection to the property in question was given on 28.2.1992 and the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs in the court on 6.9.1995. A building is exempt from the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act in Chandigarh for a period of 5 years from the date the sewerage connection is given to the building. P2 shows that the sewerage connection to the property in question was given on 28.2.1992 and the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs in the court on 6.9.1995. A building is exempt from the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act in Chandigarh for a period of 5 years from the date the sewerage connection is given to the building. As the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for the ejectment of the defendants within a period of five years, from the date the sewerage connection is given by the Chandigarh Administration to the building and, therefore, the plaintiffs have got the jurisdiction to file the suit and hence this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs." 9. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendants filed the first appeal before the court of Addl. Distt. Judge, Chandigarh, who vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.8.1999 dismissed the appeal and aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the courts below, the present appeal. 10. I have the counsel for the parties and with their assistance have gone through the record of his case. 11. Counsel for the appellants has tried to raise substantial questions of law and he submitted that all the landlords did not give the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as `the Act); that the notice u/s 106 of the Act has not been given to all the separate tenants as in the opinion of the counsel for the appellants the tenancy had split up and the plaintiffs had been receiving three cheques of rent from the defendants; and that it is not proved on the record about the date of completion of the building and the trial court has wrongly decreed the suit on the basis of temporary sewerage connection and the reasons advanced by the trial court on issue No. 3 are incorrect. The counsel also submitted that though the defendants did not challenge the findings of the trial court on issue No. 3 before the first appellate court, yet this plea can always be taken up by them being a legal plea even before the High Court. The counsel also submitted that though the defendants did not challenge the findings of the trial court on issue No. 3 before the first appellate court, yet this plea can always be taken up by them being a legal plea even before the High Court. The next submission of the counsel for the appellant were that there was a waiver on the part of the landlords when they had accepted the rent from the defendants after the alleged termination of the tenancy and that though the rent note was inadmissible, but the defendants can always take the plea by saying that the tenancy was for a fixed period of three years and, in these circumstances, the notice served by the plaintiffs is not in accordance with law. 12. On the contrary counsel for the respondents submitted that the notice u/s 106 of the Act has been given on behalf of all the plaintiffs. There was no split of tenancy. The defendants have not assailed the findings on issue No. 3. There was no waiver on the part of the plaintiffs and the suit of the plaintiffs has been rightly decreed by the courts below. 13. Some case law has also been cited by both the parties with which I will deal at the later stage but at his juncture, I only make the observation that after considering the rival contentions of the parties, I am of the considered that this appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed at the motion stage itself. 14. I have already quoted the cogent reasons given by the first appellate court. Section 106 of the Act lays down as follows :- "106.Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage. - In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property." 15. Before I deal further into the matter, I may observe that the strict provisions of section 106 of the Act are not applicable to the State of Punjab or to the Union Territory, Chandigarh. The object and intention behind the provisions of section 106 of the Act is that a tenancy of the tenant must be terminated before a regular suit for possession could be instituted by the landlord depending upon the nature of the suit. This section specifically lays down that in the absence of a contract, if a lease is for agricultural or manufacturing purposes and is from year to year, such lease can be terminated either on the part of lessor or lessee, by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy and if a lease is from month to month, then, a notice of fifteen days is necessary. 16. According to the second part of the section, every such notice must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and it and be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party. 17. Let us see, how the plaintiffs have been able to prove this aspect of the case. The case set up by the defendants before the trial court as well as before this court was that all landlords have not given the notice u/s 106. According to the counsel for appellants, the tenancy was in favour of M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Limited and M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate, but no notice u/s 106 was served upon M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate and in, these circumstances, the suit of the plaintiffs could not be decreed when the tenancy was joint and inseverable. Mr. According to the counsel for appellants, the tenancy was in favour of M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Limited and M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate, but no notice u/s 106 was served upon M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate and in, these circumstances, the suit of the plaintiffs could not be decreed when the tenancy was joint and inseverable. Mr. Sarin submitted that, in fact, M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Limited and M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate are co-tenants and, in these circumstances, separate notices were required to be served upon them by or on behalf of all the landlords but in the present case, the notice has only been served by Harbans Singh Joshan, plaintiff No. 1, who had no authority to serve the notice on behalf of the other plaintiffs and, accordingly, the tenancy has not been determined in a valid manner. Therefore, both the courts below have fell in error in deciding issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs. 18. The argument is totally devoid of merit. It is that basic law of construction of a document that a document has to be read as a whole and not in isolation. Unfortunately, the rent deed, Mark `A, on the file was neither registered nor stamped, therefore, it could not be exhibited into evidence. But this document can always be looked into for collateral purposes u/s 49 of the Registration Act. A reading of the same would show that the lessees were M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd. and M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate and the rent note was signed by the Director-cum-partner Shri Anil Kumar Gupta. Ex. P-3 is the notice dated 29.5.1995 which was issued under the signatures of Harbans Singh Joshan and it was received by Deepak Aggarwal. The notice is addressed to the Director, M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd., SCO No. 82-83, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh. A reading of the same would lead to an inescapable conclusion that this notice has been issued not in the individual capacity by Harbans Singh Joshan but he has issued this notice on behalf of other landlords also. The notice is addressed to the Director, M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd., SCO No. 82-83, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh. A reading of the same would lead to an inescapable conclusion that this notice has been issued not in the individual capacity by Harbans Singh Joshan but he has issued this notice on behalf of other landlords also. The notice reads as follow :- "Dear Sir, Please refer to our rent agreement dated 15th August 1992, with reference to which we draw your kind attention to Clause No. 13 which reads as under : "The tenancy hereby created shall be terminable at option by the lessor or by the lessee by giving two months clear notice by either of them." We require the premises for our personal use now under your occupation. We request you to kindly arrange some alternative premises for your use and give us the possession of the premises latest by 31st July, 1995. Thanking You, Yours, faithfully, Sd/- (Harbans Singh Joshan)" 19. Thus, this notice was given by Harbans Singh Joshan not only in his individual capacity, but it was given on behalf of other landlords also with the clear impression that he had even the implied authority on behalf of other owners to serve this notice. Before I proceed further, I may also state that the suit has not been filed only by Harbans Singh Joshan but by other owners i.e Ramjit Kaur, Kanwaljit Singh, Preeti Joshan and Ashwanjit Singh have also been added as plaintiffs and they has endorsed and accepted this notice dated 29.5.1995. The second notice which was given to the defendants is dated 16.8.1995. This notice is addressed to M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd. in which there is a reference to the notice dated 29.5.1995. This notice is sent by Harbans Singh Joshan and he has made a clearly mention that earlier they served a notice dated 29.5.1995. A glaring feature of this notice, Ex. P4, dated 16.8.1995 is that the copy of this notice has been addressed to Anil Kumar Gupta, Partner, M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate, Chandigarh. This notice is sent by Harbans Singh Joshan and he has made a clearly mention that earlier they served a notice dated 29.5.1995. A glaring feature of this notice, Ex. P4, dated 16.8.1995 is that the copy of this notice has been addressed to Anil Kumar Gupta, Partner, M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate, Chandigarh. It may also be highlighted here that Anil Kumar Gupta was the person who signed the rent note not only on behalf of M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd. of which he was a Director, but also on behalf of M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate, of which he was a partner. The notice dated 29.5.1995 was addressed to the Director, M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd. The company has to act through its Director or Managing Director. In these circumstances, I do not see any illegality in the notices, Exs. P-3 and P-4. 20. The things do not rest here. Anil Kumar Gupta reverted back to `Harbans Singh Joshan and others on a letter pad of M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd. and the words M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate have also been typed on this letter. In this very letter dated 24.8.1995 Shri Gupta makes reference to the letter dated 16.8.1995, Ex. P-4, meaning thereby that the letter dated 16.8.1995 has been acknowledged by Shri Gupta on behalf of M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investments (P) Ltd. as well as M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate. In this reply, it was not the case of the tenant at all that the tenancies had been split up or that there was more than one tenant. When the notice has been given on behalf of the landlords and when it has been accepted by Anil Kumar Gupta, who was the Director of M/s Shine Star Leasing and Investment (P) Ltd. and partner of M/s Vimal Marketing Syndicate, no further proof is required on the part of the plaintiffs to show that their notice was valid. In this view of the matter, I repel the first and second arguments of the counsel for the appellants. 21. This point came up for consideration in Balwant Singh & anr. v. Kuldip Singh, 1984 PLR 80, wherein it was said that heldthat in case of a joint tenancy, notice to one of the joint tenants was sufficient to terminate the tenancy. 21. This point came up for consideration in Balwant Singh & anr. v. Kuldip Singh, 1984 PLR 80, wherein it was said that heldthat in case of a joint tenancy, notice to one of the joint tenants was sufficient to terminate the tenancy. It was further observed that there can be no doubt that u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a clear 15 days notice is a must for terminating the tenancy at will but in Punjab the provisions of this Section are not applicable. The tenancy in Punjab can be terminated by notice providing reasonable period to the tenant to surrender the tenancy. 22. Reliance can also be placed upon Kanji Manji v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 468, where it was observed that the notice to determine lease to one of the joint tenants is sufficient and suit for ejectment against one of the tenants is also good. 23. Counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon Jamir Ahmad v. Madhawanand and others, AIR 1979 Allahabad 104 : 1979(1) RCR 445 (Allahabad), where it was observed that notice to quit must be on behalf of the landlords. The judgment in this case is not helpful to the learned counsel for the appellants. I have already submitted above that the notice which was issued by the plaintiffs was on behalf of all the landlords and, moreover, all the owners of the property joined as plaintiffs with plaintiff No. 1. In the cited case, the notice did not purport to be on behalf of all the landlords and, in these circumstances, it was held that the notice to quit must be on behalf of all the landlords. In the present case I have already held that Harbans Singh Joshan did not give the notice in his individual capacity. 24. Counsel for the appellant also relied upon Mahboob Ullah v. Jwala Prasad Kajriwal and anr., AIR 1974 Allahabad 413 and M/s Prince Rubber and Plastics, Jalandhar v. M/s Remington Rand of India Ltd., 1998(2) PLR 721 : 1998(2) RCR 229 (P&H). Both these judgments are distinguishable on facts and for the reasons given above. 25. My attention was also invited to Sh. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Both these judgments are distinguishable on facts and for the reasons given above. 25. My attention was also invited to Sh. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Ambadas Bukate, 1997(1) RCR 98, by the counsel for the appellant to convince me that when the tenancies have been split-up, in such suits, separate notices are required. The facts of this case are not at all applicable to the facts in hand. In the cited case, it was proved on the record that the tenancy had split up. The shop was owned by a number co-owners by metes and bounds and each owner became separate owner of his severed portion. So much so, the portion of the shop fell to the share of one of the co-owners. In such a situation, it was observed by the Supreme Court that such a co-owner cannot file a suit for ejectment of the tenant from that portion. In the present case, there is not an iota of evidence to the effect that there was any partition amongst the co-owners. Neither this is the case of the defendants before the trial court nor there is any issue to this effect. In these circumstances, the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court cannot come to the rescue of the present appellants. 26. Now, I deal with the submission raised by the counsel for the appellants with regard to the sewerage connection. Counsel for the appellant wants to show that, in fact, the sewerage connection was already in existence much prior to 28.2.1992 and that the other portions of the property were in the possession of other tenants before it was given on lease to the present appellants. 27. Firstly, I may state that issue No. 3 was not pressed by the defendants before the first appellate court. Otherwise also, there is no substance in the argument of the counsel for the appellants as no counter evidence has been led by the defendants. The defendants had not even examined any person who might have been in possession of the property prior to 28.2.1992. We all know that civil cases are decided on preponderance of evidence. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, had placed on record Ex. P-2, which shows that the sewerage connection to the property in connection was given on 28.2.1992. The defendants had not even examined any person who might have been in possession of the property prior to 28.2.1992. We all know that civil cases are decided on preponderance of evidence. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, had placed on record Ex. P-2, which shows that the sewerage connection to the property in connection was given on 28.2.1992. It may be for three months at the initial stage or it may be on temporary basis but it will not advance the case of the defendants. The suit in this case was instituted on 6.9.1995 within five years from 28.2.1992. In these circumstances, the building was exempt from the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act. Resultantly, this argument of the counsel for the appellant also fails. 28. Counsel for the appellants submitted that though his clients have not challenged findings of the trial court on issue No. 3 before the first appellate court, yet being a legal plea, it can always be taken even at the second appeal stage. So far as the legal aspect of the argument of the counsel for the appellants is concerned, it is not disputed but in this case, the plea which the appellants want to take is a mixed question of law and fact. Straightaway it cannot be decided in favour of the defendants without proper evidence. There is no evidence in rebuttal to the documents, Ex. P-2, which has been relied upon by the trial court. 29. The next submission of the counsel for the appellants was that waiver of notice dated 29.5.1995, would amount to intentional abandonment of the right on the part of an individual. On going through the contents of the letters, Ex. P-4, not an iota of inference can be drawn in favour of the defendants that the plaintiffs ever waived the notice dated 29.5.1995. Rather, the tone and texture of this letter dated 16.8.1995 is otherwise, which can be quoted in the following terms :- "This is in pursuance to our notice dated 29.5.1995, duly received by you under your signatures, whereby your tenancy was terminated and you were asked to give the vacant possession of the tenanted premises latest by 31.7.1995. It is sorry to learn that till today you have not vacated the premises and instead has sent a cheque of Rs. 12,210/- (Rs. twelve thousand two hundred ten only). The said cheques of Rs. It is sorry to learn that till today you have not vacated the premises and instead has sent a cheque of Rs. 12,210/- (Rs. twelve thousand two hundred ten only). The said cheques of Rs. 12,210/- is accepted by us as a rent but as damages for illegal use and illegal occupation of our premises after 31.7.1995. Through this letter/Notice you are again requested to vacate the demised tenanted premises, within fifteen days from today, otherwise we will be constrained to seek legal recourse." 30. A reading of the letter, Ex. P-4, would show that at no point of time, the landlords wanted to waive the notice Ex. P-3 or they wanted to create a fresh tenancy in favour of the defendants. Rather, this notice was issued by Harbans Singh Joshan on behalf of the owners of the property which is permissible according to law. The judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellants in Ram Dayal v. Jawala Prasad, AIR 1966 Allahabad 623, is not applicable to the facts in hand. The plaintiffs never accepted the amount as rent nor they had any intention to create a fresh tenancy. Rather, they had accepted the amount by way of damages for the use and occupation of the premises. 31. The last argument raised by the counsel for the appellants was that the tenancy was for a fixed period of three years and the notice terminating the tenancy is not in accordance with law. In support of his contention, he relied upon M/s Prince Rubber and Plastics, Jalandhars case (supra). The rent note, Mark A, cannot be relied upon by the present appellants as it is the case of the appellants before the courts below that this document was neither properly stamped nor it was registered. 32. After considering all the pros and cons of this appeal, I am of the considered opinion that this appeal deserves to be dismissed at the motion stage itself. Ordered accordingly. No costs. 33. However, the appellants are granted six months time to vacate the premises, failing which the decree-holder-plaintiffs shall be entitled to get the possession through the court. The appellants shall given an undertaking before the executing court that they shall vacate the premises within six months from today and that they shall not let out the demised premises to anybody-else. 33. However, the appellants are granted six months time to vacate the premises, failing which the decree-holder-plaintiffs shall be entitled to get the possession through the court. The appellants shall given an undertaking before the executing court that they shall vacate the premises within six months from today and that they shall not let out the demised premises to anybody-else. The defendants will also undertake that they will hand over the possession only to the plaintiffs-decree-holders. If the undertaking is not given within one month from today as stated above, it will always be open to the plaintiffs to take the possession of the property before the expiry of the period of six months.