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2000 DIGILAW 583 (KAR)

BANDUSAB v. B. SHAIK MAHBOOB

2000-08-23

B.N.MALLIKARJUNA

body2000
MALLIKARJUNA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions one by the landlord and the other by the tenant under Section 50 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (for short the Act) are directed against the order dated 22. 7. 1997 of XVIII addl. Judge, Court of Small pauses, Bangalore in HRC No. 2504/92. Hereinafter I refer to the parties as they are shown in the original petition. ( 2 ) PETITIONER initiated eviction proceedings both under Section 21 (1) (h) and (p) of the Act in respect of commercial premises bearing no. 1, 8th Cross Road, Swimming Pool Extension, Malleswaram, bangalore-3. It is undisputed that petitioner is the landlord and it was leased to the respondent on 17. 1. 1991 on a monthly rent of rs. 350. Respondent resisted the petition and after contest Trial Court on appreciating the evidence both oral and documentary and after hearing the parties, by order impugned refused eviction under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, directed eviction of the respondent under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act and further directed the respondent to vacate and handover vacant possession of the premises within three months from the date of the order. Petitioner-landlord has questioned in hrrp No. 1437/1997 the order refusing to grant eviction under section 21 (1) (h) and the tenant in HRRP No. 1096/1997 has called in question the legality and correctness of the eviction order under section 21 (1) (p) of the Act. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated the facts are: Petitioner it would appear purchased the property consisting of several shop premises on 12. 10. 1987 and on 12. 10. 1989 leased one of the premises in favour of one Mohan on a monthly rent of rs. 600 and another premises to one Jugadish on 8. 3. 1990 on a monthly rent of Rs. 600. However, he retained possession of two other premises to transact the business in preparing and sale of beds. It would appear that there was certain vacant area on the eastern side of the premises and in that landlord put up another shop premises measuring 5 ft. east to west and 15 ft. north to south. 600. However, he retained possession of two other premises to transact the business in preparing and sale of beds. It would appear that there was certain vacant area on the eastern side of the premises and in that landlord put up another shop premises measuring 5 ft. east to west and 15 ft. north to south. He put up that shop for the purpose of expanding his business and it is stated that in between the premises in his occupation on the western side and the newly constructed shop, provided a door however, there was delay in getting certain machinery and in the mean time respondent approached him and persuaded him to lease the premises termporaritly for a period of atleast one year The accommodation that was available in the two premises was not sufficient and therefore for expansion of his business and in particular for installing ginning machine, it is stated he put up the shop in dispute. Petitioner agreed to lease for a temporary period for the reason that he could not get the ginning machine on time and therefore on 17. 1. 1991 he inducted the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 350 subsequently, he secured the machine and wanted the respondent to vacate and handover vacant possession but the respondent refused, he did not vacate despite repeated requests and a written notice is served on him. it is also averred that the respondent, an ayurvedic practioner has acquired other premises and continuing his profession there also and therefore he is liable to be evicted. It is therefore, petitioner filed eviction petition under section 21 (1) (h) and (p) of the Act. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT resisted the petition denying that the premises was taken for a period of one year only. On the other hand, respondent's case is that petitioner constructed the premises unauthorised with an intention of earning more money, the accommodation available to him in the premises in his occupation is more than sufficient and he does not require the premises in dispute for any expansion. Petitioner has shops both at Malleswaram and Mahalaxmi Layout and therefore the alleged need is a mere desire and he does not require the premises in question that there is absolutely no need and the alleged requirement is neither bona fide nor reasonable. Petitioner has shops both at Malleswaram and Mahalaxmi Layout and therefore the alleged need is a mere desire and he does not require the premises in question that there is absolutely no need and the alleged requirement is neither bona fide nor reasonable. Respondent further denied that he has shops in various places and carries on his professional work in rotation in all the three places. However, he contended that on 10. 8. 1992 at 12 noon petitioner, his wife and son rushed to his shop abruptly and assaulted him and therefore he made a complaint to the police and acting on the complaint police issued notice dated 17. 8. 1992 and therefore this petition is filed. The requirement alleged is not bona fide and it is actuated by oblique motive. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, at the trial petitioner examined himself as PW-1 his son as PW-2 and closed his side by producing documents exs. P-1 to 15. Per contra, respondent examined himself and produced documents Exs. R-1 to 3. learned trial Judge after hearing the arguments formulated certain points for consideration and they are: 1. Whether the schedule premises are bona fide and reasonably required by the petitioner for his additional accommodation? 2. Whether the respondent has acquired vacant possession of a suitable building ? 3. To what decree or order ? on considering the evidence both oral and documentary, he recorded the finding on the first point that the requirement pleaded lacks bona fide and reasonableness. On the second point he found that the respondent has acquired alternate accommodation and is running a clinic under the name and style Karnataka Mulavyadl chikitsalaya at Rajajinagar. Accordingly, while refusing to order eviction under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act directed the respondent to vacate and handover vacant possession under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act. ( 6 ) HEARD the learned Counsel for both the parties. ( 7 ) SRI Kesthur N. Chandra Shekar, learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the finding of the Trial Court that petition lacks both banafides and reasonableness is not proper, appreciation of evidence is totally perverse, evidence definitely demonstrate not only the desire but also the absolute need. ( 7 ) SRI Kesthur N. Chandra Shekar, learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the finding of the Trial Court that petition lacks both banafides and reasonableness is not proper, appreciation of evidence is totally perverse, evidence definitely demonstrate not only the desire but also the absolute need. The accommodation i. e. , available in the two premises is wholly insufficient and as a result petitioner was forced to keep the beds in open space in front of the shop and that invited notice from the police for action. He further contends that after installing ginning machine no space is left in the premises in occupation and as such it has become difficult to transact the business. There are about 3 to 4 employees in the shop and it is difficult for them to sit and work in the area that is now available for the reason that major portion of the premises is occupied by ginning machine. He therefore contends that appreciation of evidence of the Court below is totally improper and that has lead to wrong conclusion and needs to be set aside. Per contra Sri Bhagavan, learned Counsel for the respondent contends that there are absolutely no grounds to fault the finding of the trial Court under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. The pleadings are insufficient and does not make out that the petitioner requires the premises for installing ginning machine. Necessary particulars constituting the ground either under Section 21 (1) (h) or under section 21 (1) (p) of the Act are not made out clearly in the pleadings and that itself is sufficient to reject the case of the petitioner under section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. The finding of the trial Court in refusing eviction under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act being based on proper appreciation of evidence, calls for no interference in the revision. He further contended that the order of the trial Court under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act suffers from legal infirmity for the reason that the pleadings in this behalf are totally inadequate and insufficient. Eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act can only be ordered if there is enough pleading and proof that the alleged premises is acquired subsequent to the creation of tenancy and that is a suitable premises. Eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act can only be ordered if there is enough pleading and proof that the alleged premises is acquired subsequent to the creation of tenancy and that is a suitable premises. But the pleading in this behalf is not very clear and does not make out when exactly the respondent acquired the premises assuming for a moment that he has acquired the premises as an alternate suitable premises for transacting the business which he is doing in the premises in dispute. ( 8 ) IN view of the rival contentions, points that would arise for consideration in this revision are:1. Whether the trial Court's finding that the requirement pleaded lacks both bona fide and reasonableness is not correct and calls for interference? 2. Whether the pleadings are inadequate and insufficient and therefore petitioner is not entitled to any order under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act? 3. Whether the trial Court's finding that the respondent-tenant is liable to be evicted under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act suffers from illegality and irregularity warranting interference in revision? ( 9 ) IT is undisputed that the petitioner purchased whole of the building in the month of October, 1987 and put up the construction in dispute subsequently. He has put up the construction according to the evidence somewhere in the year 1990. After the purchase, he has leased one premises to one Jagadish and the other premises to one Mohan. Petitioner's grievance is that those two shops are not convenient for him and the one which is on the western side and leased to the respondent is convenient for expansion of his business for the reason that there is already a door in the common wall. The total area of the premises in occupation of the petitioner is about 16 ft. east-west and 16ft. north-south. There is little discrepancy in the exact measurement. However, sketch produced by the learned counsel at the hearing gives out the said measurement. Petitioner no doubt has not pleaded in the petition what was the nature of expansion except saying that the accommodation that is available is not sufficient and he needs the leased premises for expanding the business. north-south. There is little discrepancy in the exact measurement. However, sketch produced by the learned counsel at the hearing gives out the said measurement. Petitioner no doubt has not pleaded in the petition what was the nature of expansion except saying that the accommodation that is available is not sufficient and he needs the leased premises for expanding the business. In evidence he has tried to show that he wanted to install a ginning machine and since he could not get the machine on time the premises was lying idle and exactly at that time respondent approached him, persuaded him and therefore he leased it for a temporary period. ( 10 ) EX. R-2 is a copy of the agreement dated 17. 1. 1991 though the petitioner admits his signature in the document disputes the existence of that agreement and says in evidence that the respondent prepared the document by himself and obtained his signature. A close look at the document reveals that it is one of the copies of the documents prepared and it bears the signature of the petitioner. It would read that petitioner agreed not to disturb the respondent for a a period of three years. No doubt, learned trial Judge refers to the terms of these documents but we are not very much concerned about it or the period of lease in determining as to whether the landlord is entitled to possession and under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act for the reason that in such matters what is required to be considered is whether the requirement pleaded is both reasonable and bona fide, if the bona fides and reasonableness are established whatever may be the period of lease, landlord would be entitled to an order under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act. ( 11 ) IN evidence petitioner has attempted to show that he requires the premises for installing ginning machine. However, it has come in evidence that during the year 1993 petitioner installed the ginning machine and for certain reason it was not being operated at the time of this petition for eviction. Whatever that may be, one thing is wanting in evidence viz. , as to when exactly he placed orders for ginning machine, when the supply made and why there was delay in supplying the machine. Whatever that may be, one thing is wanting in evidence viz. , as to when exactly he placed orders for ginning machine, when the supply made and why there was delay in supplying the machine. This is important for the reason that petitioner pleads that since he did not get the ginning machine on time he was obliged to lease the premises for a short period to the respondent. But very surprisingly, this material piece of evidence is not made available either in the statement of PW-1 or his son PW-2. learned Trial Judge has considered the evidence of both P. Ws-1 and 2 elaborately and concludes that the requirement pleaded is neither reasonable nor bona fide. What is reasonable has to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each particular case. A person's desire to expand the same business which he is transacting in the adjoining building may conveniently be concluded reasonable but the question would be whether there was absolute need or whether it was really intended. In evidence an attempt it made to show that he wanted ginning machine and since the machine was not received on time he leased the premises to the respondent. But what is the evidence of P. Ws-1 and2? Their evidence is not very accurate and convincing. They have installed the machine in the premises and for some reason or the other it was not being operated at the time of disposal of th eviction petition. But whatever that may be, evidence does not disclose as to how may employees are there and how the accommodation available in the premises in occupation of the landlord is not sufficient and why further expansion was necessary. Sri Kesthur Chandra Shekhar, learned Counsel, tried to demonstrate by saying that for want of space prepared beds had to be displayed outside the shop and that invited the notice from the police contemplating certain action. It is not unusual that in a business like this, displaying the prepared goods outside the shop. In the absence of clear evidence, it is difficult to say that the accommodation that is available in the premises in possession of the tenant is not sufficient to transact the business i. e. , business of preparing and selling the beds. It is not unusual that in a business like this, displaying the prepared goods outside the shop. In the absence of clear evidence, it is difficult to say that the accommodation that is available in the premises in possession of the tenant is not sufficient to transact the business i. e. , business of preparing and selling the beds. ( 12 ) IN addition, respondent also contested the proceedings onthe ground that petitioner has may other shops other than the one near the schedule premises. The evidence of P. Ws-1 and 2 admits of no doubt that there is another shop at 11th Cross, Malleswaram, but PW-2 tries to say that it is his exclusive business and PW-2 tries to say that it is his exclusive business and PW-1 his father relinquished whatever interest he has in the shop by executing the deed Ex. P-9 dated 9. 9. 1998. However, PW-1 in evidence states that there are 15 persons in his house and all those members are engaged in business. In support of his statement he has produced the ration card Ex. P-3. At one stage they say that they live separately and they have no business connection, but we find the name of pw-2 Alif peer in Ex. P-3 as one of the persons living with his father. Learned trial Judge after noticing these aspects in the evidence of P. Ws-1 and 2 and the fact that petitioner has another alternate premises for carrying on the similar business at 11th Cross, Malleswaram, hold that the requirement pleaded by the petitioner is neither reasonable nor bona fide. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence I hardly find any ground to fault that finding of the trial Court in this aspect of the matter. ( 13 ) SRI Kesthur Chandra Shekar, learned Counsel, invited myattention to various decisions of this Court in support of his arguments that the appreciation of evidence is perverse and calls for interference. There is no need to go in detail to all those decisions for the simple reason that in a case of this nature each case has to be examined on its own facts and circumstances. There is no need to go in detail to all those decisions for the simple reason that in a case of this nature each case has to be examined on its own facts and circumstances. The evidence must not only make out the desire but it unclinchingly make out that there is absolute need and so long as that need is not established, mere desire will not be sufficient to hold that the requirement is bona fide. Learned trial Judge, after elaborate consideration of the evidence has clearly said that the alleged requirement is neither reasonable nor bona fide. An attempt is neither reasonable nor bona fide. An attempt is made to show that the petitioner received the ginning machine a year after and therefore he asked the respondent to vacate and handover vacant possession. As I have said earlier, there is absolutely no evidence indicating as to when the orders were placed and why there was delay in supplying and when exactly the machine was supplied though PW-1 states that in 1993 he installed the ginning machine. If these particulars were there, that would have assisted the Court in appreciating an accepting the evidence of PW-1 in regard to the alleged requirement and the reason which compelled him to lease the premises to the respondent. In the absence of those material particulars Trial Court was right in rejecting the evidence of P. Ws-1 and 2 and holding that the requirement is neither reasonable nor bonafide. Therefore, revision by the landlord for setting aside the order under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act fails. ( 14 ) SRI Bhagavan, learned Counsel for the tenant argued that the pleadings in regard to the eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the act is totally inadequate and insufficient, pleadings do not make out that the respondent acquired alternate accommodation subsequent to the creation of the tenancy in his favour and therefore whatever evidence may be in that behalf would not assist the landlord in getting an order under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act. In support of his arguments, he relied on a decision of this Court in BHEEM SINGH vs HEMAVATHI1 and this was followed by another learned Single judge in Dr. H. HANUMANTHAPPA vs M. KRISHNAMURTHY Indeed there cannot be any quarrel over that preposition of law. In support of his arguments, he relied on a decision of this Court in BHEEM SINGH vs HEMAVATHI1 and this was followed by another learned Single judge in Dr. H. HANUMANTHAPPA vs M. KRISHNAMURTHY Indeed there cannot be any quarrel over that preposition of law. Landlord would be entitled to an order of eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act if only he establishes that the tenant has acquired an alternate suitable premises after creation of tenancy in his favour in respect of the disputed premises. But what is necessary to consider in the instant case is whether the pleading in this behalf is inadequate or insufficient as contended by Sri Bhagavan, learned Counsel for the respondent. He invited my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in GANAPAT RAM SHARMA AND OTHERS vs SMT. GAYATRI DEVI hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the purport and object of section 14 (1) (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act has declared that in a case where eviction is sought under Section 14 (1) (h) of the Delhi rent Control Act it is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction, that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence. Whether it is suitable or not and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts. Eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Karnataka Act is permitted only when it is established that the tenant whether before or after the coming into operation of that part (Part-V) of the Act, has built or acquired vacant possession or been allotted a suitable building. Interpreting Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act this Court in Bheem singh's case has said that it is for the landlord to establish that the tenant acquired the premises after he became the tenant of the said premises: But the question in the instant case is whether there is sufficient or adequate pleading in this behalf. Interpreting Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act this Court in Bheem singh's case has said that it is for the landlord to establish that the tenant acquired the premises after he became the tenant of the said premises: But the question in the instant case is whether there is sufficient or adequate pleading in this behalf. ( 15 ) IN para-7 of the petition, petitioner pleads that the respondentis carrying on his profession not only in the schedule shop but also in various places in Bangalore and particularly at No. 20/3, Mosque complex, Masjid-e-Noor, Rajajinagar, 4th Block, Bangalore-10 under the name and style 'karnataka Mulavyadi Chikitsalaya'. Further it is pleaded that he sits and carries his professions work in rotation in three places to the knowledge of the petitioner in a day. It is no doubt true that it is not specifically pleaded as to when exactly the respondent acquired this premises, its suitability apart. In a case of this nature the point for consideration would be as to how the respondent has understood this pleading and contested the proceedings. Respondent meets this averments in Para-7 of the statement of objections. He denies by saying that it is not true that the respondent has shops in various places and that he sits and carries on professional work in rotation in three places, assumption that he is liable to be evicted under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act is mis-conceived and untenable. ( 16 ) HOW pleadings in HRC proceedings have to be construed has come up for consideration earlier before this Court in number of matters. In fact, justice Chandrakantaraj Urs (as he then was) is more than one case has said that in eviction proceedings the Court must only satisfy itself whether the pleadings contain enough material to raise proper issues and mould the relief to which the parties would be entitled to. In this context, reference may be made to the decision in FAKIRASA vs SHEKHARAYYA4. With reference to the facts and circumstances of the case that camp up for consideration the learned judge makes this observation which reads thus:"10. . . . In this context, reference may be made to the decision in FAKIRASA vs SHEKHARAYYA4. With reference to the facts and circumstances of the case that camp up for consideration the learned judge makes this observation which reads thus:"10. . . . It is impossible for me to understand how the portions extracted above, do not constitute sufficient pleading as to the purpose and requirement of the business of the petitioners, more so, that of the the 5th petitioner -Mahadevasa, But the learned District judge either failed to read what was in the petition or misread what he read. The pleading more than satisfies the decision on which the Learned District Judge relied. In this Country for long, for various reasons, the pleadings have been construed liberally, in many cases, the lack of material particulars and details. Evidently this was due to the large scale of illiteracy and ignorance prevailing in this country on which an alien judicial system was imposed. Over the years decision after decision has emphasised this fact that has commended liberal approach. The Court must only satisfy itself whether the pleading contains enough material to raise proper issues and mould the relief to which the parties would be entitled to. Technical flaws, if any, are to be ignored. This decision holds good even to this day. Sometimes the errors in pleadings would be that of the lawyer or it could be that of the litigant who is ignorant and fails to give clear instructions to his lawyer. If there is minimum material detail and that would be enough for the Court to mould the relief justly on the evidence available in the case would more than satisfy the requirements of adequate pleading. " ( 17 ) IN HABIBULLA vs LAKSHANI5 again it has been re-iteratedas to how the pleadings in a case of this nature have to be construed. It is observed that on examination if it is found that the respondents did understand the pleadings and file the statement of objections and went to trial and in such circumstances pleadings cannot be held to be inadequate. The relevant observation reads thus: "8. . . . In regard to the shop premises constructed one has to draw inference. That is a need for her husband who is carrying on his business in a rented shop elsewhere. The relevant observation reads thus: "8. . . . In regard to the shop premises constructed one has to draw inference. That is a need for her husband who is carrying on his business in a rented shop elsewhere. Everyone of the respondents who has field the objection has said in his objection statement that the place where the husband of the landlord was doing business was sufficient for his requirement, therefore giving room for the. inference that the husband did not require the shop premises in this area where the petition premises is situated. That clearly shows that the respondents did understand the pleadings. If they understood the pleadings, then it cannot be said to be inadequate, I have in more than one cases held that what is required to be pleaded in the case like this is, that whatever is pleaded must be understood clearly by the opponent and whatever the opponent files by way of statement of objection is to enable the Court to raise the issues and points for consideration and determination. If this requirement is satisfied then the pleadings must be held to be adequate. " in another case in L. ESWAR vs E. RAGHUPATHI NAIDU AND others K. Shivashankar Bhat J. (as he then was) has said that the pleadings in eviction petition have to be construed liberally and generous interpretation must be given. The relevant observation reads thus:"9. Mr. Shekar Shetty contended that there has been no proper pleading regarding the claim of the petitioner and that the petitioner has developed his case from stage to stage. This criticism of the learned Counsel cannot be accepted. In the matter of eviction petition under Section 21 (1) of the Act the Court has been always liberal and generous in interpreting the pleadings. There are several decisions of this Court which I had occasion to refer in M/s. Mysore Champion Industries vs Pukraj, ILR 1992 kar. L. J. 1222, It is necessary to note that even in the case of a civil litigation the Courts in India have been always liberal in the matter of interpreting the pleadings and technicalities are not permitted to restrict the scope of the pleadings. This broad approach has been further developed in the matter of pleadings in the case of eviction petitions under the provisions of the Act. This broad approach has been further developed in the matter of pleadings in the case of eviction petitions under the provisions of the Act. Therefore it is clear that a highly technical approach to the pleadings is unwarranted and so long as the nucleus of the requirement is averred in the eviction petition the same cannot be rejected as vague and insufficient. In the instant case the petitioner has pleaded that he required the space for parking of car and the present accommodation available for the purpose of reception was hardly sufficient and that there was no restaurant and boarding to meet the requirements of the lodgers. This requirement was further amplified by pointing out as to which of the premises was required for reception and which was required for providing parking facilities. Again as PW-1 the petitioner has explained these requirements" ( 18 ) NOW keeping in mind the above decisions when I read the pleadings and the evidence lead by both the parties, it is rather difficult to say that the defendant did not understand what the petitioner meant about and what exactly the case pleaded by the petitioner. It is no doubt true neither the pleading nor the evidence make it very clear as to when exactly the respondent acquired alternate premises, assuming for a moment the evidence establishes that the respondent has alternative business. PW-1 or P. W-2 for that matter does not clearly say that the respondents acquired the premises in Rajajinagar after he took the disputed premises. Likewise nothing is elicited in thheir cross-examination indicating that he had the shop premises at Rajajinagar even before the lease of the disputed premises. However, the evidence of the respondent admits of no doubt that he is transacting business at Rajajinagar though he makes an attempt to show that it is being run by one of his two sons who have taken up the same profession. But not even one of them is examined to support his evidence. Except the fact that tne evidence does not very clearly establish as to when exactly the tenant acquired the premises it admits of no doubt that the respondent has an alternate accommodation and in fact he is running the same business viz. , practicing the ayurvedic medicine in the premises near rama Mandira at Rajajinagar. The evidence of the respondent in this behalf reads thus: Ex. , practicing the ayurvedic medicine in the premises near rama Mandira at Rajajinagar. The evidence of the respondent in this behalf reads thus: Ex. P-3 is the photograph of the premises at Rajajinagar. Further one another circumstance in evidence destroys even the feeble evidence of the respondent ie. the statement of his own son Ismail in the criminal proceedings. Sri Bhagawan, learned Counsel, submitted that the documents Exs. P-14 and 15 are in admissible in evidence, that whatever statements one Ismail has made in the criminal proceedings does not enure to the benefit of the respondent. The evidence admits of no doubt that there was a criminal case against the petitioner and his sons on a complaint by the respondent. Ex. P-15 is the copy of the judgment in C. C. No. 18748/95 dated 5. 2. 1997. Accused are the petitioner and his two sons. They were prosecuted for offences under Sections 448, 341, 324 RAW Section 34 of I. P. C. and they were acquitted. Ex. P-14 is the copy of deposition of Ismail son of B. Shaik Mehmood examined as PW-6 in the case. On perusal of Exs. P-14 and 15 it is clear that Ismail is no person other than the son of Shaik Mehammod who is the respondent and his two other sons M. Zaheer and M. Shafi are also examined in that case as P. Ws-3 and 5 respectively. In view of Sections 63, 74 and 76 of the Evidence Act, I find no force in the contention that these documents are not admissible in evidence. Ismail PW-6 son of the respondent very clearly and in the opening sentence of his evidence says that his father got a clinic in Rajajinagar, P. G. Halli and Malleswaram he has been examined in that case on 3. 2,1997 whereas respondent is examined in HRC Proceedings on 28. 2. 1996. When we closely examine the evidence of RW-1 and the statement of Ismail in criminal proceedings, it leads to irresistible conclusion that the respondent is attending to his profession not only in the premises in dispute but also in the premises at Rajajinagar. Learned trial Judge, considering these aspects of the matter has said that the petitioner-landlord is entitled to eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act which in my considered view and for the reasons hereinabove stated cannot be faulted. Learned trial Judge, considering these aspects of the matter has said that the petitioner-landlord is entitled to eviction under Section 21 (1) (p) of the Act which in my considered view and for the reasons hereinabove stated cannot be faulted. ( 19 ) SRI Bhagavan, learned Counsel submits that if immediate eviction is ordered, respondent would be put to greater hardship and inconvenience and sufficient time should be granted. I may mention here that in fact during the hearing time was granted on the submission of both the learned Counsel that there is a chance for settlement. However, it was reported that the parties came nearer to agreement in the matter of vacating but did not agree in the matter of grant of time. Petitioner came up to a particular period viz. , 18 to 24 months but the tenant wanted a little longer period viz. , 36 months for which petitioner did not agree. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances and the fact that the respondent is practicing in ayurvedic medicine in the disputed area for over 9 years, it is just and proper to grant him enough time to vacate and handover vacant possession. ( 20 ) IN the result and for the reasons stated hereinabove, while dismissing two revision petitions H. R. R. P. No. 1096 and 1437/97, the tenant (respondent in HRRP No. 1437/1997 and petitioner in HRRP no. 1096/1997) is granted time and he shall vacate and handover vacant possession of the premises on or before 31. 12. 2002. Parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .