JUDGMENT - A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment and order of the School Tribunal, Aurangabad, dated 1st December, 1989 in Appeal No. 81 of 1989-A. 2.Briefly stated, the respondent No. 2 was in the employment of the petitioner's School for over a period of 15 years. The respondent No. 2 was charge-sheeted and enquiry was held by issuing show cause notice which contained following charges : "1. Taking tuitions without permission of head of the institution. 2. Threatening the students that they would fail in examination, if they do not come for tuition and thereby enforcing them to come for the tuition to the house of the respondent and during night asking the students to sleep in his own house and committing immoral acts with them. 3. The third charge relates to making false complaints against office bearers of the society and also defaming them. 4. The fourth charge relates to his recovering fees from students without issuing receipts and utilising the amount for own purposes. 5. The fifth charge relates to threatening the students that they will fail and thereby taking false complaints from them. 6. The sixth charge relates to disobedience of the order of the superiors. 7. The seventh charge relates to remaining habitually absent without any application and without submitting any leave application or submitting leave application at late stage. Non submission of certificate of medical officer as suggested by the society on the pretext that respondent No. 2 is ill." It is not in dispute that the mandatory procedure as required under the Rules were duly complied with while conducting the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 was given sufficient opportunity in the said proceedings. In the said enquiry, the management examined 15 witnesses. After the enquiry was completed , the Enquiry Committee held that all the charges were proved and submitted report recommending termination of the respondent No. 2. On the basis of the said recommendation, the petitioner issued termination order dated 2nd May, 1989. Against the order of termination the respondent No. 2 filed appeal before the School Tribunal under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. On the basis of the said recommendation, the petitioner issued termination order dated 2nd May, 1989. Against the order of termination the respondent No. 2 filed appeal before the School Tribunal under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. The Tribunal by its impugned judgment, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of termination and instead directed reinstatement of the respondent No. 2 with back wages and minor penalty of stoppage of two annual increments permanently including the leave period. The petitioner has taken exception to the said decision by way of this writ petition. This Court, while admitting the writ petition, granted stay of reinstatement of respondent No. 2. 3.The learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly argued that the Tribunal has clearly acted in excess of jurisdiction inasmuch as after it had recorded a finding that necessary mandatory procedure has been complied with, there was no reason for the Tribunal to examine the matter any further. It is further contended that the Tribunal would get jurisdiction only when it is found that the termination order is illegal and improper being in contravention of any law, contract or conditions of service and in no other circumstances. It is further contended that the Tribunal although vested with Appellate Court's Jurisdiction cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record before the Enquiry Committee and substitute its opinion to the one taken by the Enquiry Committee or the Management. It is further contended that in any case, the finding recorded by the Tribunal suffers from perversity inasmuch as the reason indicated by the Tribunal for discarding the evidence adduced by the Management was that the evidence was recorded after lapse of three years. The other reason indicated, contends the learned Counsel for the petitioner that to establish the relevant fact, all the witnesses were not examined and for that reason, the witnesses who were already examined, were held to be untrustworthy. The learned Counsel has criticised the approach of the Tribunal on the ground that the appreciation of evidence has been done as if the Tribunal was examining the evidence in a criminal case to find out whether there is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The last contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Tribunal having held that the charge Nos. The last contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Tribunal having held that the charge Nos. 6 and 7 have been proved, it was not open for the Tribunal to interfere with the order of termination by reducing punishment to one of stoppage of two annual increments as has been done by the Tribunal. 4.On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 contends that having regard to section 10(1) as well as sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence which was before the Enquiry Committee to enable it to arrive at a finding that the order of termination which is based on the report of the Enquiry Committee is otherwise illegal or improper. He further contends that since the Tribunal was entitled to re-appreciate the evidence, no fault can be found with the impugned judgment especially when the Tribunal has considered the evidence of each of the witnesses and has taken the view that the finding recorded by the Enquiry Committee is improper. With regard to the submissions regarding reduction of penalty, the learned Counsel submits that for the reasons indicated by the Tribunal in para 20 of the judgment, no interference is warranted in the present writ petition. The respondent No. 2 has not assailed the finding recorded by the Tribunal against him relating to charges 6 and 7. 5.Before I proceed to examine the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions relating to the powers of the School Tribunal, viz. The respondent No. 2 has not assailed the finding recorded by the Tribunal against him relating to charges 6 and 7. 5.Before I proceed to examine the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions relating to the powers of the School Tribunal, viz. : Sections 10 (1), 11(1) and 11(2) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, read thus : "10(1) For the purposes of admission, hearing and disposal of appeals, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in an Appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and shall also have the power to stay the operation of any order against which an appeal is made, on such conditions as it may think fit to impose and such other powers as are conferred on it by or under this Act." "11.(1) On receipt of an appeal, where the Tribunal, after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties of being heard, is satisfied that the appeal does not pertain to any of the matters specified in section 9 or is not maintainable by it, or there is no sufficient ground for interfering with the order of the Management , it may dismiss the appeal." "11. (2) Where the Tribunal, after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties of being heard, decides in any appeal that the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was in contravention of any law (including any rules made under this Act), contract or conditions of service for the time being in force or was otherwise illegal or improper, the Tribunal may set aside the order of the Management, partially or wholly, and direct the management." 6.Having considered the rival submissions and the relevant provisions. I am inclined to take a view that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the appeal under section 9 of the Act is of a limited nature. Indeed, sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Act invests all the powers of the Appellate Court in the Tribunal. But, the said powers are circumscribed by the provisions of section 11 of the Act. Section 10(1) relates to the general powers of the Tribunal including the procedural powers, while section 11 of the Act relates to the powers of the Tribunal to decide an appeal. But, the said powers are circumscribed by the provisions of section 11 of the Act. Section 10(1) relates to the general powers of the Tribunal including the procedural powers, while section 11 of the Act relates to the powers of the Tribunal to decide an appeal. In the present case, we are concerned with sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 11 of the Act provides that the Tribunal shall decide appeal and conclude that the order of dismissal, removal or termination of service or reduction in rank, is either in contravention of any law or contract or conditions of service which is for the time being in force or even when it finds that the impugned order would be otherwise illegal or improper. The expression " otherwise illegal or improper" cannot permit the Tribunal to enlarge the scope of enquiry of reappreciating the evidence of witnesses on record before the Enquiry Committee or for that matter to substitute its own opinion to the one taken by the Enquiry Committee or the Management, unless it is a case of no legal evidence. 7.In so far as the first part is concerned, there is no dispute that the Tribunal has recorded a clear finding that the relevant procedure was followed by the Enquiry Committee and, therefore, there was full compliance of the Rules. In other words, the Tribunal has not interfered with the impugned termination order being in contravention of any law, contract or condition of service which were for the time being in force. The only reason, therefore, arrived at by the Tribunal, at best can be stated to be that the termination order is otherwise illegal or improper. 8.So far as the enquiry relating to whether the termination order is otherwise illegal or improper, the same would necessarily be on the basis of the record before the authorities which took the impugned decision. The Tribunal, in my view, cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own opinion to the one taken by the Enquiry Committee. The nature of power that flows from section 9 read with section 11(2) is restricted to the enquiry on the basis of whether the decision was without any legal evidence on record. The Tribunal, in my view, cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own opinion to the one taken by the Enquiry Committee. The nature of power that flows from section 9 read with section 11(2) is restricted to the enquiry on the basis of whether the decision was without any legal evidence on record. The scope of enquiry cannot be enlarged to re-appreciation of evidence of the witnesses which was before the Enquiry Committee that too by substituting the opinion of the Enquiry Committee or the Management. 9.I am therefore, of the view that the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in the present case in reappreciating the evidence of each witness. Besides that the Tribunal has appreciated the evidence as if it was trying a criminal case by applying the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The writ petition should succeed on this count alone. 10.There is additional reason for which I am inclined to hold that the Tribunal has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction, inasmuch as the Tribunal having found that there was ample evidence with regard to charge Nos. 6 and 7, which were obviously serious charges of insubordination and of persistent or habitual absence of the respondent No. 2 without permission, it has interfered with the decision of the Management without any legal basis. The Tribunal has observed that the respondent No. 2 remained absent continuously for years together without applying for permission of the management and that had deliberately flouted the directions of the Management and committed act of disobedience. Having recorded the said finding, it was not open for the Tribunal to take a lenient view of the matter by setting aside the order of termination and instead directing reinstatement with back wages and punishment of only stoppage of two annual increments. The reasons assigned for taking such a lenient view are wholly extraneous and cannot be sustained in law. The Tribunal was unduly influenced by the fact that the respondent No. 2 had served the institution for about 15 years and has a big family consisting of his wife and children. The Tribunal has, therefore, held that with a view to mitigate the hardship of the respondent No. 2's family, it would be appropriate that the termination order should be set aside and instead the respondent No. 2 can be punished with minor penalty of stoppage of two annual increments. The Tribunal has, therefore, held that with a view to mitigate the hardship of the respondent No. 2's family, it would be appropriate that the termination order should be set aside and instead the respondent No. 2 can be punished with minor penalty of stoppage of two annual increments. In my view, such approach is totally wrong and cannot be sustained in law. The fact that Charge No. 6 relates to disobedience of the orders of the superior having been proved, there was no reason to take a lenient view in the matter. Besides the charge of insubordination, even the charge of persistent and habitual absenteeism without permission from the Management, has also been established against the respondent No. 2. In the circumstances, the order passed by the Tribunal setting aside the order of termination and reinstating the respondent No. 2 with back wages and by imposing minor penalty, cannot be sustained. 11.For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal on 1st December, 1989 is set aside. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----