Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. This judgment shall dispose of LPA Nos. 122 and 123 of 1999. Initially, the matter arose out of a claim made before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras by the legal representatives of one Thangaraj who met with an accident on 2.2.1991 and was killed. Thangaraj left behind him his wife and two minor children., they being one T. Kannammal, T. Mani and T. Kumudha. In that accident, one J. Srinivasan, a boy of 19 years was also injured. Two separate applications came to be filed for compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, they being, OP Nos. 709 and 710 of 1991. Both the petitions were decreed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,70,000/-as compensation with 15% interest from the date of the petition till the date of deposit in O.P. No. 709 of 1991, the petition filed by the legal representatives of Thangaraj and awarded a sum of Rs. 60,000/-with 15% interest in O.P. No. 710 of 1991 which was filed by Srinivasan who was injured. Both sides appealed against this common award. So also cross-objections were filed by the parties. 2. Learned single Judge before whom the matter was finalised, however, reduced the award of compensation to the legal representatives and limited it to Rs. 2,25,000/- with 12% interest per annum while in the case of compensation awarded to Srinivasan also it was reduced from Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- with interest at 12% per annum. The present appeals challenge this common judgment. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants made it clear that he would restrict himself to the quantum of compensation as the question of liability on the part of the respondent is no more open and has been finalised by the High Court. In so far as the compensation is concerned, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants pointed out that the award passed by the Tribunal as also the learned single Judge ignored some vital factors which affected the quantum of compensation. Learned counsel invited our attention to the fact that the deceased was earning Rs. 60 per day at the time when he died. However, there is evidence on record that even in the year 1994 masons used to get Rs. 80 per day. Learned counsel invited our attention to the fact that the deceased was earning Rs. 60 per day at the time when he died. However, there is evidence on record that even in the year 1994 masons used to get Rs. 80 per day. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that tie deceased was working as a mason and would have earned much more than Rs. 60/-. However, the Tribunal took in to account the income on the date of death alone and did not give any scope for increase in the income which was inevitable. Learned counsel then points out that the Tribunal has applied the multiplier of 25. Learned counsel fairly conceded that this was incorrect as the total multiplier which could have been applied, could not have exceeded 18 as per the recent decision in U.P. Stale Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra (1996 ACJ 831). However, the learned counsel further points out that even the High Court has while deciding the compensation applied the multiplier of 12. Learned counsel is at pains to point out that at the time of his death, the deceased was barely 33 years old and was a man in robust health and as such would have expected to live long. According to the learned counsel, the application of multiplier of 12 by this Court was totally incorrect. Learned counsel points out that the High Court had erred in not awarding the compensation on the basis of the future income also. We have been extensively taken through the judgment of the learned single judge by the learned counsel for the appellants. 4. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent has justified the award relying mainly on the reported decision in G.M. Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Susamma Thomas ((1994 ACJ 1). Learned counsel for the respondent also urged that the court has correctly taken into consideration the fact and even the amount that would have been spent by the deceased. In short, learned counsel for the respondent supports only the order of the learned single Judge. From the order, we find that the learned single Judge applied the multiplier of 12. What is stated about the multiplier is only this: “As per the decision of the Supreme Court, the maximum multiplier could only be 18. In short, learned counsel for the respondent supports only the order of the learned single Judge. From the order, we find that the learned single Judge applied the multiplier of 12. What is stated about the multiplier is only this: “As per the decision of the Supreme Court, the maximum multiplier could only be 18. Therefore, adopting a multiplier of 12 will be reasonable.” Now beyond this reasoning, the learned single Judge has not chosen to give any other reason as to why the multiplier should be that of only 12. In fact the deceased when he died vas barely 33 years of age and undoubtedly, was in good health. He was doing arduous work as mason and was earning Rs. 60/-per day. Even, if we make a reference to II schedule, to a person who is above 30 years but below 35 years, the multiplier which has been specified is 17. In this, it cannot be ignored altogether that there is nothing on record to suggest that the life of the deceased would have been shortened by any other factors. It is true that the Tribunal had applied the multiplier of 25 without there being any justification. But, the application of multiplier of 12 by the learned single Judge also does not appear to be reasonable, much less in the absence of any reason. We feel that the multiplier of 17 would be a proper multiplier particularly because of the age and further because of the fact that there is clear evidence on record that the deceased was in good health. 5. We then find that the learned single Judge has relied on the income at the rate of Rs. 60/-per day on the date when the deceased died. When calculated for 24 days in a month his income would be Rs. 1500/- approximately per month and on that basis, applying the multiplier of 12, he has arrived at the figure of Rs. 2,15,000/-. He has also awarded Rs. 5,000/-towards loss of consortium and has awarded Rs. 2,000/- each to the minor children on account of loss of love and affection. Thus, he has calculated the figure at Rs. 2,25,000/- as against Rs. 2,70,000/- fixed by the Tribunal. We fell that this would not be a proper figure. 6. According to us, learned single Judge was bound to take into account the betterment of income in the future. Thus, he has calculated the figure at Rs. 2,25,000/- as against Rs. 2,70,000/- fixed by the Tribunal. We fell that this would not be a proper figure. 6. According to us, learned single Judge was bound to take into account the betterment of income in the future. In fact, there was evidence on record to suggest that in 1994 itself, a mason used to get Rs. 80/- per day. We do not wish to dilate on this question further, as in fact, a mason today would be earning much more than Rs. 80 per day. We would therefore, restrict ourselves to the figure of Rs. 80/- per day as the total income of the deceased for the rest of his life. If this is the figure, then considering that he would have worked for 25 days in a month, the total income would be Rs. 2,000 per month. 7. At this juncture, our attention was invited to the Supreme Court decision in Trilok Chandras case (1996 ACJ 831) (cited supra) where the Apex Court has relied on the method of calculation as approved in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., ((1942) AC 601). We would adopt the same method. There would be in all six units in this case and therefore Rs. 600/- would be the expense which we would ascribe to the deceased himself for his own purpose. Deducting that from the figure of Rs. 2,000/-, the share for others would be re stricted to Rs. 1,340/- and the annual income in that case would be Rs. 16,080/-. If we apply the multiplier of 17 as we propose to do, the total income would be Rs. 2,73,360/-. We would add Rs. 10,000/- on account of loss of expectation of life as we propose to leave that part of the order untouched, excepting adding Rs. 500 each to be paid to the children. Then the total calculation would come to Rs. 2,83,360/-. We will round off this figure to Rs. 2,85,000/-. Thus the legal representatives of the deceased Thangaraj would be entitled to a compensation of Rs. 2,85,000 which figure will carry interest as awarded by the learned single Judge. This would take care of all the factors as argued by the learned counsel. 8. As regard LPA No. 123 of 1999 filed by Srinivasan, learned single Judge has reduced the compensation amount from Rs. 60,000/-to Rs. 50,000/-. 2,85,000 which figure will carry interest as awarded by the learned single Judge. This would take care of all the factors as argued by the learned counsel. 8. As regard LPA No. 123 of 1999 filed by Srinivasan, learned single Judge has reduced the compensation amount from Rs. 60,000/-to Rs. 50,000/-. Considering the judgment of the Tribunal, we find that the award of Rs. 60,000/- was very justified and there was no scope to interfere with the same. We find that the judgment of the learned single Judge does not give any reason as to why the judgment of the Tribunal was being interfered with. We would, therefore, restore the figure of Rs. 60,000/- in LPA No. 123 of 1999. This figure will carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum as awarded by the learned single Judge. 9. In the result, both the LPAs are allowed to the extent indicated above. So far as LPA No. 122 of 1999 is concerned, it is apparent that appellants 2 & 3 have become majors. Therefore, there is no need for depositing their share. In so far as LPA No. 123 of 1999 is concerned, it is an admitted position that Srinivasan is a major. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above with costs. Consequently, CMP. No. 11024 of 1999 is dismissed.