Judgment :- 1. Today, when the above C.M.P. No. 5014 of 2000, which was filed seeking to fix an early date for the hearing of the above Civil Revision Petition has been taken up for consideration, since it came to be known that the very Civil Revision Petition has been filed on a single and minor point, this Court has taken up the Civil Revision Petition and the C.M.P. for hearing and disposal. Since only the learned counsel for the petitioner is present and neither the respondent nor his counsel made appearance before this Court, when the above matter was taken up for consideration, this Court is left with no option but to dispose the above matters having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. The above Civil Revision Petition has been filed seeking to set aside the fair and decretal order dated 26.8.1996 made in I.A. No. 15 of 19% in H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991 by the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Myladuthurai, in dismissing the said petition to condone the delay of 942 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree for divorce dated 8.4.1992 passed in H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991. 3. It comes to be known that the respondent herein filed H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991 on the file of the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Myladuthurai praying for dissolution of his marriage with the petitioner herein and an ex parte decree for divorce had been passed in favour of the respondent herein for non-appearance of the petitioner herein on 8.4.1992 in the said H.M.O.P. The petitioner herein contending that only on 27.10.1994, she came to know of such an ex parte decree having been passed by the Court below, filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree along with I.A. No. 15 of 1996 to condone the delay of 942 days in filing the said petition to set aside the ex parte decree and the said petition having been dismissed by the lower Court, the petitioner herein has come forward to file the above Civil Revision Petition. 4. 4. C.M.P. No. 5014 of 2000 being the one for fixing an early date for the hearing of the Civil Revision Petition and since it is a matter arising out of matrimonial affairs in between the husband and wife, under the strong impression that an early decision taken in the Civil Revision Petition will better serve the purpose, allowing the said C.M.P. No. 5014 of 2000, the very Civil Revision Petition has been taken up for consideration, as aforementioned. 5. The reasons assigned on the part of the petitioner wife for the said delay of 942 days caused in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree is that she had no knowledge of such a petition for dissolution of marriage having been filed by her husband; that only on 20.10.1994 when she paid visit to her marital home, through the respondent herein, she was given to understand that an ex parte divorce had been granted and thereafter on enquiry through her Lawyer, she came to know of the ex-parte divorce having been granted in favour of her husband as early as on 8.4.1992 in H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991 by the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Myladuthurai and hence it is the firm case of the petitioner that neither she knew the institution of the divorce petition by her husband nor did she know about the ex parte order dated 8.4.1992 in H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991. 6. The Court below, without accepting the said explanation offered on the part of the petitioner herein and attributing the reason that she had deliberately neglected to receive the summons in the divorce petition, had dismissed the said petition filed by the petitioner herein praying to condone the delay of 942 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree dated 8.4.1992. 7. At the outset it is an admitted case that there was no summons served on the petitioner wife in the divorce petition in H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991, which had been instituted by the husband for dissolution of his marriage held with the petitioner. The only question that is to be decided is whether she ‘neglected’ to receive the summons served on her. It is not the argument of the respondent herein before the lower Court that the petitioner refused summons and the same had been remarked in the summons sent and returned. The only question that is to be decided is whether she ‘neglected’ to receive the summons served on her. It is not the argument of the respondent herein before the lower Court that the petitioner refused summons and the same had been remarked in the summons sent and returned. Creating certain circumstances, ultimately, the lower Court has held that those circumstances would go to show that the petitioner had deliberately neglected to receive the summons, which would only prove that not on any definite proof the lower Court had come to such a conclusion. 8. Be that as it may. The main question that must be given credence to is what are the considerations of the lower Court in dealing with the subject matter of this nature. It is a petition for dissolution of marriage that had been instituted by the husband against the wife. No mention need be necessary that the very life of the petitioner-wife herein and her child are at stake. It is unfortunate that for non-appearance of the petitioner, the said divorce petition had been decided ex parte thus granting divorce to the husband dissolving the marriage of the petitioner with her husband. In such a case wherein the lives of the petitioner and her child are intertwined in the I.A. No. 15 of 1996 filed before the lower? Court, seeking to condone the delay of 942 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte order of dissolution of marriage, & high responsibility is cast on the Court below in dealing with such a sensitive subject touching the lives of a woman and her child. Moreover, there is absolutely no direct documentary evidence shown in proof of refusal of the summons by the petitioner wife in the divorce O.P. 9. Even in the event that the absence of the petitioner herein before the lower Court is deliberate and with full knowledge she had neglected to file the petition to set aside the ex parte decree within the stipulated time and the Court arrived at the conclusion that no acceptable reasons have been assigned on her part to condone the delay, what shall be the punishment that could be inflicted on the petitioner for such negligence or absence is the next point that is to be considered by the Court. Whether it is correct or reasonable on the part of the Court to think that the only course open for it to dismiss the delay excuse petition, especially in matters of such nature relating to the very lives of the wife and the child, since divorce had been granted in an ex parte manner in the main O.P., when on the part of the wife, she expressed her desire to contest the divorce petition, could the Court below deny her such a valuable opportunity, which are embodied in the high principles of natural justice, and is there no other course left with for inflicting any punishment on such petitioners for having come to prosecute the case in a delayed manner, are the questions to be considered uppermost. No doubt,. the dismissal of the application to condone the delay of 942 days will result in dental of the opportunity to contest the divorce O.P. itself on account of the delay, which is definitely a disproportionate and harsh punishment inflicted on the petitioner. The Court by dismissing such an application, has completely closed all avenues open for a helpless lady and her child to resume her conjugal relations with her husband and the child to have paternal care and affection and such other valuable rights which the wife and child are denied by their separation. 10. Hence, on an indepth study held, the upper forums of law in general, particularly the Honourable Apex Court, have uniformly held that dismissal of an application to condone the delay so far as it is concerned only with delay in filing an application to set aside the ex parte decree or order is either a crude or a rigorous punishment disproportionately inflicted on the petitioner, and even if the delay is held deliberate and to the knowledge of the petitioner, the petitioner could be punished only with costs and not with dismissal of the petition thus denying the valuable opportunity to contest the main issue in the divorce petition. 11. The Court below in refusing to allow the petitioner to contest the divorce petition by the dismissal order passed in the I.A. No. 15 of 1996 filed by the petitioner praying to condone the delay of 942 days in filing the petition to set aside the ex parte decree for divorce, has undoubtedly caused grave injustice to the petitioner besides causing unbearable mental agony and affliction. The lower Court has acted thoughtless of the fact that there are other avenues open for it to punish the petitioner even in the event that it arrives at the conclusion that the explanation offered on the part of the petitioner for condoning the delay is not either proper or reasonable or the same are not substantiated. Even while the lower Court dismissed the reasons assigned on the part of the petitioner as not acceptable, it could have better ordered allowing the application on costs and without recoursing to such avenues that are advised every now and then by the upper forums of law, in altogether dismissing the very application, the lower Court has inflicted a too harsh and unbearable punishment on the petitioner, which is not only highly disproportionate but also it has resulted in denial of ultimate justice. 12. In the circumstances of the case, the only course open for the lower Court is to allow the above I.A. No. 15 of 1996 on costs and dismissal of the same is not the answer. But, even here, I am unable to accept on facts that the delay caused on the part of the petitioner was deliberate especially when she denies knowledge of the very proceeding instituted by her husband. Since admittedly summons were not served on her, the burden of proof of knowledge of the proceeding pending lies heavily on the respondent and it must be mentioned that the respondent has only miserably failed to prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the institution of the divorce petition and hence even the question of cost in this case does not arise at all. 13. For all the above discussions held, it is hereby held that the above Civil Revision Petition is one which is to be allowed, thus setting aside the order passed in I.A. No. 15 of 1996 in H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991. In result, the above Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the fair and decretal order dated 26.8.1996 made in I.A. No. 15 of 1996 in H.M.O.P. No. 61 of 1991 by the Court of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Myladuthurai.