Judgment :- KRISHNAN NAIR, J. The accused in S.C. No. 21/95 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kottayam, are the appellants. They were charged with the offences punishable under Sections 302, 324, 323, 447, and 506(ii) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After the trial the learned Additional Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 302, 324, 447 and 506(ii) read with Section 34, I.P.C. and convicted them thereunder. Each of the accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302, I.P.C. rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 324, I.P.C., rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 447, I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 506(ii) read with Section 34, I.P.C. The sentences were allowed to run concurrently. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the accused are seriously challenged in this appeal. 2. The unfortunate victim in this case is one Sam, who was the son of P.W. 2 Kunjumol and P.W. 3 Baby. The deceased along with his parents, brother and younger sister was residing in house No. 361 of ward No. XII of Panachikkadu Panchayat. P.W. 1, Manoj, the brother of the deceased was an autorickshaw driver. The occurrence took place in the Court yard of the house of the deceased on the night of 26-6-1994. The genesis of the occurrence was a petty quarrel which took place between the 1st and 2nd accused on the one hand and P.W. 3 Baby on the other. On the date of occurrence at about 6 p.m. while P.W. 3 was standing near a shop at Kollad, accused 1 and 2 approached him and picked up a quarrel with him. The 1st accused beat P.W. 3 with his hands at the instigation of the 2nd accused. P.W. 3 went to Kanjikuzhy autorickshaw stand and informed P.W. 1 about it. P.W. 1 took P.W. 3 in his autorickshaw to their house and left the house saying that a complaint could be lodged before the police on the next day. After some time the deceased reached the house and P.W. 3 narrated the incident to him also. Thereafter the deceased went to the house of John, the brother of P.W. 2. After some time the 2nd accused came near the house and called P.W. 3 to come out. After some time the deceased reached the house and P.W. 3 narrated the incident to him also. Thereafter the deceased went to the house of John, the brother of P.W. 2. After some time the 2nd accused came near the house and called P.W. 3 to come out. Sensing danger P.W. 3 did not respond. When the deceased came back to the house from the house of John, the 2nd accused called him and took him towards the house of 3rd accused. P.Ws. 2 and 4 followed him with lighted kerosene lamps up to the boundary of their property. On seeing the deceased, the 3rd accused took out a sword stick and brandished it against the deceased saying that he was waiting for him. The deceased ran back to his house. The accused chased him and when he reached the Court yard of his house, the 1st accused with a chisel stabbed the deceased on his chest felling him to the Court yard. Thereafter the 1st accused stabbed the deceased on his back. When P.W. 2 intervened, the 1st accused stabbed her on her chest with the Chiest. The 3rd accused showing the sword stick threatened others from approaching near them. The 2nd accused beat P.W. 3 with his hands. When P.Ws. 2 and 3 cried aloud the neighbours gathered at the scene and the accused ran away with the weapons. 3. The injured were taken in an autorickshaw to the District Hospital, Kottayam. On the way to the hospital, Sam succumbed to his injuries. P.W. 8 examined P.W. 2 and referred her to the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam. 4. On 27-6-1994 P.W. 1 proceeded to the Kottayam Police Station and lodged Ext. P1 statement. On the basis of Ext. P1, P.W. 11, the then Sub-Inspector of Police registered Crime No. 240/94 under Ext. P1(a) F.I.R. P.W. 12, the Circle Inspector of Police took up the investigation in the case. He conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared Ext. P8 inquest report. Dr. Radhakrishnan, Professor of Forensic Medicine, (P.W. 7) performed autopsy on the dead body of Sam. Ext. P4 is the post mortem certificate. P.W. 12 went to the scene of occurrence and prepared Ext. P9 scene mahazar. After completing the investigation, P.W. 12 laid the charge before the Magistrate, who committed the case to the Sessions Court, Kottayam. Dr. Radhakrishnan, Professor of Forensic Medicine, (P.W. 7) performed autopsy on the dead body of Sam. Ext. P4 is the post mortem certificate. P.W. 12 went to the scene of occurrence and prepared Ext. P9 scene mahazar. After completing the investigation, P.W. 12 laid the charge before the Magistrate, who committed the case to the Sessions Court, Kottayam. The Sessions Judge made over it to the Additional Sessions Judge for trial and disposal. 5. The accused denied the charge. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 12, marked Exts. P1 to P13 and identified M.Os. 1 to 5. The defence marked Exts. D1 to D3. On an elaborate consideration of the evidence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offences, convicted them and sentenced them as stated earlier. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants strongly contended that the lower Court should have held that the prosecution version of the incident as unfolded through the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 is not true. According to the learned counsel, the Court below has not properly scanned or weighed the evidence in this case. He further contended that even if it is assumed that the 1st accused has committed the offence as found by the Court below there is no reliable evidence on record to connect the 2nd and 3rd accused with the crime. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the lower Court should have given the benefit of doubt to the 2nd and 3rd accused. On the other hand the learned Public Prosecutor supported the judgment of the lower Court and urged that there is no ground for interference. 7. The fact that Sam had a homicidal death on the night of 26-6-1994 on account of the injuries sustained by him is not in dispute. P.W. 7 who conducted the post mortem examination on the dead body of Sam has deposed that four atemortem injuries were found on the dead body at the time of autopsy. According to the doctor, the death was due to injury No. 1 noted in Ext. P4 post mortem certificate. Injury No. 1 in Ext. P4 is an incised penetrating wound on the front of chest and 1 cm. to the left of midline and 5 cm. above the level of nipple. The wound was having a depth of 4.5 cm. According to the doctor, the death was due to injury No. 1 noted in Ext. P4 post mortem certificate. Injury No. 1 in Ext. P4 is an incised penetrating wound on the front of chest and 1 cm. to the left of midline and 5 cm. above the level of nipple. The wound was having a depth of 4.5 cm. and had entered the chest cavity, pierced the pericardial sac cutting 3/4 of the arota. P.W. 7 has opined that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. There is no reason to discard the evidence of P.W. 7 and Ext. P4. 8. Then the question for consideration is whether there is reliable evidence on record to connect the accused with the crime. The prosecution cited and examined P.Ws. 2 to 4 to prove the occurrence. We have carefully and meticulously examined their evidence. On going through the materials on record we found that there is overwhelming evidence in the case to show that the 1st accused was the author of the injuries found on the deceased which resulted in his death. As already noticed, in this case the occurrence of assault took place in the Court yard of the house of the deceased. Admittedly P.W. 1 who gave Ext. P1 information was not a witness to the occurrence. P.Ws. 2 to 4 have deposed that the 2nd accused standing on the western Panchayat road called P.W. 3, but P.W. 3 did not respond to the call of the 2nd accused because of the incident which took place in the evening. According to them, when Sam returned to the house from the house of John, the 2nd accused called him out and took him towards the house of the 3rd accused. Sensing danger P.Ws. 2 and 4 with lighted kerosene lamps followed the deceased up to the boundary of their property. When Sam reached near the house of the 3rd accused, the 3rd accused took out a sword stick and waived it against him saying that he was waiting for him. Then Sam ran back towards his house. When he reached the eastern Court yard of the house, all the accused who followed him also reached the Court yard. The 1st accused stabbed Sam on his chest with M.O. 1. Chisel felling him to the Court yard. Then Sam ran back towards his house. When he reached the eastern Court yard of the house, all the accused who followed him also reached the Court yard. The 1st accused stabbed Sam on his chest with M.O. 1. Chisel felling him to the Court yard. The 1st accused again stabbed the deceased on his back. When P.W. 2 rushed towards Sam, the 1st accused with the chisle stabbed her and she also fell on the ground. The 3rd accused holding out M.O. 2 sword stick threatened them. Though P.Ws. 2 and 4 have stated that the 2nd accused beat P.W. 3 with his hand, P.W. 3 has no such cases. 9. If the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 is accepted it has to be held that the occurrence took place in the manner as alleged by the prosecution. On the other hand if the depositions of these witnesses are found to be unreliable, the prosecution case has to be thrown out. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence of these witnesses, we see no reason to discard their version regarding the stabbing incident. Admittedly the stabbing incident took place in the Court yard of the house of the deceased. The defence has no case that P.Ws. 2 to 4 were not residing in the house on the date of occurrence and they were not present in the house at the time of occurrence. Since the place of occurrence is not a matter of any serious challenge on behalf of the defence it has to be held that the prosecution has succeeded in fixing the situs of occurrence. What is said with regard to the spot of occurrence applies with equal force as regards the time thereof. The spot and time of occurrence being no longer the subject matter of challenge, the presence of P.W. 2 to P.W. 4 was natural and probable. That apart P.W. 2 had sustained injuries in the course of the incident. 10. The evidence of P.Ws. 8 and 9 and Ext. P5 wound certificate and Ext. P6 case sheet would establish that P.W. 2 had sustained injuries on the date of the occurrence. Even the defence has no case that P.W. 2 did not sustain the injuries in the course of the incident. 10. The evidence of P.Ws. 8 and 9 and Ext. P5 wound certificate and Ext. P6 case sheet would establish that P.W. 2 had sustained injuries on the date of the occurrence. Even the defence has no case that P.W. 2 did not sustain the injuries in the course of the incident. According to us, the evidence of P.W. 2 alone is sufficient to hold that it was the 1st accused who inflicted the injuries on the deceased which resulted in his death. No doubt there are certain improvements and contradictions in the evidence of P.W. 2. It is settled position that while appreciating the evidence of injured witnesses the Court must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies but must consider broad spectrum of the prosecution version. In this connection it is relevant to note the following observations of the Supreme Court in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696 : (1988 Cri LJ 848) :"It is true that there are many contradictions in the evidence of Devji. He has not attributed overt acts to individual accused in his statement before the police whereas he was attributed such overt acts in his evidence before the Court. But that is no ground to reject his entire testimony. It must not be forgotten that he was a victim of assault. Fortunately he has survived. He must therefore be considered as the best eye-witnesses. The Court while appreciating evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancy. The discrepancy which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution may be discarded". The observations of the Supreme Court in the case may equally apply in respect of P.W. 2 also who was an eye-witness, who was the mother of the deceased and who was herself an injured. 11. Another item of evidence relied on by the prosecution is the recovery of M.O. 1 on the basis of the information furnished by the 1st accused. P.W. 12, the investigating officer, has asserted in his evidence that pursuant to the statement given by the 1st accused, M.O. 1 chisel was recovered on 8-7-1994 under Ext. P2 mahazar. The evidence of P.W. 12 in this regard is confirmed and corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 5, who is an attesting witness to Ext. P2 mahazar. P.W. 12, the investigating officer, has asserted in his evidence that pursuant to the statement given by the 1st accused, M.O. 1 chisel was recovered on 8-7-1994 under Ext. P2 mahazar. The evidence of P.W. 12 in this regard is confirmed and corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 5, who is an attesting witness to Ext. P2 mahazar. P.W. 5 has deposed that he saw the 1st accused taking M.O. 1 chisel from the rubber plantation and handing over the same to the police. Though he was cross-examined, nothing was brought out to discredit his evidence. 12. Thus the evidence on record is sufficient to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was the 1st accused who was the author of the injuries found on the deceased which resulted in his death. There is also reliable material on record to hold that the 1st accused inflicted the injures on P.W. 2 with M.O. 1 chisel in the course of the incident. The prosecution has no case that accused 2 and 3 inflicted injuries on the deceased and P.W. 2. Though it is alleged that A2 beat P.W. 3 with his hands, P.W. 3 has no such case. The prosecution has no case that A2 participated in the occurrence of the assault. Admittedly he was not armed with any weapon. Though it is alleged that the 3rd accused was armed with a sword stick, there is nothing on record to show that he used the weapon against the deceased or P.W. 2. The lower Court convicted the 2nd and 3rd accused with the aid of Section 34 of the I.P.C. Before a man can be held liable for the acts done by another under the provisos of Section 34 of the I.P.C., it must be established that (1) there was a common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan between the two and the person sought to be held liable had participated in some manner in the act constituting the offence. Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Though common intention may develop on the spot, it must be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime. Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Though common intention may develop on the spot, it must be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime. No doubt, in this case the prosecution has a case that the 2nd accused called out the deceased from his home and took him towards the house of the 3rd accused and also chased the deceased when he ran back to his house. The role attributed to the 3rd accused is that he waived his sword stick against the deceased and after the stabbing incident threatened others from approaching them. If the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 in this regard is accepted it has to be held that the 2nd and 3rd accused are also liable as found by the Court below. But, we are not inclined to accept the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 in toto. It is in evidence that some time prior to the occurrence the 1st accused picked up a quarrel with P.W. 3 at Kollad and beat him as directed by the 2nd accused. If that be so, it was quite improbable that after the said occurrence the 2nd accused went near the house of the deceased and the deceased willingly accompanied him to the house of the 3rd accused. The version of P.Ws. 2 and 4 that they followed the deceased up to the boundary of their property with kerosene lamps could be accepted only with a pinch of salt. It is in evidence that there was heavy rain on the night of the occurrence. It is very difficult to believe that P.Ws. 2 and 4 were carrying kerosene lamps at that time. We are also not inclined to accept the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 4 that a lighted kerosene lamp was kept on the northern wall of the house of John. In this connection it is relevant to note the following observations of the Court below in paragraph 14 of the judgment :"Even it is taken that P.Ws. 2 and 4 had not followed Sam and did not witness what really happened near to the house of the 3rd accused that would only result in disbelieving the version of P.Ws. 2 to 4 as to what transpired near to the house of the 3rd accused viz. 2 and 4 had not followed Sam and did not witness what really happened near to the house of the 3rd accused that would only result in disbelieving the version of P.Ws. 2 to 4 as to what transpired near to the house of the 3rd accused viz. the act of the 3rd accused taking M.O. 2 sword stick and trying to injure Sam and thereafter all the accused chasing him towards the courtyard of the house of P.W. 3. But that is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.Ws. 2 to 4 as to what really transpired at the Court yard, viz. the scene of occurrence." Thus it is clear that the lower Court also entertained a doubt regarding the role played by A2 and A3 in the occurrence. 13. The learned counsel for the appellate contended that if the version of P.Ws. 2 to 4 regarding the involment of A2 and A3 in the crime is disbelieved their entire testimony should be rejected. We cannot agree. In Keshoram v. State of Assam, AIR 1978 SC 1096 : (1978 Cri LJ 1989), the Supreme Court observed : "It is now well-settled that principle Falsus in uno falsus in Omnibus does not apply to Criminal trials and it is the duty of this Court to disengage the truth from the falsehood; to sift the grain from the chaff instead of taking an easy course of rejecting the prosecution case it its entirety merely on the basis of a few infirmities". If the Court disbelieves a portion of evidence of a witness, the testimony of that witness should not be rejected in toto if the rest of the evidence is found to be acceptable and true. (See Satkumar v. State of Haryana, 1974 Cri LJ 345 : (AIR 1974 SC 294) and Raghavan Pillai v. State of Kerala, 1989 Cri LJ NCC 188 (Ker). Even if it is assumed that A2 and A3 were present at the time of occurrence it would not lead to the conclusion that it was the result of the common intention to murder the deceased. They had not even uttered any words of instigation when deceased was stabbed by Ext. A1. Even if it is assumed that A2 and A3 were present at the time of occurrence it would not lead to the conclusion that it was the result of the common intention to murder the deceased. They had not even uttered any words of instigation when deceased was stabbed by Ext. A1. In this connection it is also advantageous to refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2000 Cri LJ 12 : (AIR 1999 SC 3830) :"Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The assessee of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. The distinct feature of Section 34 is the element of participation in action. The common intention implies acting in concert, existence of a pre-arranged plan which is to be proved either from conduct or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. It requires a pre-arranged plan and it presupposes prior concert. Therefore, there must be prior meeting of minds. The prior concert or meeting of minds may be determined from the conduct of the offenders unfolding itself during the course of action and the declaration made by them just before mounting the attack. It can also be developed at the spur of the moment but there must be "a pre-arrangement or premeditated concert." In that case two of the accused persons caught hold of the deceased and the other two accused persons gave blows to the deceased and caused his death. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be said that accused persons who caught hold of deceased have shared common intention with the other two accused in inflicting blows and they cannot be held guilty of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. 14. Considering all the aspects of the case we come to the conclusion that the prosecution has not succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt and that A2 and A3 have shared the common intention to murder the deceased. A2 and A3 cannot be held liable for the individual act of A1. It follows that A2 and A3 are entitled to the benefit of doubt. A2 and A3 cannot be held liable for the individual act of A1. It follows that A2 and A3 are entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the result the order of conviction and sentence passed by the lower Court against the 1st accused is confirmed while the conviction and sentence of A2 and A3 are set aside. A2 and A3 are found not guilty of the offences and they are acquitted. They shall be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case.Order accordingly.