JUDGMENT Bakhshish Kaur, J. - The challenge in this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to the order Anneuxre P.10 dated July 17, 1998 passed in the complaint/application, under Sections 145 and 146 Criminal Procedure Code 2. The facts culminating into this petition briefly stated are as follows : Mahant Ram Saran Dass-petitioner, Chela of Mahant Kishan Dev, is looking after the Mandir Shankar Dass, Amritsar with effect from February 5, 1963 as he was appointed a Mahant by virtue of a Will. Originally Shankar Dass was the owner of the Mandir. He gifted the property to Mahant Ram Kishan Dev vide gift deed in the year 1876. Thereafter, by virtue of Will executed by the respective Mahants, it passed on to their successors named in the successive Wills from time to time. Finally, the petitioner in whose favour Mahant Kishan Dev had executed a Will dated 5.2.1963 has been managing the affairs of the Mandir. He is in exclusive possession as owner. On 24.8.1996, succession certificate Annexure P.1 was granted in favour of the petitioner by Shri J.P. Mehmi, Civil Judge (Senior Division), Amritsar. 3. Respondent No. 2 Harish Mohan, popularly known Harish Mohan alias Bitu Pistolwala has no legitimate means of livelihood. He is forcibly grabbing the property of various persons with the help of the police. 4. A civil suit filed by Rajesh Nagpal and others, against the petitioner, under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, to the effect, that a Trust is required to be carved out regarding property of Thakur Dwara, known as Mandir Shankar Nath, consisting of Mandir Shankar Bhagwan, Radha Krishan and other Devi Devtas alongwith shops and other property attached to Mandir Shankar Nath situated in Bazar Peshamwala, Amritsar, is pending. Copy of the plaint is Annexure P.2. On an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the plaintiff, the Court had restrained the petitioner from disposing of the property. Earlier to that suit, Sudarshan Kaur and others had filed a suit in the Court of Smt. Sunita Kumar Arora, Civil Judge (Junior Division), Amritsar. It was dismissed as withdrawn, as per Annexure P.4. 5. Adjoining to the Mandir, a vacant site measuring 521 yards was got vacated from Shiv Sehgal son of Charan Lal by the petitioner. Earlier to that suit, Sudarshan Kaur and others had filed a suit in the Court of Smt. Sunita Kumar Arora, Civil Judge (Junior Division), Amritsar. It was dismissed as withdrawn, as per Annexure P.4. 5. Adjoining to the Mandir, a vacant site measuring 521 yards was got vacated from Shiv Sehgal son of Charan Lal by the petitioner. One Raman Kumar son of Raj Kumar, resident of Kucha Karmo, Amritsar and Amarjit Singh, resident of Majitha Road, Amritsar fraudulently got executed a Power of Attorney with regard to 61 yards out of 521 yards from the petitioner and had sold the property, as Attorney in favour of wife of Surinder Singh. On learning this fact, he filed a suit challenging the execution of the Power of Attorney. That suit is still pending. 6. On the issuance of temporary injunction in favour of Rajesh Nagpal vide order dated April 21, 1997, the petitioner filed a Civil Revision bearing No. 2136 of 1997, which came up for hearing and H.S. Bedi, J. passed the following order :- "Present : Mr. B.R. Mahajan, Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. A.K. Mittal, Advocate for the respondents. Learned counsel for parties are agreed that the question with regard to maintenance of the suit under Section 92 Civil Procedure Code has not been decided by the trial Court. They further agree that the matter should be remanded to the trial Court for decision on this point, and in the meanwhile, the petitioner, who is defendant in the suit, shall not alienate the property. The trial Court is directed to decide the question expeditiously preferably within two months from today. Revision petition disposed of. 21.10.1997 Sd/- Judge." 7. Though there is no dispute whatsoever, even then the respondent No. 2 in connivance with the police moved an application under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Its copy is Annexure P.10. The trial Court is directed to decide the question expeditiously preferably within two months from today. Revision petition disposed of. 21.10.1997 Sd/- Judge." 7. Though there is no dispute whatsoever, even then the respondent No. 2 in connivance with the police moved an application under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Its copy is Annexure P.10. On the basis of the Kalendra, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order under Sections 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, jointly stating therein that despite the orders of the Civil Court, Ram Saran Dass had sold or given on lease some property vide sale deed dated 30.9.1997 through his attorney by Mahant Saran Dass and that in order to maintain law and order, it became necessary that preventive action should be taken immediately as both the parties are claiming to be in rightful possession of the property and it became essential to initiate proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus the receiver was appointed by respondent No. 1 vide his order Annexure P.6, which is under challenge. 8. The respondents have strongly opposed this petition by way of filing detailed written replies inter-alia, pleading that the petitioner has not come to the Court with clear hands, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. After the passing of the impugned order dated July 17, 1999, possession of the property was taken by the SHO who had submitted his report. Both the parties were present at the time of taking possession. Possession of a portion of the property was taken from the petitioner and some from respondent No. 2 namely Harish Mohan. The petitioner is simply a Pujari in the Mandir at a fixed salary of Rs. 300/- per month. He has fraudulently sold the property of the mandir of executing Power of Attorney dated Sept. 24, 1994 in favour of Raman Kumar, who had sold 61 yards of land out of 105 (521 ?) yards belonging to the mandir. The said power of attorney was executed by the petitioner which is a registered document. He has also concealed the material facts with regard to the gift deed dated January 17, 1876 made by Shankar Dass in favour of Ram Kishan Lal. Vide the said gift deed, Ram Saran Dass was authorised only to look after the property of the Mandir. He has also concealed the material facts with regard to the gift deed dated January 17, 1876 made by Shankar Dass in favour of Ram Kishan Lal. Vide the said gift deed, Ram Saran Dass was authorised only to look after the property of the Mandir. He was specifically prohibited from selling, mortgaging or transferring any property of the Mandir. He had, therefore, no right to execute any will in respect of the property of the Mandir. On merits, it is admitted that the petitioner has obtained Succession Certificate but the same is subject-matter of dispute as it is already under challenge. The impugned order dated July 17, 1998 has been rightly and legally passed by respondent No. 1 because there was apprehension of breach of peace. It is the petitioner who is trying to grab the property as he has gone to the extent of selling the property which is in complete violation of the terms of the gift deed Annexurre R.1 dated 17.1.1876. 9. The petitioner in Rejoinder to the replies has refuted the pleas contained in the written statements. 10. I have heard Mr. Sarwan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. H.S. Lalli, learned counsel for the respondents. 11. Mr. Sarwan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the matter is sub-judice. Civil suit is pending before the Civil Court at Amritsar. In addition to this, the succession certificate in favour of Mahant Ram Saran Dass Chela Mahant Kishan Dass, Mandir Shankar Dass was issued. Therefore, it is the petitioner who is managing the affairs of the Mandir being in possession of the same. Thus, no order under Sections 145/146 Civil Procedure Code could be passed. Copy of the suit for declaration under Section 92 filed by Rajesh Nagpal against the petitioner titled as Rajesh Nagpal etc. v. Ram Saran Dass, is Annexure P.2. The order passed by the Civil Judge in the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 Civil Procedure Code is Annexure P.3. 12. By way of issuing succession certificate in favour of the petitioner, the ownership would not devolve upon him in respect of the property of mandir Shankar Dass. However, the issue of succession certificate may be useful for the purposes of dealing with the debts and securities left by Late Mahant Kishan Dev. 13. Mr. 12. By way of issuing succession certificate in favour of the petitioner, the ownership would not devolve upon him in respect of the property of mandir Shankar Dass. However, the issue of succession certificate may be useful for the purposes of dealing with the debts and securities left by Late Mahant Kishan Dev. 13. Mr. Sarwan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that if there was any breach of peace then proceedings under Section 107 of the Code could be initiated and not under Section 145 or 146 of the Code. The sole object of respondent No. 1 was to get the Mandir vacated and he cannot be allowed to do so because the petitioner is the Mahant since 1963. To support his view-point, he placed reliance on Sohan Singh v. Malook Singh, 1998(1) RCR 512. 14. The facts of Sohan Singhs case (supra) are different. It was a case where the petitioner was in possession of the land as mortgagee. The owner got an ex-parte decree of redemption. The execution of the decree was stayed by the Court. It was, therefore, held that the proceedings under Sections 145/146 were not competent as the petitioner was in possession and the matter was pending in the Civil Court. Similarly, the learned counsel cannot derive any benefit from another authority reported as Saroj Gupta v. Nand Lal, 1998(2) RCR(Crl.) 435, because the dispute between the parties over the possession of a house arose out of an agreement to sell. Both the petitioner and the respondent claimed possession on account of agreement to sell and the sale-deed respectively. It was, therefore, held that if the agreement to sell is proved to be genuine, the sale deed would be hit by that agreement to sell and the agreement to sell would have precedence over the sale deed. Therefore, there was no occasion for the executive magistrate to order attachment of the house under Sections 145/146 of the Code. Reliance has also been placed on the authority reported as Jora Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998(4) RCR(Crl.) 414. The facts of this case are also different from the facts of the case in hand. 15. Therefore, there was no occasion for the executive magistrate to order attachment of the house under Sections 145/146 of the Code. Reliance has also been placed on the authority reported as Jora Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998(4) RCR(Crl.) 414. The facts of this case are also different from the facts of the case in hand. 15. In Prakash Chander Sachdeva v. The State and another, AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1436, the apex Court has held that the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code need not necessarily be dropped on the ground that the proceedings under Section 107 are dropped. It has further been held that the proceedings cannot be dropped on the ground of pendency of civil suit for the injunction when suit is not based on title but raises question only of dispossession of the co-owner. The relevant observations made by the Honble Judges of the Apex Court read as under :- "True, a suit or remedy in a civil court for possession or injunction normally prevents a person from invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court as observed by this Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 Supreme Court 472, particularly, when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. The normal rule is as stated by the Court in Puris case. But that was a suit based on title. And that could be decided by civil court only. That ratio cannot apply where there is no dispute about title. When claim or title are not in dispute and the parties on their own showing are co-owners and there is no partition one cannot be permitted to act forcibly and unlawfully and ask the other to act in accordance with law. That ratio cannot apply where there is no dispute about title. When claim or title are not in dispute and the parties on their own showing are co-owners and there is no partition one cannot be permitted to act forcibly and unlawfully and ask the other to act in accordance with law. Where the dispute is not on the right to possession but on the question of possosession the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code Neither the High Court nor the Sub-Divisional Magistrate cared to ascertain if the respondent had any claim to lawfully prevent the appellant from entering into his own house. The proceedings under Section 107 are for public peace and tranquility whereas under Section 145 relates to disputes regarding possession between parties concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof, dropping of proceedings under Section 107 could not furnish foundation for dropping the proceedings under Section 145. Nor the law laid down in Puris case could result in rejecting the application filed under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code ........" 16. As already indicated above, the petitioner is claiming his right on the basis of a succession certificate and the issuance of an order for maintaing the status quo under order 39 rule 1 & 2 of the Code, as per annexure P3. This order was challenged in Civil Miscellaneous No. 2136 of 1997 and as per Annexure P5, the order passed by this Court, the trial Court was directed to decide the question with regard to the maintaibability of the suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also ordered that the petitioner i.e. the defendant in the suit, shall not alienate the property. The petitioner is stated to be a Pujari of the Mandir and this fact is required to be proved and established on the strength of evidence to be led by the parties. The fact that the petitioner had allegedly sold the property of the Mandir by executing power of attorney dated September 24, 1998 in favour of Raman Kumar, who had sold 16 (61 ?) yards of land out of 521 yards of land of the property of Mandir is a serious matter and this fact cannot be lost sight of. The petitioner cannot be allowed to have the cake and eat it too. The petitioner cannot be allowed to have the cake and eat it too. On the one hand, he is claiming his right of possession or claim over the property in question and on the other hand he is squandering the same by alientating the portions of the property, which may be termed as absolutely contrary to the duties of a Pujari of mandir. In these premises, considering the fact that breach of peace is likely to occur over the possession of the property of Thakurdwara, the respondent No. 1 had rightly passed the order for the appointment of receiver as per Annexure P.6 so that no further mischief is done. I, therefore, find no infirmity in the impugned order nor there is any substance to interfere with the same. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is dismissed. However, the petitioner will be at liberty to challenge the impugned order of appointment of receiver before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, as is required under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal procedure. Petition dismissed.