JUDGMENT The Court: The appeal is taken up for hearing along with the stay/injunction application. 2. In this appeal the writ petitioner/appellant seeks to have the judgement and order passed in the court below reversed to have a departmental decision taken in July 1999 also reversed and to compel the respondents to give him employment as a minor in place of his deceased father, who had also been a minor in his time. 3. The facts are very brief. 4. The appellant/writ petitioner's father died in 1989. The appellant was twelve years old then. The National Coal Wage Agreement No. IV was in operation at that time and continued to operate until July, 1991. 5. In July 1991 the 5th National Coal Wage Agreement came into operation. 6. The writ petitioner made the application for appointment when he was about seventeen years old in 1994. He invoked a clause of the 4th Agreement being clause 9.4.O. which provides that a son of a deceased minor in the position of the writ petitioner "would be given an employment". 7. The writ petitioner had made an earlier writ which had resulted in an order directing the respondents to consider the application of the writ petitioner. That consideration has resulted in the impugned order of July, 1999. 8. Two grounds have been given for rejection of the writ petitioner's claim. The first ground is that he made the application some five years after his father's death. The second ground is that he was only twelve years old when his father died. 9. There is, in the 5th Agreement referred to above, a clause permitting employment to be given only to those dependants who are at least 15 years old at the date of death of the person of whom he was a dependant; but such a disqualifying clause is not present in the 4th Agreement. 10. It was argued on behalf of the appellant, and in our opinion correctly, that the National Coal Wage Agreement is a product of collective embarking bargaining and therefore, the clause 4.9.O mentioned above is absolutely different from the ground of employment on compassionate ground. It was correctly argued that a right to obtain employment under that clause is enforceable, as a matter of right. 11. It was correctly argued that a right to obtain employment under that clause is enforceable, as a matter of right. 11. We are of the opinion that the respondents argument, that the appellant being not a party to the Agreement, cannot enforce it, is not a good argument. Such point as to not being a direct party to the contract, although available in private contracts, is not available in collective agreements. All perspective beneficiaries who are envisaged in such collective agreements have a right of enforcement. 12. For the appellant, the case of Delhi Transport Corporation, reported at 1991 Supp(1)S.C.C. 600, was referred to for emphasising that the writ court is always empowered to enforce a fair decision upon public authorities, if they, for some reason, fail to take such fair decision and action themselves. 13. The case of Govind Das, reported at (1976) 1 S.C.C. 906 , was also relied upon to make the point, that instruments, including legislation, are to be usually construed as prospective unless there are clear indications to be found as to the retrospective operation. It was said that the 5th Agreement nowhere completely annulled the 4th Agreement or erased all of its effect altogether. 14. In our opinion, this argument of Mr. Udayan Dutta made on behalf of the appellant is also sound. 15. On behalf of the respondents, it was argued, showing us the case of Paras Nath, reported at 1998(2) S.C.C. 492, that a compassionate appointment is not to be enforced on public authorities long after the incident of death, because the compassionate ground exists to stay over the difficulties felt by the bereaved family immediately after death. If a long time passes, the ground of compassionate appointment disappears. 16. It was submitted that although the word compassionate does not appear in the above clause of the 4th Agreement, it is in the nature of a compassionate agreement. 17. We are of the opinion that this argument is not tenable. The agreement would compel the giving of employment to a dependant who satisfies the conditions. That might no way depends upon any body's compassion. 18. In our opinion a right accrued to the appellant appointment to obtain employment in place of his deceased father in 1989. Because of his tender age, he could wait for a reasonable length of time before enforcing that right. That might no way depends upon any body's compassion. 18. In our opinion a right accrued to the appellant appointment to obtain employment in place of his deceased father in 1989. Because of his tender age, he could wait for a reasonable length of time before enforcing that right. The right to obtain employment did not become weaker or evaporate with the passage of years, just as the right to come into possession of a deceased's property does not become weaker or evaporate in the case of a minor heir. 19. Cancelling the application of the writ petitioner for appointment, on the ground that he was 12 years old, is, thus, an error apparent on the face of the record, because in 1989 being 12 years old was no disqualification for the writ petitioner. 20. The ground of refusing employment as five years had passed after the death of the appellant's father is also not sustainable as it does not give due out or any weight to the material fact that to obtain employment the writ petitioner was entitled to wait until he could reach a suitable age for undertaking the work as a minor. 21. Thus, we are of the clear opinion that the writ petitioner/appellant is entitled to an appointment for the above reasons. The departmental decision of July 1999 is also to be rescinded. 22. These prayers are adequately formulated in prayer (a) of the writ petition. 23. The appeal is disposed of by setting aside the order under appeal and by passing an order in the nature of a Rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the writ petition as it appears at page 16 of the Paper Book late absolute is granted even though there was no Rule Nisi, issued, as the matter is being finally disposed of. 24. The appointment is to be given positively within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order. 25. The stay application is also disposed of with the above observations. 26. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 27. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given at an early date. Ajoy Nath Ray, J. Ranjan Kumar Mazumdar, J. Appeal disposed of. Order set aside