JUDGMENT - P.S. BRAHME, J.:---This case is a dismal story of an illstartred woman, Indubai, who had to meet a cruel death at the hands of her husband-appellant for no fault of hers. 2. Appellant-Atmaram Istari Shende, was tried for causing murder of his wife Indubai and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gadchiroli by his judgment and order dated 10-3-1992 found him guilty of the offence of murder and convicted him of the said offence under section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. This order of conviction and sentence is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. 3. The victim Indubai was married to the appellant some 1 1/2 years prior to 11th January, 1985, the day on which her dead body was found in the jungle of Wasi by the side of Wasi-Sonsari Road. After the marriage, Indubai lived with the appellant for some period. The appellant used to ill treat and beat her mercilessly. Her mother Jankubai (P.W. 8) accompanied Indubai and lived in the house of the appellant for some time, but it was found that the appellant used to beat deceased Indubai so also her mother Jankubai and that is why Indubai and Jankubai had returned to their house at Sonsari after about 4-5 months. After a month or so, the appellant had come to the house of Indubai to take her back to his house, but she refused. Therefore, the appellant started residing with Indubai at the house of her mother Jankubai at village Sonsari. He resided there for about few months. Thereafter, Indubai delivered a female child which unfortunately died and the appellant was informed about the same. The appellant again came to the house of Jankubai and stayed there for about a month with Indubai. Indubai had refused to go with the appellant because of ill-treatment and beating done to her by the appellant. But it was on one Monday, which fell on 7-1-1985, the appellant took deceased Indubai from the house of her mother Jankubai on the pretext that she should be shown to the doctor and provided some treatment. The appellant on their way, haulted in the evening at the house of Gopikabai (P.W. 9) who was the sister of Jankubai. But it was on one Monday, which fell on 7-1-1985, the appellant took deceased Indubai from the house of her mother Jankubai on the pretext that she should be shown to the doctor and provided some treatment. The appellant on their way, haulted in the evening at the house of Gopikabai (P.W. 9) who was the sister of Jankubai. It was on the next day morning i.e. on Tuesday the 8-1-1985, the appellant, taking Indubai with him, left the house of Gopikabai. The appellant and deceased Indubai thereafter did not return to the house of Jankubai. Dhondu Meshram (P.W. 7) brother of deceased Indubai, and his mother Janukabai were worried about Indubai as she did not return nor her whereabouts were known from the appellant. So, on Friday the 11-1-1985, both of them went to the house of Gopikabai (P.W. 9), who is maternal aunt of Indubai residing at Kadoli where the appellant had taken Indubai. Gopikabai informed them that appellant and Indubai had been to her house in the evening of Monday 7-1-1985 and after having haulted at night, left her house on the next day morning i.e. on 8-1-1985. Dhondu learnt on 12-1-1985 that a dead body of one woman was found lying in the jungle of Wasi. So, he, accompanied by his mother Jankubai and his maternal aunt Gopikabai went to see the dead body. They saw the dead body of the woman, when it was carried in a bullock cart. The body was clad in a green coloured saree (Article 2) and blouse (Article 4), red ribbon (Article 6) and silver pair of toe rings. They identified the dead body as that of Indubai on the basis of these clothes and articles. Dhondu was convinced that his sister Indubai was done to death by the appellant. He, therefore, lodged a report (Exhibit 20) to Police Sub Inspector Padole at village Kadoli where he was camping. On that report Exhibit 20, offence was registered at C.R. No. 6/85 under section 302 I.P.C. against the appellant for committing the murder of Indubai. P.S.I. Padole took up investigation in the matter. 4. On 11-1-1985, the villagers including Dansu Madavi (P.W. 2) and Sitaram (P.W. 1) saw the dead body of a woman in the jungle of Wasi. On that report Exhibit 20, offence was registered at C.R. No. 6/85 under section 302 I.P.C. against the appellant for committing the murder of Indubai. P.S.I. Padole took up investigation in the matter. 4. On 11-1-1985, the villagers including Dansu Madavi (P.W. 2) and Sitaram (P.W. 1) saw the dead body of a woman in the jungle of Wasi. Then, they went to police outpost Kurkheda which comes under Police Station Desaiganj and gave report Exhibit 11 about finding of the dead body of a woman in the jungle of Wasi. Police Head Constable Deorao Patil (P.W. 3) was present in the police outpost, accepted the report Exhibit 11 and registered MARG No. 3 of 1985. On 12-1-1985, Police Head Constable Deorao Patil visited the place in Wasi jungle where the dead body was lying. He found that the dead body was clad in a green coloured saree and green coloured blouse. He also noticed that one ribbon was tied around the neck of that body and it was pressed in the flesh around the neck. The body was swollen. He made inquest Exhibit 12 on the dead body in the presence of panch witness Dansu Madavi (P.W. 2). At the trial before the Court, Police Head Constable Deorao Patil (P.W. 3) identified that green coloured saree (Article 2), blouse (Article 4), ribbon (Article 6), pair of bangles (Article 7) and pair of silver jodwa (Article 8) which were seen on the dead body. Similarly, witness Dansu Madavi (P.W. 2), at the time of inquest, made in his presence, noticed that the dead body was clad in green coloured saree and even before the Court, he identified that saree (Article 2) and blouse (Article 4) as the same that was on the dead body. 5. In the inquest (Exhibit 12), it is specifically recited that one ribbon was tied around the neck and it had got stuck in the flesh as the body was swollen. The dead body was then sent to Primary Health Centre, Kurkheda for carrying out autopsy. 6. Witness Suklal Ransuk (P.W. 18) was a sweeper in the Primary Health Centre and he cut that ribbon that was tied around the neck of the dead body of that woman as asked by the Medical Officer who performed the autopsy. In the inquest Exhibit 12, it is also mentioned that the fingers were clinched. 6. Witness Suklal Ransuk (P.W. 18) was a sweeper in the Primary Health Centre and he cut that ribbon that was tied around the neck of the dead body of that woman as asked by the Medical Officer who performed the autopsy. In the inquest Exhibit 12, it is also mentioned that the fingers were clinched. Both the eyes of the deceased had protruded. The tongue had come out and it was clinched and pressed. In the post mortem report (Exhibit 25), it is mentioned that the eyes were slightly protruded. The tongue was slightly outside the mouth and was pressed. 7. The body was in highly decomposed state. The witnesses Dhondu (P.W. 7), Jankubai (P.W. 8), Gopikabai (P.W. 9) and Abaji Meshram (P.W. 14) on 12-1-1985 saw the dead body of a woman when it was being carried in the bullock cart. They all identified that body as that of Indubai on the basis of green saree and blouse and other articles including the pair of jodwa and red ribbon and red coloured bangles. 8. Witnesses Dhondu (P.W. 7) and Jankubai (P.W. 8) were worried as deceased Indubai did not return nor the accused informed them about her whereabouts. So, on 11-1-1985, both of them went to village Kadoli thinking that the accused might have taken Indubai to the house of Gopikabai (P.W. 9) who was maternal aunt of deceased Indubai. When they went to the house of Gopikabai, they learnt from Gopikabai that in the evening of 7-1-1985, the accused had come to her house alongwith Indubai and after having stayed overnight, the accused again took away Indubai in the morning on 8-1-1985. 9. It is also learnt that witnesses Yashodabai (P.W. 4) and Kamlabai (P.W. 5) saw in the morning of 8-1-1985 both, the accused and Indubai, proceeding by the road towards Sonsari from Kadoli. They noticed that Indubai was weeping and when enquired by these two ladies, Indubai replied that the man accompanying her was her husband and he was beating her. 10. It is learnt that witness Timaji (P.W. 11) also saw the accused and Indubai under a tree on the road going towards Sonsari from Kadoli and that the woman was weeping and when he enquired with that woman, she told that her husband had beaten her. He enquired with the accused and he told that he was her husband. 10. It is learnt that witness Timaji (P.W. 11) also saw the accused and Indubai under a tree on the road going towards Sonsari from Kadoli and that the woman was weeping and when he enquired with that woman, she told that her husband had beaten her. He enquired with the accused and he told that he was her husband. That woman disclosed to this witness that her parents are residents of Sonsari. Witness Timaji saw that the accused had beaten Indubai with chappal. That woman namely Indubai was wearing a green coloured saree with red flowers. 11. It is also learnt that on that day i.e. on 8-1-1985, witness Jeewan (P.W. 12) who was in his field which is by the roadside, which goes from Kadoli to Wasi, saw in the morning at about 8 A.M. the accused and Indubai proceeding by the road and saw Indubai weeping and when he enquired, her husband told that the woman was mad. Witness Abaji Meshram (P.W. 14) who is maternal cousin of witness Dhondu (P.W. 7) and deceased Indubai, on 8-1-1985 at noon, saw the accused alone proceeding by the road on bicycle. This fact he told later on to Dhondu and others. 12. P.S.I. Padole (P.W. 20) who conducted investigation into the crime registered on the basis of the report lodged by witness Dhondu (Exhibit 20), arrested the accused on 14-1-1985. On 28-1-1985, Tashildar Madhukar Moharli (P.W. 17) held identification parade in which the witnesses Yashodabai and Kamlabai identified the accused. After completing investigation, chargesheet was filed against the accused in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Desaiganj who in turn committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Chandrapur/Gadchiroli by order dated 10-5-1985. 13. At the trial before the Sessions Judge, the appellant adjured the guilt and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined in all 20 witnesses. In his examination under section 313 Cri.P.C., the appellant denied all the circumstances including the factum of death of Indubai. He stated that all the circumstances were false. He, however, did not give any explanation except blunt denial of the circumstances. The circumstances which stood proved on the evidence and relied upon by the trial Court are : 1. That the accused was ill treating Indubai. 2. Indubai refused to live with the appellant. 3. He stated that all the circumstances were false. He, however, did not give any explanation except blunt denial of the circumstances. The circumstances which stood proved on the evidence and relied upon by the trial Court are : 1. That the accused was ill treating Indubai. 2. Indubai refused to live with the appellant. 3. That on 7-1-1985, the appellant removed Indubai from the house of her mother Jankubai on the pretext that she would be given treatment. 4. Dhondu and his mother Jankubai on 11-1-1985 went to Kadoli to the house of Gopikabai in their bid to search for Indubai and there learnt from Gopikabai that on 7-1-1985 (Monday) in the evening, Indubai accompanied by the accused, came to her house and had haulted on that night and on the next day i.e. on Tuesday, left her house and Indubai was wearing green coloured saree and blouse and red coloured bangles and red ribbon which was identified on 12-1-1985 when they all saw the dead body. 5. Police Head Constable Deorao Patil (P.W. 3) noticed that red coloured ribbon was tied on the neck of Indubai which was cut by the witness Suklal (P.W. 18). 6. Witness Abaji Meshram saw the accused alone on 8-1-1985 at noon going by the road on his bicycle. 7. The witness Yashodabai, Kamlabai, Jeewan and Timaji on 8-1-1985 i.e. on Tuesday, saw the accused going by the road with deceased Indubai and they also learnt from Indubai that the accused was her husband and he was beating her and in particular, witness Timaji saw the accused beating Indubai with chappal in the road. They also saw that Indubai was wearing green coloured saree and blouse. 8. Indubai did not return to her mother's house till 11-1-1985 nor her whereabouts were made known by the accused to any of the relatives of Indubai. 9. On 11-1-1985, dead body of a woman was found lying in Wasi jungle and the body was clad in green coloured saree and blouse and on 12-1-1985, that body was identified to be that of Indubai by the witnesses. 14. The trial Court, on the basis of these circumstances, duly established, came to the conclusion that Indubai was last seen alive with the accused. She died homicidal death due to strangulation. The appellant-accused failed to explain the disappearance as also the death of Indubai. 14. The trial Court, on the basis of these circumstances, duly established, came to the conclusion that Indubai was last seen alive with the accused. She died homicidal death due to strangulation. The appellant-accused failed to explain the disappearance as also the death of Indubai. Thus, the appellant was found guilty of committing the murder of Indubai and the trial Court accordingly convicted him and sentenced as stated earlier. Hence this appeal. 15. Mr. Khati, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, assailed the conviction of the appellant. He submitted that the circumstances relied upon by the trial Court more particularly regarding deceased Indubai last seen with the appellant-accused, are not established. He also submitted that the dead body that was found in Wasi jungle was in highly decomposed state and as admitted by the witnesses, it was beyond identification. The witnesses have identified the dead body on the basis of the clothes on the dead body. It is submitted that evidence is not clinching and therefore, identification of the dead body on the basis of the clothes cannot be accepted. To support his submission, he placed reliance on a decision reported in (Pralhad Dnyanoba Gajbhiye v. State of Maharashtra)1, 1996(1) Bom.C.R. 52 in which it is held that identification of dead body by relatives of the deceased in doubtful in view of its highly decomposed state. 16. Mr. Khati further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove that deceased Indubai died homicidal death. He pointed out that as the body was in a highly decomposed state, the Medical Officer who performed autopsy over the dead body, could not give his opinion as to the cause of death. That the identification of the accused by the witnesses Timaji and Jeewan for the first time before the Court when the witnesses were not placed for test identification parade, is meaningless as the witnesses were not knowing the accused. So far as witnesses Kamlabai and Yashodabai are concerned, he pointed out that the identification parade was not held in all fairness, suggesting that the witnesses had opportunity to see the accused before the identification parade was held. It is therefore submitted that the evidence of identification of the accused being found with deceased Indubai was doubtful and the trial Court has committed an error in placing reliance on that evidence. It is therefore submitted that the evidence of identification of the accused being found with deceased Indubai was doubtful and the trial Court has committed an error in placing reliance on that evidence. It is therefore submitted that if that evidence is excluded, then the circumstance of last seen together goes away. It is also submitted that the circumstances by themselves are not incriminating in nature and as such, they do not form a link pointing out the guilt of the appellant. He also pointed out that the prosecution has failed on the point of motive for the appellant to commit the crime. He submitted with emphasis that in a case which entirely rests on circumstantial evidence, absence of motive plays an important factor which vitiates the trial. 17. Mr. S.G. Loney, learned A.P.P. submitted that the trial Court has appreciated the circumstantial evidence in correct perspective on the evidence on record. Each and every circumstances has been clinchingly established. That the identification of dead body by the witnesses from clothes has been established clinghingly and such identification is accepted by the trial Court in a criminal trial. He placed reliance on a decision reported in (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Vilas Maruti Sutar)2, A.I.R. 1998 Supreme Court 230. As regards identification of the accused even for the first time before the Court, it is submitted by Mr. Loney that it is clinghingly established on the evidence on record and that evidence is acceptable and for that, he placed reliance on two decisions reported in (Madhukar Damu Patil v. State of Maharashtra)3, 1996 Criminal Law Journal 1062 and (Ramanbhai Naranbhai and others v. State of Gujarat)4, 2000(1) Supreme Court Cases 358. As to the circumstance of last seen, he pointed out from the evidence of the witnesses that the accused was identified being with deceased Indubai on 8-1-1985 going by the road, proceeding from Kodali to Sonsari. It is submitted that the witnesses had ample opportunity to see the accused and also to have talk with him and the deceased. Their identification cannot be doubted. He further submitted that the circumstance as to last seen is very much incriminating and relevant to be considered pointing out involvement of the accused in the commission of the crime. It is submitted that the witnesses had ample opportunity to see the accused and also to have talk with him and the deceased. Their identification cannot be doubted. He further submitted that the circumstance as to last seen is very much incriminating and relevant to be considered pointing out involvement of the accused in the commission of the crime. For that, he placed reliance on three decisions viz., (Lavji Mona v. State of Gujarat)5, A.I.R. 1993 Supreme Court 2480, (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manohar Singh Thakur)6, A.I.R. 1998 Supreme Court 2941, and (State of Maharashtra v. Suresh)7, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)736 . Mr. Loney also submitted that on the evidence on record, the prosecution has established that the accused had motive to commit the crime and it was arising out of the fact that the accused was ill treating and beating deceased Indubai and she was therefore not ready to live with him. Mr. Loney lastly submitted that the conduct of the accused is very much relevant in not explaining anything about the missing of Indubai since the time she was left or seen by the witnesses on 8-1-1985 and also his blunt denial of the fact that Indubai died. That the trial Court has rightly taken into consideration this conduct of the appellant-accused in addition to the incriminating circumstances established on evidence, and held him guilty for causing the murder of Indubai. That when the body was found and inquest panchanama was made, it was found that red ribbon was tied around the neck and tongue of the deceased had come out of the mouth and the trial Court has, therefore, rightly come to the conclusion that deceased Indubai had met homicidal death due to strangulation. He therefore submitted that the appeal merits no consideration at all. 18. It is not disputed that the appellant-accused and deceased Indubai were married and that prior to 7-1-1985, Indubai was residing in the house of her mother Jankubai and she had refused to live with the appellant as the appellant was ill treating her. It was on 7-1-1985 in the morning that the appellant took away Indubai from the house of her mother Jankubai on the pretext that she would be given treatment. It was on 7-1-1985 in the morning that the appellant took away Indubai from the house of her mother Jankubai on the pretext that she would be given treatment. It is also not disputed that on 11-1-1985, the dead body of a woman was found lying in Wasi jungle and on 12-1-1985, Police Head Constable Deorao Patil made inquest Exhibit 12 on the dead body and noticed that the dead body was clad in green coloured saree and blouse. The witnesses Sitaram and Dansu Madavi who first saw the dead body in the jungle also noticed that the dead body was clad in a green coloured saree and blouse and these witnesses including Police Head Constable Deorao identified the green coloured saree (Article 2) and blouse (Article 4) before the Court. It is significant to note that the evidence of these witnesses that the dead body was clad in a green coloured saree and blouse went unchallenged. The witnesses Dhondu, Jankubai and Gopikabai identified the dead body on the basis of the clothes particularly, the green coloured saree (Article 2) and the green coloured blouse (Article 4) when they saw the dead body being carried in a bullock cart on 12-1-1985. It is true that the dead body was beyond identification as it was in a highly decomposed state, but the identification of the dead body by the witnesses on the basis of the clothes cannot be doubted having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is established on the evidence of the witnesses, more particularly, witnesses Dhondu, Jankubai, Gopikabai, Yashodabai, Kamlabai, Timaji and Jeewan who had seen Indubai wearing green coloured saree (Article 2) and green coloured blouse (Article 4) on 7-1-1985 when she left with the accused, and on 8-1-1985, when she was found on the road proceeding towards Sonsuri. The evidence in that regard of these witnesses has not been challenged by the defence. 19. In the decision reported in Pralhad Dnyanoba Gajbhiye v. State of Maharashtra, 1996 Criminal Law Journal 2558, relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, it was held that identification of dead body by relatives of the deceased was doubtful in view of its highly decomposed state. It was found in that case that there were no special marks of identification on the clothes of the deceased. The eye witnesses did not support the prosecution case. It was found in that case that there were no special marks of identification on the clothes of the deceased. The eye witnesses did not support the prosecution case. So, on the facts of the case, it was found that identification of dead body which was in a highly decomposed state, on the basis of clothes, was doubtful. It is not that in every case identification of dead body on the basis of clothes and ornaments is doubtful. 20. In a decision reported in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Vilas Maruti Sutar, A.I.R. 1998 Supreme Court 230, the Apex Court has accepted the identification of dead body on the basis of clothes by the relatives of the deceased. The mother of the deceased identified those clothes which were on the person of the deceased. The Apex Court held that the identification of the dead body on the basis of clothes could not be doubted. In the case before hand, having regard to the facts and circumstances attending the case, identification of the dead body by the witnesses on the basis of clothes particularly, green coloured saree and green coloured blouse which was on the dead body of the deceased right from inception from 7-1-1985, cannot be doubted. It was most clinching. It has to be said that the trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the dead body was that of Indubai being correctly identified by the witnesses. Therefore, we have no slightest hesitation in holding that the dead body of a woman was identified to be that of deceased Indubai. 21. Much has been made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the prosecution has failed to establish that deceased Indubai died homicidal death. So far as the appellant is concerned, he took up the stance of denying everything and in the background of the fact that the appellant was last seen with the deceased, failure on his part to explain as to what had happened to his wife Indubai, assumes more importance. That apart, it is borne out on the evidence on record particularly that of witness Deorao Patil (P.W. 3) and Suklal Ransuk (P.W. 18) and specific recital in the inquest (Exhibit 12) that ribbon was tied around the neck of the deceased and it was pressed in the flesh. That apart, it is borne out on the evidence on record particularly that of witness Deorao Patil (P.W. 3) and Suklal Ransuk (P.W. 18) and specific recital in the inquest (Exhibit 12) that ribbon was tied around the neck of the deceased and it was pressed in the flesh. In the post mortem report (Exhibit 25), it has been specifically mentioned that the eyes had protruded out, so also the tongue of the deceased had come out and the fingers were clinched. It was on the basis of these findings the trial Court came to the conclusion that deceased Indubai died homicidal death due to strangulation. Having regard to the facts and circumstances attending the case, we do not think that the trial Court has committed any error in coming to the conclusion that the deceased met a homicidal death. Bare denial, without any explanation by the appellant, clinches the issue. We, therefore, accept that Indubai died homicidal death. 22. As to the absence of motive, the learned Counsel for the appellant, placed reliance on a decision reported in (Arjun Marik and others v. State of Bihar)8, 1994(2) Supreme Court Cases 372. It is observed by the Apex Court that : "Mere absence of proof of motive for commission of a crime cannot be a ground to presume the innocence of an accused if the involvement of the accused is otherwise established. But in incidents in which the only evidence available is circumstantial evidence then in that event the motive does assume importance if it is established from the evidence on record that the accused had a strong motive and also an opportunity to commit the crime and the established circumstances along with the explanation of the accused, if any, exclude the reasonable possibility of anyone else being the perpetrator of the crime, then the chain of evidence may be considered to show that within all human probability the crime must have been committed by the accused." 23. There is no dispute as to the proposition that is laid down by the Apex Court. Mere absence of proof of motive for commission of crime, cannot be a ground to presume innocence of the accused if the involvement of the accused is otherwise established. The motive, no doubt, plays as important role in heightening the probability of the accused perpetrating the crime. Mere absence of proof of motive for commission of crime, cannot be a ground to presume innocence of the accused if the involvement of the accused is otherwise established. The motive, no doubt, plays as important role in heightening the probability of the accused perpetrating the crime. In the case before hand, as could be seen from the evidence of witnesses Dhondu and Jankubai, deceased Indubai was suffering ill-treatment at the hands of the accused. In that context, the evidence of witness Jankubai is very much relevant for the reason that he had left with deceased Indubai, while the latter was residing with the accused. In her evidence, she has stated that the accused used to beat her (Indubai) which she has witnessed. There is also evidence on record that Indubai refused to live with the accused and probably for the reason that there was ill-treatment to her at the hands of the accused. In addition to this, witness Timaji who happened to see the accused and Indubai on 8-1-1985 on the road, saw that the appellant had beaten Indubai with chappal. Indubai was weeping and that fact was seen by witnesses Yashodabai, Kamlabai and Jeewan. Therefore, reluctance of Indubai to live with the accused was the motive in the mind of the accused for which he committed the crime of causing her death after removing her from the house of her mother. 24. The witnesses Kamlabai, Yashodabai, Timaji and Jeewan have identified the accused and the trial Court has accepted their evidence as to identification of the accused supporting the claim of prosecution on the question of last seen. It is no doubt true that all these witnesses, prior to 8-1-1985, had not seen nor they were knowing the accused and Indubai. So far as the witnesses Kamlabai and Yashodabai are concerned, they have identified the accused at the time of identification parade held on 28-1-1985 by witness Madhukar Moharil, Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate (P.W. 17). The trial Court has accepted their evidence on test identification parade. The defence could not point out any infirmity in the evidence of witness Madhukar showing that the identification parade was unfair. Nothing was brought on record to show that the witnesses had opportunity to see the accused before he was placed for identification. Therefore, identification of the appellant by the witnesses Yashodabai and Kamlabai is clinching and truthful. 25. The defence could not point out any infirmity in the evidence of witness Madhukar showing that the identification parade was unfair. Nothing was brought on record to show that the witnesses had opportunity to see the accused before he was placed for identification. Therefore, identification of the appellant by the witnesses Yashodabai and Kamlabai is clinching and truthful. 25. So far as other two witnesses namely Timaji and Jeewan are concerned, it is not disputed that they were not called to identify the accused at the time when the identification parade was held. These two witnesses were not knowing the accused nor they had seen him prior to 8-1-1985. But then, they have identified the accused before the Court when their evidence was recorded. This identification by two witnesses is challenged by the defence contending that the identification by witness before the Court, without there being identification parade, is meaningless and valueless. The learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decisions reported in 1982(2) Bom.C.R. 316 (Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra)9, 1983 Criminal Law Journal 1854 (Mahadeb Ghosh v. The State)10, so also 1970(2) Supreme Court Cases 128 (Budhsen and another v. State of U.P.)11. The ratio laid down in all these cases is that: "In assessing the trustworthiness of a witness identifying an accused for the first time in Court, the Court should be extra-cautious. The extent of caution and the value of identification made for the first time in Court without testing the veracity of such identification by placing the accused in a T.I. parade has been the subject of several decisions and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court is now well settled. In case of Budhsen v. State of U.P. reported in 1970(2) S.C.C. 128 it has been observed that as a general rule the substantive evidence of a witness is a statement made in Court, that the evidence in order to carry conviction should ordinarily clarify as to how and under what circumstances he came to pick out the particular accused person and the details of the part which the accused played in the crime in question with reasonable particularity. The decision goes on to say that the purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. The decision goes on to say that the purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding. The decision, however, also observes that there may be exceptions to this general rule when the Court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely without such or other corroboration." 26. Therefore, it is not that in each and every case, the evidence of witness on identification of the accused, when test identification parade was not held, is rendered worthless or valueless and therefore, cannot be relied upon. 27. As against that, the Apex Court in a recent decision reported in 2000(1) Supreme Court Cases 358, Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat, has held that: "Identification of accused for the first time in Court by eye witnesses when they did not know him earlier and when no test identification parade had been held, though such evidence may be treated to be of a weak nature, it is not a totally irrelevant or inadmissible. The real credence of such evidence would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 28. In the case before hand, so far as the evidence of these two witnesses is concerned, what we have found is that the accused has not challenged the factum of these two witnesses seeing Indubai with one person at the time and place as stated by the witnesses on the road. What was suggested to both the witnesses by the defence, was the fact that the person with that woman was not the accused as identified by them before the Court. Therefore, the evidence of these two witnesses is almost admitted on the question of Indubai being found with one person on 8-1-1985 on the road in the morning. These two witnesses have seen the accused on the road with Indubai. Not only that, but they had opportunity to have talk with the accused and Indubai, more particularly for the reason that they saw Indubai weeping. These two witnesses have seen the accused on the road with Indubai. Not only that, but they had opportunity to have talk with the accused and Indubai, more particularly for the reason that they saw Indubai weeping. It is also very pertinent to note that the witnesses have stated that Indubai told them that the person with her at that time was her husband. Witnesses Timaji has also seen the accused having beaten Indubai with the chappal. So, one thing is clear that both the witnesses had ample time to see the accused and Indubai. It is not that the witnesses saw the accused very cursorily. Having regard to all these facts and circumstances, the claim of both the witnesses having identified the accused, cannot be doubted. The witnesses had no reason to give evidence against the accused. They were totally strangers. According to us, the identity of the accused by these witnesses is established on the basis of the disclosure by Indubai that the person accompanying her, was her husband, as the accused does not dispute the fact that he was the husband of Indubai. Therefore, identification of the accused by these two witnesses is clinchingly established on the evidence on record. 29. Witnesses Gopikabai has testified before the Court that the accused accompanied by deceased Indubai had come to her house in the evening of Monday the 7-1-1985 and on 8-1-1985 both of them left her house for going to Sonsari. It is pertinent to note that this version of Gopikabai has not been specifically disputed by the defence. In our view, this version of witness Gopikabai corroborates the identification of the accused by the witnesses Timaji and Jeewan and on the basis of that, the prosecution has clinchingly established the fact that the accused was last seen with the deceased on 8-1-1985. 30. As stated earlier, the whereabouts of deceased Indubai were not known since after 8-1-1985, as she could be traced with the accused while proceeding by the road on 8-1-1985. The accused himself did not bring back deceased Indubai to her mother's house. It was on 11-1-1985 that the dead body of Indubai was found. It is also brought on record through the evidence of witness Abaji Meshram (P.W. 14) that the accused was seen by him going by bicycle on 8-1-1985 at noon. He was alone. The accused himself did not bring back deceased Indubai to her mother's house. It was on 11-1-1985 that the dead body of Indubai was found. It is also brought on record through the evidence of witness Abaji Meshram (P.W. 14) that the accused was seen by him going by bicycle on 8-1-1985 at noon. He was alone. This has significance in the background of the fact that earlier on the same day, the accused was found with Indubai on the road by the witnesses. The accused has not given any explanation as to how and where deceased Indubai was missing. The accused being the husband of Indubai, was required to give explanation as to the whereabouts of Indubai when he had taken her with him on 7-1-1985 and was seen with her on 8-1-1985. What we find is that the accused simply denied the incriminating circumstance including the death of Indubai in his examination under section 313 Cri.P.C. A false answer offered by the accused when his attention was drawn to the aforesaid circumstances, renders that circumstance capable of inculpating him. 31. The defence of the appellant is one of mere denial. There is no explanation as to why he left the deceased and where she went and what happened to her. He did not make any effort to search for her. He did not even open his mouth after his arrest on 14-1-1985 when he learnt that Indubai died. What is worst and incriminating is his denial at the trial to the fact of death of Indubai. This conduct, in our view, is consistent with his guilt. 32. In this context, we are fortified with the view expressed by the Apex Court in a recent decision reported in A.I.R. 2000 Supreme Court Weekly 2252 (Geetha v. State of Karnataka)12. The case was resting on circumstantial evidence. The evidence of prosecution witnesses clearly established that the deceased had gone to the house of the accused on the date of incident and she had many ornaments on her person at that time and thereafter she was found missing. The dead body was recovered at the instance of the accused from his house. The evidence of prosecution witnesses clearly established that the deceased had gone to the house of the accused on the date of incident and she had many ornaments on her person at that time and thereafter she was found missing. The dead body was recovered at the instance of the accused from his house. There was false denial of the accused about the recovery of dead body and ornaments from her house in her statement under section 313 Cri.P.C. It was held that such false denial of the accused supplies missing link in the chain of circumstances. It is observed that when all these incriminating circumstances were put to the appellant in her examination under section 313 Cri.P.C., she merely stated that they were false and failed to give any other explanation. The prosecution evidence which has been found reliable, proved that the answers given by the appellant in her statement under section 313 Cri.P.C. were really false. The appellant did not explain how the dead body and the articles belonging to the deceased were found from her house. This being the case of circumstantial evidence, this false denial assumes importance as it would supply a missing link in the chain of circumstances. 33. We have also another decision of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 2000 Supreme Court Weekly 1682 (Joseph s/o Kooveli Poulo v. State of Kerala)13. In that, it is observed that plain and outright denial of every one and all incriminating circumstances by accused provided missing link to connect him with death and the cause for death of victim. 34. In the case before hand, we have found that the incriminating circumstances have been duly established and all the circumstances put together unerringly point out towards the guilt of the appellant rather than his innocence. In addition to that, plain denial by the appellant at the trial and not giving any explanation as to the circumstances in which his wife deceased Indubai was left, provided a missing link in the chain of circumstances indicating his involvement in the commission of the homicidal death of Indubai. The trial Court has, therefore, rightly found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence for committing the murder of Indubai. We have no hesitation in holding that the appellant has committed the offence of murder. We confirm the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. The trial Court has, therefore, rightly found the appellant-accused guilty of the offence for committing the murder of Indubai. We have no hesitation in holding that the appellant has committed the offence of murder. We confirm the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. There is no reason to interfere. Appeal merits no consideration. Appeal deserves to be dismissed. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismiss. -----