JUDGMENT B. P. DAS, J. — The petitioner in this application under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure calls in question the legality of the order dated 9.7.1996 passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bolangir, in ICC Case No. 16 of 1993 taking cognizance of the offence under Secs. 506/294 of the Indian Penal Code (‘I.P.C.’, in short) and issuing process against him. 2. The brief facts leading to this application are as fol¬lows : Opp. party No. 1, Balgopal Mishra, on being declared elected as Member of Parliament of Bolangir Lok Sabha constituency took out a victory procession on 27.11.1989 in Bolangir town. At about 2.30 p.m. when the processionists were passing in front of the residence of the Superintendent of Police, they gave provocative slogans, pelted stones and abused the S.P. in filthy languages. The police force which was accompanying the procession took reasonable steps to disperse the unruly crowd. One D.B.Sethi, S.I. of Police of Bolangir Town P.S., who was accompanying the procession alongwith other police personnels lodged a report about the aforesaid incident at the Town Police Station which was registered as FIR No. 214 dated 27.11.1989, corresponding to G.R.Case No. 548 of 1989, under Secs. 143, 294, 336/506 read with Sec. 149, IPC (Annexure-1). After due investigation, charge-sheet has been filled against opp. party No. 1 vide Annexure-3, and the case is pending for trial in the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir. On the same day, i.e. 27.11.1989, opp. party No. 1 also lodged a report at the Bolangir Town Police Station, which was registered as FIR No. 216 dated 27.11.1989, corresponding to G.R.Case No. 547 of 1989, under Secs. 294, 506, 426/323 read with Sec. 34, IPC (Annexure-2), against the present petitioner, who was then the S.P., Bolangir, and some other police officers, on the allegation, inter alia, that the petitioner alongwith other police personnels abused the processionists. The further allegation is that while opp. party No. 1 was going in the procession in front of the office of the S.P., a group of armed police attacked the processionists and started assaulting them indiscriminately as a result of which the people, who were going in the procession, started running away and finding the S.P. directing the police to chase opp. party No. 1, his jeep driver drove away his jeep to the house of Shri Narasingha Mishra, Advocate. party No. 1, his jeep driver drove away his jeep to the house of Shri Narasingha Mishra, Advocate. His jeep was chased by the armed police men in a police van and a jeep under the leadership of S.P., opp. party No. 1 also found that the armed police men and the S.P. with other armed police officers got down from their vehicles and chased the people, assaulted them, damaged the cycles and other properties and armed fireguns towards the public. He also heard a police officer shouting at the top of his voice and uttering filthy languages and opp. party No. 1 was told that the person who was uttering filthy languages and shouting at him was the voice of the present petitioner. It is further alleged in the FIR that the petitioner chased opp. partyNo. 1 from his residence to the house of Shri Narasingha Mishra to kill him and had his jeep not rushed inside the house of said Narasingha Mishra, he would have been killed by the S.P. After the police left, the D.I.G. visited the spot. Opp. party No. 1 was also told that the S.P. alongwith armed police was moving to kill him and the people’s representa¬tives. The matter was investigated by the police and after inves¬tigation, final form had been submitted on 3.9.1992. Against the final report submitted by the police in the aforesaid G.R.Case No. 547 of 1989, opp. party No. 1 has filed a protest petition on 10.2.1993 and the same has been registered as ICC Case No. 16 of 1993 on the file of the learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir vide Annexure-6. The aforesaid complaint case has been filed against the present petitioner and some other police offi¬cers and the initial statement of the complainant-opp. party No. 1 and statement of some other witnesses were recorded under Sec. 202, Cr.P.C. On going through the complaint petition, the initial statement of the complainant and the statement of other witnesses as also the records of G.R.Case No. 547 of 1989, the learned S.D.J.M. came to hold that there was prima facie case against the petitioner for which cognizance under Secs. 506/294, IPC has been taken by order dated 9.7.1996, vide Annexure-8. 3. 506/294, IPC has been taken by order dated 9.7.1996, vide Annexure-8. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the incident occurred, the petitioner and other police officers were on duty to maintain law and order and the action taken during the incident was in due discharge of their official duty, and, therefore, the learned Magistrate ought not to have taken cogni¬zance withour prior sanction under Sec. 197, Cr.P.C. That apart, from the FIR lodged by the police officer vide FIR No. 214 dated 27.11.1989 (Annexure-1) corresponding to G.R.Case No. 548 of 1989, it appears that the police officers were dispersing the mob and they were acting while discharging their duties under Sec. 129, Cr.P.C. and, therefore, they are protected under Sec. 132, Cr.P.C. as they were maintaining public order/law and order situation. The complaint petition so filed by the complainant in Annexure-6 corroborates the fact that there was a victory procession and also fortifies the stand of the petitioner that the police officers in due discharge of their official duty were maintaining law and order situation when the procession was passing through the streets of Bolangir town. In the FIR being FIR No. 216 dated 27.11.1989 filed by the complainant, it is stated that “I also heard police officers shouting on the top of his voice, uttering filthy languages saying ..... (obscene lan¬guage in Oriya)”. I was told that the voice was that of Sanjib Marik, S.P., Bolangir.” 4. On perusal of the allegations made by the complainant in his FIR as also in the complaint petition, it seems to be developed when he describes in the complaint petition that “On the way and at the time of chasing, the accused person No. 1 was shouting at the top of his voice and abusing the complainant in filthy languages......” 5. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner was on duty and FIR No. 214 dated 27.11.1989 indicates that the mob was being dispersed. Hence, I have no hesitation to hold that the police officer is protected under Sec. 132, Cr.P.C. So, for taking cognizance against the petitioner, sanction is necessary as envisaged by Sec. 197, Cr.P.C. 6. That apart, the occurrence took place in the year 1989 and protest petition/complaint petition was registered on 10.2.1993. Several adjournments were taken by the complainant and ultimately initial statement of the complainant was recorded on 3.6.1996. That apart, the occurrence took place in the year 1989 and protest petition/complaint petition was registered on 10.2.1993. Several adjournments were taken by the complainant and ultimately initial statement of the complainant was recorded on 3.6.1996. This indicates that the matter was delayed only to harass a public officer who was discharging his public duty when the occurrence had taken place. (*)7. "The object of Sec. 197, Cr.P.C. is to guard" against vexatious proceedings against public servants and to secure the well-considered opinion of the superior authority before a prosecution is launched against them. To find out as to what is the true and correct meaning of the phrase “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”, Courts have con¬sidered different situations and no hard and fast rule has been laid down. It would essentially depend upon the facts and circum¬stances of each case. But there has been a unanimity of judicial authorities to the effect that if there is a coherent nexus between the act complained of as an offence and the duty of the public servant, sanction becomes necessary even if such act is in excess of his exact duty. In the decision reported in the case of Kremjit Mohananda v. Mohanpani Karua and another [1995 (II) OLR 284] this Court held that the principle embodied under Sec. 197, Cr.P.C. well established. Before the provisions of Sec. 197, Cr.P.C. is invoked, two conditions must be first fulfilled; (i) the public servant is not removable from his office except by or with the sanction of the State Government or the Central Government, as the case may be, and (ii) he is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him. After these two pre-conditions are satisfied, a further enquiry is necessary to be made as to whether the alleged offence was committed by the public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. It is in this connection that the expres¬sion “purporting to act in the discharge of official duty” as¬sumes importance. This expression is neither to be too narrowly interpreted nor too widely. Ultimately this Court held that what comes under the protective umbrella is an act constituting an offence, which directly or reasonably connects with his official duty. It is in this connection that the expres¬sion “purporting to act in the discharge of official duty” as¬sumes importance. This expression is neither to be too narrowly interpreted nor too widely. Ultimately this Court held that what comes under the protective umbrella is an act constituting an offence, which directly or reasonably connects with his official duty. Protection of Sec. 197 does not extend to acts done purely in a private capacity by public servant. This Court in Kartike¬swar Nayak v. Satyabadi Mallik, reported in (1994) 7 OCR 326, while dealing with a case where a police officer was alleged to have taken the complainant into custody and thereafter the complainant was alleged to have been assaulted, tortured, and detained in the lock-up by the concerned officer, held that the acts complained of against the police officer was undoubtedly committed in course of discharge of his official duty in arresting the complainant and producing him before the Court and even if any excess was committed in discharge of hid duty, that excess was plainly in relation to his official duty in the sense that it was professed to be so and it was meant to convey to the mind of the complainant that he was acting under the authority of his office. Even if an excess was committed while effecting or continuing such arrest, it cannot be said that it was completely divorced from his duties. Accordingly, it was held that prior sanction under Sec. 197, Cr.P.C. was necessary. 8. A bare perusal of the complaint petition indicates that the petitioner was on official duty when the incident took place and he was acting while discharging his official duty. Hence, in my view, no cognizance of the alleged offence can be taken against the petitioner without prior sanction of the Government. That apart, the learned Magistrate has not made any effort to see whether the act complained of was committed while the pettioner was discharging his official duty or not. In my opinion, the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order taking cognizance against the petitioner in a mechanical manner at a belated stage and without application of mind properly. What had been done by the police officer appears to have been done while discharging or purporting to discharge his official duties. 9. In my opinion, the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order taking cognizance against the petitioner in a mechanical manner at a belated stage and without application of mind properly. What had been done by the police officer appears to have been done while discharging or purporting to discharge his official duties. 9. Accordingly, the impugned order taking cognizance against the petitioner in I.C.C. Case No. 16 of 1993 on the file of the learned S.D.J.M., Bolangir, cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same is hereby quashed. 10. The Criminal Misc. Case is accordingly allowed. Crl. Misc. case allowed.