Judgment :- R. JAYASIMHA BABU, J. 1. A misconceived application by the appellant has led to the predicament in which it finds itself now. However, the cause of justice is also being better served by that action initiated by the appellant, as it now enables the Court to do justice between the parties. 2. The appellant school had appointed the son of the Secretary of the school as the Headmaster in preference to one Arjuna, who was also working in the same school and who was a few days senior to the appointee-Vellaiswamy. The Secretary of the School Committee Ramaswamy is the father of Vellaiswamy. The Resolution of the Committee dated 30.5.1996 sets out that the Committee had found that Vellaiswamy was more qualified, as he had an additional Post-graduate degree in Tamil, which the other teacher Arjunan did not have, and, therefore, Vellaiswamy was being selected as the Headmaster. One of the participants in that meeting was the father of the selected. 3. Although Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 does not in terms require the prior permission of the District Educational Officer when the appointment is made by way of promotion from among the qualified teachers in the school, nevertheless a communication had been sent to the concerned Officer by the School seeking acceptance of-the selection made, and not approval. The District Educational Officer has construed that as an application for approval, and without examining the provisions of Rule 15 of the Rules, has declined to grant approval. Not only did he so decline, but he Vent further and directed the appointment of the other teacher, Arjunan, even though he had not called for and examined the records, either of Vellaiswamy or of Arjunan, nor had he any other occasion to know the relative merits of the two. That order of the District Educational Officer was affirmed* in appeal by the Joint Director, who also has omitted to examine the manner in which the proceedings commenced, and who had also failed to look at the scope of the powers of the District Educational Officer. 4. When the matter was argued before the learned single Judge, unfortunately attention was not focussed on these aspects. 4. When the matter was argued before the learned single Judge, unfortunately attention was not focussed on these aspects. The judgment proceeds on the assumption that the authorities had validly assumed jurisdiction, and that they had the power to do what they purported to do. The learned single Judge has confirmed the order of the Joint Director by dismissing the Writ Petition. The school is now in appeal before us. 5. We are constrained to set aside the order of the learned single Judge, as it is based on the erroneous premise that the order made by the authorities was within their jurisdiction. As pointed out by us earlier, that order was not within the four corners of Rule 15(4) of the Rules. Need for prior permission of the authority arises only when the appointment by selection is made by appointing a person from any other School, or by direct recruitment. In this case, admittedly the person appointed, as also the person who was disappointed by reason of not having been appointed are teachers in the same school. It was open to the employer to make a selection from among the teachers within the school, and make appointment. It was not within the purview of the authority of the District Educational Officer, or of the Joint Director to direct the School to appoint someone else in place of the one chosen by the appellant, so long as the person so appointed had the qualifications required, and had been found to be superior in merit and ability to those not selected. 6. Though normally we would, at this point, have allowed the appeal, and set aside the orders of the authorities, and not given any further direction, in this case, we are required to proceed further in the light of the fact brought out by the respondents in their affidavits filed before the learned single Judge the fact to which we have already adverted viz., the relationship of father and son as between Secretary of the School Committee, and the person appointed as the Headmaster. It was most improper for the father of the selectee to have sat on the Selection Committee. It was most improper for the father of the selectee to have sat on the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee in which such direct personal relationships are involved would certainly tilt the scale in favour of the relative and would in the normal circumstances, prejudice the right of the other persons to have their case considered impartially and objectively. The father would have had that direct personal interest in the selection of his son, and it is difficult to assume that he would notwithstanding the fact that his son was the candidate bring to bear a wholly objective and impartial mind for comparing the relative merits of the candidates. This has vitiated the selection made, though this was not the ground that had been considered by the authorities below. The fact having been brought to our notice in the course of the proceedings in this Court and the relationship having been admitted by the appellant, we consider it proper, in exercise of our power under Article 226 of the Constitution to set aside the appointment of the son of the Secretary of the School Committee, Vellaiswamy and further direct the School Committee to make a fresh selection as between the said Vellaiswamy and the other candidate S. Arjunan. The father of the said Vellaiswamy shall not participate in the proceedings of the Selection Committee, and he shall not be a member thereof. The Selection Committee, which may comprise of the other members of the School Committee excluding the father of Vellaiswamy, provided they are not blood relatives of the said Vellaiswamy, shall make the selection. The selection shall be made within a period of eight weeks from today. 7. The Writ Appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently C.M.P. 3991 of 1999 is dismissed.