T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS application is filed for review of the order of this Court dated 11-1-2000 in R. F. A. No. 677/95. It arise out of a suit for injunction filed by the petitioner herein in O. S. No. 5596/92 against the defendant including Bangalore City Corporation from interfering with the peaceful construction of the plaintiff in the schedule property. ( 2 ) THE trial Court rendering a finding that the construction is beyond the limits of the plaintiff entering the area and precluding (protruding) on the road, dismissed the suit. As against the said decree of dismissal an appeal was preferred and the appeal came to be dismissed confirming the finding rendered by the Court below. However, liberty was given to approach the Corporation, to the plaintiff. Without availing such liberty the appellant has chosen to come forward to this Court by way of this revision petition. ( 3 ) MR. Veerabhadrappa, appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the plaintiff has not violated any rule or bye-law and DW-2 has admitted that the construction is in accordance with the sanction of plan and licence has been granted and are not withdrawn by the Corporation and they are still in force. Non-examination of the Commissioner appointed renders the judgment invalid and non-consideration of the above facts is an error apparent on the face of the record. Mr. Vasantha Krishna learned counsel appearing for Mr. Ashok Harnahalli, for the Corporation Mr. Younus Ali Khan for R2 opposed the review petition contending that the finding of fact by the Court below has been considered by the Court and there is no error apparent on the face of the record and the application does not lie within the four corners of Order 47, Rule 11 CPC. ( 4 ) HEARD the respective counsel. ( 5 ) THE power of review has been considered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1964 SC 1372 (M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (In all appeals) v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur) to the following effect :"a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. No questions of fact were involved in the decision of the High Court in T. R. Cs. 75 to 77 of 1956. The entire controversy turned on the proper interpretation of R. 18 (1) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules and the other pieces of legislation which are referred to by the High Court in its order of February 1956 nor could it be doubted or disputed that these were substantial questions of law. In the circumstances therefore, the submission of the appellant that the order of September 1959 was vitiated by "error apparent" of the kind envisaged by O. XLVII, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code when it stated that "no substantial question of law arose" appears to us to be clearly well founded". Mr. Veerabhadrappa relied upon the dictum of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 526 (Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasious), and relied upon the following passage. "on a fair reading of the judgments the Judges had been misled by a misconception as to the nature and scope of the concession alleged to have been made by the defendants' Advocate. They could not properly decline to go into the question of fact on account of the admission of the defendants' Advocate that the plaintiffs remained in the Church. Such admission at best was an admission as to the canon law and the decision that the defendants had voluntarily gone out of the Church even in the absence of an ecclesiastical verdict necessarily implied that the concession made by the defendants' Advocate requiring an ecclesiastical verdict as a condition precedent to voluntary separation also was obviously wrong. Hence the judgments of the Judges were vitiated by an error of a kind which was sufficient reason within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure for allowing the review". Hence the judgments of the Judges were vitiated by an error of a kind which was sufficient reason within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure for allowing the review". There is a case where some concession was made by the advocate and that was sought to be questioned. In fact, the Supreme Court considered "a misconception by the Court of a concession made by the Advocate or of the attitude taken up by the party appears to be a ground analogous to the grounds set forth in the first part of the review section and affords a good and cogent ground for review. " ( 6 ) THE facts of the above decision does not apply here in the present case. The learned counsel relied upon the dictum of Sri Krishna Banwari Lal v. Behari Lal Krishna, AIR 1964 All 516 at para 19 which is as follows :"in view of these decisions I am clearly of the opinion that the findings of the learned Civil Judge that his omission to consider the entire contents of Ex. 3, which was a material document was an error apparent on the face of the record and, his failure to take into account the entries in the defendants' account books while deciding the question of their liability towards the plaintiffs was a sufficient reason within the meaning of O. XLVII, R. 1 of C. P. C. are perfectly correct and do not call for any interference in appeal. "it is contended by him that the plan has been considered by this Court. The principle evolved therein may not strictly apply to the facts of this case in any event. The plan has been taken into consideration and considered by not only the trial Court but also by this Court and it cannot be said that there was omission to consider or speak about the same in the judgment. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel also relied upon the dictum in AIR 1960 J and K 125 (Mohd. Sultan Zargar v. Custodian General) and contended that there is an error of fact apparent on the face of the record. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel also relied upon the dictum in AIR 1960 J and K 125 (Mohd. Sultan Zargar v. Custodian General) and contended that there is an error of fact apparent on the face of the record. His submission was that the finding of the Court below that the construction is found to be on the road is not warranted by evidence available on record and such finding having been confirmed by this Court is again liable to be set aside. In this case, there is no error of fact inasmuch as the fact has been found as existing by the trial Court and that finding has been confirmed by this Court sitting in appeal. Such concurrent finding cannot be questioned by the learned counsel as error of fact under the guise of a review. In fact, in AIR 1995 SC 455 (Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury) the Supreme Court has considered and held that review petition cannot be made by way of an appeal. This is what the Apex Court says :"an error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. "in such options review is not a remedy and the counsel cannot be allowed to raise by way of an appeal against the order. In AIR 1965 SC 1372 the Apex Court has held a review is by no means an appeal in disguise. The Supreme Court also considered that there is distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 'error apparent'. ( 8 ) TESTING the facts available on record on the annal of decisions made above, I do not find any reason to interfere or allow the application under review. ( 8 ) TESTING the facts available on record on the annal of decisions made above, I do not find any reason to interfere or allow the application under review. I may incidentally point out the dictum of this Court in ILR 1999 Karnataka Short Notes 13 which is to the following effect :"there is a class of litigants who are assisted by professionals who subscribe to such mischief, who, after a final order is passed change the lawyer and file review petitions, recalling petitions and another class of petitions filed under the heading of 'for being spoken to'. This is only a ruse to engage another lawyer and reargue the case that has been finally disposed of. This has become almost a regular practice in certain quarters and it is necessary that this Court puts a stop to these malpractices. I do concede that there is a small category of cases where a review application may be maintainable and the law is very well defined in so far as if material of crucial importance has escaped the attention of the Court for whatever reason and if an important aspect of fact or law that would alter the decision in the case has escaped the attention of the Court, it is in these few instances only that the law permits a review petition. The law is well defined that in all other instances a party who is aggrieved by a decision has to get it set aside by a superior Court. The devious devise of changing the lawyer and filing one of these petitions is regularly resorted to and the new lawyer comes before the Court and starts re-arguing the case on the ground that he did not know what happened earlier. Not only does the law permits it but this involves waste of judicial time and it is a heavy burden on the Judge who is required to not only review the record, read his own earlier order and then try to find out the justification for the subsequent petition. Despite this being pointed out, there are still a small category of advocates who insist on filing petitions of this type and I think the time has come when this Court, in no uncertain terms will have to finally remind them that this cannot be done". This dictum directly and substantially applies to the facts of this case. Despite this being pointed out, there are still a small category of advocates who insist on filing petitions of this type and I think the time has come when this Court, in no uncertain terms will have to finally remind them that this cannot be done". This dictum directly and substantially applies to the facts of this case. Looking from any view, I do not find any ground having made out, to call for review. Revision Petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .