Judgment 1. By the present application under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent read with Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs/Petitioners pray, inter alia, for the following reliefs :- "a) Rule be issued calling upon the respondents herein to show 'cause as to why the aforesaid O.A. No. 194 of 1998, United Bank of India v. The New Red Bank Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., and O.A. No. 195 of 1998, United Bank of India v. Surendra Nagar Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta, withdrawn from the file of the learned Tribunal and transferred to this Hon'ble Court for trial and disposal and if no cause or insufficient cause be shown, the Rule be made absolute; b) Stay of all further proceedings of O. A. No. 194 of 1998, United Bank of India v. The New Red Bank Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., and of O. A. No. 195 of 1998 United Bank of India v. Surendra Nagar Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta; c) Injunction restraining the respondent No.1 from taking any steps or further steps in O. A. No. 194 of 1998, United Bank of India v. The New Red Bank Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors and in O. A. No. 195 of 1998, United Bank of India v. Surendra Nagar Tea Estate Private Ltd." 2. In the first week of June 1998, the petitioners, filed Suit No. 207 of 1996, The New Red Bank Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. United Bank of India & Ors., praying, inter alia, for rendition of accounts by the Defendant- Bank in respect of the transactions between the P1:dntiffs and the Defendant and also for a decree for Rs. 929 lacs against the Defendant- Bank with interim interest and interest on the Judgment @ 21 % per annum. The respondent No.1, United Bank of India tiled O. A. No. 194 of 1998, United Bank of India v. The New Red Bank Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (the Tribunal for short) on 27.8.1998 and O. A. No. 195 of 1998, United Bank of India v. Surendra Nagar Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., in the said Tribunal. 3. 3. The Bank prays, inter alia, for the following reliefs in O. A. No. 194 of 1998 against the Petitioners and Respondent Nos. 3-5 herein :- "Certificate for payment of Rs. 14,05,33,514/- interest at 18% per annum with quarterly rents; Plus 2% interest on tax interest from August 1, 1998 till payment by the defendants to the applicant; Certificate for payment of contingent claim for Rs. 4,23,000/- and Rs. 5,75,000/- by the defendants to the applicant; Certificate for sale be issued and the Recovery Officer be directed to attach and sell the assets and properties of the defendants including those mentioned in Annexures “M" and "N" hereof in the modes permissible under law with direction to make over the proceeds thereof to the applicant for appropriation towards pro tanto satisfaction of the applicant's claims herein." 4. In O.A. No. 195 of 1998, the reliefs claimed against the Petitioners and the Respondent Nos. 3-5 herein are :- "Certificate for payment of Rs. 3,51,48,601/- with further interest from August 2, 1998 till payment by the defendants jointly and severally to the applicant at 18% per annum with quarterly rents; Plus 2% interest on tax interest; Certificate for sale be issued and the Recovery Officer be directed to attach and sell the assets and properties including those mentioned in Annexures "S" and "I'" hereof in the modes permissible under the law with direction to make over the net proceeds thereof to the applicant for appropriation towards pro tanto satisfaction of the applicant's claims herein." 5. Another suit which was originally filed by the respondent Nos. 1 & 3-5 and the petitioner No.3 herein and some others and numbered as Title Suit No.8 of 1984 before the Assistant District Judge, Jalpaiguri was transferred to this Court and registered as Extraordinary Suit No.1 of 1985. The said suit has been partly heard and is still pending in this Court. From the pleadings it appears that the said suit also relates to transactions referred to in the other suits and matters mentioned above. 6. The grounds on which the petitioners pray for the transfer of the O. A. No. 194 of 1998 and O. A. No. 195 of 1998 from the Tribunal, inter alia, are :- a) that the office of the respondent No. 1-Bank, the purported banking documents, the office of the petitioner Nos. 6. The grounds on which the petitioners pray for the transfer of the O. A. No. 194 of 1998 and O. A. No. 195 of 1998 from the Tribunal, inter alia, are :- a) that the office of the respondent No. 1-Bank, the purported banking documents, the office of the petitioner Nos. 1 & 2, the offices of the witnesses who may be required at the trial of the suit arc all available and/or located within the jurisdiction of the Original Side of this Court; b) that the Petitioners cannot make a counter claim in O. A. No. 194 of 1998 & O. A. No. 195 of 1998 instituted by the Respondent-Bank but the latter, if so advised, may file the counter claim or pray, inter alia, for similar reliefs as prayed for in the aforesaid O. A. Nos. 194 & 195 filed before the Tribunal, in Suit No. 207 of 1998 ; c) that if Suit No. 207 of 1998 and O. A. Nos. 194 & 195 of 1998 proceeded independently there is likelihood of conflict of Judicial pronouncement; and d) that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction both under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent and under Clause 24 of the Civil Procedure Code to entertain and decide the matters getting the O.As. transferred to this Court. 7. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners contends that it is not the Petitioners' case that the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (hereinafter cal1ed the 1993 Act), has not conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal. His submission is that in case of transfer to this Court of the O.A. No. 194 of 1998 & O. A. No. 195 of 1998 from the Tribunal, this Court will only be exercising the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Tribunal under the 1993 Act and not its own jurisdiction, power and authority. Therefore, he says, the "exclusivity theory" based on the provisions of Sections 17, 18, 31 & 34 of the 1993 Act as pronounced and enunciated in the latest Supreme Court and High Court judgments would remain unaffected. 8. In support, Mr. Chatterjee cites the decision in (1) Krishna Kumari Damani v. Ram Narain Agarwal and Anr. reported in AIR 1984 Calcutta 162. 8. In support, Mr. Chatterjee cites the decision in (1) Krishna Kumari Damani v. Ram Narain Agarwal and Anr. reported in AIR 1984 Calcutta 162. In that case it was held 'by the Hon'ble Justice Monjula Bose (as she then was), that the provisions of Section 20 and the First Schedule of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (W.B.P.T. Act for short) would not be any 'bar to the transfer of an eviction suit from the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore to this Court in the exercise of this Court's powers under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent read with Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, although under the provisions of the 1956 Act, it was the I Court at Alipore which had the exclusive jurisdiction, to try, the suit. 9. Referring to this decision Mr. Chatterjee contends that the power of the High Court cannot be curtailed or restricted and that the 1993 Act also has not restricted or curtailed the High Court's powers under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent read with Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to withdraw the O. As., from the Tribunal and to decide the matters with the suits pending in this Court. Mr. Chatterjee also refers to the decisions reported in (2) AIR 1956 Calcutta 65, and (3) AIR 1971 Calcutta 471, in support of his contention that the High Court has powers both under' Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause 13 of the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction under the said provisions for transfer and withdrawal. 10. Citing the decisions reported in (4) AIR 1956 SC 66 , Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain; (5) AIR 1961 SC 1669, Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhundar Jhunjhunwala & Ors. ; (6) AIR 1963 SC 874 , 'Engineering. Mazdoor Sabha & Ors, v. Hind Cycles Ltd.; (7) AIR 1982 Calcutta 134, Haridas Chatterjee v. Debendra Nath Basu. Mr. Chatterjee further contends that the Tribunal is a Court with all the trappings of a Court, and therefore, the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 24 of the Code pf Civil Procedure to withdraw ,the suits and proceedings from the Tribunal for trying and deciding such withdrawn suits and proceedings. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee further contends that the Tribunal is a Court with all the trappings of a Court, and therefore, the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 24 of the Code pf Civil Procedure to withdraw ,the suits and proceedings from the Tribunal for trying and deciding such withdrawn suits and proceedings. Mr. Chatterjee has also referred to the 'decision reported in (8) AIR 1949 Madras 283, in support of his contention that the transfer application is a proceeding under Section 141 of the Code of Civil procedure, These decisions, however, do not lay down anything regarding the effect of the exclusionary provisions similar to those appearing in the 1993 Act. 11. The Bank is contesting the application and it is stated that the Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to try and determine the O. As. sought to be transferred from the Tribunal to this Court and that a counter claim, if any, can be agitated before the Tribunal which has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, try and determine such counter claims. 12. Mr. Mitra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Bank contends referring to the decision in (9) 20,00 (3) SCC 205, Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank & Anr., as also to a Division Bench and a Single Bench decisions of this Court in the judgment dated 10.12.1998 in A.L.P. No. 20 of 1998, (10) Perin Steel & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank of India, and in Appeal No. 406 of 1999, (11) Allahabad Bank v. Hara Parvati Coal Storage Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., with A. P. O. No. 46 of 1999, (12) UCO Bank v. Hara Parvati Coal Storage Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., respectively, that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present application for transfer. 13.. In the decision reported in 2000 (3) SCC 205 (supra), cited by Mr. Mitra, it has been laid down by the Apex Court that under the provisions of Sections 17, 18,25 to 30, 31 & 34 of the 1993 Act, the adjudication of liability and the recovery of the amount by execution of the Certificates are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Recovery Officer respectively and that no other Court or authority can go into the said question relating to the liability and the recovery except as provided in the 1993 Act. 14. 14. The provisions of the W.B.P.T. Act which exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court by virtue of Section 20 read with the First Schedule of the said Act, are not in pari materia with the provisions of Section 18 of the 1993 Act which are as follows : "Bar of Jurisdiction: On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Section 17." 15. There is no such specific provision in the W. B. P. T. Act, limiting the jurisdiction of the High Court similar to the above provisions in the 1993 Act. 16. Mr. Chatterjee does not dispute the contention of Mr. Mitra that the Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the O. As. now pending before the Tribuna1. What he contends is that though the Tribunal has such exclusive jurisdiction, the High Court is competent to get those matters transferred to this Court and to exercise the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 17. In my view, the High Court which has no jurisdiction to entertain the O. As. cannot assume such jurisdiction in a circuitous way and the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (13) Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh & Anr. reported in AIR 1979 SC 381 at p. 384 ( para 5 ), would be apposite in this connection. 18. The said matter related to a maintenance case where the Sessions Judge refused in the exercise of his revisional powers under Section 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interfere with the order of the Magistrate. The High Court's jurisdiction was invoked to avoid the order of the Magistrate and not that of the Sessions Judge. 18. The said matter related to a maintenance case where the Sessions Judge refused in the exercise of his revisional powers under Section 397 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interfere with the order of the Magistrate. The High Court's jurisdiction was invoked to avoid the order of the Magistrate and not that of the Sessions Judge. The following observations of the Supreme Court in the said case, in my view would be relevant in the present case to ascertain the scope of High Court's powers to exercise the jurisdiction of the Tribunal notwithstanding the bar under Section 18 read with Sections 17, 25 to 30, 31 & 34 of the 1993 Act :- "In order to cross the hurdle imposed by Section 397(3), it was suggested that the revision application before the High Court could be treated as an application directed against the order of the Sessions Judge instead of as one directed against the order of the Magistrate. We do not think that it is permissible to do so. What may not be done directly cannot be allowed to be done indirectly: that would be an evasion of the statute. It is a "well-known principle of law that the provisions of all Act of Parliament shall not be evaded by shift or contrivance" (per Abbott, C. J., in (14) Fox v. Bishop of Chester, (1824) 2 B & C 635. "To carry out effectually the object of a Statute, it must be construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined" (Maxwell, 11th Edition, page 109). When the Sessions Judge refused to in1erfcre with the order of the Magistrate, the High Court's jurisdiction was invoked to avoid the order of the Magistrate and not that of the Sessions Judge. The bar of Section 397 (3) was, therefore, effectively attracted and the bar could not be circumvented by the subterfuge of treating the revision application as directed against the Session Judge's order." (Emphasis supplied) 19. In this case also transfer sought for cannot be allowed as the result thereof would be usurping jurisdiction in an indirect manner, which the provisions of the 1993 Act have prohibited. 20. In this case also transfer sought for cannot be allowed as the result thereof would be usurping jurisdiction in an indirect manner, which the provisions of the 1993 Act have prohibited. 20. In the application for transfer it is also stated that the Petitioners cannot make any counter claim and there may be conflict of judicial pronouncement. But, these points arc no longer tenable in view of the amended provisions of Section 19 of the 1993 Act, that counter claims can be entertained by the Tribunals. 21. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee that it will be beneficial to all the parties if all the matters are heard and decided by the High Court and therefore this Court should take a practical approach as held by the Supreme Court in the case reported in (15) 1980 (1) SCC 601 , is not acceptable. The cited case in which this practical approach was resorted to by withdrawal of 250 suits in different Courts in Kerala to the High Court for advancement of public Justice at a stage when all the evidence had been recorded in all the 250 suits, is clearly distinguishable. 22. In the facts of the said case it was held by the Supreme Court that the arguments would be heard by the High Court by withdrawal of all the 250 suits to save a few years in the stressful life of the litigation involving over a thousand Parish Churches and a following of a million and a half Christians. This is an exceptional case and it does not appear from the decision that there was any statutory bar to such hearing of arguments by the High Court, similar to the bar under the 1993 Act. 23. It is also contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the judgment in 2000 (6) SCC 6 cited by Mr. Mitra would be of no help as no application for transfer of Suit No. 207 of 1998 to the Tribunal has been made by the Bank. Mr. Mitra submits that the said suit filed after the commencement of the 1993 Act, is not maintainable and that the Bank would take steps for having the said suit struck of the file. Mitra would be of no help as no application for transfer of Suit No. 207 of 1998 to the Tribunal has been made by the Bank. Mr. Mitra submits that the said suit filed after the commencement of the 1993 Act, is not maintainable and that the Bank would take steps for having the said suit struck of the file. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the pendency of the suit should be a ground to entertain the matters in this Court against the letter and spirit of the 1993 Act as explained above. 24. I find none of the grounds, taken in the application for transfer and urgued by Mr. Chatterjee, to be tenable and the application under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent read with Section 24 of the Code or Civil Procedure is dismissed. 25. Earlier, by an order dated 29.10.2000, the interim order of stay was vacated. On that day, none appeared for the Petitioners herein, when the matter was heard on the reopening day after the long vacation. The Petitioners filed an application for recalling the said order vacating the interim order of stay. In view of the order of dismissal passed on the main application for transfer under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent read with Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order vacating the interim stay need not be recalled and the said application is thus disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. S. K. G.