JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---Heard Counsel for the petitioner and respondent. 2. The petitioner approached this Court challenging the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal passed in TNC/192/85 dated 5-7-1987 whereby the petitioner's revision application was dismissed by the Tribunal. 3. The short facts of the case is that the suit premises belong to one Shri. Mahadev Krishna Bhosale. He died in 1940 leaving his minor sons Panduranga and Sridhar. On the death of Mr. Bhosale to safeguard the interest of the minors namely Panduranga and Sridhar, Mr. Bhairu, father of the respondents herein, was appointed as Guardian vide order passed in Misc. Application No. 44/46 to look after the property and he was put into possession of the property. On the attainment of the majority, the said Panduranga and Sridhar applied for restoration of the land to them from Mr. Bhairu and by order dated 15-9-1958 the Court has directed the Collector to return the property to Panduranga and Sridhar. Subsequently two brothers partitioned the property and Bhairu respondent's father was happened to be in possession of the share of Panduranga. Inspite of the order passed by the Court giving clear direction to the Collector, Panduranga could not succeed in getting the possession of the property from the said Bhairu. Ultimately he had approached Tenancy Awal Karkoon by filing Tenancy Case No. 34 of 1960 for restoration of the land. The Tenancy Awal Karkoon allowed that application. The respondent's father Bhairu challenged that order by filing an Appeal No. 246 of 1967 but that appeal was dismissed. The order of Original Authority was confirmed by the Appellate Authority by an order dated 31-12-1968. Then Bhairu filed Revision being M.R.T. No. 26 of 1969 in which the revisional authority passed an order dated 12-5-1970. In the meantime on the strength of the appellate order the possession of the property was handed over to Panduranga. It is in these circumstances that the Revisional Authority by its order dated 12-5-1970 has directed Panduranga to hand over possession back to respondents. This created a very serious controversy which has pervaded the present proceedings. 4. Because of the direction of the Revisional Authority, the apprehension triggered in the mind of the petitioner and therefore, he filed a suit for injunction for protecting possession of the property. This created a very serious controversy which has pervaded the present proceedings. 4. Because of the direction of the Revisional Authority, the apprehension triggered in the mind of the petitioner and therefore, he filed a suit for injunction for protecting possession of the property. He filed the suit being Civil Suit No. 189 of 1970 and the petitioner also filed writ petition before the Court as Writ Petition No. 14 of 1979 and the same was subsequently withdrawn. The suit for injunction was decreed and appeal was filed by the respondents which was allowed. Consequent to that second appeal was filed before this Court as Second Appeal No. 616 of 1978. Before this Court respondent had made a statement to the effect that the respondent will not disturb the possession of the petitioner (Plaintiff) except in accordance with due process of law. After recording the statement, Second Appeal was dismissed by this Court. By this proceedings, one chapter of the litigation was closed. 5. The respondent then filed an application under section 73 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "B.T. A.L. Act") purported to be an application to execute direction issued by the Revisional Authority in M.R.T. No. 26 of 1969, before the Tenancy Awal Karkoon as Tenancy Case No. 39 of 1983 and that petition was allowed and the possession of the property from Panduranga was directed to be withdrawn and put into the possession of the respondent. Against this petitioner filed an appeal before S.D.O. Satara as TNC/A/No. 31 of 1984. The said appeal was dismissed which gave rise to the impugned order passed by the Revisional Authority, Maharashtra Tribunal, Pune on the revision application filed by the petitioner. It is this order that has been challenged in the writ petition. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that no authority under the B.T. A.L. Act can declare Bhairu, father of the respondent as tenant in respect of the property because no tenancy was created in his favour at any point of time. He was appointed only as Agent during the minority of the owner of the land and when the minority ceases, he is bound to restore the land to the owner. That is the implication of the order passed by the Court on 15-9-1958. I find substance in this submission. He was appointed only as Agent during the minority of the owner of the land and when the minority ceases, he is bound to restore the land to the owner. That is the implication of the order passed by the Court on 15-9-1958. I find substance in this submission. But complication arose in this case when the petitioner approached wrong authorities to get the land restored back to them by invoking section 29 of the B.T. A.L. Act. On the reading of the section 29 will go to show that only those categories of persons mentioned in section can invoke the section to get restoration of the possession of the property. As I indicated earlier, the Panduranga is not a tenant. Therefore, he had approached wrong authority and hierarchy of the authority under the B.T. A.L. Act has passed an order ad invitem to his disadvantage. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the order of the Revisional Authority which emanates from the application filed by the petitioner as a result of approaching the wrong authority has to be declared as non est because it is illegal and passed without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the respondents however, strenuously argued that the order passed by the revisional authority is binding on the petitioner because he is responsible for passing of that order by approaching the authority under section 29 of the B.T. A.L. Act. Therefore, according to the Counsel, it is binding on them though the order is passed without jurisdiction. I can not agree to this submission for the simple reason that merely because the person approached a wrong authority and in case that authority passed order will not attain any legality to that order. The order is nonest, ab initio void when the authority passed the order which lacks jurisdiction. Therefore, the submission made on behalf of the respondent that revisional authority's order is bound to be implemented by the petitioner, cannot be accepted. 7. The learned Counsel for the respondent further, strenuously advocates the preposition that the impugned order came to be passed on the application made by the petitioner under section 73 of the B.T. A.L. Act to implement the order passed by the revisional authority in M.R.T. 26 of 1969. It appears from the record that the application was filed by the respondent under section 73 read with section 29. It appears from the record that the application was filed by the respondent under section 73 read with section 29. The authorities proceeds on the basis that the respondents or their father Bhairu was not tenant and the authority has in fact held so. But the only point on which the possession was directed to be handed over was that the revisional authority in earlier occasion in M.R.T. 26/69 directed the petitioner to hand over the possession to the respondent. According to me this direction is also quite illegal. Section 73 can be pressed into service only where the authorities under the Act passes an order either for payment of money or for ordering restoration of land. In other words, section 73 is a section under which the lawful order passed by the authorities under the Act to be executed. There are two categories of persons i.e. tenant and landlord are the persons contemplated under the various provisions of the B.T. A.L. Act to apply for restoration of the land. The authority under the Act order restoration of possession of the land either in favour of the tenant or the landlord as the case may be. Section 29 deals with the restoration of possession of tenants and sections 31 and 43(1)(a) etc. of the said Act are the provisions for the landlord to have restoration of possession of land under various circumstances. Therefore, what is executable under section 73 are only those orders passed by the appropriate authority either in favour of the tenant or in favour of the landlord under various provisions of the B.T. A.L. Act. Only those orders can be executed or implemented by way of setting the machinery in motion set up by the statute. In other words, if any other order which directs restoration of piece of land cannot be implemented or executed by way of application under section 73 nor the authorities under the Act has power to direct restoration of possession of land in favour of a person other than a tenant or landlord. In other words, if any other order which directs restoration of piece of land cannot be implemented or executed by way of application under section 73 nor the authorities under the Act has power to direct restoration of possession of land in favour of a person other than a tenant or landlord. Therefore, contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that the Court need not to go into the question of tenancy either of the petitioner or respondent as the respondent approached simply for executing the order passed by the Tribunal in M.R.T. No. 26 of 1969 where it was directed that the petitioner to hand over the possession to the respondent. In view of the above discussion, I hold that this order cannot be executed by invoking the machinery provided under section 73 of the Act. Therefore, the order passed by the Revisional Authority is without any jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside. 8. The next, learned counsel for the respondent contended that no application is required for implemention of direction or the order passed by the Revisional Authority. This contention also cannot be accepted for the simple reason that when the person invokes jurisdiction of the authorities to implement the order and when it is found to be illegal, he cannot turn round and say that no application is necessary. The petitioner approached, the Court and invited the orders and therefore, he cannot be heard to contend that no such application is necessary to restore the possession of the land. 9. In view of the above discussions, I hold that the Revisional Authority has passed order without having any jurisdiction and therefore, I set aside this order. 10. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute in terms of Prayer Clause (b). In the circumstances of the case, no orders as to costs. 11. Parties to act on the ordinary copy of this order authenticated by the Sherisedar of this Court. P.A. to issue ordinary copy. Prayer Clause (b) : "quash and set aside the impugned order dated 5-2-1987 passed by the M.R.T., Pune in Revision Application No. M.R.T.-N.S.-3/85 (T.N.C.-B-85) preferred from order dated 11-6-1984 in Appeal No. T.A.-31/84/" Writ petition allowed. -----