B. N. MALLIKARJUNA, J. ( 1 ) BY order dated 22-3-2000, the two revision petitions under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code in C. R. P. No. 3026 of 1999 and C. R. P. No. 3027 of 1999 were dismissed by me. In these two petitions under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code the petitioners have sought for review of the said common order. ( 2 ) FEW facts relevant for the disposal of these two applications may be stated thus: petitioners are the L. Rs of deceased Khamruddin, defendant in O. S. No. 4305 of 1989 in the Court of Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore. Respondent herein is the plaintiff in the said suit. It would appear that there was an agreement between them to sell the house property situated in the City of Bangalore and accordingly deceased Khamruddin executed an agreement to sell dated 2-4-1987 agreeing to sell the property for a sum of Rs. 8,57,000/ -. It is stated that thereafter the deceased khamruddin refused to execute the sale deed and therefore plaintiff instituted original suit in O. S. No. 10743 of 1987 for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the property and that suit came to be dismissed with an observation that the plaintiff could as well file a suit for specific performance. It is thereafter plaintiff instituted o. S. No. 4305 of 1989 for specific performance of the contract based on the said agreement dated 2-4-1987. After contest the suit came to be decreed on 8-6-1994. It would reveal that thereafter an application for setting aside the decree was filed in Mis. Case No. 455 of 1994 and that application was dismissed on 17-1-1996. Aggrieved, a revision petition was filed before this Court in C. R. P. No. 313 of 1996 and on 14-2- 1996 the Court declined to admit it. It is also seen from the records that thereafter the L. Rs filed regular first appeal in R. F. A. No. 396 of 1996 against the judgment and decree dated 8-6-1994 in O. S. No. 4306 of 1989 and that appeal was dismissed on 6-11-1996. It is thereafter decree-holder sued out execution, one for delivery of warrant and the other petition for recovery of costs. These two applications were contested and the Trial Court by order dated 21-9-1999 dismissed those applications and directed issuance of delivery warrant. It is thereafter decree-holder sued out execution, one for delivery of warrant and the other petition for recovery of costs. These two applications were contested and the Trial Court by order dated 21-9-1999 dismissed those applications and directed issuance of delivery warrant. Aggrieved by the said order, petitioner filed civil revision petitions and C. R. P. No. 3027 of 1999 in this Court. After hearing both the learned Counsel, these two revision petitions were disposed of by a common judgment dated 22-3-2000. In the execution proceedings objection raised was that in view of the provisions contained in Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and therefore the decree passed in the suit is a nullity and that objection was repelled by the executing Court on the ground that the agreement in question is prior to the day Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act came into force. Chapter xxc of the Act was made applicable to the City of Bangalore with effect from 1-10-1987, the date of agreement to sell is 2-4-1987. The order was confirmed in revision holding that the consideration being less than Rs. 10,00,000/-, Section 269-UC of the Income-tax Act is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case in view of Rule 48-K of the Income-tax rules. It is this order that is sought to be reviewed. ( 3 ) IT may also be noted here that after the disposal of the regular first appeal and during the pendency of execution petitions and may be after the Court executed the sale deed in terms of the decree in the suit, on 12-12-1996 one Abdul Shukoor it is stated has filed a suit in O. S. No. 86s2 of 1996 against the parties to these proceedings for specific performance of the contract based on an agreement to sell dated 14-3-1986 said to have been executed by the deceased Khamruddin and it is pending trial. It is also stated that one of the reliefs sought in the suit is to set aside the judgment and decree dated 8-6-1994 in O. S. No. 4306 of 1989. The date of agreement between the deceased Khamruddin and the respondent is 2-4-1987. The suit is filed in the year 1989 and the judgment and decree is dated 8-6-1994. It is also stated that one of the reliefs sought in the suit is to set aside the judgment and decree dated 8-6-1994 in O. S. No. 4306 of 1989. The date of agreement between the deceased Khamruddin and the respondent is 2-4-1987. The suit is filed in the year 1989 and the judgment and decree is dated 8-6-1994. But the records do not reveal that at any time before, the deceased defendant or bis L. Rs raised the question of jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 269-UC of the Act which was made applicable to Bangalore City with effect from 1-10-1987. ( 4 ) THE principal contention of Sri Rama Rao, learned Counsel is that the Court in making the order in revision has ignored the decision of the apex Court in C. B. Gautam v Union of India and Others, and that in itself is a ground for reviewing the order. In elaborating his arguments he contended that the sale price shown in the agreement is far below the market value and that has been shown for the purpose of not only avoiding the stamp duty but also to avoid incidentally other liabilities under Income-tax Act and other various Acts. In support of his arguments that overlooking a binding decision of the Supreme Court is a ground for review of the order or judgment of a Court, relied on the decision of this Court in Selection Committee for Admission to Medical and Dental colleges v M. R. Nagaraj. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri G. B. Shantaraj, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent contended that there are absolutely no grounds for reviewing the order, neither there is any mistake of law nor fact apparent on the face of the record and as such calls for no review. Further he contended that the conduct of the party in changing the Advocate and the Advocate filing the review petition without obtaining 'no Objection Certificate' from the Advocate appeared earlier must necessarily be deprecated. In support of his arguments, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v N. Raju Reddiar and Another. ( 6 ) IN view of the rival contentions raised, I have perused the papers carefully and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. B. Gautam's case, supra. In support of his arguments, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v N. Raju Reddiar and Another. ( 6 ) IN view of the rival contentions raised, I have perused the papers carefully and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. B. Gautam's case, supra. Before adverting to the point of law raised by Mr. Rama Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, I would like to dispose of the objection raised by Mr. G. B. Shantaraj in regard to the conduct of the party. These two revision petitions were disposed of by me on 22-3-2000. The matter was argued for the petitioners by one Mr. Basava prabhu Patil, learned Advocate. He made an application on the very day for stay of the operation of the order contending that the parties intend to take the matter in appeal before the Apex Court and accordingly it was stayed and time was granted. Subsequently, on 4-4-2000 another application was made seeking extension of time and that was also granted. In the meantime, these revisions have been filed by petitioners by engaging the services of one Sri H. S. Rama Rao and Sri M. R. Rajagopal, advocates without obtaining no objection certificate from Sri basava Prabhu Patil who appeared for the petitioner earlier in the revision petitions. Mr. Shantaraj raised objection for the appearance of those advocates without there being a 'no Objection Certificate' by Mr. Basava Prabhu Patif. Learned Counsel for the petitioner took some time and in the meantime on 11-7-2000 Sri Basava Prabhu Patil filed a memo requesting the Court to delete his name and further stated that he has returned the papers to the parties and he has no objection for any other advocate appearing on behalf of petitioners. In view of subsequent developments, I do not wish to dwelve on this point elaborately. However, I would only say that such practice can neither be appreciated nor accepted and it needs to be discouraged. ( 7 ) THE principal contention of Sri Rama Rao is that this Court while disposing of civil revision petitions has ignored the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in C. B. Gautam's case, supra. However, I would only say that such practice can neither be appreciated nor accepted and it needs to be discouraged. ( 7 ) THE principal contention of Sri Rama Rao is that this Court while disposing of civil revision petitions has ignored the decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in C. B. Gautam's case, supra. First I must say that this decision was not brought to my notice by either of the learned advocates for the parties while hearing the arguments, may be for the reason that it did not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reasons which I would presently state. What has been considered by the Apex Court in C. B. Gautam's case, supra, is in a case where Form 37-I is filed both by the seller and the purchaser, the appropriate Authority is required to notify them and hear them before making an order under Section 269-UD of the Act. In answering that point, Apex court has said that if Appropriate Authority is satisfied that the apparent consideration shown in the statement in Form 37-I is less than the fair market value, the Appropriate Authority before making the order under Section 269-UD, is required to notify both the seller and the purchaser, hear them and only then to proceed to make the order. Further, it is stated that in satisfying whether there is undervaluation, it should add up 15% to the apparent consideration and see whether it falls short of the fair market value. However, it is stated that it is a rebuttable presumption and the intended seller or the purchaser can lead evidence to rebut such presumption. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, the amount shown in the agreement did not exceed the amount prescribed under the rules. It is on that ground the revision petitions were disposed of on 22-3-2000. In view of the vehemence with which Mr. Rama Rao argued the matter, I read the decision of the Apex Court in C. B. Gautam's case, supra, over and again and I fail to understand as to how the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said decision is applicable or attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Here is a case where the agreement between the parties came into existence on 8-4-1987 and it is for Rs. 8,57,000/ -. Here is a case where the agreement between the parties came into existence on 8-4-1987 and it is for Rs. 8,57,000/ -. If 15% of it is added to it, it would be Rs. 9,85,550/- and thus does not exceed Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten lakhs ). The provisions contained in Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were made applicable to the City of Bangalore with effect from 1-10-1987. Section 269-UC reads thus:"section 269-UC. Restrictions on transfer of immovable property. (1) notwithstanding anything contained in the transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or in any other law for the time being in force, [no transfer of any immovable property in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees, as may be prescribed], shall be effected except after an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property (hereinafter referred to as the 'transferor') and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred (hereinafter referred to as the 'transferee') in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) at least [four] months before the intended date of transfer. (2) The agreement referred to in sub-section (1) shall be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties. (3) Every statement referred to in sub-section (2) shall. (i) be in the prescribed form; (ii) set forth such particulars as may be prescribed; and (iii) be verified in the prescribed manner, and shall be furnished to the Appropriate Authority in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, by each of the parties to such transaction or by any of the parties to such transaction acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties. (4) Where it is found that the statement referred to in sub-section (2) is defective, the Appropriate Authority may intimate the defect to the parties concerned and give them an opportunity to rectify the defect within a period of fifteen days from a date of such intimation or within such further period which, on an Application made in this behalf, the appropriate authority may, in its discretion, allow and if the defect is not rectified within the said period of fifteen days or, as the case may be, the further period so allowed, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Chapter, the statement shall be deemed never to have been furnished". Rule 48-K reads thus:"rule 48-K. Value of immovable property. The value of any immovable property for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 269-UC shall be the apparent consideration of that property exceeding ten lakh rupees". (As it stood before amendment on 1-8-1995) rule 48-L (l) and (2) (a) read thus:"rule 48-L. Statement to be furnished under Section 269-UC (3 ). (1) the statement required to be furnished to be Appropriate authority under sub-section (3) of Section 269-UC shall be in Form 37-I and shall be signed and verified in the manner indicated therein by each of the parties to the transfer referred to in sub-section (1) of that section or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties. (2) The statement jn Form 37-1 shall be furnished, in duplicate, to the Appropriate Authority. (a) before the 30th day of October, 1987, in a case where the agreement for transfer is entered into before the coming into force of Chapter XXC in the areas comprised in the "bangalore metropolitan Region", and "ahmedabad Urban Development area" and the areas comprised in the city of ahmedabad, as referred to in the notification of the Government of India in the Department of Revenue No. SO 835 (E), dated 21st September, 1987". The executing Court disposed of the two applications without referring to Rule 48-L but by referring to the date of agreement and the date on which Chapter XXC was made applicable to the City of Bangalore. However, this order was confirmed in revision for the reason that the sale price did not exceed Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten lakhs ). The executing Court disposed of the two applications without referring to Rule 48-L but by referring to the date of agreement and the date on which Chapter XXC was made applicable to the City of Bangalore. However, this order was confirmed in revision for the reason that the sale price did not exceed Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten lakhs ). ( 9 ) RULE 48-L requires the seller and the purchaser in case where the agreement is prior to 1-10-1987 to file the Statement in Form 37-I before the Appropriate Authority on or before 30-10-1987. The question would be when that requirement has to be complied? A plain reading of Section 269-UC and Rule 48-K of the Income-tax Rules make it clear that a statement in Form 37-I is required to be signed both by the seller and the purchaser in case the value of the property intended to be sold exceeded Rs. 10,00,000/- and not otherwise. In the instant case, the apparent consideration shown in the agreement is Rs. 8,57,000/ -. I have said above that even if 15% is added to this apparent consideration, it did not exceed Rupees Ten Lakhs. Then where was the need to file statement in Form 37-I. Further, if it was a case of undervaluation, the deceased defendant could have raised this plea in the, suit which was filed in the year 1989 as it was within his knowledge. But till they filed the applications in the execution proceedings, that too after the sale deed was executed by the Court, neither the original defendant nor his legal representatives have raised that plea. Therefore, they cannot be heard to say that there is undervaluation and the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 269-UC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. ( 10 ) THE question that came up for consideration before the Apex court is totally different and more so the Apex Court has declared that even when the appropriate authority is satisfied that the value shown in the agreement is less than the fair market value, an opportunity should be given to the parties to rebut the said presumption. ( 10 ) THE question that came up for consideration before the Apex court is totally different and more so the Apex Court has declared that even when the appropriate authority is satisfied that the value shown in the agreement is less than the fair market value, an opportunity should be given to the parties to rebut the said presumption. I am therefore of the considered view that the decision in C. B. Gautam's case, supra, neither applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case nor there was any occasion for this Court to ignore it in making the order in revisions on 22-3-2000. I may also state with all humility at my command that this Court or for that matter any other Court cannot afford to ignore the judgment of the. Supreme Court which is directly on the point, more importantly when it. is brought to its notice at the hearing, in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. No other substantial ground is urged warranting review of the order dated 22-3-2000. Assuming that the order is erroneous, that cannot be a ground to correct under the colour of reviewing it and what is permitted under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code is a review if there is mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. On a careful scrutiny of papers, I hardly find any grounds to say that the common order in the revisions suffer either from mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, therefore calls for no review. Hence, these two petitions fail. ( 11 ) IN a case of this nature, normally exemplary costs is being imposed. Defendant judgment-debtor died during the pendency of the execution proceedings. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that now the litigation is being fought by the L. Rs and on the assumption that they might have been wrongly advised, I decline to impose any costs. ( 12 ) IN the result and for the reasons hereinabove stated, both these petitions fails and accordingly they are dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Sri Rama Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner prays for staying the operation of this order at least for 4 weeks. ( 12 ) IN the result and for the reasons hereinabove stated, both these petitions fails and accordingly they are dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Sri Rama Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner prays for staying the operation of this order at least for 4 weeks. In the circumstances of the case, operation of the order is stayed only for 15 days from today and it is made clear that no further extension shall be granted on any ground. --- *** --- .