Judgment :- The Order of the Court is as follows: This revision is filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution, praying to set aside the ex parte order of status quo passed on April 19, 2000 in I.A. No. 364 of 2000 in O.S. No. 128 of 2000, by the District Munsif, Mettur. The plaintiff is a Senior Clerk in the Stores of the defendant's Company. The defendant Company is a company incorporated under Indian Companies Act. The plaintiff was served with a show cause notice of dismissal on January 27, 2000. Therefore, he rushed to Civil Court and filed a suit for a declaration that the notice dated January 27, 2000 issued by the defendant is capricious, arbitrary, null and void, and for an order of injunction against the defendant and his subordinates from in any manner dismissing the petitioner from service. I have gone through the plaint carefully. Nowhere in the plaint, it is alleged that there was any violation of the principles of natural justice, either in the conduct of the enquiry or otherwise. It is only stated that there is no justification for the defendant to frame charge against the plaintiff. It is also stated that the plaintiff has given explanation, denying the allegations contained in the notice and that while so, a retired Judge was appointed as Enquiry Officer. It is simply stated in para. No. 6 that the enquiry was not proper as the Enquiry Officer is a tool in the hands of the defendant company. There is nothing stated anywhere in the plaint, alleging that there was violation of any principles of natural justice or a failure to comply with the procedure. It is the fundamental position of law that contract of personal service cannot be enforced and the remedy is only to sue for damages. In HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, 4th Edition. Vol. 44. at para No. 407, it is stated as follows: "407. Contracts for personal work or services : A judgment for specific performance of a contract for personal work or services is not pronounced, either at the suit of the employer or the employee. The Court does not seek to compel persons against their will to maintain continuous personal and confidential relations. However, this rule is not absolute and without exception. Contracts for personal work or services : A judgment for specific performance of a contract for personal work or services is not pronounced, either at the suit of the employer or the employee. The Court does not seek to compel persons against their will to maintain continuous personal and confidential relations. However, this rule is not absolute and without exception. It has been held that an employer may be restrained from dismissing an employee in breach of contract if there is no loss of confidence between the employer and employee or if (at least in a contract of employment to carry out a public duty) the employee has been dismissed in a manner which does not comply with statutory or contractual regulations governing dismissal. No Court may, whether by way of an order for specific performance of a contract of employment or an injunction restraining a breach of threatened breach of such a contract, compel an employee to do any work or attend at any place for the doing of any workThis principles applies not merely to contracts of employment, but to all contracts which involve the rendering of continuous services by one person to another." In the decision reported in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain 1976-II-LLJ-163, the Apex Court has held that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions, "(i) Where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law, and (iii) Where a statutory body acts in breach of violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute." The other pronouncements on this aspect are found in S. R. Tiwari v. District Board, Agra 1964-I-LLJ-1, Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. C. K. Tyagi, 1970-I-LLJ-32 and Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain (supra). In the above cases, the Apex Court has also held that the relief of declaration and injunction under the provisions of Specific Relief Act is purely discretionary and the plaintiff cannot claim it as of right and normally a Court would but give a declaration that the contract subsists. In Badrinath Dixit's case (supra) again it was reiterated by the Supreme Court that a contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer and the remedy is to sue for damages. The grant of specific performance is purely discretionary and must be refused when not warranted by the ends of justice. Such relief can be granted only on the sound legal principles. In the absence of any statutory requirement, Courts do not ordinarily force an employer to recruit or retain an employee not required by the employer. The above ratio has been subsequently reiterated by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Srivastav v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 1998-II-LLJ-699, where it was again observed "that the legal position is clear and the respondent cannot now reagitate the question regarding maintainability of the suit under Section 34 of the Act. However, the learned counsel adopted an alternative contention before us that the suit is in effect one for specific enforcement of the contract and such a suit is not conceived under Section 14 of the Act and hence it is not maintainable. According to the learned counsel, the reliefs claimed in the suit, if granted, would result in specific enforcement of a contract of employment. Section 14(a) of the Act makes it clear that a contract of employment is not specifically enforceable since non-performance of it can be compensated by money." The Bombay High Court has held in the decision reported in C. S. Malhotra v. Nirlon Limited, 2000-I-LLJ-83 at 89 as follows: "Thus, even if a declaration could be granted under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, no relief of injunction could be granted in view of Section 14(1)(b) read with 41(e). In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that a contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer. The remedy is to sue for damages. In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that a contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer. The remedy is to sue for damages. This is so because the provisions of Section 14(1)(a) would be applicable after the declaration is given under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, to the effect that the contract of personal service is subsisting. Section 41 specifically provides that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced." Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of this Court reported in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. D. Vasantha 1999-I-LLJ-107 (Mad) and Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. M. Parthasarathi, 1998 1 L.W. 479. As regards the facts of the case concerned in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (supra) there the plaintiff had specifically stated and alleged violation of the principles of natural justice, and in fact, the lower appellate Court found that the principles of natural justice had been thrown overboard by the appellant in issuing show cause notice. But, in this case on hand, there is not even a whisper anywhere in the plaint to the effect that the principles of natural justice have been violated in any manner. In fact, there is not even any allegation that there is any violation of any statutory regulation, circular or Standing Order. Therefore, the above decision will not applyIn the case known as Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, 1995-II-LLJ-728, the Apex Court has held as follows: "Any violation of the Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the fora created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil Court where recourse of civil Court is open. The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeal upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil Court. The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeal upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil Court. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to industrial dispute." On facts of the case, the Apex Court held that the suit filed by the employees challenging the order of termination based on violation of certified Standing Orders with regard to holding of disciplinary enquiry is not maintainable in law. In yet another decision in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadle, 1975-II-LLJ-445 which is earlier in point of time, the Apex Court after taking into consideration several English and Indian decisions on that subject enunciated the following principles of law 1975-II-LLJ-445 at 459. " To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus, (a) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court(b) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (c) If the industrial dispute related to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (d) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. (d) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. If we apply the above principles laid down by the Apex Court, it can be seen that the dispute in this suit is an industrial dispute related to enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act viz., to continue the service of the plaintiff and not to dismiss him. Therefore, the remedy is only to get an adjudication under the Act. In fact, in the above judgment, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that cases of industrial dispute by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle 3 stated above. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision reported in P. Selvaraj v. Kattabomman Transport Corporation and Ors. 1999-I-LLJ-1186 (Mad) wherein a single Judge of this Court has held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief that order of dismissal was invalid and no consequential relief of reinstatement can be granted by the civil Court and that the civil Court cannot declare that employee should be deemed to continue in service. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. M. Parthasarathi (supra), related to an employee of a co-operative society, who was suspended during pendency of criminal proceedings by an order of the Special Officer. The employee filed suit against suspension and the same was challenged by the Society on the ground that Section 100 of the Act read with Section 119-A would bar such suit. The principle there it was held that a contract of employment between a person and a Co-operative society depends on the volition of the parties in the same way as a contract between individuals. Therefore, I am of the view that the said decision will not advance the case of the plaintiffIt is not necessary for the purpose or disposal of the C.R.P. to set out the facts elaborately. Action was taken against the plaintiff by the defendant and he was served with a notice calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from the service. Action was taken against the plaintiff by the defendant and he was served with a notice calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from the service. Thus, this notice more or less brings down the curtain upto the enquiry held against the plaintiff and what all that remained was for the employer to decide about the further course of action in the light of the answers to be given by the employee to the show cause notice. The plaintiff has nowhere stated or alleged that there was any irregularity or illegality in the proceeding or in the enquiry. He has not stated that any Standing Order, circular or rule was violated. He has not alleged anywhere that he has not been furnished with any copy or that there is any violation of the principles of natural justice, in the matter of the conduct of the enquiry. All that he says in the plaint is that an enquiry was initiated against him. He submitted his explanation. A retired Judge was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. Then he was served with a notice, calling upon him as to why he should not be dismissed, and therefore, he has come forward with the suit. Therefore, we have to consider the plaintiff's case only on the basis of the averments made in the plaint. In view of the Rulings to which I have already referred to it is clear that it is only an industrial dispute the plaintiff wants to raise. It is not a civil dispute or a dispute for which ordinarily recourse is to approach the civil Court. Moreover, the main relief sought for by the plaintiff is only for an injunction against the defendant and his subordinates from dismissing him from service. In other words, it is for a direction to continue him in service. Though a relief of declaration is introduced in the prayer and that the declaration is only confined to the notice dated January 27, 2000, that is only an innocuous prayer. For, what is going to follow after the service of notice and after the answer of the plaintiff, will be only an order of dismissal. Therefore, in effect, the suit is one for specific performance of a contract of service and the main relief asked for is for continuation of service of the plaintiff under the defendant. For, what is going to follow after the service of notice and after the answer of the plaintiff, will be only an order of dismissal. Therefore, in effect, the suit is one for specific performance of a contract of service and the main relief asked for is for continuation of service of the plaintiff under the defendant. Such a suit is clearly barred under Section 14 and read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. By merely resorting to the camouflage of seeking an innocuous declaration, the plaintiff cannot succeed in making out that the case would not fall under Section 14. Even assuming that if the plaintiff is ultimately granted a decree for declaration that the notice dated January 27, 2000 is capricious, and void, still it does not prevent the defendant from issuing a fresh notice in accordance with law, if really there was any defect in the notice and proceed further. Therefore, the only relief aimed at by the plaintiff is for the specific performance of the personal service. In other words, he must be continued in service and should not be terminated or dismissed. The law on this subject is quite clear that such relief cannot be asked forHad the plaintiff at least alleged that the enquiry which culminated in the issuance of notice was opposed to the principles of natural justice and was a violation of Standing Orders, Rules or Regulations, perhaps one could say that applying the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant (supra), that the relief can be asked for by the plaintiff either before a specially constituted forum, or a civil Court. In the absence of such pleadings and considering the fact that the main and the only relief asked for is the continuance of service and the declarative relief not being incidental to the same and being a relief asked for only for the purpose of maintaining a suit, it has to be held clearly that the suit cannot be maintained. When the plaintiff cannot ask for an injunction, in effect, it would amount to a prayer for continuance of service and therefore, the suit cannot be maintained. When the suit is not maintainable, the lower Court cannot have any jurisdiction to entertain it and pass interim order. When the plaintiff cannot ask for an injunction, in effect, it would amount to a prayer for continuance of service and therefore, the suit cannot be maintained. When the suit is not maintainable, the lower Court cannot have any jurisdiction to entertain it and pass interim order. Were it not for the relief of injunction, there can be nothing in the plaint to proceed further. For, even if the relief of declaration is granted, that will not prevent the defendants from issuing a fresh notice in accordance with law. For, the prayer that is asked for is not that the entire enquiry proceeding culminating in the notice dated January 27, 2000 is capricious, arbitrary, null and void. The prayer only refers to the notice and not to the background of facts leading to the notice. There is yet another flaw. The application in I.A. No. 364 of 2000 has been filed by the petitioner/plaintiff, praying for an ad interim injunction restraining the respondent from in any manner dismissing the petitioner/plaintiff from service or sending the petitioner out of the company till the disposal of the suit. This prayer would clearly show that it is the main relief that the plaintiff intended in filing the suit and wanted in the suit and with a view to sustain the suit before the civil Court has lugged in an innocuous prayer of declaration. The prayer that is asked for in the interim application cannot be said to be a consequential one. If the prayer is granted, it would amount to a specific performance of a contract of service and it is also mandatory in character. If the order of dismissal is challenged, perhaps the relief of injunction, restraining the respondent from dismissing the plaintiff from service may arise, as incidental to the main prayer. But here, the declaration is only with reference to the noticeI am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that there is a remedy of appeal available against the order to the proper forum. On the other hand, I am convinced that the order passed by the learned District Munsif is an illegal one. It is an abuse of process of law. On the other hand, I am convinced that the order passed by the learned District Munsif is an illegal one. It is an abuse of process of law. Knowing that it is contract of personal service and without pleading the necessary basis for bringing the lis within the folds of the civil Court, the plaintiff has filed the suit for continuance of service, by clearly introducing a prayer for declaration, which is not the main prayer or the main relief. Thus, to that extent, there is an abuse of process of law and process of Court as well. The civil Court therefore lacks jurisdiction. Further, the order passed by the lower Court is an illegal order. Though the order reads that there will be an order of status quo, in effect, it is an order of interim injunction. The rulings of this Court are to the effect that the Court before pronouncing order under Section 39, Rules 1 and 2 shall give reasons for passing such an order. There must be some discussion and the order must disclose proper reasons on the basis of which, the order had to be passed by the lower Court. On the other hand, a reading of the order does not show that there was any application of mind on the part of the lower authority or that he considered the case and was satisfied that it was a case where such a relief can be granted. Moreover, here, the subject matter of the suit is shown as the notice dated January 27, 2000. Therefore, any relief asked for must be only with reference to the same. The relief that can be asked by the plaintiff is only to restrain the defendant from proceeding further pursuant to the notice. On the other hand, the relief here asked for is an injunction, restraining the defendant from dismissing from service, which cannot directly flow as result therefore, I am of the view that there is an abuse of process of law. There is lack of jurisdiction and even otherwise, the order passed is illegal. Therefore, it is a fit case, where the jurisdiction under Art. 227 can be well exercisedIn the result, the C.R.P. is allowed, setting aside the order passed by the lower Court. There is lack of jurisdiction and even otherwise, the order passed is illegal. Therefore, it is a fit case, where the jurisdiction under Art. 227 can be well exercisedIn the result, the C.R.P. is allowed, setting aside the order passed by the lower Court. In the circumstances of the case, I order that the prayer relating to ad interim injunction made in the plaint shall be struck off from the plaintiff.