B. PRAKASH RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal, originally filed as a revision (C. R. P. No. 2572 of 2000) and later converted, is against the orders dismissing an application seeking restoration of an appeal dismissed for default, as per orders in I. A. No. 85 of 2000 in A. S. No. 32 of 1997 dated 19-6-2000 on the file of the viii Additional Chief Judge, City Civil court, Hyderabad. ( 2 ) ON facts, originally, the appellants- plaintiffs, three in number, filed the suit in O. S. No. 2288 of 1990 on the file of the iv Assistant Judge, City Civil Courts, hyderabad, seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property consisting of a house at Kandikal gate, Hyderabad, which was ultimately dismissed. As against the said dismissal, the petitioners filed an appeal in A. S. No. 32 of 1997. Meanwhile, the appellant No. 1 died on 6-1-1999 and it is represented that an application along with delay condonation was filed in LA. (SR) Nos. 797 and 798 of 1999 on 16-6-1999 and the same were pending. While so, the appellant No. 2 also died on 29-3-2000. However, the appeal was dismissed for default on 3-4-2000 as neither they were present nor there was any representation through Counsel. Hence the present application was filed for restoration of the appeal stating that in view of the death of the appellant No. 2, they were in mourning and could not be present and the counsel, in view of other work, could not represent. ( 3 ) THE respondents opposed the application denying all the allegations including the death of the appellant No. 2. The Court below on considering the rival allegations, dismissed the application on the ground that there is variation as to the date of death of the appellant No. 2 viz. ,. 29-3-2000 and 20-3-2000 and no death certificate is filed. The Court having waited for the whole day, dismissed the same. Further, the petitioners have been taking adjournments on earlier occasions and relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C. Venkatasuryanarayana murthy vs. M. Ramabhadraraju to say that the restoration is not a grace. ( 4 ) HEARD both Counsel. The Court having waited for the whole day, dismissed the same. Further, the petitioners have been taking adjournments on earlier occasions and relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C. Venkatasuryanarayana murthy vs. M. Ramabhadraraju to say that the restoration is not a grace. ( 4 ) HEARD both Counsel. ( 5 ) THE question, on this factual background and as seriously contested on either side, remains to be seen is: whether the appellants have made out sufficient cause for restoration or readmission of the appeal, which is dismissed for default? ( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY, the suit is one of a comprehensive nature seeking declaration of title and perpetual injunction in respect of substantive property. On contest, the suit having been dismissed, a regular appeal is filed. It is well settled that an appeal is a continuation of suit. While the matter was thus pending, the appellants 1 and 2 died on 6-1-1999 and 29-3-2000 respectively. An application with delay to bring the legal representatives of the appellant No. 1 was stated to have been filed on 16-6-1999, the knowledge of which, the respondent- defendants of course denied. Now, on the dismissal of appeal for default on 3-4-2000, this application was filed under Order 41 rule 19 of the C. P. C. , on the ground that the appellant No. 2 also died on 29-3-2000 and they were in mourning. This reason, the court below did not accept, since there was a variation in the date of death as it was mentioned both as 29-3-2000 and 20-3-2000 in the affidavit and no death certificate is filed. However, now in this appeal, a certificate issued by the Municipal corporation of Hyderabad with its registration No. 71 dated 1-4-2000 is filed to show the date of death of the appellant no. 2 as 29-3-2000. Whether the said date was 29th or 20th March, 2000, the fact remains that on the date of dismissal of the appeal, he was dead. The appellant No. 1 also was dead and his legal representatives were yet to be brought on record. Thus, the dismissal is against two dead persons, one being just four days prior to the dismissal. Whether the said date was 29th or 20th March, 2000, the fact remains that on the date of dismissal of the appeal, he was dead. The appellant No. 1 also was dead and his legal representatives were yet to be brought on record. Thus, the dismissal is against two dead persons, one being just four days prior to the dismissal. ( 7 ) RULE 19 of Order 41 contemplates the readmission of an appeal, which was dismissed for default on proof by the appellant that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called for hearing. The expression "sufficient cause" is akin to the one which is used in Rule 13 of Order 9 of the C. P. C. which also contemplates the setting aside of a decree passed ex parte against a defendant on his satisfying the court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the case was called for hearing. However, rule 7 of Order 9 which provides a remedy of setting aside of an order setting the defendant ex parte contemplates that on the defendant assigning good cause for his previous non-appearance, he will be permitted to participate in the subsequent proceedings. Similar expression viz. , "sufficient cause" is also found in Section 5 of the Limitation Act providing for condonation of delay in the event of any application or appeal or other proceedings filed beyond the prescribed time. All these provisions, being part of procedural laws, enables the party to come out with a proper cause and on satisfaction of the sufficiency thereof, the Court always is inclined to give an opportunity to contest the matter on merits. ( 8 ) THE fact that the petitioners were in mourning cannot be disputed. Curiously, the Court below went to the extent of doubting even the factum of death. The factum of death of appellant No. 1 was also mentioned in the affidavit filed along with the present application and further stated that he is being represented. On the face of it, the very order dismissing the appeal is against dead persons and is non est. The court ought to have restored the appeal on chis ground alone. However, it had also gone into other reasons stating that having waited for the entire day, it was dismissed. On the face of it, the very order dismissing the appeal is against dead persons and is non est. The court ought to have restored the appeal on chis ground alone. However, it had also gone into other reasons stating that having waited for the entire day, it was dismissed. Further, the petitioners were not ready and taking adjournments on the earlier dates and thus held to be not entitled to any indulgence. Normally, the cause has to be mainly shown on the date of dismissal and if, on satisfaction thereof on its sufficiency, the prior conduct of the parties need not be looked into. Here is a case, where the parties were in mourning on the death of a party just few days prior and in view of the fact that the order is against a dead person, the earlier conduct much less extension of any grace does not arise. The parties cannot be blamed for such calamities and consequent agony. There is ample justification for their non-appearance de hors the one attributed against the Counsel, which need not be gone into nor it has any relevance in view of the first ground. Even the earlier conduct as alleged in this case, also recedes into background. In fact from 6-1-1999 when the appellant No. 1 died, the appeal could not possibly be heard unless the legal representatives were brought on record. Therefore, any proceedings thereafter could not be put against the petitioners. ( 9 ) IN situations of this nature, especially when the main Us touches upon the substantial question affecting substantive rights of the parties, any request for providing opportunity to contest on merits cannot be lightly denied. ( 10 ) IN Sangram Singh Election Tribunal, kotah it was held that a Code of Procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties, not a thing designed to trip people up. Similarly, in bhagwan Swaroop vs. Moolchand it was held that laws of procedure are devised for j advancing justice and not for imposing i penalties. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid reasons, it has to be held that the appellants not only had a sufficient cause for their valid non- appearance but in fact such a very cause itself makes the order non est and it is liable to be set aside. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid reasons, it has to be held that the appellants not only had a sufficient cause for their valid non- appearance but in fact such a very cause itself makes the order non est and it is liable to be set aside. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is allowed and the order in I. A. No. 85 of 2000 is set aside and the said I. A. , stands allowed. The lower appellate Court is directed to dispose of the main appeal itself within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.