JUDGMENT - B.P. SINGH, C.J.:---The petitioner is a very senior officer of the respondent, Bank of India. He has filed the instant writ petition after a show-cause notice was issued to him on 22nd November, 1999 under the proviso to Regulation 11 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline Appeal) Regulations, 1976, calling upon him to show cause why the major penalty of dismissal from service be not imposed against him under Regulation 4(j) of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, since there was a judicial finding recorded by a competent Court of law that he had committed acts of sexual molestation against two female Japanese employees of the Bank and of rape against one female Japanese employee of the Bank. As a result of the said finding recorded by a competent Court of law in Japan, the petitioner and the Bank have been held jointly liable for payment of damages and costs. Another notice was issued to the petitioner on the same day, informing him that the financial loss caused to the Bank would be recovered from him both on grounds of reimbursement and contribution. It was also clarified to him that the Bank would exercise its right of general lien and set off in respect of any amount lying with the Bank in his name. The petitioner filed the instant writ petition praying that this Court may declare that part of Regulation No. 11 is unconstitutional, inoperative, void and illegal, and the respondents be directed not to adhere to Regulation No. 11 of Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976. It was further prayed that this Court may hold and declare that the action on the part of the Bank in freezing the account of the petitioner is wholly without any authority, illegal and bad in law. 2. At the admission stage itself, the parties have been heard at length. Affidavits-in-reply as well as Affidavits-in-rejoinder have been filed. After hearing parties, we now proceed to dispose of this writ petition itself. 3. The facts of the case, insofar as they are relevant, may be succinctly stated thus :--- The petitioner, who was promoted as Deputy General Manager in the Bank, was directed to report at Tokyo as Chief Executive of the Bank of India, Japan Branches. Accordingly, the petitioner reported in December, 1995. 3. The facts of the case, insofar as they are relevant, may be succinctly stated thus :--- The petitioner, who was promoted as Deputy General Manager in the Bank, was directed to report at Tokyo as Chief Executive of the Bank of India, Japan Branches. Accordingly, the petitioner reported in December, 1995. He took over charge as Chief Executive, and shifted to the official residence provided to him by the Bank in Tokyo. It is alleged that on 21st February, 1996, the petitioner misbehaved in the office premises with a female employee, viz.. Ikeda. He also misbehaved with another female employee in the office premises on 26th February, 1996. The name of the said female employee is Fujita. It is also alleged that on 28th February, 1996, the petitioner raped Ikeda at his residence in the evening-hours when she had been purportedly called to his residence for teaching him the Japanese language. The case of the petitioner is that though such incidents are stated to have occured towards the end of February, 1996, no complaint was made by the aforesaid two female employees to any one, nor was any action taken against him. It was only on the 1st April, 1996 that the Foreign Bank Employees' Union leaders called on the Chairman and Managing Director of the Bank, Mr. G. Kathuria, who had come to Osaka in Japan in connection with official work, and a complaint was lodged against the petitioner regarding the three incidents noticed above, involving two female Japanese employees. Later on 19th April, 1996, one Mr. Yoshiko Hashimoto, Attorney-at-Law for Ikeda and Fujita, submitted a report to the Bank alleging sexual harassment of the two female employees aforesaid, and calling upon the Bank to take appropriate action in the matter. It also appears that one Mr. Divanji was deputed by the Chairman and Managing Director of the Bank to investigate into the alleged episodes, and Mr. Divanji submitted a report, finding that the complaint against the petitioner was vague and concocted. The aforesaid two female employees thereafter filed a suit in the District Court at Tokyo on 10th December, 1996 alleging that the petitioner had caused sexual harassment to them, and claimed compensation against him as well as the Bank, who were impleaded as defendants in the suit. The aforesaid two female employees thereafter filed a suit in the District Court at Tokyo on 10th December, 1996 alleging that the petitioner had caused sexual harassment to them, and claimed compensation against him as well as the Bank, who were impleaded as defendants in the suit. The petitioner as well as the respondent-Bank appeared in the suit proceeding, and the Bank sanctioned the necessary amount for legal expenses. In the suit, both the plaintiffs were examined and cross-examined. The petitioner was also examined and cross-examined in the proceeding, and he also examined one Ms. Yasuda as a defence witness. The plaintiffs also examined one Maruyama as their witness. Though the suit was initially being tried by a Single Judge, it was thereafter referred to a Collegiate Court of Three Judges on 28th January, 1999. On 17th February, 1999, the plaintiffs' witness Maruyama was cross-examined, and thereafter a site inspection was held by the Court on 19th May, 1999. Plaintiff Ikeda was again examined and cross-examined for a second time on 19th May, 1999. On 27th October, 1999, the Court pronounced its judgment, and while decreeing the suit, awarded 3300,000 yen as damages and compensation to Ikeda and 700,000 yen as damages and compensation to Fujita, apart from costs and interest at the rate of 5% per annum from 31st December, 1996 till the date of payment. 4. The Bank was not inclined to appeal against the judgment of the Japanese Court, and it accordingly informed the petitioner that if he wished to prefer an appeal, he might do so in his individual capacity. The petitioner was also called upon to deposit the amount to be paid to the plaintiffs by way of compensation. It appears that on 12th November, 1999, the petitioner wrote to the Bank stating that he was not interested in preferring appeal in his individual capacity. It is not necessary to go into the question as to why the petitioner preferred not to appeal against the judgment rendered by the Japanese Court. However, the Bank on 22nd November, 1999 issued the two impugned notices to the petitioner, the first of which was issued under the proviso to Regulation 11 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations") referring to the suit filed by the aforesaid Ikeda and Fujita, and the judgment passed therein. However, the Bank on 22nd November, 1999 issued the two impugned notices to the petitioner, the first of which was issued under the proviso to Regulation 11 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations") referring to the suit filed by the aforesaid Ikeda and Fujita, and the judgment passed therein. The notice further referred to the fact that the damages have been awarded not only against the petitioner but also against the Bank. There was, therefore, a judicial finding by the competent Court of law that he had committed the acts of sexual molestation of two female employees of the Bank, and rape of one of the female employees. It was further stated in the notice that by his conduct, the petitioner had brought the Bank to ignominy and financial loss; that he had not acted with integrity and honesty, and had committed a grave act, which was highly unbecoming of a Bank's Officer; and that he had not maintained good conduct and discipline, and instead of showing courtesy and attention to employees of the bank, he had taken advantage of his position and committed grave and reprehensible acts. In view of the aforesaid facts, and having considered the matter in-depth, the Bank Authority has come to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed various acts of misconduct, which justified imposition of a major penalty under the regulations. The attention of the petitioner was drawn to the Special Procedure provided in Regulation 11 of the Regulations, which waives the detailed procedure for disciplinary action where, inter alia, the Disciplinary Authority decided to take action on the strength of facts and conclusions arrived at by a judicial tribunal. Such a Special Procedure was applicable to the case of the petitioner as well. A Court of competent jurisdiction had tried the petitioner, and found him guilty of rape and sexual harassment after giving him full opportunity to put forward his defence. The charges proved were so grave that they justified imposition of major penalty of dismissal, which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment as provided for in Regulation 4(j) of the Regulations. The petitioner was called upon to submit his representation within 30 days of the receipt of the communication. The charges proved were so grave that they justified imposition of major penalty of dismissal, which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment as provided for in Regulation 4(j) of the Regulations. The petitioner was called upon to submit his representation within 30 days of the receipt of the communication. By the second notice of the same date, the petitioner was informed that the Court had directed him and the Bank to pay the total compensation which came to Indian Rs. 18,62,024.80. Since the aforesaid decision of the Court had become final as no appeal had been preferred against that judgment, the bank had incurred heavy financial loss to the extent of Rs. 18 lacs and odd, which amount was recoverable from the petitioner as reimbursement of financial loss and as contribution for satisfaction of the judgment of the said Japanese Court. The payment of costs to the plaintiffs' Attorneys in terms of the aforesaid judgment had already been made by the bank on 15th November, 1999. In this context, the petitioner was informed that the financial loss cause to the Bank would be recovered from him both on grounds of reimbursement and contribution. Accordingly, steps would be taken by the bank as and when the amounts were due to the petitioner from the bank for recovering the aforesaid amount. The bank would also exercise its right of general lien and set off in respect of any amount lying with the bank in the petitioner's name. There was some exchange of correspondence between the petitioner and the bank thereafter, and ultimately the instant writ petition was filed on 14th December, 1999. 5. The validity of Regulation 11 has been challenged in the instant proceedings. Regulation 11 reads as follows :--- "11. Special procedure in certain cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 6 or Regulation 7 or Regulation 8 the Disciplinary Authority may impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 if the officer employee has been convicted on a criminal charge, or on the strength of facts or conclusions arrived at by a judicial trial. * Provided that the officer employee may be given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed before any order is made. * (Adopted at B.M. dated 10-9-88 published in Govt. * Provided that the officer employee may be given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed before any order is made. * (Adopted at B.M. dated 10-9-88 published in Govt. Gazette dated 22-10-88 Circular 83/24 Sub-Personnel 89/1 dated 2-2-1989)" In the instant case, a notice has been issued to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. This notice proceeds on the strength of facts or conclusion arrived at by a judicial tribunal. Though the facts established would justify the petitioner's conviction on a criminal charge, since the concerned female employees did not lodge a prosecution, but took recourse to a civil proceeding, while awarding damages and/or compensation, the Court has recorded findings of fact holding the petitioner guilty of raping one of the female employees, and subjecting both the female employees to sexual harassment. It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the Bank that there is nothing unreasonable if the Regulation provides for a punishment based on a finding recorded by a Court of law. Though the petitioner in the instant writ petition has prayed that Regulation 11 be declared unconstitutional and void, at the hearing of this writ petition, Counsel for the petitioner did not seriously address that argument, and instead took shelter under section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and submitted that the judgment of a Foreign Court relied upon in the instant case was not conclusive. He further submitted that no disciplinary proceeding was held in the instant case, and at the same time the order does not proceed on the basis that it was not practicable to hold an enquiry. In the absence of a conviction recorded in a criminal trial, the respondent-Bank could not dismiss the petitioner from service on the basis of findings recorded in a civil suit in a foreign country. He further submitted that the mere fact that the petitioner did not prefer an appeal did not mean that the petitioner accepted the judgment of the Japanese Courts as final. On the question of recovery of the amount awarded by way of damages, it has been submitted that there was no debt due to the Bank from the petitioner, and there was no adjudication by a Court of law. On the question of recovery of the amount awarded by way of damages, it has been submitted that there was no debt due to the Bank from the petitioner, and there was no adjudication by a Court of law. The decree had been passed against the Bank as well as the petitioner, and, therefore, the Bank could not claim reimbursement from the petitioner. In any event, the Bank had no right of reimbursement against the petitioner for recovery of loss and damages in the absence of an adjudication by a Court of competent jurisdiction. It was submitted that in any event, the joint accounts which he held with his wife and daughter could not be frozen, and the amounts therein could not be adjusted against the amount claimed by the Bank by way of reimbursement and contribution for satisfaction of the decree. 6. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that a fair trial was conducted by the Japanese Court, in which the petitioner had full opportunity of defending himself against the accusations made against him. The Court, after considering the evidence on record, by a reasoned judgment, found the petitioner guilty of misconduct, and awarded damages against him as well as the Bank, which was a co-defendant. In the circumstances, the Bank was justified in acting under Regulation 11, and calling upon the petitioner to reimburse the Bank; and contribute for the satisfaction of the judgment of the Japanese Court. The provisions of section 13 of CPC did not, in any manner, adversely affect the stand of the respondents. In view of the findings recorded by the Japanese Court, there was no need to hold an enquiry, since the Bank proceeded on the strength of facts and conclusions arrived at by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The fact that the petitioner was not convicted in a criminal trial made no difference whatsoever. Since the petitioner did not prefer an appeal, the judgment attained finality, and, therefore, there is no option for the petitioner and the Bank but to satisfy the judgment and decree passed by the Japanese Court. The fact that the petitioner was not convicted in a criminal trial made no difference whatsoever. Since the petitioner did not prefer an appeal, the judgment attained finality, and, therefore, there is no option for the petitioner and the Bank but to satisfy the judgment and decree passed by the Japanese Court. It was further contended that since the Bank had suffered financial loss on account of the misconduct of the petitioner, it was entitled to recover from him the said amount, and for doing so, it could proceed against the account held by the petitioner either singly or jointly. 7. The provisions of section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not directly attracted to a disciplinary proceeding of this nature. However, reliance has been placed upon the principles enshrined in the said provisions to test the reasonableness of the regulation in question. 8. A translated copy of the final decision of the Japanese Court dated 27th October, 1999 has been produced before us. The judgment runs into 44 typed pages. It refers to the pleadings of the parties and the evidence led by them. After dealing with all aspects of the matter in great detail, the Court recorded a finding that the petitioner was guilty of improper conduct as alleged. He was also guilty of rape. We have already noticed that at the trial, the plaintiffs led evidence, and they examined themselves as witnesses. Similarly, the petitioner also examined himself as a witness, and examined one other witness in support of his defence. All the witnesses were examined, and thereafter cross-examined. Nothing has been brought to our notice to satisfy us that the trial was not a fair trial, and that the same was held in breach of principles of natural justice. It was submitted before us that the procedure adopted by the Court was not exactly the same procedure as is adopted by the courts in India. It was submitted that the matter was being heard by a Single Judge, but later, the Court was converted to a Collegiate Court of three Judges after the defence had examined its witnesses. It was submitted that even after the petitioner had examined himself as a defendant, and even after his witness, Ms. Yasuda, was examined, the plaintiffs were allowed to examine witnesses. In fact, plaintiff Ikeda was again examined and cross-examined after the defence had closed its case. It was submitted that even after the petitioner had examined himself as a defendant, and even after his witness, Ms. Yasuda, was examined, the plaintiffs were allowed to examine witnesses. In fact, plaintiff Ikeda was again examined and cross-examined after the defence had closed its case. It may be that the procedure followed by courts in Japan is not exactly the same as in this country. It is not the requirement of section 13 of the C.P.C. that the procedure followed by the Foreign Court, which has rendered the judgment, must be identical to the procedure followed in this country. It has not been submitted before us that the Court which tried the suit, and gave judgment, was not a Court of competent jurisdiction. It has also not been contended that the judgment is not on the merits of the case. There also appears to be nothing on the face of the proceeding to show that the judgment was founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise the law of India in cases in which such law is applicable. It was, however, submitted that the proceeding in which the judgment was obtained was opposed to natural justice. 9. We are not persuaded to accept this submission on behalf of the petitioner. The parties examined their witnesses, and they were permitted to be cross-examined. Full opportunity was given to the defendants to defend themselves. There is not even a grievance before us that the defendants were not permitted to effectively defend themselves in the suit. The mere difference in procedure, which appears to us to be insignificant, does not justify the criticism that the procedure followed by the Court, or the judgment rendered by it, was opposed to natural justice. On a fair reading of the judgment of the Japanese Court, we are satisfied that the procedure followed by the Court was fair, and the judgment rendered by the Court is a well-reasoned judgment discussing all aspects of the matters, and the conclusions reached are justified by the evidence on record. We, therefore, reject the submission urged before us on the strength of section 13 of the C.P.C. 10. Regulation 11, which has been noticed earlier, justifies the action taken by the respondent-Bank. We, therefore, reject the submission urged before us on the strength of section 13 of the C.P.C. 10. Regulation 11, which has been noticed earlier, justifies the action taken by the respondent-Bank. In service jurisprudence, it is well known that the Rules may provide that the Disciplinary Authority may, on the basis of a finding recorded by a Court of law, take action against an employee. What is of essence is the finding recorded by a Court of competent jurisdiction. If a disciplinary proceeding is necessary only to test the charge that the concerned employee is guilty of misconduct, law does not consider it necessary to conduct such a disciplinary proceeding if the same matter has been the subject-matter of a judicial proceeding and has been gone into by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which has pronounced its judgment in the matter on merits. It cannot, therefore, be said that if the disciplinary authority acts on the strength of findings recorded in such a judgment, its action is either arbitrary, irrational or unreasonable. The Regulation expressly provides for disciplinary action against an employee if he has been convicted of a criminal charge, or on the strength of facts or conclusion arrived at by a judicial trial. As we have noticed, the findings recorded by the Court against the petitioner, though in a civil suit, in reality, relate to his criminal conduct of sexual harassment of female employees and the rape of one of the female employees. The proviso of Regulations 11, however mandates that the employee shall be given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. This the respondents have complied by issuing the Notice dated 22nd January, 1999. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that Regulation 11 is neither unconstitutional nor void, and that the respondents are justified in taking action against the petitioner under Regulation 11. The decision of the Supreme Court in (Y. Narasimha Rao others v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi another)1, reported in 1991(3) Supreme Court Cases 451, and relied upon by both the parties, supports the conclusion reached by us, having regard to the fair procedure adopted by the Foreign Court which has found the petitioner guilty of gross misconduct. 12. The decision of the Supreme Court in (Y. Narasimha Rao others v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi another)1, reported in 1991(3) Supreme Court Cases 451, and relied upon by both the parties, supports the conclusion reached by us, having regard to the fair procedure adopted by the Foreign Court which has found the petitioner guilty of gross misconduct. 12. It was submitted before us that no proceeding has been conducted against the petitioner, and there is no finding that it was not practicable to hold a disciplinary proceeding. In our view, in a case covered by Regulation 11, it is not necessary to hold a disciplinary proceeding. Since the disciplinary action proceeds on the basis of findings recorded by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the regulations do not oblige the respondent-Bank to hold a disciplinary proceeding. Moreover, as explained by the Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank, it would be wholly impracticable, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to summon witnesses from Japan to enable them to depose in a disciplinary proceeding. He has strongly relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Ikramuddin Ahmed Borah v. Superintendent of Police, Darrang, others)2, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2245, and submitted that applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment, it must be held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. It is, however, not necessary for us to express any opinion on this aspect of the matter, since we have found that Regulation 11 itself, in given circumstances, justifies the imposition of punishment without insisting upon holding of a disciplinary proceeding. The notice issued to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment, therefore, is justified in law, and the challenge to the said notice must be rejected. 13. The next question that arises for consideration is: whether the Bank is justified in freezing the Bank accounts of the petitioner ? From Paragraph 28 of the affidavit-in-reply, it appears that the Bank has frozen three such accounts which are in Tokyo, Hong Kong and Jersey. According to the petitioner, the account in Tokyo is his own account operated by him. However, the account in the Hong Kong Branch is the account of his wife who is the first signatory, while the petitioner is the second signatory. According to the petitioner, the account in Tokyo is his own account operated by him. However, the account in the Hong Kong Branch is the account of his wife who is the first signatory, while the petitioner is the second signatory. Similarly, the account at Jersey Islands is the account of his daughter jointly with the petitioner's wife and the petitioner. The petitioner is a third signatory so far as this account is concerned. He, therefore, submitted that, in any event, the Bank had no right whatsoever to freeze the accounts of his wife and daughter. This is without prejudice to his contention that the Bank cannot, without taking recourse to legal proceedings, take a decision to appropriate the amounts lying in the aforesaid accounts for adjustment against the loss said to have been suffered by the Bank. In the show-cause notice dated 22nd November, 1999, it has been stated that the Bank had incurred heavy financial loss to the extent of Rs. 18 lacs and odd plus costs, which amount was recoverable from the petitioner as reimbursement of financial loss and as contribution for satisfaction of the judgment of the said Japanese Court. The Bank, therefore, proposed to recover financial loss caused to the Bank from the petitioner. The Bank also indicated that it would exercise its right of general lien and set off in respect of any amount lying with the Bank in the petitioner's name. 14. So far as the Bank exercising its right of general lien and set off in respect of any amount lying with the Bank in his name is concerned, it may not be possible for this Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, to express any opinion in the matter. The petitioner denies his liability to make good the loss said to have been suffered by the Bank as a result of the judgment of a Foreign Court in which the Bank was a co-defendant. The Bank claims to recover from the petitioner the loss suffered by it even in the absence of an adjudication by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In these circumstances, the parties are left to work out their rights in accordance with law. They are, therefore, at liberty to take appropriate legal proceedings, if so advised. 15. The remaining two accounts, however, stand on a different footing. In these circumstances, the parties are left to work out their rights in accordance with law. They are, therefore, at liberty to take appropriate legal proceedings, if so advised. 15. The remaining two accounts, however, stand on a different footing. Prima facie, it appears that though the two accounts are held jointly, the first signatories to those accounts are the wife and daughter, respectively, of the petitioner. It is well known that for the sake of convenience, joint accounts are opened, even though the amounts deposited in such accounts may really belong to only one of the holders, who is, usually, the first signatory. Though the amounts are lying in the aforesaid two accounts which are joint, it is difficult to say, on the basis of material on record, that the amounts, really, belong to the petitioner. This is, again, a question on which we find ourselves unable to express any opinion, in the absence of relevant facts. In any event, this being a disputed question of fact, we would not like to go into this question. We may only observe that no rule or regulation has been shown to us under which the Bank may proceed against the account of the petitioner or his wife or daughter. Admittedly, the Bank has not initiated any proceeding before a Court of competent jurisdiction enabling it to proceed against the aforesaid two accounts for the recovery of loss caused to the Bank by the misconduct of the petitioner. Therefore, there appears to be no justification for the Bank to proceed against the aforesaid two accounts for the recovery of loss allegedly caused by the misconduct of the petitioner. The respondent-Bank is, therefore, directed to withdraw the order freezing these two accounts, of which the first signatories are the wife and daughter of the petitioner. This, however, will not prevent the respondent-Bank from seeking remedy before a Court of competent jurisdiction to proceed against the accounts. This order will also not prevent the petitioner from seeking remedy before the appropriate forum if he denies his liability to make good the loss said to have been incurred by the respondent-Bank on account of the misconduct of the petitioner. 16. This writ petition is, therefore, partly allowed in the above terms. 17. After this judgment was pronounced, Counsel for petitioner prayed for stay of operation of the judgment and order. 16. This writ petition is, therefore, partly allowed in the above terms. 17. After this judgment was pronounced, Counsel for petitioner prayed for stay of operation of the judgment and order. We find no good reason to grant stay. Prayer is, therefore, rejected. 18. Certified copies of this judgment and order be given within three days. Writ petition partly allowed. -----