( 1 ) THIS Criminal Appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur in Sessions Case No. 3/93. The allegation against the accused was that he had used a fire-arm and caused gun shot injuries to PW-1 H. S. Payanna Shetty at about 7 p. m. on the evening of 2-11-1991 at Hosahalli Village. The prosecution alleges that there was some backgroud to this incident insofar as the complainant had been instrumental in taking certain steps relating to a plot of land on which the accused had encroached and that the accused was therefore ill-disposed towards the complainant and that this was the motive for the commission of the offence. The learned trial Judge held the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 307, IPC and sentenced him to suffer R. I. for 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- in default to suffer S. I. for 4 months for the offence punishable under Section 307, IPC. He was further sentenced to suffer R. I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to suffer S. I. for one month for the offence under Section 3 r/w. 25 (1b) of the Indian Arms Act. The present appeal assails the correctness of these convictions and sentences. ( 2 ) AT the hearing of the appeal, the appellant's learned Counsel Sri Ajit J. Gunjal and the learned Addl. SPP have considerably assisted the Court in doing a total review of the record. Mr. Gunjal has assailed the prosecution evidence which essentially comes down to almost one witness, the reason being that the incident took place at dusk time when PW-1 was closing his shop and it is his case that the accused fired at him from across the road where some coffee bushes were grown. The complainant has very clearly stated that he saw the accused, he identified him and that after he was injured, that even he shouted out that the accused was the person who has fired at him. Mr. The complainant has very clearly stated that he saw the accused, he identified him and that after he was injured, that even he shouted out that the accused was the person who has fired at him. Mr. Gunjal has done an elaborate analysis of this evidence because it is his case that there is no dispute about the complainant having got injured on that date but, what he is at pains to point out was that having regard to the distance from where the shot was fired which is about 35 to 50 ft. , the fact that the complainant contends that there was only one light out side the shop would render the evidence of identification uncertain. While the learned counsel admits that somebody did fire the shot which injured P. W. 1, his submission is, that it would have been physically impossible for the victim to have identified the assailant because obviously, the shot was fired from a considerable distance and from a coffee grove and the assailant would obviously have taken the precaution of concealing himself. It is his explanation that because of the background, the P. W. 1 has jumped to the conclusion that it was the accused who fired the shot when in fact, it could have been any other person. As regards the other supporting evidence of the witnesses who have stated that P. W. 1 shouted out that it was the accused-Prabhakar who had attacked him, the learned counsel submits that this evidence is an extension of the evidence of P. W. 1 and if P. W. 1 was mistaken in his identity, that the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 would be of no consequence. The learned Government Advocate submits that the parties were known to each other, that there was a background of hostility and that the evidence of P. W. 1 has virtually remained unshaken even despite very elaborate cross-examination and that in this background, what must be noted is that the trial Court was justified in accepting the evidence because there was no valid ground on which it could be discarded. He emphasises the fact that P. W. 1 has in terms stated that he had seen the accused and identified him before he ran from that place and that consequently, the finding of the trial Court ought not to be disturbed. He emphasises the fact that P. W. 1 has in terms stated that he had seen the accused and identified him before he ran from that place and that consequently, the finding of the trial Court ought not to be disturbed. I have very carefully reviewed the oral evidence, the documentary evidence and the circumstantial evidence in this case for purposes of ascertaining as to whether the defence has been able to assail the record to the extent of creating a reasonable doubt because, if this is the position, then under the well settled principles of criminal jurisprudence the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. To my mind, it would be improper to disturb the finding recorded by the trial Court that the accused was the assailant in view of the fact that despite a severe grilling in the witness-box the prosecution evidence has really come through unscathed. In the light of this position, this Court will have to confirm the finding that it was the accused who fired the shot which caused the injury to the complainant P. W. 1. ( 3 ) PROCEEDING further, the appellant's learned counsel submitted that the invocation of S. 307, I. P. C. is unjustified in the present case. Essentially, he has taken me through the medical evidence in detail and he submits that the type of fire arm was such, that it could possibly be used with fatal consequences as far as birds or very small game are concerned, and that this type of weapon may cause injury but, that it could never endanger life when used against a human being. His submission therefore was that unless the act in question is life threatening, that in law it may be impermissible to invoke the charge of attempt to murder which was why the accused was awarded a heavy sentence. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor vehemently refuted this submission by contending that the medical evidence very clearly indicates that the doctor has opined that if the injuries had not been treated, since some of the pellets had lodged themselves in vital parts of the body that P. W. 1 could have died and consequently, that the conviction u/s. 307 was justified. Secondly, the submission was that a fire arm was used and the learned Addl. Secondly, the submission was that a fire arm was used and the learned Addl. SPP relied on the position in law that for a conviction u/s. 307, I. P. C. , the gravity of the injury is not the criterion and he drew my attention to the leading case under S. 307 In this country was one in which no injury was caused because, when the accused pulled the trigger of the gun, the firing pin got jammed, no bullet was ejected and no injury was caused and the Court still convicted the accused on the ground that he had completed an act which ipso facto could have endangered life. ( 4 ) IT is necessary to resolve the correct legal position with regard to the conviction under S. 307, I. P. C. in this case. It is true that the accused had used a fire-arm but, what the Criminal Court requires to consider is the mens rea aspect. It for instance, the accused had used a sophisticated rifle there would have been no doubt about the fact that his intention was to kill and even if the shot had missed the victim, he would still have been liable. From the fact that he used a fire-arm, that was not only unlikely but wasincapable of endangeringlife it is very clear that the intention was to cause injury and not to cause death. It is not proper for Courts to be totally carried away by the word 'fire-arm,' because it is of greater consequence that the Courts must scrutinise the type of fire-arm that was used and the consequences that emanate therefrom. Secondly, what the Courts must also guard against are the type of half-baked unprofessional opinions that are based on a very unrealistic and immature knowledge of medical science that are sprouted out in the witness-box by ignorant medical practitioners, most of whom are unfortunately in Government service and who technically pass off when put into the witness-box as experts. No Court is obliged to be led by the nose by opinions from this class of persons unless those opinions when scrutinised, pass the scientific test. No Court is obliged to be led by the nose by opinions from this class of persons unless those opinions when scrutinised, pass the scientific test. In my opinion therefore, the opinion of the doctor in this case which was to the effect that if the P. W. 1 had not been treated that he would have died is an overstatement of the situation and will have to be watered down. On a careful assessment of the facts and the injuries caused which were not of much consequence, the case would be liable for a conviction under S. 324, I. P. C. and not S. 307, I. P. C. ( 5 ) THE appellant's learned counsel assailed the conviction under the Arms Act because he submitted that the gun was a licenced one and that consequently, the convictions under this head are misconceived. I do not need to really re-examine the finding of the trial Court as far as this aspect is concerned because first of all, the licence stood in the name of the father of the accused but, more importantly, even if one possesses a licence for a fire-arm the misuse of the fire-arm itself is an act punishable under the Arms Act and it can never be argued that the accused was justified in having used that fire-arm against P. W. 1. Under these circumstances, the conviction under the Arms Act will have to be upheld. ( 6 ) ON the question of sentence again, I have heard the learned Advocates on both sides. To my mind, the sentence under the main head will have to be considerably reduced to bring it in consonance with that under S. 324, I. P. C. and similarly, having regard to the nature of the fire-arm in question, the sentence awarded under the Arms Act would also have to be considerably scaled down. To my mind, having regard to the fact that the accused is not a hardened criminal and having regard to the overall circumstances of the case and the length of time that the legal proceedings have taken i. e. , virtually nine years, this is not a case in which the appeal Court should direct reincarceration of the accused at this late point of time. ( 7 ) THE conviction and sentence awarded to the accused under S. 307, I. P. C. by the trial Court are set aside, the accused is convicted of the offence punishable under S. 324, I. P. C. and it is directed that he shall undergo R. I. for the period already undergone and shall pay a fine quantified at Rs. 10,000/- in default S. I. for 6 months. While this Court upholds the conviction for the offence under the Arms Act, the sentence awarded by the trial Court under this head is modified to the period already undergone and to the payment of fine quantified at Rs. 2,000/- indefault S. I. for 2 months The appellant is granted 12 weeks time to deposit the fine amount in the trial Court. The appeal succeeds to this extent and stands disposed of. The bail bond of the accused to stand cancelled after the fine amount has been recovered. I do concede that since the complainant P. W. 1 has sustained some injuries and it has come on record that he was hospitalised for 13 days, that the trial Court is hereby directed after recovery of the fine amount from the accused to issue notice to P. W. 1 and to pay over an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to him as and by way of compensation. The accused shall be given credit for whatever amount that has been deposited by him in the trial Court pursuant to the earlier order. The appeal succeeds to this extent and stands disposed of. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .