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2000 DIGILAW 621 (MAD)

C. Masanam v. The Chief Educational Officer, Madurai & Another

2000-06-29

PRABHA SRIDEVAN, V.S.SIRPURKAR

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Judgment : The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mrs.Prabha Sridevan, J.: 1. The appellant is the school teacher, who had worked for sixteen years as such before, his services were terminated without even an enquiry. 2. The appellant joined the services of the second respondent school. This school is fully aided and established and administered by a linguistic minority. .3. On 25. 1986 a show cause notice was issued to the appellant by the second respondent calling upon him to show cause why he ought not to be suspended temporarily, since he had not conducted classes and he was disobeying the Headmaster and he had also not enrolled new students to the school like other teachers. To this, the appellant gave a detailed explanation by his letter dated 30.5.1986 bringing to the Managements notice that from 1970 till date he had been discharging his duties properly and without any complaint and that he had always complied with the directions of the Headmaster and also had been concerned about the growth of the school and the improvement of the students. He had also stated in his letter that two classes had been merged into one at the instructions of the Headmaster and though repeatedly the appellant requested the Headmaster to put him incharge of one class, the Headmaster had not heeded to request. He has also stated that he had been meeting the parents of children, who lived in the neighbourhood asking them to admit their children in the second respondent-school. The second respondent received this explanation. On 6. 1986, the second respondent issued another letter reiterating the same complaints set out in the letter dated 25. 1986 and rejecting the explanation given by the appellant as false. By this letter, the second respondent again called upon the appellant to show cause why action cannot be taken against him. 4. To this, again the appellant replied by his letter dated 6. 1986 to the second respondent stating that he had given a factual and truthful reply in his letter dated 30.5.1986 and that would be sufficient explanation to this letter also. He has stated that he was always willing to comply with the instructions of the Headmaster. A copy of this letter was marked to the Deputy Inspector of Schools. On 26. He has stated that he was always willing to comply with the instructions of the Headmaster. A copy of this letter was marked to the Deputy Inspector of Schools. On 26. 1986, the second respondent placed the appellant under suspension stating that the explanation given by the appellant were not satisfactory and charges were framed, which were the same charges that were alleged against him in the earlier letter dated 25. 1986. On 7. 1986, the second respondent terminated the service of the petitioner, on the ground that since the appellant had not given any satisfactory explanation against him, by giving him three months notice from 7. 1986. To this, again the appellant sent a detailed letter dated 27. 1986 to the Chief Educational Officer, in which he stated that no salary was paid to him for two years and he was still continuing to work. In this letter he had also given a detailed reply to all the charges framed against him. He also brought to the notice of the Chief Educational Officer, who is the first respondent herein that there was no enquiry and no opportunity was given to him. This letter dated 27. 1986 was sent to the first respondent with a copy marked to the District Educational Officer, Madurai, The Deputy Inspector of Schools, Madurai. The Director of School Education, Chennai and also the second respondent dated 8. 1986 rejected the representation of the appellant on the ground that he had no jurisdiction, since the second respondent was a minority school. On 10. 1986, the second respondent sent a letter to the appellant stating that since there was no denial or explanation to the notice dated 7. 1986, the three months period came to an end and the appellant was removed from service from 10. 1986. 5. Aggrieved by this, the teacher filed W.P.No.12299 of 1986. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court on the ground that no proper reply was given to the notice dated 7. 1986 and that the failure to conduct the enquiry did not vitiate the order of termination, since no proper explanation was given by the petitioner nor did he ask for any enquiry. Aggrieved by this order, the present appeal has been filed by the teacher. 6. 1986 and that the failure to conduct the enquiry did not vitiate the order of termination, since no proper explanation was given by the petitioner nor did he ask for any enquiry. Aggrieved by this order, the present appeal has been filed by the teacher. 6. The only point that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant was given sufficient opportunity before his services were terminated. .7. In the appeal, the learned Senior Counsel, Mr.K.Chandru appearing for the appellant took the Court through all the facts referred to above. He submitted that the appellant had given detailed answers to the charges framed against him and in addition he had also addressed a representation to the Chief Educational Officer in which again a detailed explanation had been given. The second respondent after having received the letters, insisted on issuing repeated notices levelling the same charges and it is therefore that the appellant kept quiet after stating that he had already stated his defence in the earlier reply. At no point of time had the appellant indicated by his conduct or by his words that he was accepting the charges. 8. The learned senior counsel referred to some decisions (1) (1989)1 L.L.N. 728 where this Court bemoaned the fact that the services of a Headmaster of the School was terminated without even an opportunity to deny the serious charges levelled against him thereby throwing to the winds the elementary principles of natural justice. In this case which also dealt with a minority school, this Court quashed the order of termination on the ground that no enquiry was conducted. The learned senior counsel next referred to. (2) A. Casmir and others v. The Joint Director of Schools etc. and two others A. Casmir and others v. The Joint Director of Schools etc. and two others A. Casmir and others v. The Joint Director of Schools etc. and two others, 1996 Writ L.R. 470 which is again a case involving a minority school where the services of a teacher were terminated without conducting any domestic enquiry. This Court was pleased to quash the impugned orders and to direct that the petitioners be reinstated with all attendant benefits. and two others, 1996 Writ L.R. 470 which is again a case involving a minority school where the services of a teacher were terminated without conducting any domestic enquiry. This Court was pleased to quash the impugned orders and to direct that the petitioners be reinstated with all attendant benefits. The learned senior counsel finally referred to the decision reported in, (3) M.Dinakaran v. Director of School Education (Elementary Schools) and another M.Dinakaran v. Director of School Education (Elementary Schools) and another M.Dinakaran v. Director of School Education (Elementary Schools) and another , (1999)3 L.L.N. 343 where he submitted that the question whether a writ against a private institution could be instituted also came up for consideration as also the question of whether the Management ought to have held an enquiry before terminating the services of the teacher. According to the learned senior counsel, in this decision this Court after elaborate consideration had held that there was not even an attempt made by the school authorities to hold an enquiry before deciding to terminate the services of the teacher and therefore, the principles of natural justice had been totally violated. On this ground, this Court in the above case, set aside the order of termination, but since in the meantime, the teacher had attained the age of superannuation and reinstatement was not possible and therefore 50% of the backwages were directed to be paid to the teacher in that case. 9. Thelearned senior counsel would therefore submit that there was an absolute violation of principles of natural justice and the teacher, who had put in 16 years of service had been thrown out for reasons which are not even serious. 10. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that if the appellant had been dismissed, he had only himself to blame. He had been given enough opportunity to represent his case but he chose to take an indifferent attitude and failed to answer the charges levelled by the management against him. When the appellant himself had neither cared to refute the charges nor had asked for an enquiry to be conducted, there was no duty on the part of the management to conduct an enquiry. When the appellant himself had neither cared to refute the charges nor had asked for an enquiry to be conducted, there was no duty on the part of the management to conduct an enquiry. A plain reading of the letters, referred to earlier, would show that repeatedly the Management had asked him to give his explanation and it is only because he failed to do so that his services were terminated with three months’ notice. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for this respondent the order of the learned Judge was perfectly correct and there was no warrant for interference. 11. He also referred to the Judgment reported in Union of India and others v. Ram Pal Union of India and others v. Ram Pal Union of India and others v. Ram Pal , A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1500, in which case the delinquent officer had neither denied the allegation nor made a request for an enquiry. The Director General, who was the authority in that case was therefore not required to appoint an Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry and the Supreme Court held that the prescribed procedure had been followed before passing the dismissal order. 12. The charges framed against the teacher are not specific and are in fact vague. In the notice dated 7. 1986 the reasons stated for giving three months notice was that the appellant had not discharged his duties as teacher properly, had not made any efforts for the educational improvement of students, has disregarded the Rules of the School and disobeyed the Management. In the earlier letters, in particular the letter dated 26. 1986 the main grievance seems to be that the appellant had not made any effort to enrol new students in the school. This, according to the Management, affected the growth of the school, since the other teachers had been responsible for admission of new students. 13. The appellant had given his explanation for each of the charges and also stated that he had made an earnest attempt to canvass for the school in the neighbourhood. It is also a matter of record that he had given his reply as early as 30.5.1986 and in fact in the letter dated 27. 13. The appellant had given his explanation for each of the charges and also stated that he had made an earnest attempt to canvass for the school in the neighbourhood. It is also a matter of record that he had given his reply as early as 30.5.1986 and in fact in the letter dated 27. 1986 addressed to the Chief Educational Officer with a copy marked to the second respondent, there is a specific reference to failure to conduct an enquiry and denial of opportunity to examine witnesses etc. It is not in dispute that certain provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private School Regulation Act, 1973 (the Act) are applicable to minority schools also. In particular, the Rules, 8, 15, 25 and 27 of the Private Schools Regulation Rules apply to minority institutions also especially when, as in the instant case the school is fully a government aided school. 14. As per Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Act every teacher enters into an agreement in the prescribed form when appointed to the school for a period exceeding three months. This agreement is in Form 7-A. Form 7-A agreement, inter alia, provides for the procedure to be followed by a school in terminating the services of the teacher by disciplinary action. 15. Clause 7 is the relevant clause and it reads as follows: .(7) “That the school committee shall not dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or terminate the services of the said teacher without informing him/her in writing of the grounds on which they intend to take action and shall adopt the following procedure before taking any final decision regarding the punishment to be imposed; (a) The memorandum of charges shall be communicated to him/her in writing giving him/her reasonable time to send his/her explanation to the school committee. .(b) After considering his/her explanation the school committee shall communicate to him/her the findings and if so desired by the said teacher conduct a personal hearing or enquiry, wherein he/she shall be given the opportunity to examine or cross-examine any or all the witnesses and also produce witness. .(b) After considering his/her explanation the school committee shall communicate to him/her the findings and if so desired by the said teacher conduct a personal hearing or enquiry, wherein he/she shall be given the opportunity to examine or cross-examine any or all the witnesses and also produce witness. .(c) After the conduct of the personal hearing or enquiry by the school committee the report of such personal hearing or enquiry shall be furnished to the teacher and a notice shall be issued to him/her setting out the proposed punishment and he/she shall be given a reasonable time to defend himself/herself against the proposed punishment. .(d) After the receipt of the statement of defence from him/her and taking it into consideration, the school committee shall inform him/her in writing about its final decision.” 16. Every teacher in a private school including a minority school is given the protection of these Rules and therefore unless the procedure agreed upon by the school and management for terminating the services is followed, there cannot be a valid termination of a service of the teacher. Clause 7 sets out clearly and in unmistakable terms, the steps to be followed by the school by the school before taking a final decision regarding dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of the service of a teacher. These are all the statutory safeguards to protect the teacher against arbitrariness. Since the prescribed procedure has not been followed here, the decision reported in Union of India v. Ram Pal, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1500 will not come to the aid of the 2nd respondent. 17. None of the procedures spelt out in Form 7-A have been followed. The charges are really not very grave and the teacher cannot be faulted for not going around and canvassing the merits of the school. It is surprising that the school should cite this as a reason for deciding to terminate the service of a person, who has given sixteen years of his life for the school. The stand taken by the school that there was no proper reply is also not correct. The appellant had explained his case at the earliest juncture and since repetitive notices were issued, the appellant thought it fit to reiterate what he had said in the earliest reply. The stand taken by the school that there was no proper reply is also not correct. The appellant had explained his case at the earliest juncture and since repetitive notices were issued, the appellant thought it fit to reiterate what he had said in the earliest reply. The school cannot be heard to say that it has no obligation to conduct an enquiry when the Rules stare at our face and the appellant had in fact represented to the first respondent that there was no enquiry and no opportunity was given to him to prove his case. The second respondent who was served with a copy of the representation addressed to the first respondent could have given an opportunity to the appellant by conducting enquiry. They did not do so. Their conduct appears peevish and not befitting an educational institution. The principles of natural justice is totally violated by the failure to conduct an enquiry. Therefore, the order of termination will have to be quashed. 18. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the appellant has two more years of service. Since the impugned order has been set aside, we feel that in the interest of justice, it will be proper to award the appellant 50% of the backwages from the date of termination and the same has to be calculated and paid to the appellant and he has to be reinstated within four months from this date. 19. The writ appeal is therefore allowed. With cost of Rs.3,000.