Judgment I.P.Singh, J. 1. This application in revision has been filed under sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code). It is directed against the order dated 20.4.1996 passed by Shri Anil Kumar Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Patna in complaint Case No. 137/94 by which he rejected the complaint petition filed by the petitioner under section 203 of the Code. 2. It appears that the present petitioner filed a complaint petition in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna making out various allegations against the opposite party. The case was numbered as Complaint Case No. 170-C/93. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate referred the matter to the police under section 156(3) of the Code. The police registered Kadamkuan P.S. Case No. 188/93. In the meantime, the petitioner could learn that the police was in collusion with the opposite party and he accordingly filed a protest-cum-complaint petition in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna. The police submitted final form in the said case after which the petitioner-complainant was examined on solemn affirmation on 1.10.1994. The case was posted for enquiry under section 202 of the Code in which four witnesses were examined. Before, however, the petitioner could file a complaint petition in the court he was arrested by the police at the instance of the opposite party and Kadamkuan P.S. Case No. 116/93 was instituted against him in which he was also put under arrest. The learned Judicial Magistrate, however, dismissed the complaint petition of the petitioner under section 203 of the Code by a detailed order in which the learned Magistrate has taken into consideration the F.I.R. lodged by the opposite party and also the defence taken by them. It is well settled that at the stage of section 203/204 of the Code the court has only to see whether from the statement of the complainant made on solemn affirmation and on the basis of the statement of the witnesses recorded under section 202 of the Code if a prima facie case against the accused persons is made out the cognizance has to be taken. At this stage the court is not to scrutinise meticulously the evidence adduced by the complainant nor could the Magistrate take into consideration the defence taken by the accused. The Magistrate has only to find out prima facie case at this stage. At this stage the court is not to scrutinise meticulously the evidence adduced by the complainant nor could the Magistrate take into consideration the defence taken by the accused. The Magistrate has only to find out prima facie case at this stage. On these grounds amongst others it has been contended that the impugned order be quashed and further enquiry under section 398 of the Code be ordered. 3. The parties have been heard in detail on these points. On behalf of the opposite party it has been seriously contended that since this application has not been filed under section 398 of the Code further enquiry cannot be ordered in this criminal revision application. My attention has been drawn to the fact that this application has only been filed under sections 397 and 401 of the Code and not also under section 398 of the Code. I do not find any force in this contention of the learned counsel for the opposite Party. In this connection I will firstly refer to the case of Madhu Limaye V/s. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47). In this case also the petition was filed under sections 397 and 401 of the Code. The Honbie Supreme Court after a detailed discussion has held that the label of the petition is immaterial and even on a petition filed under sections 397 and 401 of the Code the jurisdiction of the Court under section 482 of the Code could be invoked. 4. Even otherwise it is well settled that the court can exercise the power under section 397 of the Code even suo motu to prevent the perpetuation of illegality and miscarriage of justice as held in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Girdharilal and others (A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1169). In order to attract the provisions of section 397 if any illegality, impropriety in any finding, sentence or order is brought to the notice of the court it is sufficient to set the court in motion even suo motu without anybody applying for the same. The moment the attention of the court is drawn to an illegal or improper order it bcomes the bounden duty of the court to correct the same. Even in this back-ground the labelling of the petition is hardly of any consequence. 5. The moment the attention of the court is drawn to an illegal or improper order it bcomes the bounden duty of the court to correct the same. Even in this back-ground the labelling of the petition is hardly of any consequence. 5. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another V/s. Special Judicial Magistrate and others (A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 128). In this case a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was filed before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court which was dismissed. The appellants had sought for quashing of the complaint filed against them under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Hon ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and allowed the appeal. The complaint petition against the appellant was also quashed. Its paragraph no. 26 runs as follows : "26. Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the present one the Court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 the Court can certainly treat the petition one under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code. It may not, however, be lost sight of that provisions ovist in the Code of revision and appeal but sometime for immediate relief Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate Courts. The present petition though filed in the High Court as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under Article 227 of the Constitution." 6. From the aforesaid also it would appear that the nomenclature of a petition or the sections mentioned therein is hardly of much consequences as has been held by the Honbie Supreme Court in the above two cases. 7. From the aforesaid also it would appear that the nomenclature of a petition or the sections mentioned therein is hardly of much consequences as has been held by the Honbie Supreme Court in the above two cases. 7. On behalf of the opposite party it has been submitted that in the present case the protest petition filed in the court not be treated to be a complaint petition and, therefore, neither the complainant could have been examined on solemn affirmation nor an enquiry under section 202 of the Code could have been held under the facts and circumstances of this case. This takes us to the consideration of the question what is meant by protest petition. It is well settled that a protest petition alleging that the Investigating Officer was not investigating the case properly and the accused be summoned and put on trial can be treated as a complaint petition. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Rameshwar Prasad V/s. Bhatu Mahton and others (A.I.R. 1958 Patna 11). In this decision in paragraph 2 it has been observed as follows : "The entire definition makes it clear that a petition will be treated to be a complaint only when there is an accusation against some persons and the prayer is for taking action as upon a complaint under Sections 200 to 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has also placed reliance on this decision in a different context which I will subsequently mention in paragraph Nos. 14 and 15. 8. Now coming to the present case the following prayer has been made. From the facts of this case it would appear that in the protest petition the entire detail of the alleged occurrence making out a case under various sections of the Indian Penal Code has been made. Its prayer portion runs as follows : "It is, therefore, prayed that your Honour may be pleased to keep this protest-cum-complaint petition on record and to pass necessary order as per law." The question that may arise in this connection would be whether this protest petition as contained in Annexure-1 be treated to be a complaint petition. This brings us to the definition of the complaint petition as contained in section 2(d) of the Code. This brings us to the definition of the complaint petition as contained in section 2(d) of the Code. It runs as follows : "2(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report, (explanation omitted)." 9. The requisites of a legal complaint are : It must be (1) an allegation (oral or written) that some person (known or unknown) has committed an offence; (2) made to a Magistrate and (3) with the object that he should take action under law. If these three ingredients are satisfied the petition can be treated toba complaint petition. In the present case as has already been noticed in the concluding portion of the protest petition a prayer has been made "to pass necessary order as per law". The question is whether this will come within the meaning of a prayer with the object that the Magistrate whould take action under the law as has been noticed in requisite no. (3) above. The answer would be obviously in affirmative. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Bhimappa Bassappa Bhu Sannavar V/s. Laxman Shivarayappa Samagouda and others (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1153) in which the following observation has been made : "The word complaint has a wide meaning since it included even an oral allegation. It may, therefore, be assumed that no form is prescribed which the complaint must take. It may only be said that there must be an allegation which prima facie discloses the commission of an offence with the necessary facts for the magistrate to take action. Section 190(1)(a) makes it necessary that the alleged facts must disclose the commission of an offence." If this definition of the complaint is taken into consideration the protest petition as mentioned above as contained in Annexure-1 can be treated to be a complaint petition in the eye of law. 10 The true scope of an enquiry under section 202 of the Code has come up for consideration before the Hon ble Supreme Court from time to time. In this connection I will firstly refer to the case of Nagawwa V/s. Veeranna (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1947). 10 The true scope of an enquiry under section 202 of the Code has come up for consideration before the Hon ble Supreme Court from time to time. In this connection I will firstly refer to the case of Nagawwa V/s. Veeranna (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1947). In this case the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that the scope of enquiry under section 202 of the Code is extremely limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegation before the court, on the basis of materials placed before the court by the complainant for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process is made out or not. This question has to be decided purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to defence that the accused may have. It has further been held that in an enquiry under section 202 of the Code the accused has got no locus standi and cannot be heard. From this it would appear that at the stage of enquiry under section 202 of the Code the Magistrate has only to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out or not. At this stage the Magistrate cannot take notice of the probable defence the accused may have since in an enquiry under section 202 of the Code the accused has got no locus standi in the matter. From the impugned order it, however, appears that the learned Magistrate has gone in great detail and has discussed not only the prosecution case and the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant but also the F.I.R. lodged by the opposite party. Obviously this is completely beyond the scope of the enquiry under section 202 of the Code. From the impugned order it would appear that the learned Magistrate had converted the enquiry under section 202 of the Code into a full dress trial to see whether the accused was guilty or not. Obviously this is completely beyond the scope of the enquiry under section 202 of the Code. From the impugned order it would appear that the learned Magistrate had converted the enquiry under section 202 of the Code into a full dress trial to see whether the accused was guilty or not. In the case of Balraj Khanna and others V/s. Moti Ram (A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1389) the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that the object of an enquiry under section 202 of the Code is to see whether there is a prima facie case for issuing the process against the accused and this enquiry could not be converted into a trial by taking into consideration the defence taken by the accused. 11. Before proceeding any further I will refer to the case of Chandra Deo Singh V/s. Prokash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose and another (A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1430). In this case a detailed discussion has taken place vis-a-vis the position of the accused in an enquiry under section 202 of the Code. In this case it has been held that the accused does not come into picture at all till the process is issued nor he can examine any witness in course of the enquiry. Whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under section 202 of the Code can in no sense become a trial as under law there can be only one trial of the offence. It was further held that it was not open to the Magistrate to consider the statements recorded during the investigation by the police on the basis of the F.I.R. lodged by accused or during the enquiry arising out of any complaint petition, since all these matters could be extraneous to the proceeding before the court. 12. A Bench of this Court in the case of Naresh Singh & others V/s. The State of Bihar (1988 P.L.J.R. 216) relying on the decision of Chandra Deo Singh (supra) has held that in an enquiry under section 202 of the Code the Magistrate has to appliy his mind to the materials produced in the complaint case. The Magistrate cannot look into other materials such as earlier police investigation. In this case eference has also been made to the case of Ram Kumar Pandey V/s. The State of Bihar and another (1979 B.B.C.J. 293). The Magistrate cannot look into other materials such as earlier police investigation. In this case eference has also been made to the case of Ram Kumar Pandey V/s. The State of Bihar and another (1979 B.B.C.J. 293). In this decision also a similar view has been taken. 13. So far as the order of dismissal to be passed under section 203 of the Code is concerned it provides that (i) after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant (ii) and of the witnesses and (3) the result of the enquiry or investigation (if any) under section 202 of the Code if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is non sufficient ground for proceeding he shall dismiss the complaint and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing. Thus, it is clear that the scope of the enquiry under section 202 of the Code is extremely limited as has been held in the case of Nagawwa (supra). At this stage the accused has got no locus standi and he cannot be heard. The scope of second enquiry under section 202 of the Code does not permit the Magistrate to take into consideration the probable defence which the accused may have or to advert to his case. 14. I have carefully gone through the impugned order. The learned Magistrate has passed a very detailed order in which he has taken into consideration the Fardbeyan of opposite party no. 2, Vikash Ghosh, as recorded in Kadamkuan P.S. Case No. 116/93. The law never permitted the learned Magistrate to take into consideration any such Fardbeyan since at this stage no such thing taken into consideration. On this ground alone the impugned order is liable to be quashed. Even other-wise it suffers various other material defects and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 15. Before concluding I would like to mention that as per the learned counsel for opposite party no. 2, the protest petiion filed in this case should not be treated to be a complaint petition and in support of this contention she has also placed reliance on the case of Rameshwar Prasad (supra) which has been referred to in paragraph no. 7 of this judgments. 2, the protest petiion filed in this case should not be treated to be a complaint petition and in support of this contention she has also placed reliance on the case of Rameshwar Prasad (supra) which has been referred to in paragraph no. 7 of this judgments. Her contention is that in the said case the protest petition has not been treated to be a complaint petition and therefore in the present case also it should not be so treated. I, however, do not find any force in this contention for the reasons noted below. 16. As will appear from paragraph no. (1) of this reported case there the protest petition was a petition in which the only prayer made was that the Magistrate shoula direct the statements of some of the prosecution witnesses to be recorded under section 164 of the Code. In view of this solitary prayer it was held that this protest petition does not come in the definition of a complaint petition within the meaning of section 4(h)(old) [Sec. 2(d) (New)] of the Code. In the present case it is not so, as has been noticed in paragraph no. 8 of this judgment. Hence this contention of the learned counsel is rejected. 17. In the result this revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dismissing the complaint petition under section 203 of the Code is quashed. The learned Magistrate is directed to hold further enquiry into the matter under section 398 of the Code and to proceed in accordance with law on the basis of the complaint petition, statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the evidence of the witnesses recorded by him.