JUDGMENT Tirath Singh Thakur, J.— These Cross-Appeals arise out of a suit for refund of octroi duty collected from the Plaintiff on the import of tobacco into the Municipal limits of Mysore Municipality. In the accompanying Writ Petition the Petitioner has called in question the constitutional validity of Section 324(1) of Karnataka Municipalities Act and Bye-law No. 3 of the Municipal Bye-laws. A mandamus directing the Respondent to refund the amount collected from the Petitioner towards the octroi has also been prayed for. 2. Mangalore Ganesh Beedies works, was at the relevant time a partnership concern engaged in the manufacture and marketing of "Beedies". It would in connection with the said business purchase Tobacco from dealers and growers within and outside the State of Karnataka and transport the same to Mangalore for being stored in its bonded ware-houses located within the limits of Mangalore Municipal Council established under the Municipalities Act, 1964. The Council had levied an octroi on the import of tobacco into its limits for use, sale or consumption therein. Consequently, Octroi at the prescribed rates was levied and collect from the Plaintiff on the stocks imported by it. The Plaintiff claimed refund of the amount recovered from it on the ground that the stocks were not meant for sale, use or consumption within the Municipal limits. This request was turned down by the Municipality on the ground that the consignor and consignee of the goods being different no refund was admissible. Aggrieved Plaintiff/Appellant filed Writ Petition No. 4174 of 1996 which was disposed of by a single Bench of this Court by order dated 14th March, 1979, with a direction that the Municipal Council shall not levy octroi on tobacco imported by the Petitioner only on the basis that the consignee for the stocks sent out from the limits of the Council was not the same person as the consignor. Writ Appeal No. 776 of 1979, filed by the Municipal Council against the said order was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court leaving the question regarding the liability of the Petitioner to pay octroi and its right to seek refund of the same open. Original Suit No. 159 of 1981 was filed by the Plaintiff, two years after the disposal of the appeal for a declaration that Bye-law 32 of the Municipal Bye-laws was invalid and for refund of an amount of Rs. Original Suit No. 159 of 1981 was filed by the Plaintiff, two years after the disposal of the appeal for a declaration that Bye-law 32 of the Municipal Bye-laws was invalid and for refund of an amount of Rs. 9,82,360.71 collected by the Defendant towards octroi on the import of tobacco by the Plaintiff. 3. The trial Court framed as many as 13 issues and while answering the same held that the tobacco imported by the Plaintiff was meant only for storage purposes to be despatched for use, sale or consumption outside the Municipal limits. The Municipal Council could not according to the trial Court recover any duty towards octroi on such imports. The Corporation of the City of Mangalore, which had succeeded the Municipal Council was held liable to refund the amount collected from the Plaintiff. The trial Court further held that the suit filed by the Plaintiff was governed by Article 62 of the Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to Article 24 of the new Act which prescribe a period of three years from the date the right to sue accrues. The claim made by the Plaintiff was accordingly decreed in part with costs and interest as noticed earlier. Aggrieved the Plaintiff has filed Regular First Appeal 76 of 1990 in so far as the impugned judgment and decree declines the relief in respect of the balance amount claimed by it. The Corporation of the City of Mangalore has on the other hand questioned the judgment and decree of the Court- below even in so far as the Plaintiff's claim for refund has been accepted in part. 4. Appearing for the Plaintiff/Appellant in Regular First Appeal No. 76 of 1990, Mr. A.G. Holla, made a two-fold submission. He urged that the import of tobacco into the Municipal limits of Mangalore, was not meant for use, sale or consumption therein. The tobacco was according to the learned Counsel, stored in the ware-houses of the Plaintiff from where the same was despatched after mixing and repacking to contractors engaged for the manufacture of beedies outside Mangalore. The use or consumption of the tobacco stocks was therefore outside the limits of the Mangalore Municipality hence not exigible to any duty towards octroi. In support he placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hiralal Thakorlal Dalal Vs. The use or consumption of the tobacco stocks was therefore outside the limits of the Mangalore Municipality hence not exigible to any duty towards octroi. In support he placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hiralal Thakorlal Dalal Vs. Broach Municipality and Others, AIR 1976 SC 1446 ; HMM Ltd. and another Vs. The Administrator, Bangalore City Corporation, Bangalore and another, AIR 1990 SC 47 ; Mafatlal Industries Ltd. Vs. Nadiad Nagar Palika and Another, AIR 2000 SC 1223 Secondly he argued that the trial Court having found that the stocks were not sold, used or consumed within the Municipal limits fell in error in holding that the Plaintiff's claim for refund of the duty recovered on the same was barred by limitation. He argued that the right to sue for refund had accrued to the Plaintiff only after the disposal of Writ Petition No. 4174 of 1976 and Writ Appeal No. 776 of 1979 filed against the order made by the learned Single Judge. So reckoned the suit was according to the learned Counsel within the period of limitation prescribed for the same. Reliance in support was placed by him upon decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Kishore and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 313 ; Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong and Others, AIR 1990 SC 772 . 5. Mr. B.P. Holla, learned Counsel for Defendant/Appellant in Regular First Appeal No. 115 of 1990, on the other hand argued that the trial Court had fallen in a palpable error in decreeing the suit filed by the Plaintiff on the basis of evidence which was contrary to the case set up in the plaint. He urged that the Plaintiff's version that the stocks imported by it had not been sold or consumed within the Municipal limits of Mangalore had neither been proved nor could the same be proved in the absence of the sale agreements which the Plaintiff had set up but failed to produce. He alternatively, contended that in a suit for refund of any tax or duty illegally, charged and governed by Article 62 of the Limitation Act of 1908 corresponding to Article 24 of the new Act the Plaintiff had to establish that the claim for refund had been made within 3 years of the date of export of the stocks. He alternatively, contended that in a suit for refund of any tax or duty illegally, charged and governed by Article 62 of the Limitation Act of 1908 corresponding to Article 24 of the new Act the Plaintiff had to establish that the claim for refund had been made within 3 years of the date of export of the stocks. No claim beyond that period was maintainable nor could refund be claimed or granted unless credible evidence regarding the export of the material was adduced which the Plaintiff had failed to do. 6. Two questions fall for consideration namely i) WHETHER the collection of octroi duty from the Plaintiff on the import of tobacco stocks by it, into the Municipal limits of Mangalore, was illegal? and ii) WHAT IS the period of limitation applicable to a suit for refund of any such collection? Reg. Question No. (1) 7. As noticed earlier the suit instituted by the Plaintiff was proceeded by a writ petition in which the Plaintiff had assailed the refusal of the Municipality to grant a refund. The Plaintiff had in the said petition inter alia asserted that the tobacco procured by it was brought into the municipal limits of Mangalore for storage in ware-houses from where the same was after breaking the bulk mixing and repacking exported out of Mangalore for delivery to various parties outside. The export was according to the Plaintiff pursuant to sale orders received by it from the purchasers. Paras III(c) and III(d) of Writ Petition No. 4174 of 1976, a copy whereof has been produced at the trial and marked as Ext.P.59, contain the following specific assertion: (c) Inter alia, the Petitioner purchases the beedi tobacco from dealers and growers from Nippani and Gujarath and from there the beedi tobacco is brought to its place of business in Mangalore by Lorries and stored in their warehouses. Thereafter, the beedi tobacco so brought into Mangalore is repacked in packages of uniform weights in gunny bags. After that, the said tobacco is exported out of Mangalore and delivered to the various parties out of Mangalore. These deliveries are made to various parties out of Mangalore on the sale orders received by the Petitioners from: (1) M/s. Shantheri Tobacco Company, Mangalore. (2) M/s. Bhakta Enterprises, Maidan Road, Mangalore, and (3) M/s. Baliga and Company, Hevathi Building, Balmatta, Mangalore. These deliveries are made to various parties out of Mangalore on the sale orders received by the Petitioners from: (1) M/s. Shantheri Tobacco Company, Mangalore. (2) M/s. Bhakta Enterprises, Maidan Road, Mangalore, and (3) M/s. Baliga and Company, Hevathi Building, Balmatta, Mangalore. (d) The Petitioner submits that the value of the beedi tobacco so purchased by them, brought into their Mangalore Office and thereafter sold after repacking and delivered to parties outside Mangalore town on an average is about Rs. Four crores per annum. (emphasis supplied) 8. The Plaintiff's case set up at the earliest point of time thus was that tobacco stocks brought into the Municipal limits were not only mixed but repacked and more importantly such repacked tobacco was sold by it pursuant to sale orders received from the three concerns mentioned above. The averments in paras III(c) and III(d) (supra) leave no manner of doubt that tobacco stocks entered the Municipal limits for purposes of sale therein and that the same were sold from Mangalore to those mentioned in Para-III(c) (supra) no matter the delivery of stocks pursuant to the sale orders received from them was made to parties outside Mangalore. This position is reiterated even in Writ Petition No. 20124 of 1990 filed by the Plaintiff after the filing of the present appeals. In paragraph 7 of the said writ petition, the Plaintiff had once again asserted that the repacked tobacco was supplied to parties outside the Municipal limits pursuant to sale orders received by it. The averments in para 7 of the petition may also be usefully extracted: The firm used to supply the repacked tobacco to various parties outside the Mangalore City Municipality limits as per the sale orders. True copies of 5 such Sale Orders are produced herewith marked as ANNEXURES"E-1 to E-5". It is clear from the sale orders that the sale of tobacco covered by the said orders is not complete until the same are delivered to the parties specified therein, and until and unless approved by the said parties. Thus, the sale of tobacco covered by these Sale Orders is not complete within the limits of Mangalore City Municipality, and the beedi tobacco brought without the Mangalore limits by the firm is meant only for export to places outside the municipal limits of Mangalore in all these cases. The sale was also completed outside Mangalore Municipal limits. 9. Thus, the sale of tobacco covered by these Sale Orders is not complete within the limits of Mangalore City Municipality, and the beedi tobacco brought without the Mangalore limits by the firm is meant only for export to places outside the municipal limits of Mangalore in all these cases. The sale was also completed outside Mangalore Municipal limits. 9. A similar assertion is made by the Plaintiff in para 6 of the plaint in which it is alleged that the despatch of the tobacco brought within the Municipal Limits, is pursuant to sale agreements between the Plaintiff and the purchasers in whose favour sales are according to the Plaintiff completed only outside the Municipal limits. The Plaintiff's case in this connection is stated in the following words: The Plaintiff is not liable to pay octroi tax in such cases for merely bringing the tobacco to the municipal limits outside and thereafter exporting from outside the city limits to consignees who may not be the Plaintiff itself, as according to the Plaintiff and the terms of the agreement between the parties, sale is completed outside the city Municipal limits as per the provisions of the Sales of Goods Act. (emphasis supplied) 10. To sum up the claim made by the Plaintiff was founded on the following premises: a) Tobacco was imported by the Plaintiff in the Municipal limits of Mangalore for storage, mixing and repacking after breaking the bulk. b) The stocks so mixed and repacked were sold from the warehouses of the Plaintiff located within the municipal limits. c) The sales were in favour of three traders referred to in para-III(c) of Writ Petition 4174 of 1976 extracted earlier, pursuant to sale orders/agreements received/executed with them. d) Although the traders referred to above are all from Mangalore, the agreements/sale orders received from them required the delivery of the stocks to be made to parties outside the municipal limits. 11. The Plaintiff's contention on the basis of the above was that since the property in the goods sold to the purchasers was transferred outside the municipal limits, the same could not be said to have been brought into the municipal limits for sale, use or consumption therein. 11. The Plaintiff's contention on the basis of the above was that since the property in the goods sold to the purchasers was transferred outside the municipal limits, the same could not be said to have been brought into the municipal limits for sale, use or consumption therein. If that be so, it was for the Plaintiff to establish by adducing reliable evidence that the goods were not at the time of their entry into the municipal limits meant for sale, use and/or consumption within the municipal limits. The burden of proving that the stocks were not intended for sale to a consumer in Mangalore or that the same were not in fact sold to any such consumer unquestionably lay on the Plaintiff. Although no authority for that proposition may be required, yet a reference to Indore Municipal Corporation Vs. V. Caltex (India) Limited, AIR 1991 SC 4541 relied upon by Mr. B.P. Holla may not be out of place. That was a case where a Division Bench of the High Court at Indore had taken conflicting views as regards the burden of proof in cases where the question was whether the goods brought into the limits of the local authorities had or had not been consumed within such limits. While Bhave, J., had expressed the opinion that it was open to the Municipal Corporation to show that the goods in regard to which the refund was claimed were in fact consumed within Municipal Corporation limits, Oza, J. had held otherwise. In an appeal before the Supreme Court, their lordships approved the view taken by Oza, J., according to which the burden of proving that the goods were not consumed within the Municipal limits lay on the party claiming refund and not on the Corporation. 12. The question then is whether the Plaintiff has in the instant case discharged that burden. This will necessarily take us to the evidence adduced at the trial. According to Sri Vittal Rao, PW-1, the despatch of tobacco from the warehouses of the Plaintiff was in favour of the contractors engaged by the Plaintiff for manufacture of beedies to be delivered back to the Plaintiff. This will necessarily take us to the evidence adduced at the trial. According to Sri Vittal Rao, PW-1, the despatch of tobacco from the warehouses of the Plaintiff was in favour of the contractors engaged by the Plaintiff for manufacture of beedies to be delivered back to the Plaintiff. The following statement made by the said witness in the cross-examination is in this regard relevant: Beedi tobacco is handed over to our contractors for the purpose of manufacturing beedies which, after such manufacture the contractors have to deliver to us, i.e., to our branch office as per our instructions. Our contractors are paid wages by us in the sense we pay a certain amount at the contract rate per thousand beedies. We have no records to show that the goods despatched by us have reached our contractors. 13. It is evident from the above that the case sought to be proved in evidence is totally different from the one set up in the pleadings. The evidence suggests as though the despatches were not pursuant to sale orders or sale agreements but pursuant to contracts entered into with the contractors engaged for purposes of manufacturing beedies. We need hardly say that no amount of evidence which runs contrary to the case set up in the pleadings can be of any help to the party adducing the same. More importantly the Plaintiff has not made any attempt to produce or prove the sale orders or agreements pursuant whereto the despatches are said to have been made from its warehouses. Whether or not the sale of the stocks despatched was complete within or outside the limits of the Mangalore Municipality, would depend upon the terms of the contract governing the sale transaction the intention and conduct of the parties. The question was one of fact or a mixed question of law and fact which could be answered only on the basis of evidence that has not come forward. Confronted with this position, Mr. A.G. Holla, sought to place reliance upon the documents produced by the Petitioner along with Writ Petition No. 20124 of 1999 as Annexures-E1 to E5. It was argued that this Court could refer to and rely upon the said documents and record a finding that the sales were completed outside the limits of the Mangalore Municipality. We see no merit in that submission. It was argued that this Court could refer to and rely upon the said documents and record a finding that the sales were completed outside the limits of the Mangalore Municipality. We see no merit in that submission. The sale orders in question were the best evidence on the aspect which were not produced before the trial Court nor any evidence let in to prove the same as required by law. The production of the said documents as Annexure to Writ Petition No. 20124 of 1999 cannot therefore suffice. The Plaintiff ought to have taken care to produce the relevant documents at the appropriate stage and got the same proved by examining the witnesses competent to do so. Its failure to produce and prove the documents cannot be rewarded or made inconsequential by allowing it to produce the documents in the form of Annexures to the Writ Petition. That is especially so when the Defendant would have no opportunity to lead any evidence, in rebuttal at this stage. The fact that the Plaintiff/Appellant has not made any application for producing additional evidence in this appeal in no way improves its case. 14. It was argued by Mr. B.P. Holla that in the absence of evidence showing a different intention, the Rules contained in Sections 20 to 24 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 would apply and an unconditional appropriation of the goods by the seller towards the contract of sale should result in transfer of property in the goods from the seller to the buyer. It was contended that where the delivery of the goods was through a carrier as was the position in the instant case, the seller is deemed to have unconditionally appropriated the goods to the contract once the same are delivered to the carrier for transmission. Reliance in support was placed by him upon the provisions of Section 23 of the Act, which inter alia provide that delivery to the carrier for transmission to the buyer would amount to unconditional appropriation of the goods if the seller does not reserve the right of disposal. 15. Reliance in support was placed by him upon the provisions of Section 23 of the Act, which inter alia provide that delivery to the carrier for transmission to the buyer would amount to unconditional appropriation of the goods if the seller does not reserve the right of disposal. 15. The provisions of Section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act provide that where the contract is for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intended it to be transferred and that for purposes of ascertaining the intention of the parties regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. In the absence of a different intention, the Rules contained in Sections 20 to 24 are made relevant for purposes of ascertaining the intention of the parties. These Rules are prima facie Rules of construction and are in that sense subject to the terms of Section 19(3) in so far as the same makes them applicable to situation where a different intention does not appear. There is therefore no gain said that the transfer of property in the goods under the provisions of Sections 19 to 24 takes place as per the intention of the parties. Intention has in turn to be gathered from the terms of the contract, conduct of the parties and circumstances of the case including trade usages if any. The Plaintiff ought to have led evidence on these factual aspects before it could argue that the parties intended the property in goods to pass to the purchaser outside the Municipal limits of Mangalore. The failure of the Plaintiff to adduce material evidence in this regard assumes significance in view of the orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 4174 of 1976, according to which the situs of the sale and the nature of the dealings between the seller and the purchasers of tobacco had to be determined before levying the duty or refunding the amount. We must however hasten to add that the place of transfer of property in the goods may not in itself be determinative of the liability of the Plaintiff to pay octroi on the import of such goods within municipal limits of Mangalore. We must however hasten to add that the place of transfer of property in the goods may not in itself be determinative of the liability of the Plaintiff to pay octroi on the import of such goods within municipal limits of Mangalore. What is important is whether the goods imported were meant for use, sale or consumption within the local area. If the goods had been imported into the local area for sale and eventually sold within such an area, the burden of proving that the sale was not for the ultimate consumption of a customer within the area would be heavier for a person making any such assertion. That is because import of goods within a local area for purposes of sale would in the ordinary course and in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary imply that the goods had come to repose in such area. Such goods could not then be treated to be in transit so as to be immune from the levy of octroi. The failure of the Plaintiff in the instant case to establish that the sale was not completed within the local area or that even if the property in goods had been transferred to the purchaser, the same had not been actually used or consumed within the local area must inevitably result in the dismissal of his claim for refund. 16. In Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. India Ltd. Vs. The Belgaum Borough Municipality, AIR 1963 SC 906 the expression "consumption" appearing in Entry 52 of List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution, which defines the legislative field for the levy of octroi duties by the State Legislatures fell for interpretation before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court declared that goods brought within the local area must be regarded to have been brought in for purposes of consumption when a person brings them in either for his own use or consumption or to put them in the way of others in the area, who are to use and consume the same. The Court observed that the act of sale by the person importing the goods would merely put the goods in the way of use or consumption and constitute an earlier stage, the ultimate destination of the goods being use or consumption. The Court observed that the act of sale by the person importing the goods would merely put the goods in the way of use or consumption and constitute an earlier stage, the ultimate destination of the goods being use or consumption. The earlier stage, ie., the sale did not however save the person, who brings the goods into the local area from the liability to pay the tax if the goods were brought inside for consumption or use. The Court declared that it made no difference if the consumer does not consume them in the area but takes them out for consumption elsewhere as the word "therein" appearing in Entry 52 of Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act did not mean that all the acts of consumption must take place in the area of Municipality. The following passage from the decision is in this regard apposite: Further, so long as the goods are brought inside the area for sale within the area to an ultimate consumer, it makes no difference that the consumer does not consume them in the area but takes them out for consumption elsewhere. The word "therein" does not mean that all the act of consumption must take place in the area of municipality. It is sufficient if the goods are brought inside the area to be delivered to the ultimate consumer in that area because the taxable event is the entry of goods which are meant to reach an ultimate user or consumer in the area. 17. Respectfully following the law declared in the above decision, we have no hesitation in holding that the Plaintiff having imported the goods into the limits of Mangalore Municipality, broken the bulk, mixed, repacked and sold the same to traders within Mangalore, it did not matter much whether upon such sale the goods were consumed within the limits of Mangalore or taken out for use or consumption elsewhere. The Plaintiff has in any case led no evidence to establish that the goods had been sold to parties outside Mangalore as was asserted by it in the plaint. The trial Court in the circumstances fell in error in holding that the octroi duty recovered from the Plaintiff was not legally payable. Our answer to Question No. (1) is accordingly in the negative. Reg. Question No. (2): 18. The trial Court in the circumstances fell in error in holding that the octroi duty recovered from the Plaintiff was not legally payable. Our answer to Question No. (1) is accordingly in the negative. Reg. Question No. (2): 18. In the light of what we have said in answer to question No. (1) above, it is unnecessary to determine the period of limitation applicable to the Suit filed by the Plaintiff. Since however that question was also argued at some length, we may as well deal with the same, no matter briefly. 19. The argument of Mr. A.G. Holla was based entirely on the assumption that the payment of octroi by the Plaintiff was due to a mistake in law, which mistake was discovered only after this Court allowed Writ Petition No. 4174 of 1976 and dismissed Writ Appeal No. 776 of 1979 by order dated 23rd of July, 1979. Reckoned from the said date, the Suit filed by the Plaintiff on 29th of July 1981 was, according to the learned Counsel, well within the period of three years prescribed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Reliance in support was placed upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Kishore and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 313 and Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong and Others, AIR 1990 SC 772 . 20. Article 113 of the Limitation Act deals with Suits, for which no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the schedule to the Act. Section 17 of the Act inter alia provides that where in a Suit or application, the relief claimed is on the basis of a mistake or fraud, the period of limitation shall not be begin to run until the Plaintiff or applicant had discovered the fraud or the mistake or could with reasonable diligence have done so. The term "mistake" has not been defined by the Limitation Act, but given its literal meaning should imply a misunderstanding of meaning; error or fault, in thought or action. In order to bring his case within the purview of 'relief flowing from the consequences of a mistake', the Plaintiff was required to make suitable averments indicating the nature of the mistake committed by it and the facts leading to its discovery. In order to bring his case within the purview of 'relief flowing from the consequences of a mistake', the Plaintiff was required to make suitable averments indicating the nature of the mistake committed by it and the facts leading to its discovery. Since the Plaintiff's case was not based on a mistake of fact, the Suit filed by it could be brought under Article 113 only if the payment of octroi was made in ignorance of an invalidity attached to the provision, or a judgment of a competent Court declaring the same to be invalid or unenforceable. That however is not the case set up by the Plaintiff. It is not as though the provision under which octroi was being demanded and recovered from the Plaintiff had been declared to be unconstitutional by a competent Court, so that any payment made in ignorance of any such declaration could be said to be a payment made under a mistake. It is on the contrary a case, where the Plaintiff had from the inception resisted its liability to pay octroi on the ground that the goods imported by it into the municipal limits of the Mangalore Municipality were not exigible to any such duty as the same were only in transit and meant for re-export for use or consumption outside such limits. Writ Petition No. 4173 of 1976 filed by the Plaintiff was aimed at vindicating that position. The Plaintiff was thus all the time aware of the legal position as regards its liability to pay the duty. A claim for refund could not in such circumstances be said to be a claim based on a mistake factual or otherwise. The decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Holla do not, in that view, lend much assistance to him. In Mahabir Kishore's case, the Supreme Court was examining whether the declaration of a competent Court as regards the invalidity of a provision imposing any tax or liability could be said to be the date of knowledge of the Plaintiff as regards the discovery of the mistake. Holla do not, in that view, lend much assistance to him. In Mahabir Kishore's case, the Supreme Court was examining whether the declaration of a competent Court as regards the invalidity of a provision imposing any tax or liability could be said to be the date of knowledge of the Plaintiff as regards the discovery of the mistake. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Court observed: It is thus a settled law that in a suit for refund of money paid by mistake of law, Section 72 of the Contract Act is applicable and the period of limitating is three years as prescribed by Article 113 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of that Act will be applicable so that the period will begin to run from the date of knowledge of the particular law, whereunder the money was paid, being declared void; and this could be the date of the judgment of a competent Court declaring that law void. 21. Similarly, in Salonah Tea Company's case (supra), the question was whether a writ Court could direct refund of tax recovered illegally. Answering the question in the affirmative, their lordships held that where tax or money had been realised without the authority of law, a writ Court could under Article 226 direct refund unless the Petitioner was guilty of avoidable laches indicating an abandonment of his claim. The Court also recognised that normally, the period of limitation prescribed for a Suit is the period beyond which the Court could not grant relief by way of refund but added that the said Rule was not inflexible. Suffice it to say that both these decisions have no application to cases, where the refund is not sought on the ground that the law, under which the recovery was made had been declared to be unconstitutional, thereby rendering the recoveries illegal, unfair and unjust. Even otherwise Article 113 is in its very nature a residuary provision, which can apply only if the suit does not fall under any other Articles shall therefore have to be excluded by a process of elimination. That process will stop at Article 24 of the 1963 Act corresponding to Article 62 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which applies to cases where money is payable by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's use. In A. Venkata Subba Rao Vs. That process will stop at Article 24 of the 1963 Act corresponding to Article 62 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which applies to cases where money is payable by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's use. In A. Venkata Subba Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1773 one of the questions that fell for consideration related to the application of Article 62 of the old Act to suits for refund of tax received by the State which the Plaintiff was not in law bound to pay. The question was whether payment of tax to the State where the same was not legally payable could be said to be money received by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's use. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court held that the expression "money received by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's" use need not be interpreted literally and that the Article would apply even when the Defendant did not actually intend to receive it for the use of the Plaintiff. The Court declared that it was sufficient if the receipt was in circumstances that the law would impute to him an obligation to retain it for the use of the Plaintiff and make a refund when demanded. The Court approved the following observations of Mookerjee, J. in Mohamed Wahib Vs. Mohamed Ameer, ILR 1932 Cal 527. The Article when it speaks of suit for money received by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's use, points to the well known English action in that form; consequently the Article ought to apply wherever the Defendant has received money, which injustice and equity belongs to the Plaintiff under circumstances which in law render the receipt of it, a receipt by the Defendant to the use of the Plaintiff. 22. In the light of the above pronouncement, recovery of any tax or duty paid by the Plaintiff, which was not lawfully recoverable from him shall be governed by Article 24 of the new Act corresponding to Article 62 of the old, for even when the amount received by the Defendant may not have been intended to be for the use of the Plaintiff, the circumstances of the case, justice and equity would render any such receipt for the use of the Plaintiff. 23. 23. In the result, Regular First Appeal No. 76 of 1990 and Writ Petition No. 20124 of 1990 filed by the Plaintiff fail and are hereby dismissed. Regular First Appeal No. 115 of 1990 filed by the Mangalore City Municipal Corporation however succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, in O.S No. 159 of 1981 is set aside and the suit dismissed with costs throughout.