Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : This order shall dispose of writ Petition Nos. 14457 and 14458 of 1991. While in Writ Petition No. 14457 a communication by the respondent dated 31-7-1990 is under challenge in Writ Petition No. 14458 of 1991, a Government order - G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dated 27-7-1987 is challenged and more particularly its Clause 5 (iii) to a limited extent. 2. Few facts would be necessary for understanding the exact controversy. While petitioners hold urban lands in Survey Nos. 705, 706 and 158/21 in Sanganur village, Coimbatore District, petitioner's firm M/s. Jaya and Co. is the owner of urban land in Survey Nos. 1457/1B and 1475/1J at Pulikulam village, Coimbatore District. It is the case of the petitioners that in pursuance of the demand made by the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, petitioners have paid a total sum of Rs. 67,238.46 towards the Urban Land Tax for the fasli years 1385 to 1394. The assessment was made vide order dated 29-6-1983. It is the petitioners' case that they have actually paid this amount. The petitioners then claimed that they filed an appeal, and those appeals were allowed by order dated 31-12-1984 by the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax by which he had set aside the orders of assessment passed by the first authority. A revised order came to be issued. however, in the meantime the Department had already collected a total sum of Rs. 67,238.46 in the terms of the original orders. As per the revised assessment, the petitioners claim that their total tax due for fasli years 1385 to 1399 came to Rs. 10,035/- as against their lands and Rs. 32,484/- against the firm and therefore it was obvious that the petitioners were entitled to a refund of Rs. 24,719.46. The petitioners therefore sent a notice through an advocate for this refund vide notice dated 14-7-1990 and claimed interest thereon at 18% per annum from 13-12-1984. This request was rejected on the ground that the retention of excess tax amount was authorised by the provisions of G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dated 27-7-1987 and therefore, the petitioners have challenged that communication as also the G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dt. 27-7-1987. 3. This request was rejected on the ground that the retention of excess tax amount was authorised by the provisions of G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dated 27-7-1987 and therefore, the petitioners have challenged that communication as also the G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dt. 27-7-1987. 3. The main case of the petitioners is that the authorities could not have issued the said Government order directing the adjustment of the refund against the payment of tax for the future fasli years. On merits also the petitioners' case is that the communication dated 30-7-1990 is wholly incorrect because the petitioners had already made the adjustments for the past years and there was no question of any adjustment being made for the future years, which adjustment was sought to be done by the authorities wholly relying on clause 5(iii) of the said Government Order. Learned counsel for t he petitioner says that initially G.O.Ms. No. 1165 itself is wholly ultra vires that Act as also the other Constitutional Provisions, because there is no scope for retaining the refund under any of the enactments and therefore such retention, which was authorised by the said Government Order, would be without any valid law. In so far as the merits are concerned, the petitioners point out that there was no question of retaining any amount. The learned counsel for the petitioners also attacks the said Government Order on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness and therefore says that G.O. Ms. No. 1165 was clearly offending their rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. It will be better to see the Government Order and more particularly the relevant clause 5 (iii) which is under attack. Clause 5 (iii) is as under : "5(iii) There will be no refund of urban land tax already collected in all such cases and excess in relation to the provisional order, if any, will be adjusted against the amounts due for the past or future faslis." 5. This G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dt. 27-7-1987 seems to have been issued under some special circumstances. This G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dt. 27-7-1987 seems to have been issued under some special circumstances. Sec. 6B of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act 1966, provided for the assessment on the basis of total extent of urban land and also provides that the aggregate area of the assessee would be taken into account for applying the rates specified in part in column No. 1 of the Parts 1 to 4 of the schedule to the Act. Now this Section was challenged on the ground that the rates could not be different and could not be more for the aggregate area and that the assessment should be on the individual separate holdings in respect of each piece of urban land as opposed to the aggregate urban land owned by the assessee. This Court in W.P.No. 4397 and 4403 of 1978 struck down the said Section and more particularly the expression 'aggregate' taking a view that the assessment ought to be on the individual fields. This judgment was questioned in the appeal filed before the Supreme Court by the State and the question before the Government was as to in what manner the assessment should be made in the interrengum period during the pendency of the appeal filed before the Supreme Court. The Government came out with this G.O.Ms. No. 1165 mainly in order to meet this contingency and in paragraph 5 of this Government Order directed the way in which the cases were to be treated and finalised. While so doing, it came to the conclusion that where it is ultimately found on the basis of the assessment made afresh that the party has paid excess tax on account of the provisions, which were ultimately struck down, then in so far as the excess amount was concerned, the said excess amount should be adjusted against the amount due for the past or future faslis. In short, the said amount was never to be returned because if the land remained with the land owner then there would always be a future liability. It is the validity of this G.O.Ms. No. 1165 which is at stake in this present petition. 6. It is really surprising that such Government Order should have been issued particularly in the wake of Section 21 of the Act which specifically deals with the refunds. It is the validity of this G.O.Ms. No. 1165 which is at stake in this present petition. 6. It is really surprising that such Government Order should have been issued particularly in the wake of Section 21 of the Act which specifically deals with the refunds. Sec. 21(a) of the Act is as under : Sec. 21 (a) : refund of any amount becomes due to the assessee, such amount shall be refunded to him without interest; or The language of the Section makes it clear that the person who is entitled to a refund would be entitled to claim it but without interest. Sub-sec. (2) is more important for the purpose of the present controversy. It suggests that in cases of such a refund, the urban land tax officer could set off the amount to be refunded or any part of that amount against the sum if any remaining payable under this Act by the person to whom refund is due after giving an intimation in writing, to such person, of the action proposed to be taken. This language is clear enough to suggest that there can be an adjustment in respect of refund. But that adjustment necessarily has to be in respect of the past liability. It is imperative that on the date when the assessee is entitled to a refund, there should be some amount remaining payable under the Act, meaning thereby that the person concerned should be under the legal obligation on that date to pay the amount and if it is not paid, that amount of refund can be adjusted against such amount. However the Section is very specifically clear so as not to include any future liability and indeed it could not have been contemplated under the Section for the simple reason that so long as the urban land is there, there would always be a liability to pay the urban land tax. In that case, had the Section provided any such adjustment against even the future liability to pay the tax, then the concept of refund would itself have been redundant because there would always be a liability to pay the future tax on the land now. Therefore, it is clear that the Section itself did not provide any such adjustment of the refund with a future liability. Therefore, it is clear that the Section itself did not provide any such adjustment of the refund with a future liability. If that is so, the Government could not have under the said Government Order provided something which is contra to Sec. 21 of the Act. It is clear from a reading of the said Government Order and more particularly clause 5 (iii) thereof that even the future liability is to be taken into account and for that purpose the refund can be denied. In short by G.O.Ms. No. 1165 the Government sought to achieve that which was prohibited specifically by the Section. In that view the Government Order concerned is clearly ultra vires Sec. 21 itself and on that account itself it is bad. It is the cardinal principle that any rule or any executive instruction cannot travel beyond the scope of the main Act. Here is an order which very clearly runs beyond the scope. On this account itself the said clause 5 (iii) in so far as it pertains to the future liability alone can be declared to be invalid. That apart, there would be another reason in support of the contention of the petitioners. The clause is completely silent regarding the length of the future liability. In one case it could be five years, in another ten years and in another still fifty years. Therefore, it is not provided as to what extent this liability would go in cases of refund. There the provision, apart from being vogue, is quite unreasonable. There would be still another reason why the said provision would not stand the test of validity and that is, there is no other provision in the Act on the basis of which the Government could be allowed to stop the refund being paid to the assessee excepting Sec. 21 of the Act and it has already been shown that Sec. 21 does not permit the retention of the refund and its adjustment against any future liability. There is no guideline again in the whole provision as regards the determination of that future liability. There also the provision in completely untrammelled. As has already been pointed out in one case the authorities can consider the future liability of five years while in another longer than that time. There is no guideline again in the whole provision as regards the determination of that future liability. There also the provision in completely untrammelled. As has already been pointed out in one case the authorities can consider the future liability of five years while in another longer than that time. In the absence of any guideline, the concept of future liability introduced in clause 5 (iii) tends to be unreasonable. The further question is whether to strike off the whole G.O.Ms. No. 1165 dated 27-7-1987. It is seen that clause 5(iii) is the only clause providing for the adjustment of refund. In that, in so far as the adjustment of the refund against the past liability is concerned, there is no vires found. The only vires found is in the concept of the adjustment of refund as against the future liability. Therefore, it is only that part of clause 5(iii) which would be unconstitutional and is liable to be struck off. The rest of the clause being severable, can be retained. 7. The writ petition No. 14458 of 1991 therefore succeeds to the extent indicated above. If that writ petition succeeds, naturally the writ petition No. 14457 of 1991 has also to succeed and the concerned communication dated 31-7-1990 has to be quashed and set aside as it depends only on the said G.O.Ms. No. 1165 and more particularly clause 5(iii) thereof. 8. The writ petition succeeds. The question now is what is the relief to be granted. It would be better for the concerned authority to consider the extent to which the refund can be made. It is the case of the petitioners that they have made the payments for all the years and are not liable to pay anything on account of other liabilities. They have to receive, as per their calculations, Rs. 19,950.26. The concerned authority shall go into that question within one month from today and order the refund. Considering that the refund is not to carry any interest as per the specific language of Sec. 21 of the Act, the request of the petitioners for an interest at the rate of 18% per annum appears to be unreasonable. 19,950.26. The concerned authority shall go into that question within one month from today and order the refund. Considering that the refund is not to carry any interest as per the specific language of Sec. 21 of the Act, the request of the petitioners for an interest at the rate of 18% per annum appears to be unreasonable. However, considering the fact that the petitioner had to wait for nine long years it will be equitable to grant interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the total amount of refund to which the petitioners would be found entitled to, if any. With these observations the petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above. The Rule NISI is made absolute. Connected W.M.Ps. are also closed. No costs. Petitions allowed.