P. VENKATARAMA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE C. R. P. arises out of an order allowing the petitioner s application for leave to defend the suit filed under order XXXVII Rule 3 (5) of the Code of Civil procedure on condition of the petitioner depositing a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- on or before 5-6-2000. Aggrieved by the condition imposed by the trial Court, the present c. R. P. , is filed. ( 2 ) IN the suit, the respondent-plaintiff sought for a money decree for an amount of rs. 2,19,500/. The break-up of the amount for which the decree is sought is as follows: (1) Advancing a loan of Rs. 1,00,000/- on 24-4-1999 on execution of a promissory note. (2) Advance of a further sum of rs. 1,00,000/- on 6-5-1999 for which a receipt has been passed; and (3) Interest at 24% p. a. , on the aforementioned amounts which, according to the plaintiff, the defendant orally promised to pay. ( 3 ) THE plea of the petitioner-defendant is that the documents viz. , promissory note and receipt are fabricated and they were not executed by him. It is also contended that as the suit is not entirely based on the promissory note, it does not fall under order XXXVII Rule 2, C. P. C. In other words, it is contended that the nature of the suit is such that the summary procedure under Order XXXVII cannot be resorted to. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge, by a cryptic order, allowed the application subject to the petitioner depositing a sum of rs. 1,00,000/ -. The crucial sentence in paragraph 8 of the impugned order reads as follows:". . . . . . . . . . . SINCE the petitioner/defendant claims that the suit documents are forged and fabricated documents, it is just and proper, if one chance is given, the petitioner/defendant to contest the suit, no prejudice will be caused. . . . . " ( 5 ) IT is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that leave has been granted apparently for the reason that there was a prima facie triable issue and the plea of the petitioner is not frivolous. In such a case, it is contended that the petitioner must not be saddled with the onerous condition of depositing rs. 1,00,000/ -. In such a case, it is contended that the petitioner must not be saddled with the onerous condition of depositing rs. 1,00,000/ -. It is also submitted that the suit itself is hot maintainable under order XXXVII for the reasons already referred to above. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in T. Sukender Reddy vs. M. Surender Reddy in which certain principles enunciated in Mechalac Engg. and manf. vs. Basic Eq. Corporation were referred to and applied by the learned Judge. It was laid down therein that the direction to deposit half of the suit amount as a precondition for grant of leave was opposed to proposition No. (c) enunciated in Mechalac engg. Corporation case. Reliance is also placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar vs. Bhai Mool Singh. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the decision in Sukender Reddy s case has no application. It is further submitted that the case falls under proposition No. (d) or (e ). In reply to the second argument, the learned Counsel for the respondent submits that atleast a part of the claim is based on a promissory note and, therefore, the remedy by way of summary suit is available to the plaintiff even if the other claims for money are included therein. ( 7 ) THE question of directing deposit of the amount into Court as a pre-condition for granting leave would arise if the defendant has no defence or the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine, vide proposition No. 5 laid down in mechalac Engg. Corporation case (supra ). However, if the defendant raises a triable issue, though not positively a good defence, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. As per proposition No. (c) laid down by the supreme Court in the said case, even if the affidavit of the defendant does not positively and immediately make it clear that he has good defence, yet if the state of facts leads to the inference that at the trial, the defendant will be able to establish a defence, the defendant is still entitled for leave to defend, but, in such a case, the court may in its discretion impose conditions as to the time or mode of the trial but not as to payment into Court or furnishing security. A perusal of the impugned order does not at all indicate that there was any serious application of mind to the various factors/propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case (supra) and reiterated by this Court in Sukender Reddy s case (supra ). ( 8 ) IN Sukender Reddy s case, there was a clear finding that the defendant therein had a triable case; still, certain amount was directed to be deposited. This was not approved by the Court. There is no positive finding that the case raises a triable issue or that the petitioner-defendant herein has a substantial and good defence. At the same time, there is no finding that the defence is frivolous or utterly untenable or sham and that the defendant would not be able to substantiate his version even if the trial proceeds. A bald observation was made that there was no harm in giving one opportunity to the defendant, on the presumption that no prejudice will be caused to the plaintiff. Such approach, ignores the principles laid down by the supreme Court in the case 2nd cited supra. There was no discussion whether the case falls within one or the other of the propositions laid down therein. Moreover, the question whether the suit is of the nature that falls within the sweep of order XXXVII Rule 1 (2) CPC, has not been considered by the learned trial Judge. ( 9 ) FOR these reasons, I set aside the impugned order and direct a fresh consideration of LA. 1920 of 1999 in accordance with law, expeditiously. ( 10 ) THE C. R. P. is thus allowed and the matter is remanded to the 1st Senior Civil judge, City Civil Court. No costs.