PADMARAJ, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the arguments of the learned Counsel on eitherside, at a considerable length, and carefully perused the case papers, with their assistance. We have also carefully gone through the series of decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel on eitherside. Learned Counsel for the complainant has relied on the following decisions:1. VIJAYA BANK EMPLOYEES HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE society LIMITED vs MUNEERAPA 2. ADVOCATE GENERAL, STATE OF BIHAR vs MADHYAPRADESH KHAIR INDUSTRIES 3 NAGARAJA RAO vs CHIKKACHENNAPPA 4. HAJI RASHEED MOHAMMED vs D. RAMANUJAM 5. COMMISSIONER, AGRA vs ROHTAS SINGH 6. ERAPPA vs CHANNABASAPPA 7. DHULABHAI vs STATE OF M. P. 8. PREMIER AUTOMOBILES vs K. S. WADKE 9. STATE OF PUNJAB vs B. D. KAUSHAL 10. DARYAO vs STATE OF U. P 11. STATE OF U. P. vs NAWAB HUSSAIN 12. SUBBIAH and TWO OTHERS vs VENKATAGIRIYAPPA 13. MUZRAI OFFICER vs C. R. SHIVANANDA 14. BHINKA vs CHARAN SINGHLearned Counsel for the respondent/accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 has relied on the following decisions:1. ADVOCATE GENERAL, BIHAR vs M. P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES 2. MAKAR DHWAAJ PAL vs NEER YADAV 4. ORIENTAL MACH. and CIVI CONST. LTD. vs VIKRANT TYRES ltd. 5. THAKUR LAL vs MAHABIR PRASAD 6. MANISH GUPTA vs GURUDAS ROY 7. MONOHARLAL vs PREM SHANKAR 8. ROSHAN SAM JOYCE vs S. R. COTTON MILLS LIMITED 9. B. VENKATA REDDY vs HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA 10. MALOJIRAO vs C. G. MATKARLearned Counsel for the respondent/accused No. 3 has relied on the following decisions:1. MATHURA PRASAD SARJOO JAISWAL AND OTHERS vs dossibai N. B. JEEJEEBHOY 2. THE PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD. vs ENGINEERING mazdoor SABHA AND OTHERS 3. SRIKANT KASHINATH JITURI AND OTHERS vscorporation OF THE CITY OF BELGAUM 4. DHULABHAI ETC. , vs STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ANDANOTHER 5. SHEELA BARSE vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS 6. KARNATAKA BANK LTD. vs NARAYANA BHATTA 7. AIR 1992 SC 222 ;the complainant is a convener of the temple called Sri sampangiramaswamy Temple of Dandu Upparahalli situated in the cunningham Road in Bangalore City. It is a Muzarai institution, managing its affairs through a committee constituted of dharmadarshees or trustees. The respondents/accused are B. S. Raghavachar BSV Chari, B. S. Krishnamachar and B. S. Ramachar, who are arraigned as Accused Nos. 1 to 4 in the above proceedings. It is a Muzarai institution, managing its affairs through a committee constituted of dharmadarshees or trustees. The respondents/accused are B. S. Raghavachar BSV Chari, B. S. Krishnamachar and B. S. Ramachar, who are arraigned as Accused Nos. 1 to 4 in the above proceedings. They are charged and tried by this Court for an act amounting to contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2 (c) (iii) of the contempt of Courts Act, which is punishable under Section 12 of the said Act. The complainant and the Respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 having opted to adduce evidence on their behalf in the form of affidavits, they were permitted to file affidavits by way of their evidence. Accordingly, the complainant has filed an affidavit of one k. N. Visweswaraiah, who claims to be a convener of the complainant temple, wherein he has sworn to certain facts. Likewise, the respondents/accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 have filed the affidavit of one b. S. V. Chari, the Accused No. 2 in the case, who has sworn to certain facts on their behalf, and the respondent/accused No. 4 has filed his own affidavit by way of his evidence in the case. All these affidavits filed by the parties by way of their evidence were placed on record and they did not choose to adduce any other evidence in the case. The subject matter of controversy between the parties was a land measuring 2 guntas with a superstructure thereon in Sy. No. 5/4 of Dandu Upparahalli village, subsequently renumbered as 6/7 situated on the Millers Road in Vasanthnagar, Bangalore. The respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 and four others, who claim to be the legal representatives of the deceased Archak of the above said temple suffered an order under Section-10 of the Karnataka Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 1927, dated 4. 6. 1969, holding that the property in question belong to the temple and the same is an inam land. Aggrieved thereby, they preferred an appeal before the special Deputy Commissioner, who confirmed the order of the assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeal on 31. 1. 1973 dissatisfied with the same, they preferred a second appeal to the commissioner for Religious and Charitable Endowments, which also came to be dismissed on 24. 3. 1976. Aggrieved thereby, they preferred an appeal before the special Deputy Commissioner, who confirmed the order of the assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeal on 31. 1. 1973 dissatisfied with the same, they preferred a second appeal to the commissioner for Religious and Charitable Endowments, which also came to be dismissed on 24. 3. 1976. Not being satisfied with the same, they took the matter in Revision to the Karnataka Appellate tribunal, Bangalore, which also came to be dismissed on 7. 11. 1990. Challenging all these orders, a writ petition came to be filed in W. P. No. 26351/90 by them, which was dismissed on 11. 9. 1996. challenging that order, they preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of this Court in W. A. No. 8600/96, which was also dismissed on 9. 10. 1996. Against that, a Special Leave Petition in SLP No. 21449/ 96 was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which again was dismissed on 18. 11. 1996. Thus the findings recorded by this Court in W. P. No. 26351/90 on several controversies raised by the parties and the conclusions arrived at by the Court received the seal of confirmation by the highest Court of the land. Now it would be of some relevance to place on record, the findings recorded by this court in W. P. No. 26351/90. Under para-11 of the order, this Court while rejecting the contention of the respondents herein that the land in question was not an Inam land, has observed vide para-12 that it is not possible to hold that the Inam was anything but a sarkari inam. Again in para-13 of the Order, this Court while dealing with the contention of the respondents that the finding returned by this court in Regular Appeal Nos. Again in para-13 of the Order, this Court while dealing with the contention of the respondents that the finding returned by this court in Regular Appeal Nos. 113/53 and 218/58 holding that the land in question was not owned by the temple operated as an estoppel and disentitled the temple from claiming ownership over the same, has, observed that there is no merit in the said submission since the property involved in the said acquisition proceedings and the appeals was distinctly different from that involved in the Present writ petition and hence it is difficult to see how any finding returned as to the ownership in respect of the former either by the reference court or by this Court in appeal would be helpful to the respondents herein or otherwise operate as an estoppel or res judicata in the present Writ Proceedings. Regarding the contention of the respondents herein that the deceased Rangachar had perfected his title to the property in question by way of Prescription, this Court vide para-16 of the order has observed that in the absence of any evidence or material to show that the possession of the respondents herein was adverse to the temple, the claim set up by them of their having perfected title to the Property in question by way of prescription was held to be rightly rejected, it would be of some relevance to note here itself that the Writ Appeal filed, by the respondents herein came to be dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court in W. A. No. 8600/96 with the following observations:"no ground is made out to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge which is based upon the findings of facts arrived at by holding that the land in dispute was an inam land with which the appellants (respondents herein) had no connection. Learned Single Judge has also rightly held that the plea of adverse possession was an after thought plea raised for the first time before the revisional authority. There is no merit in the appeal. "it is to be seen therefore that the claim of ownership made by one Rangachar in respect of the property in question came to be rejected. Learned Single Judge has also rightly held that the plea of adverse possession was an after thought plea raised for the first time before the revisional authority. There is no merit in the appeal. "it is to be seen therefore that the claim of ownership made by one Rangachar in respect of the property in question came to be rejected. This is very clear from the finding recorded by this Court in w. P. No. 26351/90, wherein it is specifically stated thus:"it is therefore safe to conclude that the claim of ownership stated by Rangachar stood rejected, which finding would operate as res judicata in any future proceedings between the parties or those claiming through them. That a finding returned in the reference proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act would operate as res judicata in any future litigation is no longer res integr'a in the light of the judgment of the Privy Council in Mt. Bhagwathi vs. Mt. Ram Kali in AIR 1939 PC 133. "it is not in dispute that the respondents herein who claim to be the legal representatives of the deceased Archak, were parties to all the above proceedings. In fact all these above findings were invited by the respondents themselves in the said Writ Petition filed by them. It is hardly required to be stated that such a decision rendered by this Court in the Writ Petition is directly binding as between the parties to the proceedings in which it was made and finally confirmed by the Apex Court. While the matter stood thus, the respondent/accused No. 2 Sri B. S. V. Chari and the respondent/ accused No. 3 D. S. Krishnamachar filed the suits being O. S. Nos. 11393/96 and 4578/97 on the file of the Addl. City Civil Judge, bangalore. The prayer or the reliefs sought for in O. S No. 11393/96 reads as under:"prayer FOR JUDGMENT AND DECREE that, the plaintiff most humbly prays for the Judgment and decree against the defendants:- 1) For declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule property. 2) As consequence the defendant be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit schedule property by granting an order of temporary injunction against the defendant. 3) The cost of this suit be awarded to the plaintiff from the defendant. 4) Have to amend the plaint as and when necessary be granted. 2) As consequence the defendant be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit schedule property by granting an order of temporary injunction against the defendant. 3) The cost of this suit be awarded to the plaintiff from the defendant. 4) Have to amend the plaint as and when necessary be granted. 5) Such other relief as the Court deems fit may be awarded. "it would be of some relevance to note here itself the cause of action as disclosed in the suit which reads as under:"the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore division, Bangalore dated 4. 6. 1969 directing to vacate the premises or suit property was challenged in appeal and revision writ Petition, the same came to be rejected are not maintainable as stated above. The defendant taking the advantage of this, threatening the plaintiff to dispossess the plaintiff from suit property by resorting corrective steps. "the reliefs sought for in the other suit O. S. No. 4578/97 are as under: wherefore, the plaintiff prays that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass a Judgment and Decree:"a. To declare that the plaintiff is the absolute owner in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. b. To grant consequential injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents, workers of anybody acting and claiming under the defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property by the plaintiff; c. To award costs of the suit. d. And to pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble court deems fit to grant in the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity"the cause of action disclosed in the suit was when the officials of the fourth defendant therein threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the schedule property in the third week of May 1997. The filing of these two suits by the above respondents/accused, led the complainant to file the present complaint under Section 12 and 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1964 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India, for initiating action against the respondents/ accused under Section-12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, for their wilful disobedience of the order of this court and also for their wilful act of abusing the process of the Court. It is in this background, the present proceedings came to be initiated against the respondent/ accused Nos. 1 to 4. It is in this background, the present proceedings came to be initiated against the respondent/ accused Nos. 1 to 4. Learned Counsel for the complainant while placing reliance on the above decisions, has vehemently contended as under: the respondents herein have failed miserably to establish their title over the property in question and it was held throughout in the proceedings transpired be'tween the parties that the property in question belong to the temple and thus it has reached its finality. Even after the finality to the litigation after the Apex Court order, the respondents have again filed the suit on the same cause of action and urging the same contentions. The respondents are contending that they are the absolute owners in enjoyment and possession of the property in question though a finding contrary is given in the proceedings. The very contention that they are the owners is against the Judgment pronounced by the competent authorities, competent civil Court and this Hon'ble Court. The respondents could not have filed the suit on the same cause of action and on the same grounds. The suit is also not maintainable as the civil Court's jurisdiction is barred under Section-10 of the Act. That apart, the same is hit by the principles of res judicata. All the contentions of the Respondents have been negatived and the orders of the highest Court is binding upon subordinate Courts. But inspite of all these things, the respondents with an ulterior motive have filed the suit and hence their action, amounts to abuse of process of law and they are trying to interfere with the administration of justice, thereby they have committed a criminal contempt. Whatever possible pleas that were open to them, were urged in the Writ Petition and they were clearly negatived by this Court. The very assertion made in Para-2 of the plaint is contemptuous. The plaintiff being a party to the Writ Petition, the findings recorded therein are clearly binding on him. The several contentions raised in the suit are contrary to the findings recorded by this Court in the Writ Petition. The very defence of the respondents that the findings recorded in the writ proceedings are not binding upon them, will be more contemptuous than the original act itself. The several contentions raised in the suit are contrary to the findings recorded by this Court in the Writ Petition. The very defence of the respondents that the findings recorded in the writ proceedings are not binding upon them, will be more contemptuous than the original act itself. The respondents and their predecessors prolonged the matter for over 50 years and now when a finality has been reached, they filed the suits in order to prolong the proceedings further by taking all untenable pleas, which have already been decided by this Court in the Writ Petition. As against this, the learned Counsel for fhe respondents/accused nos. 1,2 and 4 while placing reliance on the above decisions, has contended as under: the complainant is not at all the owner of the property in Sy. No. 5/ 4 of Dandu Upparahalli at Millers Road in Vasanthnagar, Bangalore. The order dated 4. 6. 1969 of the Asst. Commissioner, Bangalore under Section-10 of the Act is an order passed in a summary enquiry without giving any opportunity to the respondents to produce the documents and that therefore the same cannot be sustained under law in deciding the matter regarding the title to the property. It is incorrect to state that the suit is filed on the same cause of action and on the same grounds. The disputed questions of facts were not gone into in the writ proceedings and in fact this Court has not gone in detail in giving a finding of facts in the order made in the writ Petition. The said orders on the writ side pertained only in respect of summary orders of the Muzarai Officer. The suit filed by the respondents is clearly maintainable under Section-9 of CPC and there is no bar to maintain the suit under the provisions of the karnataka Religious and Charitable institutions Act. The respondents have not suppressed any material facts, They have the highest regard to this Court and they have not committed any contempt of Court nor committed any criminal contempt as alleged by the complainant. The respondents have filed suit for declaration of title to the property. with a bonafide ground and on the other hand the complainant has filed this criminal complaint against the respondents only with a view to harass and humiliate the respondents and with a mala fide intention to pressurize them to withdraw the suit. The respondents have filed suit for declaration of title to the property. with a bonafide ground and on the other hand the complainant has filed this criminal complaint against the respondents only with a view to harass and humiliate the respondents and with a mala fide intention to pressurize them to withdraw the suit. That after the termination of the proceedings arising out of the order of eviction passed by the Muzarai Officer under Section-10 of the Karnataka religious and Charitable Institution Act, the complainant himself filed a caveat petition before the City Civil Judge and it is only thereafter they have filed the suit in O. S. No. 11393/96 before the City Civil judge. Since the complainant had filed the caveat petition, a notice was ordered to be issued to the complainant in that case. Along with the suit, they had filed an interim application for an ad-interim order of injunction in the said suit. After the complainant entered appearance in the suit, he filed the written statement and also three interim applications contending that the suit is not maintainable. After hearing both the sides, the learned City Civil Judge has granted an order of status quo directing both the parties to maintain status quo with regard to the property in question. Thereafter the status quo order was continued until further orders. The Civil Court has also framed issues. It is at this juncture the above criminal complaint came to be filed before this Court by the complainant, suppressing all the relevant facts. There is no clear finding on the question of title to the property in question by this Court which is binding on them under law. Neither this Court in the Writ Petition nor in the writ appeal has gone into the merits of the case. Even the Hon'ble supreme Court has not gone into the merits of the case and on the other hand the SLP has been dismissed at the stage of admission itself. There has been no clear finding by any of the Courts on the question of title to the property in question. Therefore they bonafide believed that it is open to them to approach the Civil Court by way of filing a regular suit in O. S. No. 11393/96 on the file of the City civil Judge, Mayo Hall Unit, Bangalore for declaration of title and consequential relief of permanent injunction. Therefore they bonafide believed that it is open to them to approach the Civil Court by way of filing a regular suit in O. S. No. 11393/96 on the file of the City civil Judge, Mayo Hall Unit, Bangalore for declaration of title and consequential relief of permanent injunction. They have not filed the suit raising very same contentions that were raised and rejected and confirmed by the Supreme Court. However since the impugned order of Muzarai Officer that was questioned before this Court is only an administrative order under Section-10 of the said Act, they were advised that there is no bar to file a regular suit and hence they bonafide believed that they have a legal right to adjudicate their rights in the Civil Court. Therefore they have filed the suit in question before the Civil Court. They have not indulged in delaying tactics by filing suit on the same cause of action and therefore filing a suit with a bonafide intention of adjudicating their rights in a civil court will not amount to abuse of process of law and the said Act on the part of the respondents does not amount to interference or tending to interfere with the administration of justice. At any rate they have not committed any offence under Section-2 (c) (iii) punishable under Section-12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. They have highest regards to this Court and they have not committed any criminal contempt as alleged by the complainant. It is therefore prayed that this Court may be pleased to drop all further proceedings and dismiss the contempt petition. Learned Counsel for the respondent/accused No. 3 while placing reliance upon the above decisions, has putforth the following contentions: they have not abused the process of this Court and have not committed any contempt of Court. He filed the suit against the complainant and others in respect of the property in question, only with a bonafide impression that the revenue authorities cannot decide title in respect of a property which was not at all an inam land. The cause of action for the suit is that the officials of the complainant threatened to dispossess him from the property in question. Unless the land in question is an inam land, the revenue authorities will not get any jurisdiction to pass any order under the provisions of the karnataka Religious and Charitable Institutions Act. The cause of action for the suit is that the officials of the complainant threatened to dispossess him from the property in question. Unless the land in question is an inam land, the revenue authorities will not get any jurisdiction to pass any order under the provisions of the karnataka Religious and Charitable Institutions Act. The complainant is not at all the owner of the property in Sy. No. 5/4 of Dandu upparahalli at Millers Road in Vasanthnagar, Bangalore. The order dated 4. 6. 1969 passed by the Assistant Commissioner under Section-10 of the Act is an order passed in a summary enquiry without giving any opportunity to him and without giving any opportunity to produce any documents. On the facts and circumstance of this case, the filing of a suit by him will not amount to res judicata or disobedience of the orders of this Court and it is only filed with intent to protect his property rights. It is incorrect to state that the suit is filed on the same cause of action and on the same grounds which were urged in the Writ Petition. That the disputed questions of fact were not gone into in the writ proceedings and in fact this. Court has not gone in detail with regard to the rights of the parties and the finding of fact in the orders of this Court in the Writ Petition and in the writ appeal and in SLP was only in respect of summary orders of the Muzarai Officer. That the suit filed by him is clearly maintainable under Section-9 of CPC and there is no bar to maintain the suit under the provisions of the Karnataka Religious and charitable Institutions Act. He has not suppressed any material facts. He has highest respect to the orders of this Court and he has not committed any contempt of Court order, nor committed any criminal contempt as alleged by the complainant. He has filed the suit in question to protect his rights and there is no legal bar to maintain the suit which is a comprehensive suit pertaining to the property in question. The complainant has filed the criminal contempt petition against him only with a view to harass and humiliate him and also with a malafide intention to pressurize him to withdraw the suit. The complainant has filed the criminal contempt petition against him only with a view to harass and humiliate him and also with a malafide intention to pressurize him to withdraw the suit. Further as the proceedings initiated under the age old Act called the Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act-1927 and the proceedings are continuing for the last more than nearly 50 years and under the guise of the said Act, title to the property in question cannot be decided in a summary jurisdiction. He has filed the suit to protect his property rights, in respect of the only property possessed by him. Hence the suit is maintainable and he has not committed any disobedience of the orders of this Court. It is therefore prayed that this Court may be pleased to drop all further proceedings in this case and dismiss the contempt petition.- in the light of the series of decisions relied upon by the learned counsel on eitherside and the submissions made on both sides, we shall now proceed to consider the question whether the charge framed against the respondents under Section-2 (c) (iii) read with section-12 of the Contempt of Courts Act is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The instant proceeding for contempt stems from a Writ Petition filed by the respondents before the learned Single Judge of this court in W. P. No. 26351/90, seeking to setaside the order dated 7. 12. 1990 of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in Revision Petition no. 210/76 and the order dated 4. 6. 1969 of the Assistant commissioner, Bangalore Sub-Division, Bangalore in the cases bearing DVS Nos. 109 and 110/66-67. As we have already noticed, the above said Writ Petition filed by the respondents came to be dismissed by the learned single Judge on 11. 9. 1996; and aggrieved thereby the respondents filed a writ appeal before the Division Bench of this Court in W. A No. 8600/96, but without success. Thereafter the respondents filed the SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which came to be dismissed on 18. 11. 1996. While the matter stood thus, the respondents/accused filed the above said two suits before the city Civil Court at Bangalore seeking declaratory and other consequential reliefs in respect of the property in question. Thereafter the respondents filed the SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which came to be dismissed on 18. 11. 1996. While the matter stood thus, the respondents/accused filed the above said two suits before the city Civil Court at Bangalore seeking declaratory and other consequential reliefs in respect of the property in question. It is in this background, the present complaint has been filed by the complainant for initiating contempt action against the respondents/ accused, and accordingly the present contempt proceedings came to be initiated. The charges framed against the respondents/accused nos. 1 to 4 are as under:"that in respect of the property situate in Sy. No. 5/4 (presently 6/7) of Dandu Upparahalli, Millers Road, Vasanthanagar, bangalore, you along with others had claimed ownership of the property inter alia contending that you are the legal representative of the deceased B. S. Rangachar, who was the archak of the temple. In this regard, you had filed various proceedings before the Muzrai Authorities as well as the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal who rejected all your contentions. Then you challenged all the orders in Writ Petition No. 26351 of 1990 and by the order dated 11. 9. 1996 in Writ Petition was dismissed on merit rejecting your contention. The writ appeal filed by you in W. A. . No. 8600 of 1996 and the Special Leave Petition in SLP No. 2144 of 1996 were also dismissed. In spite of the clear finding by the Court in the writ Petition and the writ appeal you have once again filed original suit No. 4578 of 1997 and 11393 of 1996 urging and raising the very same contentions that were raised and rejected by this Court and affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This conduct of yours, viz. , having lost throughout right from the initial stage upto the highest Court of the land, viz. . , the Apex court, you are indulging in delaying tactics by filing suits on the same cause of action and title. Thus your action not only amounts to abuse of process of law, but also amounts to interference and tends to interfere with the administration of justice. Hence, you have committed an offence under Section 2 (c) (iii) which is punishable under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. "the complainant and Respondents Accused Nos. Thus your action not only amounts to abuse of process of law, but also amounts to interference and tends to interfere with the administration of justice. Hence, you have committed an offence under Section 2 (c) (iii) which is punishable under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. "the complainant and Respondents Accused Nos. 1 to 4 have filed the affidavits by way of their evidence in support of their versions. In practise also, the contempt matters in the High Court are generally heard on the affidavits and on record only. When the interest of justice require examination of parties, oral examination is permissible so as to test the veracity particularly when the affidavits filed on eitherside make it difficult for evaluating their probative value. There is however no such difficulty in this case and hence the parties were permitted to file their affidavits in support of their case and accordingly the complainant as well as the respondents. Accused have filed affidavits in support of their versions and arguments were heard on the basis of the affidavits filed by both the parties and on the records of the case. It has to be stated that the High Court can deal with the contempt proceedings in a summary manner and adopt its own procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure should be fair and the contemners are aware of the charges framed against them and they have been given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. In the instant case, there has been a substantial compliance with this procedure and the parties have no grievance of any kind regarding the procedure followed in the case. The respondents have been given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend themselves in the case and they have been made aware of the charges framed against them in the case. Now it is not in dispute that the respondents/accused 1 to 4 alongwith some others had filed a Writ Petition challenging the above said orders. That Writ Petition ended against them. In the Writ Petition filed by the respondents, this Court has recorded a clear finding that the property in question was an inam land and the plea of adverse possession raised by the respondents herein was negatived. That Writ Petition ended against them. In the Writ Petition filed by the respondents, this Court has recorded a clear finding that the property in question was an inam land and the plea of adverse possession raised by the respondents herein was negatived. The learned Single Judge has further held in the said Writ Petition that the claim of ownership set up by one Rangachar stood rejected in view of the finding recorded by the Civil Court in L. S Misc. No. 133/56 that the possession of rangachar over the land in question was only in his capacity as an archak of the temple who was the real and absolute owner of the property in question, which finding would operate as res judicata in any future proceedings between the parties or those claiming through them. It is not in dispute that the present respondents/accused are claiming right to the property in question through the said Archak-as his legal representatives. The writ appeal filed by the respondents came to be dismissed confirming the findings recorded by the learned single Judge of this Court in the above Writ Petition. The Hon'ble supreme Court dismissed the SLP. Under the circumstances, therefore; it is to be concluded that the order passed by the Assistant commissioner under Section-10 of the Act, holding that the land in question is an inam land, is valid and proper. Further it is the temple which was held to be the real and absolute owner of the property in question. The claim of ownership made by the deceased Archak, through whom the present respondents are claiming their rights to the property in question, has been rejected. It has to be stated that the sine qua non for initiating proceedings under Section-10 of the above Act by the Asst. Commissioner is that it should be an inam land, and when the proceedings initiated by the Assistant commissioner were held to be valid and proper, it is to be concluded that it was an inam land and hence the Assistant commissioner has jurisdiction to pass the order under Section-10 of the said Act in respect of the property in question. The complainant temple was held to be the real and absolute owner of the said property. The complainant temple was held to be the real and absolute owner of the said property. In that situation, it is rather difficult to accept the contention of the respondents herein that they are entitled to seek a declaration before a Civil Court regarding their title to the suit property in question. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PUSHPAGIRI MATH vs kapparaju VEERABHADRA RAO wherein it is held as under;"under the A. P Inam Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari act, Act 37/56, after the Act had come into force, the pre-existing right, title and interest stood extinguished arid the new rights were sought to be conferred under Section 3 read with Section 7 thereof either in a suo motu enquiry under Section 3 or on an application under Section 7. A new grant of ryotwari patta is to be made by the Tahsildar by way of an order after enquiry to the extent of entitlement as per law. the grant of ryotwari patta under Section 7 becomes conclusive, overriding the effect given by Section 15 over any other law. It would, therefore, be clear that after the inam stood abolished, the preexisting rights extinguished and the obligation to render service burdened witn the land was relieved. The holder of the land became entitled to free-hold ryotwari patta. Thus the pre-existing right, title and interest stood extinguished. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to declare title to the inam land, by necessary implication, stood excluded. "in the instant case also, the competent authority viz. , the Assistant commissioner by an order dated 4. 6. 1969 passed under Section 10 of the above said Act, has recorded a clear finding or held that the property in question is an inam land. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents herein preferred an appeal to the Special Deputy commissioner, who confirmed the order of the Assistant commissioner and dismissed the appeal. A further appeal to the commissioner for Religious and Charitable Endowments met the same fate and was dismissed on 24. 3. 1976. Then the matter was taken in Revision to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, which also upheld the view taken by the competent Muzarai officer and dismissed the Revision Petition on 7. 12. 1990. A further appeal to the commissioner for Religious and Charitable Endowments met the same fate and was dismissed on 24. 3. 1976. Then the matter was taken in Revision to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, which also upheld the view taken by the competent Muzarai officer and dismissed the Revision Petition on 7. 12. 1990. Aggrieved by the above orders, the respondents herein filed a Writ Petition before this Court in W. P 26351/90. In the said Writ Petition filed before this court, a contention was raised on behalf of the respondents herein that the Muzarai officer viz. , the Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 10 of the said Act as the land in question was not an inam land. The learned Single Judge of this Court in the Writ Petition considered this contention of the respondents in great detail and has observed as under:"7. Section 10 of the Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 1927, read thus: "whenever any alienation, transfer or other act in respect of inam lands which is not valid under the provisions of Section 9, comes to the knowledge of a Muzrai officer, he may after such enquiry as he may deem necessary, issue notice to the the alienee or the party in possession to restore such lands to the institution to which they belong within six months from the date of service of such notice and in default of compliance, the Muzrai officer may summarily resume and restore such lands to the said institutions: provided that alienations made prior to the 31st day of January 1853 shall be dealt with in accordance with the Inam Rules contained in Chief Commissioner's notification No. 266, dated the 17th November 1877; provided further that where a person has had adverse possession of a property for a period of twelve years before the passing of this Act, the Muzrai Officer shall cancel the inam tenure and impose the full assessment due to the Government under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code or cancel the tenure and direct the assessment recovered to be handed over for the benefit of the institution concerned. "8. "8. A plain reading of the provision shows that the powersreserved in favour of the Muzrai Officer are exercisable only in respect of Inam Lands granted to a Muzrai Institution to the same effect is the view taken by two Division Benches of this Court in abdul REHAB KHAN vs. STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS (1963 (1) MLJ. 184) and in GURUVASAVAIAH VS. KATIKERE linge GOWDA and OTHERS (1961 MLJ. 708 ). The question then is as to whether the land in dispute has been found to be Inam land either by the Civil Court in the Reference under the Land acquisition Act or by the Authorities below while exercising their powers under Section 19. A perusal of tne order passed by the addl. Subordinate Judge in L. S. Misc. Case No. 133/56 reveals that Sri Rangachar, the Archak had laid a claim to the ownership underlying Sy. No. 5/4, which was upon investigation by the Court found untenable and 'repelled on the ground that the Khatedars register on which the petitioner placed reliance, was not a document of title nor was the Karidayarn Register of Bangalore city Municipality sufficient to show his ownership. His possession over the land, it was held was only in his capacity as an Archak of the temple who was the real and absolute owner of the property. The Civil Court had while rejecting the claim made by rangachar observed thus: "i have no hesitation to conclude that Rangachar, the second claimant has no right or title, to the property in question, and that his claim has to fail. I may also say that the first claimant has undoubtedly established that the temple has a better title to the property than the second claimant. In the circumstances, I hold that the first claimant is entitled to get the compensation awarded in respect of the property. "9. The above judgment of the Civil Court has no doubtbecome final as the same was not questioned in appeal at any stage either by the petitioners or Rangachar, their predecessor in interest. In the circumstances, I hold that the first claimant is entitled to get the compensation awarded in respect of the property. "9. The above judgment of the Civil Court has no doubtbecome final as the same was not questioned in appeal at any stage either by the petitioners or Rangachar, their predecessor in interest. It is therefore safe to conclude that the claim of ownership stated by Rangachar stood rejected which finding would operate as res judicata in any future proceedings between the parties or those claiming through them that a finding returned in the reference proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act would operate as Res judicata in any future litigation is no longer Res. Integra in the light of the judgment of the Privy Council in Mt. BHAGWATI vs MC. RAM KALI (AIR 1939 PC 133) where the legal position has been stated thus: "in order successfully to establish a plea of res judicata or estoppel by record it is necessary to show that in a previous case a court having jurisdiction to try the question came to a decision necessarily and substantially involving the determination of the matter in issue in the later case. It was at one time a matter of doubt in India whether the determination of a Court to which a matter has been referred by the Collector under Section 18 Land Acquisition Act was such a decision. That doubt was resolved by the judgment of this Board in 49 IA 129, which decided that where a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation has been referred to the Court, a decree thereon not appealed from renders the question of title res judicata in a suit between the parties to the dispute. In that case some question arose as to whether any appeal lay to His Majesty in Council in a case where the determination of the Judge ended in an award and not in a decree. The Board took the view that where the matter referred was not the adequacy of the amount of compensation awarded, but a dispute between the persons claiming. . . . . . 10. Even in the proceedings under Section 10 of the Act, theland in question has been held to be Inam land, granted to the third respondent-Institution by the Government. . . . . . 10. Even in the proceedings under Section 10 of the Act, theland in question has been held to be Inam land, granted to the third respondent-Institution by the Government. The Tribunal, has in this connection returned a finding in the following words : "it is pertinent to note that Archak B. S Rangachar called himself as Vahivatdar. This is formed found from file maintained by Assistant Commissioner in Muzrai Case No. 1/5. 9. 60. It is dated 25. 7. 1960. In that document B. S. Rangachar not only mentioned that he is Archak and Vahivatdar but also that he is a right hakkadar of Inam lands attached to the Temple. This claim by b. S. Rangachar makes it clear that he not only called himself as archak, but also vahivatdar. It is also clear that he admitted that it was Inam land attached to the temple. While describing present nos. 31, 32, 41 and 42 during the year 1871-72, it was mentioned as Inamthi Sy. Nos. 141-12, guntas 141 portion, 15. . . . . 12 guntas, 16. . . . 1 guntas. It is described therein that poojar Rangaiah did not pay arrears. The copy was obtained by the petitioners on 28. 10. 1948. This also goes to show that it was Inam land belonging to the Temple. "11. From the above, it is apparent that the land in questionhas been held to be Inam land not only on the basis of the documentary evidence produced on record but also on the basis of the admission of Rangachar himself. Learned Counsel for the petitioner was not able to show any error in the above finding that has been recorded by the Tribunal after a careful and pains taking evaluation of the evidence and the material placed on record. Interference with any such finding would be permissible only in case the conclusion arrived at can be said to be either without any evidence or otherwise perverse. No such perversity having been pointed out I have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the land in question was not Inam land and could not therefore have been the subject matter of an order under Section-10 of the Act. No such perversity having been pointed out I have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the land in question was not Inam land and could not therefore have been the subject matter of an order under Section-10 of the Act. "it was thus held to be an inam land and the Assistant commissioner had jurisdiction to pass the impugned order under section-10 of the said Act. Then a contention was raised on behalf of the respondents herein that the land in question might be an inam land but there is nothing to show that the same was a Government Inam land. The learned single Judge in the writ petition considered this contention also and held that the inam was anything but a sarakari inam. It was next contended on behalf of the respondents in the said writ Petition that the finding returned by this Court in RA Nos. 113/ 58 and 218/58 holding that the lands in question were not owned by the temple, operated as an estoppel and disentitled the temple from claiming ownership over the same, and the learned Single Judge has held that there is no merit in this contention since the property involved in the said acquisition proceedings and the appeal was distinctly different from that involved in the present writ petition and hence it is difficult to see as to how any finding returned as to the ownership in respect of the former either by the reference Court or by this Court in appeal would be helpful to the respondents or otherwise operate as estoppel or res judicata in the writ proceedings. Lastly it was contended on behalf of the respondents before the learned Single Judge in the said Writ Petition that the deceased rangachar had perfected his title to the property in question by way of prescription and could not be asked to surrender possession of the same and that the possession of the deceased Archak was open, hostile and continuous and had ripened into an absolute title in his favour. The said contention urged on behalf of the respondents was also considered in great detail by the learned Single Judge in the said writ petition and it has been observed in paragraphs-15 and 16 of the order passed in the writ petition as under:"15. The said contention urged on behalf of the respondents was also considered in great detail by the learned Single Judge in the said writ petition and it has been observed in paragraphs-15 and 16 of the order passed in the writ petition as under:"15. A plea of "adverse possession" raises a mixed question of law and facts. Such a plea must not only raised specifically but must be substantiated by production of the requisite evidence to support the same. Even though there is nothing to show on record that any such plea was raised by the deceased Rangachar, before the Muzrai Officer in the objections filed by him, yet assuming that such a plea was raised, it is not in dispute that rangachar had led no evidence whatsoever in support thereof. So much so his own statement as a witness in support of such a claim was also never offered. In the absence of any evidence to show that the petitioner had at any stage prescribed against the temple openly and continuously for the stipulated period of 12 years, it is difficult to see no such a plea could at all be accepted. This so particularly when possession is always relatable to the legal status if any held by the person enjoying the same. Any attempt by the person in possession to disassociate the possession from the capacity in which he holds the same can succeed only if he sets up and proves by cogent evidence what is known in law as a plea of ouster. No such plea was ever set up let alone proved by the petitioner. The very fact that Rangachar had continued in occupation of the property belonging to the temple as an Archak would therefore be in consequential considering the admitted position that till long after the initiation of proceedings under Section 10 Rangachar had continued to function as the Archak of the temple. 16. That apart the plea of adverse possession was never pressed before the First Appellate Authority, no matter the same was raised before the Tribunal in Revision, who rejected it on the ground that since the predecessor in interest of the petitioners were handling the management (wahivat) of the temple and its properties their possession was permissive in nature. 16. That apart the plea of adverse possession was never pressed before the First Appellate Authority, no matter the same was raised before the Tribunal in Revision, who rejected it on the ground that since the predecessor in interest of the petitioners were handling the management (wahivat) of the temple and its properties their possession was permissive in nature. Before the tribunal the petitioner appears to have for the the first time relied upon the judgment of this Court in RFA No. 113 and 218/1958 besides placing reliance upon the extract of the record of rights and the building assessment register of the Corporation of the city of Bangalore. None of these documents however could either independently or collectively lend any assistance to the petitioner's case of Adverse possession The revenue record and the assessment Register at best show that the petitioner was in occupation of the property a fact which was never disputed by the temple. It is also pertinent to note that such a plea was never raised before the Reference Court in the Land Acquisition case even though the same could have been raised and tried if the petitioners were really serious about it. Suffice it to say that in the absence of any evidence or material to show that the possession of the petitioner was adverse to the temple the claim set up by the petitioners of their having perfected title by the prescription was rightly rejected. I see no error of law or other irregularity vitiating the said finding of the Tribunal to warrant interference. "in the Writ Appeal, the Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the appeal of the respondents herein and confirming the qrder of the learned Single Judge in the writ petition, has clearly observed that no ground is made out to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge which is based upon findings of facts arrived at by holding that the land in dispute was an inam land with which the appellants (respondents herein) had no connection. It has been further observed therein that the learned Single Judge has also rightly held that the plea of adverse possession was an after thought raised for thejirst time before the revisional authorities. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the respondents herein came to be dismissed with the above observations. It has been further observed therein that the learned Single Judge has also rightly held that the plea of adverse possession was an after thought raised for thejirst time before the revisional authorities. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the respondents herein came to be dismissed with the above observations. Even the SLP filed before the Hon'ble Supreme court by the respondents came to be dismissed, confirming the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court in w. P. No. 26351/90. It is thus clear from the above that the property in question is an inam land and the respondents herein have absolutely no right, title or interest in tne said property. That apart, even the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner under Section-10 of the above said Act is held to be valid and proper. Under the circumstances, therefore and in the light of tne above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which in our view applies in all its fours to the facts and circumstances of this oase, where is any scope for the respondents to go to a civil Court seeking a declaratory and other consequential reliefs in respect of the property which is held to be an inam land and in respect of which the respondents had no connection whatsoever. Therefore in our view the filing of the suits by the respondents is nothing short of an abuse of process of the court, which would amount to Contempt of Court within the meaning of Section-2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Filing of a simple suit for adjudication of certain rights by a party in a civil Court may not amount to contempt of court, but filing of such a suit with a mala fide intention to circumvent the earlier orders of the Court with intent to delay or defeat the rights of the other parties and to squat on the property of others as far as they can, will amount to contempt of court. There is a tendency to defy the orders of the Court under the garb of seeking alleged adjudication of rights before a Civil Court. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of this court in the case of VIJAYA BANK EMPLOYEES HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE society LIMITED vs MUNEERAPPA wherein it is held in paragraph-8 as under:"8. There is a tendency to defy the orders of the Court under the garb of seeking alleged adjudication of rights before a Civil Court. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of this court in the case of VIJAYA BANK EMPLOYEES HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE society LIMITED vs MUNEERAPPA wherein it is held in paragraph-8 as under:"8. The filing of the suit cannot be got away with on the ground that there is no disobedience of any order. It is not mere disobedience, but as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the above ruling, even abuse of process of the Court would amount to contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2 (c) of the contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, where the action of the accused is calculated to obstruct the due courses of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice, it would amount to criminal contempt of Court. We do not have even a formal apology of the accused in the statement of objections. Therefore, we hold that the accused is guilty of contempt of Court. The above observations dovetail into the facts of the instant case, for there cannot be any manner of doubt that by filing the suits, the respondents/accused have not only made deliberate attempts to impede the administration of justice, but succeeded in their attempts in delaying the delivery of possession. Dismissal of the Writ Petition by this Court recording a positive finding with regard to the nature of the land in question and the alleged rights of the respondents and the same being affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in the Writ Appeal and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the SLP the filing of the present two suits by the respondents seeking the very same relief, which have been conclusively determined and finally set at rest by the highest Court, will certainly amount to criminal contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2 (c) (iii) of the contempt of Courts Act. The said act on the part of the respondents is calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice. The said act on the part of the respondents is calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice. The contentions of the respondents that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition and later confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in the Writ appeal and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the SLP are not conclusive and they will not debar the respondents from filing the suits seeking adjudication of their rights in respect of the property in question before a competent Civil Court, is in our view ex-facie conteumacious. This is because the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the writ Petition on the basis of the contentions urged and the materials available on record, are clearly binding on the respondents who were parties to the said proceeding and they cannot, under the pretext of prosecuting their rights, re-open the findings which have become final and conclusive. If the respondents are allowed to do the same, there will be no end to the litigation. Hence, the present filing of the suits by the respondents is only an attempt to prolong the proceedings asfar as they can. The respondents claiming the same reliefs refused to them in the writ petitions by filing the present suits before a Civil Court would only encourage multiplicity of litigation. Having lost the battle on the writ side, perceiving that they will be evicted from the property in question, the respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 have filed the present suits only with a malafide intention to protract the proceedings and to squat on the property as far as they can. It is well settled that a decision on an issue raised in a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution would also operate as res judicata between the same parties in subsequent judicial proceedings the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of DARYAO vs state OF U. P. has held 'that the basis on which the rule rests is founded on consideration of public policy and it is in the interest of public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decision pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over the same kind of litigation. The same principles have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions reported in AIR 1964 sc 1013 and AIR 1998 SC 2046 . Therefore there can be no doubt that the general principle of res judicata applies to a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore there is no merit in the contention that since the writ petition was in challenge of an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner under Section-10 of the Karnataka Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, in a summary proceedings, the decisions rendered in such writ petition and later confirmed by the Division Bench in the Writ Appeal and the Hon'ble supreme Court in the SLP, would only remain in the realm of summary proceedings and they would not preclude the respondents/ accused from raising such issues over again in the suits filed by them before the Civil Courts seeking declaratory and other consequential reliefs in respect of the said property. It is now a settled law that the respondents cannot reagitate the issues which have been finally decided and conclusively determined between the parties in the earlier proceedings. However the learned Counsel for the respondents/accused adopted an alternative contention that the filing of such suits is not barred under the Karnataka Religious and charitable Institutions Act, especially when they are seeking a declaratory and other consequential reliefs in respect of the said property on the ground that it is not an inam land and the order of the Assistant Commissioner passed under Section-10 of the said act is one without jurisdiction. The said contention is based on a fallacious premise that the land in question is not an inam land whether the land in question is or is not an inam land has already been decided in the earlier proceedings by the competent authorities and the same has been confirmed by this Court in the Writ Petition. The said finding has become conclusive as between the parties to the earlier proceedings. Now the question is whether the filing of the present suit by the respondents would amount to contempt of court or not is clearly answered in the decisions of the Hon'ble supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court in 1980 (3) SCC 311 and ILR 1990 Kar. 4179. Now the question is whether the filing of the present suit by the respondents would amount to contempt of court or not is clearly answered in the decisions of the Hon'ble supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court in 1980 (3) SCC 311 and ILR 1990 Kar. 4179. It has to be stated that whenever an act adversely affects the administration of justice or tends to impede its course, or shakes public confidence in a judicial institution, the power can be exercised to uphold the dignity of the Court of law and protect its proper functioning. It is in the light of these principles that one has to examine Section-2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act section-2 (c) reads as under: section 2 (c): "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which - i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; or ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. "the definition of criminal contempt under Section 2 (c), therefore, refers not merely to publication by words, signs etc. , but includes the doing of any act whatsoever which scandalises or. tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any manner. Therefore any act which tends to interfere with the administration of justice or tends to lower the authority of any Court can be punished with contempt In the present case, despite there being a clear finding in the writ petition that the land in question is an inam land and the complainant temple is an absolute owner thereof and that the respondents/accused herein have no manner of right title or interest therein, and the same having been confirmed by the highest Court, the filing of the present suits by the respondents seeking declaratory and other consequential reliefs in respect of the very same property and justifying their act is on the face of it contumacious. Therefore in the instant case, there cannot be any manner of doubt that by filing the present suits, the respondents have made a deliberate attempt to impede the administration of justice The said act on the part of the respondents which tends to interfere with the administration of justice or tends to lower the authority of this Court can be punished with contempt. At this stage, it will be useful to refer to a decision of this Court in the case of S. N. NAGARAJA RAO vs CHIKKACHENNAPPA wherein it is held as under:"article 215 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself This power is wide enough to cover cases of ex facie criminal contempt as also every act or omission which amounts to contempt of High Court. Therefore whether contempt of High Court alleged to have been committed by any one is of the description referred to in Section 14 of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it is competent for the high Court to punish the alleged contemner in exercise of its power under that Article. Such an action could be taken by the High Court under Article 215, either on its own motion on securing information in whatever manner or on a motion made by the Advocate General or by any other person. Consent of the advocate General is not contemplated by the Article for a motion made by any other person. Even after the enactment of the contempt of Courts Act, the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself, continues to be derived from and traceable only to Article 215, and therefore a provision in an enactment made by the Legislature to regulate contempt actions cannot be so construed as to affect the contempt of the power given to the High Court under the Constitution. Therefore Section 15 (1) providing for the consent of the Advocate general cannot be construed as mandatory as the power of the high Court to punish for criminal contempt of itself is conferred on it by Article 215 without any such restriction. Further, Section 15 (1) is not couched in a negative language stating that no motion by a person (other than the Advocate general) shall be entertained by the High Court without the consent of the Advocate General. Further, Section 15 (1) is not couched in a negative language stating that no motion by a person (other than the Advocate general) shall be entertained by the High Court without the consent of the Advocate General. The Legislative intent or its reason also does not justify the construction that it is mandatory. The purpose of the provision is only to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court by unscrupulous persons by filing frivolous petitions there might be cases where having regard to the facts and circumstances, the High Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case for initiating action though consent of the advocate General has not been obtained and that the presentation of the petition is by a person, who has locus standi and bona fide, and there might also be cases the circumstances of which indicate that the petitioner had good reasons for not approaching the Advocate General seeking his consent or that the consent has been wrongly refused. Further there might be cases where acts of criminal contempt committed by an alleged contemner is not by way of public speeches or writings published in newspaper or books or pamplets, but as in the present case, are within the personal knowledge of an individual, and consequently an action is practicable and also convenient to be allowed to be taken at the instance of the aggrieved person, instead of a suo motu action by this Court. Section 15 (1) is certainly not intended to preclude the High Court from entertaining such a petition and compel the high Court to take action suo motu only. By construing Section 15 (l) (b) as directory it does not mean that the provision should be ignored or that the consent of the advocate General provided for in Section 15 (1) is of no importance at all. A directory provision also must be given due weight and should be rendered useless. The Court may reject a petition presented without consent of Advocate General or where consent has been refused, in limine. However, if in a given case the Court finds that the petition is bona fide by a person who has locus standi and there are sufficient grounds to take action the Court is not precluded by Section 15 (1) (b) to entertain the motion as Section 15 (1) (b) of the Act is only directory. However, if in a given case the Court finds that the petition is bona fide by a person who has locus standi and there are sufficient grounds to take action the Court is not precluded by Section 15 (1) (b) to entertain the motion as Section 15 (1) (b) of the Act is only directory. In the instant case, the petitioner was one of the petitioners in an election petition filed under Section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and pending before the High Court. The allegations made by the petitioner in the present petition under article 215 for criminal contempt of court inter alia were that respondents 3 to 8, who were all the supporters of the first respondent, forcibly kidnapped the petitioner from Hunsur oh 29. 6. 1978, broughfhim to Bangalore, kept him in a hotel at bangalore under wrongful restraint till 3. 7. 1978 and during this period he was taken before the first respondent and his advocate, the second respondent and ultimately took a letter from him addressed to his advocate asking her to withdraw the election petition under threat, coercion and danger spelled out to his life and the life of his wife and children, and that after such letter was taken and sent to his advocate, and' he was released, he met his advocate and explained the circumstances under which the letter was written and thereafter the present petition under article 215 was filed. Held, the presentation of the petition under Article 215 for criminal contempt of court was bona fide and the petitioner has locus standi. No one else than the petitioner could make the said allegations and furnish information to the Court and prove them. Also the fact that the Advocate General was appearing for one of the respondents in the election petition, though in his personal capacity, was a strong circumstance to indicate that the petitioner could not be expected to secure his consent to prosecute the present petition under Article 215. Further there was a prima facie case for framing a charge against respondents 3 to 7 under Article 215 for criminal contempt of Court. Therefore, the motion taken by the petitioner, through the petition under article 215, for taking action for criminal contempt of the High court against the respondents, though made without consent of the Advocate General, was maintainable. Further there was a prima facie case for framing a charge against respondents 3 to 7 under Article 215 for criminal contempt of Court. Therefore, the motion taken by the petitioner, through the petition under article 215, for taking action for criminal contempt of the High court against the respondents, though made without consent of the Advocate General, was maintainable. Further in the case of MURRAY and COMPANY vs ASHOK K. R newatia, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under "though hypersensitiveness on the part of the taw courts, if it does not obstruct or impede the course of justice, as such cannot be appreciated, yet angelic silence on the part of a judge is also not expected vis-a-vis an infraction of the majesty of law. This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law to violate the order of the court or to obstruct or tend to obstruct is a quasi-criminal offence, as such the court, in the matter of award of punishment ought to be rather cautious in its approach even if the court is otherwise satisfied as to the act or conduct of the party. The approach of the court is thus different in the matter of imposition of punishment against a contemner the same being totally dependent on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. No generalised guidelines can be had nor can a set of general principles in the matter of award of punishment be formulated. The court must otherwise come to the conclusion that on facts the act tantamount to obstruction of justice, which, if allowed, would even permeate into our society it is only then that this power ought to be exercised. "the right to inflict punishment for contempt of court in terms of the Act of 1971 on to the law courts has been for the purposes of ensuring the rule of law and orderly administration of justice.- the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law since the image of such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be left to be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is true that the judiciary will be judged by the people for what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence which can even remotely be termed to affect the majesty of law, the society is bound to lose confidence and faith in the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the trust and confidence of the people in general. "in another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of om PRAKASH JAISWAL vs O. K. MITTAL, it is observed as under:"a private party or a litigant may also invite the attention of the court to such facts as may persuade the court in initiating proceedings for. contempt. However, such person filing an application or petition before the Court does not become a complainant or petitioner in the proceedings. He is just an informer or relator. His duty ends with the facts being brought to the notice of the Court. It is thereafter for the Court to act on such information or not to act though the private party or litigant moving the court may at the discretion of the Court continue to render its assistance, during the course of proceedings. It is not necessary that there must have been actual interference with the administration of justice. It is enough if it is likely or tends in any way to interfere 'with the proper administration of law. The filing of the present two suits by the respondents/accused, who-were confronted with an order passed by this Court in the writ petition, is a clear abuse of process of Court, calculated to hamper the course of judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice, is a contempt of Court within the meaning of Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. In common law it is not essential to the existence of contempt, for the conduct to actually obstruct justice, it is sufficient if the conduct tends to obstruct the administration of justice. The conduct of the respondents/accused Nos. In common law it is not essential to the existence of contempt, for the conduct to actually obstruct justice, it is sufficient if the conduct tends to obstruct the administration of justice. The conduct of the respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 in this case clearly amounts to an interference with the course of justice and is punishable as contempt of court irrespective of what the ultimate result of the suits be. No doubt every citizen has got a right to prosecute his remedies and adjudicate his rights in a Court of law, but that does not give a licence to abuse the process of Courts to harass the other party by endless and meaningless litigation. Therefore on the facts and circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation to hold that the respondents/accused Nos 1 to 4 are guilty of criminal contempt of Court, punishable under Section-12 of the contempt of Courts Act. Accordingly, we hold the respondents/ accused Nos. 1 to 4 guilty of the criminal contempt of court under section 2 (c), which is punishable under Section-12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. But looking however to the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the respective ages of the respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 the ends of justice will be met if they are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of the payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks each, as punishment for contempt. There is no merit in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4. Further in view of the findings arrived at by us on the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no need to make individual references to the several decisions or the series of decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents/accused. In the result, therefore, this Criminal Complaint filed by the complainant is granted. The respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 are held to be guilty of the criminal contempt of Court and they are accordingly convicted of the charge under Section 2 (c) which is punishable under Section-12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/ each and in default of which, the respondents/accused Nos. The respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 are held to be guilty of the criminal contempt of Court and they are accordingly convicted of the charge under Section 2 (c) which is punishable under Section-12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/ each and in default of which, the respondents/accused Nos. 1 to 4 shall undergo SI for a period of two weeks each, as punishment for contempt. The fine be realised within a period of four weeks from the date of this order and shall be paid to the Legal Services Authority of this Court. The complaint petition filed by the complainant is ordered accordingly. --- *** --- .