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2000 DIGILAW 63 (KAR)

DHAMA PHULCHAND v. DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, CANARA BANK

2000-01-20

A.V.SRINIVASA REDDY

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A. V. SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who has been dismissed from service on being found guilty of the various charges levelled against him has filed this petition challenging the validity and correctness of the order of dismissal. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are: the petitioner was appointed as probationary clerk on May 21, 1979 and was confirmed in the said cadre on December 4, 1979. He was promoted as Jr. Management officer (Gr. I) with effect from March 1, 1989. On August 28, 1989 a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner alleging violation of regulation 3 (1) read with Regulation 24 of canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) regulations 1967 which is punishable under canara Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and appeal) Regulations, 1976. An inquiry was held and the inquiry authority submitted a report as per Annexure-B dated December 18, 1990. On February 27, 1991 the Deputy general Manager, Bangalore Circle Office, bangalore who is the disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the inquiry authority and imposed the punishment of dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. The appellant went in appeal to the appellate authority who by his order dated december 17, 1991 dismissed the appeal upholding the order of dismissal. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned Counsel on both sides. ( 4 ) THE question that arises for my consideration is: whether there was any denial of opportunity to the petitioner to file a reply to the charge-memo and whether the same has prejudiced the petitioner's case in any manner? ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the denial of opportunity to the petitioner to file a reply to the charge-memo contravenes Article 311 of the Constitution of india and, therefore, the enquiry proceedings have to be quashed. It is also submitted by him that the order of the disciplinary authority is cryptic and without application of mind and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. It is also submitted by him that the order of the disciplinary authority is cryptic and without application of mind and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. ( 6 ) THE charge levelled against the petitioner is that he opened a fictitious SB account No. 20289 in the name of one Sri Arun kumar on December 30, 1988 at Bidar branch and fraudulently removed one cheque book bearing No. 184471 to 184480 from the branch and utilised one cheque bearing No. 184476 for the purpose of getting the same lodged in the osc Register B-48 of the branch as OSC No. 476 being cheque dated March 28, 1989 for Rs. 40,000/- drawn on S. B. No. 2079 at basavakalyan branch. On the purported fictitious advice from Basavakalyan branch the osc was responded and the OSC proceeds were credited to SB 20289 on April 17, 1989. Thereafter, it was alleged, that the said sum of rs. 40,000/- was withdrawn fraudulently by the petitioner through cheque leaves bearing nos. 184471, 184473 and 184474. ( 7 ) IN the enquiry that followed 17 witnesses were examined and 65 documents were marked as evidence. The petitioner got marked three documents and did not examine himself or any person on his behalf. The inquiring officer after a detailed enquiry and relying on the letter sent by the petitioner to Sri chandrashekar, clerk, in the Bidar branch and the letter dated July 24, 1989 addressed to the senior Manager of the branch owing responsibility for the fraud of Rs. 40,000/- found him guilty of the charges levelled against him. ( 8 ) THE ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he was not provided an opportunity to file his reply to the charge. Therefore, the enquiry is violative of article 311 of the Constitution of India. I find there is no substance in the said contention because, he has subsequently appeared in the inquiry and defended himself. This ground was not urged by him in the inquiry as a ground of defence. After conclusion of the inquiry and submission of the enquiry report a copy of the findings of the inquiry authority was furnished to the petitioner but as could be seen from annexure-C he has failed to submit any submission. The disciplinary authority was, therefore, left with no option but to agree with the finding of the inquiring authority. After conclusion of the inquiry and submission of the enquiry report a copy of the findings of the inquiry authority was furnished to the petitioner but as could be seen from annexure-C he has failed to submit any submission. The disciplinary authority was, therefore, left with no option but to agree with the finding of the inquiring authority. In fact in the appeal to the appellate authority, the petitioner himself submitted as follows:"i did not make any submission to Dy. General Manager because it was not known whether the findings of enquiry authorities were acceptable to Dy. General Manager. "the question whether the findings are acceptable or not acceptable to the disciplinary authority would arise only after the disciplinary authority has the benefit of perusal of the submissions, if any, made by the petitioner against the findings recorded by the inquiring authority. Therefore, this ground now urged by the petitioner in support of his case for quashing the impugned orders also is without any basis. This being a finding recorded on a pure question of fact is not open for attack in a Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the constitution. ( 9 ) IN Bank of India and Am. v. Degala suryanarayana (1999- II-LLJ-682) (SC), the apex Court while examining the scope of judicial review in Departmental Enquiry proceedings, has held:"the Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting a case of mala fides or perversity i. e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weigh in the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. " (Italicising is mine) ( 10 ) THE findings recorded by the inquiring authority as could be seen from the report at annexure-B are well-founded and based on evidence produced in the case. The findings do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. ( 11 ) WHAT remains to be seen is whether the punishment imposed is just and proper. " (Italicising is mine) ( 10 ) THE findings recorded by the inquiring authority as could be seen from the report at annexure-B are well-founded and based on evidence produced in the case. The findings do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. ( 11 ) WHAT remains to be seen is whether the punishment imposed is just and proper. This is yet another case of a bank employee driven by greed contriving to defraud the bank, using all the experience and expertise gained as an officer of the Bank over the years, throwing to the winds the honesty and integrity expected of him. The only punishment that can be imposed in such cases is the extreme punishment of dismissal which has been rightly imposed in this case. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1996-I-LLJ-1231) the Apex Court has held:"the High Court/tribunal while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. " ( 12 ) THE punishment imposed on the petitioner, given the facts and circumstances of the case, is well-deserved by him and is most appropriate. Therefore, this Court need not take upon itself the task of either directing the disciplinary authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to impose any other punishment which it finds appropriate as the same is uncalled for in the present case. ( 13 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, there is no merit in the Writ Petition and it is, accordingly, dismissed. --- *** --- .