JUDGMENT Amit Talukdar, J.: An order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Basirhat in case No. M-7 of 1992 on 27.4.94 falls for consideration before this court. The petitioner filed an application supported by an affidavit under sections 7 and 8 of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) that she desires to be governed by the provisions of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the said Code) and the proceeding may be converted accordingly. The opposite party maintained that as he does not wish to be governed by the provisions of section 125 of the said Code. The learned Magistrate refused the prayer of the petitioner and directed that the proceeding will continue in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. 2. The learned lawyer appearing for the petitioner submits by drawing the attention of this court to section 5 of the said Code by submitting that the option to be governed either by section 125 of the said Code or under the provisions of the said Act can be exercised either by the husband or by the wife and the learned Magistrate was not correct in dismissing her prayer. Referring to the provisions of section 5 of the said Act he submitted that in view of the language of the said section which speaks “a divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).” 3. It is either the divorced woman or her former husband who can exercise this option. He laid emphasis on the words either jointly or separately. The learned lawyer for the petitioner by referring to the said section has prayed for setting aside the impugned order and for direction upon the learned Magistrate to proceed under the provisions of the said Code. 4. He laid emphasis on the words either jointly or separately. The learned lawyer for the petitioner by referring to the said section has prayed for setting aside the impugned order and for direction upon the learned Magistrate to proceed under the provisions of the said Code. 4. The learned lawyer appearing for the opposite party has opposed such prayer and submitting that the learned Magistrate was justified in refusing the same as according to him section 5 of the said Act was sufficiently clear that the option has to be examined by both the parties together and cannot be exercised by either of them. 5. In support of his contention he has relied on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in 1992 CRI. L. J. 899 (Mohd. Umar Khan vs. Gulshan Begum and Anr.). 6. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and on behalf of the opposite party and have gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate. For profitable discussion the provisions of section 5 of the said Act is quoted here-in-below: "5. Option to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of Act 2 of 1974.-If on the date of the first hearing of the application under sub-section (2) of section 3, a divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and file such affidavit or declaration in the court hearing the application, the Magistrate shall dispose of such application accordingly. "Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, ‘on the date of the first hearing of the application' means the date fixed in the summons for the attendance of the respondent to the application." 7. From a plain reading of the provisions of the said section it appears that the language of the same is very clear with regard to exercise of option. It has been very clearly in no uncertain terms stated in the said section that “a divorced woman and her former husband declare.....................”. From a plain reading of the provisions of the said section it appears that the language of the same is very clear with regard to exercise of option. It has been very clearly in no uncertain terms stated in the said section that “a divorced woman and her former husband declare.....................”. As such, the declaration has to be at the behest of both the divorced woman and her former husband that they want to be governed under sections 125 to 128 of the said Code. The said section has to be read as a whole and I cannot persuade myself to the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that affidavit or any declaration in writing as contemplated under the said provision which speaks" either jointly or separately" would mean that the option can be exercised by anyone or either of them as from the opening words of the said section clearly stipulates that" a divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit ......................". On the contrary, I accept the submission made on behalf of the opposite party and I find that the provisions of section 5 of the said Act clearly provides that the declaration has to be filed both by the former husband and the divorced woman but the affidavit or other declaration in writing may either be filed jointly or separately but the declaration exercising the option has to be filed by both for exercising their option to be governed under Chapter IX of the said Code. 8. As such, this revisional application deserving no merit is dismissed accordingly. 9. There will be no order as to costs. Revisional application dismissed.