JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal filed by the appellant defendant against the judgment and decree dated 8-9-1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer by which he allowed the appeal filed by the respondents-plaintiff and thus, decreed the suit of the respondents-plaintiffs for eviction of the appellant-defendant and reversed the judgment and decree dated 9-3-1987 passed by the learned Munsiff, Pokaran by which he dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents. 2. Facts giving rise to this second appeal are as follows:--Note:- That the original plaint was filed by Narayandas and Manaklal as plaintiffs. 3. Narayandas and Manaklal (hereinafter referred to as 'the original plaintiffs') filed a suit in the Court of Munsiff, Pokaran on 12-10-1979 against the defendant appellant for arrears of rent and for eviction of the defendant appellant from the suit premises alleging that on 2-5-1976, house and bada mentioned in para 1 of the plaint were taken by the defendant-appellant on monthly rent of Rs. 5/- and Rs. 3/- respectively from Satyanarayan-PW1, Mukhtar of the original plaintiffs. The defendant appellant has not paid any rent, therefore, he has become defaulter. A notice terminating his tenancy was also given by the original plaintiffs to the defendant appellant on 23-10-1978, which was received by him on 27-10-1978 and after receipt of the said notice, he has not vacated the suit premises and thus, the present suit has been filed by the original plaintiffs against the defendant appellant for his eviction from the suit premises and for arrears of rent. 4. The suit of the original plaintiffs was contested by the present defendant appellant by filing a written statement on 4-2-1980 alleging that it is wrong to say that he is the tenant of the original plaintiffs, but on the contrary, he is in possession of the said house and bada as owner of them and notice which was given by the original plaintiffs is invalid and the alleged Mukhtarnama Ex. 1 is also invalid. Hence, the suit of the original plaintiffs be dismissed. 5. 1 is also invalid. Hence, the suit of the original plaintiffs be dismissed. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Munsiff framed the following issues on 22-7- 1981 : " 1- vk;k oknh fookn xzLr edku ckMk dk ekfyd gS vkSj izfroknh dks 2&5&1976 dks :0 5@& o 3@& izfrekg ds fglkc ls fdjk;s ij fn;k x;k\ oknh 2& vk;k izfroknh fMQkYVj gks pqdk gS\ 3& vk;k oknh izfroknh ls 288@& :i;k fdjk;s dk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 4& vk;k uksfVl xSj dkuwuh gS\ 5& vk;k eq[r;kj uke xSj dkuwuh gS\ 6& vuqrks"k\ " Note:- That during the pendency of the suit in the Court of Munsiff, an application for substitution of the new plaintiffs in place of original plaintiffs was filed on 31-10-1983 by the present respondents stating that all rights in respect of dispute property have been given to Sochiya Mataji Sanstha, Pokaran by the original plaintiffs and thus, now they may be substituted in place of the original plaintiffs. The reply to this application was filed by the defendant appellant on 20-2-1984. The learned Munsiff vide his order dated 17-9- 1984 allowed the said application. Thus, the present respondents plaintiffs were substituted in place of original plaintiffs. An amended cause title was also filed in the lower Court. 6. In the Court of Munsiff, four witnesses were produced on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents and one witness was produced on behalf of the defendant appellant. 7. The learned Munsiff, Pokaran vide his judgment dated 9-3-1987 decided issue No. 1 against the substituted plaintiffs-respondents holding that both the original plaintiffs as well as the substituted plaintiffs-respondents have not been able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant with defendant appellant or in other words, it has not been proved by the plaintiffs-respondents that they are the landlord and the defendant appellant is their tenant. Hence, he dismissed the suit. 8. Against the judgment and decree dated 9- 3-1987 passed by the learned Munsiff, Pokaran, substituted plaintiffs-respondents preferred first appeal before the Court of Additional Judge, Jaisalmer. Hence, he dismissed the suit. 8. Against the judgment and decree dated 9- 3-1987 passed by the learned Munsiff, Pokaran, substituted plaintiffs-respondents preferred first appeal before the Court of Additional Judge, Jaisalmer. The learned Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer vide his judgment and decree dated 8- 9-1988 allowed the appeal filed by the substituted plaintiffs-respondents and reversed the judgment and decree dated 9-3-1987 passed by the learned Munsiff, Pokaran and thus, decreed the suit of the substituted plaintiffs respondents for eviction of the defendant appellant on the ground of denial of title as envisaged under Section 13(1)(f) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short the Act of 1950'). 9. While decreeing the suit of the substituted plaintiffs respondents, the learned Additional District Judge came to the following conclusions after discussing the evidence on record:- 1. That the owner of the disputed property was in the beginning original plaintiffs Narayandas and Manaklal. 2. That in the beginning, this disputed property was in the possession of PW2 Manaklal as tenant of the original plaintiffs before present defendant appellant was put in possession as tenant. 3. That the disputed property was taken later on by present defendant appellant on rent from PW1 Satyanarayan, who is Mukhtar of the original plaintiffs. 4. That now the substituted plaintiffs respondents are the owner of the disputed property. 5. That the substituted plaintiffs-respondents were competent to file first appeal before the Court of Additional District Judge. 6. That the original suit, Such was filed in the Court of Munsiff, Pokaran, was filed by PW1 Satyanarayan, Mukhtar of the original plaintiff and he was competent to file the suit on behalf of the original plaintiffs. 7. That since the defendant appellant has denied the title of the landlord, therefore, he is liable to be evicted on the ground of Section 13(1)(f) of the Act of 1950. 8. That since PW2 Manaklal states that he was tenant before 14 years back and for the last 10 years defendant appellant is the tenant, in these circumstances, the case of the defendant appellant that he has been in possession of the disputed premises since long back and from the days of his ancestors becomes doubtful and no evidence has been produced by the defendant appellant to substantiate his case on this point. Hence, the appeal was allowed and suit was decreed. 10. Hence, the appeal was allowed and suit was decreed. 10. Against the judgment and decree dated 8-9-1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer, the present appellant defendant has filed this second appeal in this Court on 4-11-1988. 11. This Court while admitting this second appeal on 28-8-1989 formulated the following substantial question of law:- 1. Whether the Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer has misread the evidence in arriving to his conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed in between original plaintiffs Narain Das and Manaklal on the one hand and defendant Sukhdev on the other hand? 2. Whether the suit in the names of the present plaintiffs without impleading 'Sochiya Mataji' to whom the suit property has been gifted by the original plaintiffs Narain Das and Manaklal is maintainable? 3. Whether the suit for ejectment could be decreed against the defendant on the ground of denial of the title when it was not so-pleaded in the plaint and issue not framed on this point? 4. Whether the findings of the Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer that the defendant had not complied with the provisions of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 is perverse." 12. The learned counsel for the appellant defendant vehemently argued that the findings of judgment dated 8-9-1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer are perverse and contrary to law and thus, deserve to be set aside in the light of the questions formulated above. He has further argued that since the first appellate Court i.e. Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer has misread the evidence and, therefore, in this second appeal, this point can be raised as substantial question of law. He has relied on the following rulings:- 1. M.M. Chetti v. C. Coomaraswamy Naidu & Sons, AIR 1980 Madras 212 . 2. Tarachand v. Paltu Nath, 1996 (3) Current Civil Cases 244 Raj . 3. Syed Walliuddin v. Mst. Rafiqua Bibi, 1986 RLR 954 . 4. Surain Singh (dead) by LR's v. Mehenga (dead) by LR's, 1996 (1) CCC 251 (SC) .) 5. Smt. Mehrunnisa v. Smt. Visham Kumari, AIR 1998 SC 427 . 13. 2. Tarachand v. Paltu Nath, 1996 (3) Current Civil Cases 244 Raj . 3. Syed Walliuddin v. Mst. Rafiqua Bibi, 1986 RLR 954 . 4. Surain Singh (dead) by LR's v. Mehenga (dead) by LR's, 1996 (1) CCC 251 (SC) .) 5. Smt. Mehrunnisa v. Smt. Visham Kumari, AIR 1998 SC 427 . 13. On the contrary, it has been argued on behalf of the substituted plaintiffs-respondents that in second appeal, the findings of facts recorded by the first appellate Court i.e. Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer cannot be appreciated and thus, the findings arrived at by the first appellate Court on various issues are correct one and this Court cannot interfere with them in second appeal. The learned counsel for the substituted plaintiffs respondents had relied on the following rulings:- 1. Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, AIR 1999 SC 864 . 2. Ninge Gowda v. Linge Gowda, (1997) 1 SCC 477 . 3. Chairman, Raj State Elecy. Board v. Bhinwa Ram, 1999 (2) WLC (Raj) 180 . 4. Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh, AIR 1998 SC 3021 . 5. Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Das, AIR 1999 SC 3248 . 14. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and gone through the records and decisions cited by the parties. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 has held that where the finding by the Court of facts is vitiated by non consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. 16. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 has held that where the finding by the Court of facts is vitiated by non consideration of relevant evidence or by an essentially erroneous approach to the matter, the High Court is not precluded from recording proper findings. 16. After going through the case law cited by both the counsel, the following position of law emerges:-That as a rule High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be or as a rule in second appeal, finding of fact should not be disturbed, but if, they are based on no evidence or in disregard of evidence or on inadmissible evidence or against the basic principles of law or on the face of it there appears error of law or procedure or when there is a complete variance between pleadings and proof, or based on mere surmises and conjectures or inadmissible evidence or it misreads the evidence i.e. assumes certain evidence to exist where there is none of vice verse, if it disregards or fails to consider material evidence in arriving at the conclusion, such type of findings can be disturbed in second appeal, as they would amount to committing an error of law. 17. Looking to the above proposition of law, facts and findings of this case are being examined. 18. Before proceeding further something about relationship of landlord and tenant with special reference to the provisions of the Act of 1950 should be discussed. 19. The expression 'title' in Rent Control Act means the title of landlord on the basis of which he can base his suit for eviction and does not refer to the proprietary rights or ownership of the premises which are immaterial to the right of eviction is concerned. It is however made clear that as a general rule where a suit is filed on the basis of tenancy and relationship of landlord and tenant, such suit should be decided on the basis of tenancy alone and it should not be converted into a title suit. 20. It is however made clear that as a general rule where a suit is filed on the basis of tenancy and relationship of landlord and tenant, such suit should be decided on the basis of tenancy alone and it should not be converted into a title suit. 20. But, previously it was the view of the Rajasthan High Court that whenever the relationship of landlord and tenant is challenged or denied in a suit, the Court have to decide this question first and then it can assume jurisdiction to proceed further. This view also found place in some other High Courts, but later on it was felt that the denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant has become a common practice in form of defence in every case and then the view was revised by the Court. Now it is settled law that it is not necessary for the Court to hold an enquiry first for deciding the question of relationship of landlord and tenant. Thus, the question of relationship of landlord and tenant now can be decided simultaneously. 21. Before proceeding further something about the burden of proof in civil Cases has to be stated. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Moksh Builders & Financiers Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 409 while dealing with the burden of proof has observed that the burden of proof is not static, and may shift during the course of the evidence. Thus, while the burden initially rests on the party who would fail if no evidence is led at all, after the evidence is recorded, it rests upon the party against whom judgment would be given if no further evidence were adduced by either side. Where evidence has been led by the contesting parties on the question in issue, abstract consideration of onus are out of place, and the truth or otherwise of the case must always be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties. 23. In Ramji Davawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import, AIR 1985 SC 2085 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that where both the parties have led evidence, the burden of proof would assume secondary importance. 24. In Smt. Rebit Devi v. Ram Dutt, AIR 1998 SC 310 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when both sides adduce evidence oral and documentary, question of burden of proof would pale into insignificance. 24. In Smt. Rebit Devi v. Ram Dutt, AIR 1998 SC 310 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when both sides adduce evidence oral and documentary, question of burden of proof would pale into insignificance. 25. In Raghunathi v. Raju Ramappa Shetty, AIR 1991 SC 1040 , it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that once the parties have been permitted to produce evidence in support of their respective cases and it is not their grievance that any evidence was shut out, the question of burden of proof loses significance and remains only academic. 26. The burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue and not upon the party who denies it. This rule of convenience has been adopted in practice, not because it is impossible to prove a negative, but because the negative does not admit of the direct and simple proof of which the affirmative is capable. Moreover, it is but reasonable and just that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact, should be called upon to prove his own case. In the application of this rule, regard must be had to the substance and effect of the issue, and not to its grammatical form for in many cases the party, by making a slight alteration in the drawing of his pleadings, may give the issue a negative or affirmative form, at his pleasure. 27. On difference between evidence in civil and criminal proceedings, it can be said that the rules of evidence are in general the same in civil and criminal proceedings, and bind alike State and citizen, prosecutor and accused, plaintiff and defendant, counsel and client. There are, however, some exceptions, e.g. the doctrine of estoppel applies to civil proceedings only, the provisions relating to confessions (Ss. 24-30), character of persons appearing before Courts (Ss. 53, 54), and incompetence of parties as witnesses (S. 120), are peculiar to criminal proceedings. 28. In civil cases, a Judge of fact must find for the party in whose favour there is a preponderance of proof, though the evidence is not entirely free from doubt. 29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sayyad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 has expressed the difference between evidence in civil and criminal proceedings in the following manner:- ". . . . 29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sayyad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 has expressed the difference between evidence in civil and criminal proceedings in the following manner:- ". . . . There is a marked difference as to the effect of evidence, viz, the proof, in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings, a mere preponderance of probability is sufficient and the defendant is not necessarily entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, but in criminal proceedings the persuasion of guilt must amount to such a moral certainty as convinces the mind of the Court, as a reasonable man beyond all reasonable doubt." 30. In civil cases, it is the duty of the parties to place their case before the Court as they think best so that the Court can arrive at the correct conclusion. 31. Keeping in mind the scope of the High Court in second appeal, in dealing with the question of title in Rent Control Cases and looking to the scope of burden of proof in civil cases, the findings of the first appellate Court i.e. Additional District Judge are being examined now.Issue No. 1 32. The issue No. 1 has two aspects:- (a) whether the original plaintiffs are the owners of the disputed house and bada; and (b) whether the same were given to the defendant appellant on monthly rent of Rs. 5/- and Rs. 3/- respectively on 2-5-1976 by the original plaintiffs. 33. The conclusions which the learned Additional District Judge has arrived at after discussing the evidence, have been narrated in para No. 9 of this judgment. 34. The reasons for arriving at the findings on Issue No. 1 have been mentioned in para 4 of the Impugned judgment of the learned Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge has relied on the statements of PW1- Satyanarayan, PW2-Manaklal, PW3-Gokaldas and PW4 Vasudeo produced on behalf of the. plaintiffs respondents and also on rent note Ex. 4 which was executed by PW2 Manaklal in favour of the original plaintiffs for the same premises on which at present defendant appellant is in occupation. The learned Additional District Judge has relied on the statements of PW1- Satyanarayan, PW2-Manaklal, PW3-Gokaldas and PW4 Vasudeo produced on behalf of the. plaintiffs respondents and also on rent note Ex. 4 which was executed by PW2 Manaklal in favour of the original plaintiffs for the same premises on which at present defendant appellant is in occupation. In my opinion, the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge on issue No. 1 in.para 4 of the impugned judgment, are based on the evidence best available so far in the present case and produced by the parties, as they would be revealed from the discussion later on. 35. PW1 Satyanarayan is the Mukhtar of the original plaintiffs and he has stated in his examination that the disputed house and bada were given to the defendant appellant on monthly rent of Rs. 5/- and Rs. 3/- respectively and thereafter, no rent was ever paid by the defendant appellant and, furthermore, a notice terminating his tenancy Ex. 2 on 23-10-1978 was given to the defendant appellant and receipt and AD of that notice is Ex. 3 and it was received by the defendant appellant and no reply has been given by the defendant appellant. In cross examination, he has admitted that:- (1) the full house now is in occupation of the defendant appellant. Note:-Though in examination in chief he has stated that some portion was in occupation. (2) the original plaintiffs live in Maharashtra. (3) On refusal by the defendant appellant for payment of rent, the suit has been filed after four years. (4) the power of attorney Ex. 1 was executed in Maharashtra in which three persons including him were authorised by the original plaintiffs. 36. PW2 Manaklal is the witness with whom the disputed property was in possession before it came in possession of the defendant appellant and he has clearly stated in his statement that Ex. 4 rent note was executed by him in favour of the original plaintiffs and he was put in possession by one Mohanlal.Note:- Mohanlal is the father of PW1 Satyanarayan therefore, it cannot be said that he was stranger and this Mohanlal has died. 37. This point also substances that WW1 Satyanarayan is the Karta Dharta of the original plaintiffs respondents and before him, his father was doing the job for the original plaintiffs respondents. 38. 37. This point also substances that WW1 Satyanarayan is the Karta Dharta of the original plaintiffs respondents and before him, his father was doing the job for the original plaintiffs respondents. 38. PW3 Gokaldas has clearly stated in his statement that Ex. 4 rent note was in his writing, but in cross examination, he has admitted that PW2 Manaklal paid rent in his presence, though PW2 Manaklal states otherwise. 39. PW4 Vasudeo is also the witness of the same locality. He also supports the case of the plaintiffs respondents. 40. In rebuttal, the defendant appellant himself appeared in the witness box as DW1 and states that he never took the disputes premises on rent from PW1 Satyanarayan and in cross-examination, he states that his father has two brothers and he did not know the patta was In whose name and he has no documentary proof for the disputed house and bada and he has no enmity with PW2 Manaklal and he cannot say whether before him, PW2 Manaklal was in occupation of the disputed premises etc. Thus, defendant appellant has not been able to prove his stand. 41. So far as the Ex. 1 power of attorney is concerned, it is dated 27-9-1978, the same is attested by the Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Shamgaon, Maharashtra and in that power of attorney, the original plaintiffs have clearly authorised three persons including PW1 Satyanarayan not only to file suit, but also to pursue the suit up to the stage of appeal etc. and in that power of attorney, it is clearly mentioned that PW1 Satyanarayan has given the disputed premises on rent to the defendant appellant and this is a special power of attorney. 42. Some words about the legal position of power of attorney should also be mentioned before considering the power of attorney Ex. 1 in this case. 43. Power of attorney or letter of attorney is an authority whereby one Is set in the tune, stead or place of another" to act for him. The authority in writing is the power of attorney. The person authorised to do any lawful act in the stead of another is called the attorney or the donee of the power of attorney. The person who gives the power is called the donor. 44. A power of attorney may be executed jointly by a number of persons as the principles. The person authorised to do any lawful act in the stead of another is called the attorney or the donee of the power of attorney. The person who gives the power is called the donor. 44. A power of attorney may be executed jointly by a number of persons as the principles. It may also be executed in favour of one person or a number of persons as the attorney or attorneys. A power of attorney is either general or special A Power attorney is either general or special A power of attorney in regard to a single transaction is known as a special power of attorney. Where the power authorizes the attorney to act generally or in more than one transaction it is known as a general power of attorney. 45. In the present case, looking to the contents of Ex. 1 power of attorney, it appears that PW1 Satyanarayan and two more persons were authorised to file suit etc. against the defendant appellant and in pursuance of that specific power of attorney, if the steps have been taken by PW1 Satyanarayan, it cannot be said that he was not authorised to do so nor it can be said that this power of attorney Ex. 1 is invalid, merely because it was executed in Bombay and not in the presence of PW1 Satyanarayan. Presence of donee at the time of execution of power of attorney is not necessary. Not only this, from Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, genuineness of the power of attorney (Ex. 1) can be presumed, if the same is executed before the Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate etc. In the present case, Ex. 1 power of attorney was executed before the Magistrate, therefore, its genuineness cannot be doubted and the argument that it is illegal, was rightly rejected by the learned Additional District Judge. Thus, this also strengthens the case of the plaintiffs-respondents. 46. In Ex. 2 notice also, the case of the original plaintiffs that the defendant appellant is their tenant is clearly mentioned, though no reply has been given by the defendant appellant. It also helps to the plaintiffs-respondents. 47. Thus, this also strengthens the case of the plaintiffs-respondents. 46. In Ex. 2 notice also, the case of the original plaintiffs that the defendant appellant is their tenant is clearly mentioned, though no reply has been given by the defendant appellant. It also helps to the plaintiffs-respondents. 47. To say that Narayandas and Mohanlal have not been produced and in absence of this, title and tenancy cannot be proved, is wrong, inasmuch as, PW1 Satyanarayan, who is attorney of these two persons, has been produced in the Court and he has proved the case as he had put forward the case on behalf of the original plaintiffs. Hence, their non-production is not fatal in this case and the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant defendant on this point is rejected. 48. In the above circumstances, the findings of the learned Additional District Judge that from the evidence on record, it clearly appears that the disputed property was in the possession of PW2 as tenant before it was given to the present defendant appellant and this fact is being corroborated by Ex. 4 rent note and the witnesses PW3 Gokaldas and PW4 Vasudeo, who hail from the same locality also support the case and further-more, from the statement of PW 1 Satyanarayan, it further appears that the disputed premises were given on rent to the defendant appellant, are Correct one and they do not suffer from any infirmity and it cannot be said that the learned Additional District Judge has misread the evidence, as alleged by the learned counsel for the appellant defendant. If there are minor discrepancies in the statement of witnesses, they do not affect the testimony of these witnesses. 49. If there are minor discrepancies in the statement of witnesses, they do not affect the testimony of these witnesses. 49. It may be stated that after the evidence is led by both the parties, the burden of proof would assume secondary importance and from this point of view also, when the evidence has been led by the defendant appellant also on the point that he is in possession of the disputed property as owner, but he has miserably failed to prove his case on this point, therefore, in the probability if the learned Additional District Judge has come to the conclusion that the original plaintiffs were the owners of the disputed property and the defendant appellant was their tenant, he has committed no mistake and his findings do not suffer from any infirmity and it can be said that they are based on the evidence best available in this case and the defendant appellant in such circumstances, cannot get the benefit of doubt. 50. The findings of the learned Additional District Judge on issue No. 1 are not based on surmises or conjectures, but based on the oral evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3 & PW4 and apart from this evidence, there is some documentary evidence available in Ex. 2 notice, Ex. 4 rent note and also in the power of attorney Ex. 1. 51. Therefore, to say that the learned Additional District Judge has based his decision on irrelevant or inadmissible evidence or has misread the evidence or has based his decision on no evidence, is wrong and whatever conclusions have been arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge, they are based on evidence on record and since these are findings of facts and they do not suffer from any infirmity or error of law or procedure and thus should not be disturbed in second appeal. 52. Hence, the findings given by the learned Additional District Judge on issue No. 1 that the original plaintiffs were the owners of the disputed house and bada and the defendant appellant was their tenant since 2-5-1976 are liable to be confirmed and they are confirmed. The issue No. 1 was rightly decided by the learned Additional District Judge in favour of the plaintiffs respondents. 53. The issue No. 1 was rightly decided by the learned Additional District Judge in favour of the plaintiffs respondents. 53. In this case, by producing the so-called evidence, the plaintiffs respondents have discharged their burden in proving the issues No. 1, while on the other hand, the defendant appellant has miserably failed to prove his case that he Wad in possession of the disputed premises as owner. 54. Thus, the substantial question No. 1 is decided in the manner that that the learned Additional District Judge has not misread the evidence in arriving to his conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed in between original plaintiffs Narain Das and Manaklal on the one hand and defendant Sukhdev on the other hand. 55. So far as the substantial question No. 2 is concerned, the learned Additional District Judge has found that by the order dated 17-9-1984, the present respondents plaintiffs were substituted in place of the original plaintiffs and thus, they were competent to file the first appeal. In my opinion, his findings should not be disturbed in second appeal, inasmuch as, this order was passed on 17-9-1984 by the learned Munsiff, Pokaran after hearing both the parties including the defendant appellant himself and, therefore, to assail this order merely on the ground that no gift deed has been produced is of no use now. Since the substituted plaintiffs were made parties during the proceedings of the suit before the trial Court, therefore, the defendant appellant was aware of all the circumstances in which they were substituted. Hence, now permitting to challenge that order dated 17-9-1984 in second appeal would amount to injustice. In view of this, the decision in Balkrishan v. Mohsin Bhai, AIR 1999 MP 86 would not be helpful to the defendant appellant, as the facts of that case are different from the facts of the present case. Thus, the argument that without adding Sochiya Mataji, the present substituted plaintiffs respondents could not be substituted, is not tenable, in view of the fact that the present substituted plaintiffs respondents are the trustees of the said Sochiya Mataji Trust. 56. Thus, the argument that without adding Sochiya Mataji, the present substituted plaintiffs respondents could not be substituted, is not tenable, in view of the fact that the present substituted plaintiffs respondents are the trustees of the said Sochiya Mataji Trust. 56. Therefore, the substantial question No. 2 Is decided in the manner that the suit in the names of the present substituted plaintiffs without impleading Sochiya Mataji to whom the suit property has been gifted by the original plaintiffs Narain Das and Manakial is maintainable.Substantial Question No. 3 57. The learned Additional District Judge has decreed the suit of the substituted plaintiffs respondents on the point that the defendant appellant has denied the title of landlord taking the recourse of Section 13(1)(f) of the Act of 1950. 58. In this case, there is no doubt that to substantiate the ground of ejectment as mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act of 1950, no specific Issue is framed, nor there are specific pleadings of the parties. Thus, the question is whether in absence of above, whether the ground on which a decree for eviction has been passed can be substantiated or not? 59. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by LRs., 1989 (4) SCC 732 held that amendment of plaint not necessary to maintain the subsequent ground of denial of title and the ground of eviction is maintainable even without amendment of the plaint. 60. This point has come many times before this Court and in a series of judgments, it has been answered in the manner that the landlord can seek eviction of tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act of 1950 in the absence of specific issue or pleadings. 61. 60. This point has come many times before this Court and in a series of judgments, it has been answered in the manner that the landlord can seek eviction of tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act of 1950 in the absence of specific issue or pleadings. 61. In Lallu Narayan v. Ratan Chand Lunia, 1989 (1) RLR 475 (DB Reference) , the following question was referred:- "WHETHER the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act in the absence of specific pleading, issue and evidence in that regard and for that purpose the ground set out in Section 134(1)(f) of the Act stands on a different footing from the other grounds of eviction contained in Section 13(1) of the Act?" It was answered in the following manner:- "The landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act, in the absence of specific pleading and issue, if the parties went to trial on that ground when no real prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant. Although, the ground set out in Section 3(1)(f) does not stand on a different footing from the other grounds, still, the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act can be examined on merits in the aforesaid situation." 62. Thus, from the above, it is clear that the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground mentioned in Section 13(1)(f) of the Act of 1950, in the absence of specific pleadings and issue, if the parties went to trial on that ground when no real prejudice is shown to have been caused to the tenant. In this regard, following rulings may also be seen:- 1. Lallu Narain v. Ratan Chand Lunia, 1989 (2) RLR 789 2. Ram Lal v. Girraj, 1992 (2) RLW 147 . 3. Bishan Singh v. Virendra Verma, 1992 (1) RLW 506 . 4. Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad, AIR 1995 Rajasthan 87 . 63. In the present case, the defendant appellant has denied the title of landlord from the very beginning through his written statement and in the statement as DW1 as well. 3. Bishan Singh v. Virendra Verma, 1992 (1) RLW 506 . 4. Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad, AIR 1995 Rajasthan 87 . 63. In the present case, the defendant appellant has denied the title of landlord from the very beginning through his written statement and in the statement as DW1 as well. Thus, when the first appellate Court has given the finding that the disputed property belongs to the plaintiffs respondents and defendant appellant is their tenant, then, in such circumstances, a decree on the ground of denial of title as envisaged under Section 13(1)(f) can be passed, though there are no specific pleadings and issue on this point. Thus, the findings of the first appellate Court i.e. Additional District Judge do not suffer from any infirmity from this point of view also and they are liable to be confirmed. 64. It may be stated that the issue of denial of title is a question of fact and not law and from this point of view also, the findings of the first appellate Court on this point cannot be disturbed in second appeal, as they are based on correct appreciation of evidence. 65. Thus, the substantial question No. 3 is decided in the manner that the suit for ejectment could be decreed against the defendant on the ground of denial of the title when it was not so pleaded in the plaint and issue not framed on this point. 66. So far as the substantial question No. 4 is concerned, it need not be decided now as the main points have been covered.For the aforesaid reasons, this second appeal of the defendant appellant fails and is dismissed by affirming the judgment and decree dated 8-9- 1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jaisalmer. Three months' time is granted to the appellant defendant to vacate the suit premises. No order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******