Judgment : 1. The applicant/first defendant has filed this application under O.14, Rule 10 of Original Side Rules read with O.1, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code to permit him to implead the proposed parties as party defendants in the suit. 2. Thecase in brief is as follows: The applicant is the first defendant in C.S.No.1532 of 1993. The first respondent/plaintiff has filed the suit for recovery of money for certain alleged advances made to the applicant company. The first defendant company is not the actual receiver of the amounts. Respondents 5 to 7 who are the proposed parties, are the officials of the plaintiff bank committed fraud in misappropriating monies from the bank in the guise of advances to the first defendant company in collusion with the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant purporting to be the Managing Director had no authority to bind the company signed various documents on behalf of the company and the proposed parties have advanced the money from the bank, who had been siphoning all the monies for their personal benefits and not for the first defendant company. They have violated all codes and instructions for advance of funds to companies. First of all the 1st defendant company is at Vazhapadi, with its registered office at Salem. No account can be opened in Madras for the company. The account should have been opened at Salem. The first proposed party was then Regional Manager at Madras and the 2nd proposed party is the Branch Manager, who have joined hands with the 2nd defendant in looting the public money in the name of the 1st defendant company and the third proposed party is an officer in the Vigilance Cell and had been hand in gloves in this transaction. The proposed parties being parties to the fraud and misappropriation are jointly and severally liable to the suit claim and not the first defendant company. They are necessary parties. 3. Thelearned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff opposed the application and contended that the bank had filed suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.46,62,100 with interest under open cash credit facility, and for a sum of Rs.61,12,952.35 under medium term loan facility with interest and for a sum of Rs.3,97,542.71 under the Advance Bills Facility together with interest against defendants 1 to 4. The first defendant is the company, engaged in the business of spinning and weaving mills, cotton mills and jute mills. Defendants 2 to 4 are the guarantors. Learned counsel for the first respondent further stated that the first respondent bank is a Nationalised Bank and after passing of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Act 51 of 1993), the suit ought to have been transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. In spite of several letters given by the learned counsel, this Court has not transferred the suit to the Debt Recovery Tribunal and, as such, requested to pass an order to transfer the suit before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 4. Heard the learned counsel of parties. 5. Thepoints that arise for consideration are: .(1) Whether the proposed parties are necessary parties to be impleaded as defendants in the suit. .(2) Whether C.S.No.1532 of 1993 has to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 6. Point: It is not in dispute that the first respondent has filed a suit against defendants 1 to 4 for recovery of more than Rs. one crore under various terms and conditions. The applicant is the first defendant company. Learned counsel for the first defendant contended that the 2nd defendant purporting to be the Managing Director had no authority to bind the company and he had singed various documents on behalf of the company and the proposed parties, who are working in the first respondent bank, have advanced money from the bank to him, who had siphoned all the monies for their personal benefit and not for the first defendant company. Learned counsel further stated that the 5th respondent was the Regional Manager at Madras, 6th respondent was the Branch Manager and the 7th respondent was an Officer working in Vigilance Cell of the bank and all of them hand in gloves with the 2nd defendant have committed fraud and, as such, they should be impleaded as necessary parties to the suit. Learned counsel further stated that only when there is a debt legally due, it can be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. In the present case, the bank officials have committed fraud in giving loan and, as such, the suit cannot be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal and contended that it has to be tried only before this Court. 7. In the present case, the bank officials have committed fraud in giving loan and, as such, the suit cannot be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal and contended that it has to be tried only before this Court. 7. Thedebt is defined under Sec.2(g) of Act 5 of 1993 as follows: “‘Debt’ means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is alleged as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or otherwise and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on the date of the application.” 8. Sec.18 of the Act relates to Bar of jurisdiction, which reads as follows: “On and from the appointed day, no court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in Sec.17.” Sec.31(1) of the Act reads as follows: “Every suit or other proceeding pending before any court immediately before the date of establishment of a tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such tribunal: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court.” Sec.34(1) of the Act reads as follows: “ Act to have overriding effect: Save as provided under Sub-sec.(2), the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.” 9. As adverted to, the suit was filed by the first respondent bank against defendants 1 to 4 for recovery of a debt. As adverted to, the suit was filed by the first respondent bank against defendants 1 to 4 for recovery of a debt. Normally, after the passing of Act 51 of 1993 and after the constitution of the Tribunal, the suit ought to have been transferred to the file of Debt Recovery Tribunal. By operation of law, the transfer ought to have been made by this Court; but unfortunately, it has not been done for the last seven years. It is not necessary that the bank should file an application, seeking transfer of the suit from this Court to the file of Debt Recovery Tribunal. The language employed under Sec.31(1) namely ‘shall’ is important to be borne in mind. In spite of the mandatory provision, the suit has not been transferred and kept in cold storage for all these years. Learned counsel for the first respondent bank stated that already letters have been given by him and in spite of this, it has not been transferred. .10. Per contra, learned counsel for the applicant/first defendant contended that respondents 5 to 7 are necessary parties since they have committed fraud in advancing money and moreover, when fraud had been committed by the bank officials in giving loan and moreover, the 2nd defendant had siphoned of the monies, these disputes cannot be decided by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Unless the proposed parties are impleaded as defendants 5 to 7 in the suit, they may not be able to get justice and these questions can be decided only before this Court. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant. In fact, even according to the affidavit, the 2nd defendant purported to act as Managing Director of the applicant company, availed loan from the bank and if he had siphoned of the money, it is a dispute between the applicant and the other defendants. Even assuming that respondents 5 to 7, bank officials have committed fraud, it is a matter to be dealt with by the police under proper investigation and this Court cannot investigate into a criminal act alleged to have been committed by the bank officials. It is open to the applicant to give a complaint to the Police Officials, who can act in accordance with law. It is open to the applicant to give a complaint to the Police Officials, who can act in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the applicant has not filed any record to show that no loan had been sanctioned to the applicant company. On the other hand, the stand taken by the applicant company itself is that the loan had been sanctioned and it has been siphoned of by the 2nd defendant. Moreover, it is a matter to be decided only on proper evidence and whatever defence available to the applicant company can be agitated before the Debt Recovery Tribunal when the matter is taken up for trial. 11. Learned counsel for the applicant relied on Bank of India v. Vijay Ramniklal Kapadia , A.I.R. 1997 Guj. 75 relating to a case, wherein misappropriation of funds of the bank by its employees. It was held that it cannot be considered as a debt. It was held in the same decision that misappropriation of the amount of the bank by its employee and recovery thereof by way of suit can never be construed as a debt. This decision has no application to the case on hand. Learned counsel also relied on State Bank of India v. Vijay Kr.Tayal State Bank of India v. Vijay Kr.Tayal State Bank of India v. Vijay Kr.Tayal, A.I.R. 1997 Del. 170 wherein it was observed that in the suit filed by the bank, counter claim or cross suits founded on same or different cause of action and or amount thereof may be in excess of claim in suit, the tribunal has no authority to pass decree against bank. This decision is also not applicable to the case on hand. They also relied upon Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, A.I.R. 2000 S.C.W. 1347 wherein it was stated that the word ‘proceedings’ in Sec.31 includes an ‘execution proceedings’ pending before a civil court before the commencement of the Act. The suit and proceedings so pending on the date of the Act stand transferred to the tribunal and have to be disposed of in the same manner. This decision only supports the case of the first respondent bank. 12. Learned counsel for the first respondent bank relied on State Bank of Bikaner v. Ballabh Das and Co. State Bank of Bikaner v. Ballabh Das and Co. This decision only supports the case of the first respondent bank. 12. Learned counsel for the first respondent bank relied on State Bank of Bikaner v. Ballabh Das and Co. State Bank of Bikaner v. Ballabh Das and Co. State Bank of Bikaner v. Ballabh Das and Co., (1999)2 C.T.C. 345 decision of the Apex Court that suit filed by bank in civil court before establishment of Debt Recovery Tribunal, such suits have to be transferred to Debt Recovery Tribunal on and from date when tribunal was established. Such transfer is automatic because of operation of law. Bank need not file any application and the application filed should be treated as application for forwarding records of suits to Debt Recovery Tribunal. This decision is applicable to the case on hand. .13. Reliance is also placed upon in M/s.Har Sahaimal Tikaram and others v. Punjab National Bank and others M/s.Har Sahaimal Tikaram and others v. Punjab National Bank and others M/s.Har Sahaimal Tikaram and others v. Punjab National Bank and others , (2000)1 B.C. 7 wherein it was observed that by reason of operation of Sec.31, the civil court has lost its jurisdiction even to decide as preliminary issue…. Sub-sec.(4) read with Sec.2(g), the civil court cannot assume jurisdiction in the matter as it stood transferred automatically by fiction of law on the establishment of the tribunal and, such the question cannot be gone into. These decisions are applicable to the case on hand. 14. It is, therefore, clear from the decisions aforesaid as well as the language employed under Sec.31(1) of the Act that on and after the formation of the tribunal, the only course open to the court is to transfer the suits, wherein the value is more than Rs.10.00 lakhs. There is absolutely no reason to implead the proposed parties in the suit. The office ought to have mechanically transferred the suit without waiting for an application from the bank to transfer the suit to the file of Debt Recovery Tribunal. Now, the application as well as the suit are pending before this Court for the last seven years. The applicant is not able to establish any prima facie case that the proposed parties are necessary parties for effective adjudication of the dispute. Under the circumstance, I am of the view that the proposed parties are not necessary parties. 15. Now, the application as well as the suit are pending before this Court for the last seven years. The applicant is not able to establish any prima facie case that the proposed parties are necessary parties for effective adjudication of the dispute. Under the circumstance, I am of the view that the proposed parties are not necessary parties. 15. For the reasons stated above, the application is dismissed. Office is directed to transmit the entire records relating to the suit to the Debt Recovery Tribunal without causing further delay on or before 7. 2000. The applicant is entitled to raise all the legal objections, if any, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.