A. K. BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE above two writ petitions involve identical questions. Hence, I have heard the said writ petitions analoguously and I intend to dispose of the same by a common judgment. ( 2 ) AT the outset I intend to set out the facts and circumstances of the said two writ petitions. Prahlad Kumar Maji : In this case the writ petitioner claimed to be a successful candidate in the interview held in the post of Group "d" staff in Banagram High School, Banagram, District : Birbhum. According to writ Petitioner, his name was appearing as a second candidate whereas the name of the Respondent No. 6 was appearing at the top of the panel. For the concerned post an interview was called by the school concerned upon receipt of the list of the sponsored candidates from the District Employment Exchange in accordance with the recruitment rules prevailing at that point of time. It is the case of the writ petitioner that the Respondent No. 6 although not a sponsored candidate by the Employment Exchange was allowed to participate in the interview in terms of an order passed by this Court in a writ petition filed by the Respondent No. 6 on December 9, 1998. Relying on the Special Bench decision in the case of Debasish Dutta, reported in (1998)2 Cal LT 398 (HC) 1998, Volume II, Calcutta Law Journal, Page 2, writ petitioner contended that the name of the Respondent No. 6 should be removed from the panel and panel should be recasted accordingly. It was also contended by the writ petitioner that the Respondent No. 6 was a minor on the date when the school sought prior permission of the concerned authority to fill up the post in question. In support of such contention the writ petitioner relied on the case of Pintu Acharjya, reported in 1997 Volume 2, Calcutta Law Journal, Page 428. Prabhat Kumar Mondal : In this case, the writ petitioner also challenged the inclusion of Respondent No. 6 in the panel prepared for the post of Class-IV staff in Asadtolla Nivedita Kanya Bidyapith, Post Office : Asadtolla, District-Midnapore on the ground that the respondent No. 6 was not a sponsored candidate who allowed to participate in the interview pursuing to an order of Court. However, the question of minority was not involved in this case. However, the question of minority was not involved in this case. ( 3 ) WITH regard to the first writ petition, I find that there is no subsistence to the contention that the Respondent No. 6 could not have been considered as he was a minor on the date when prior permission was obtained by the school concerned to fill up the vacancy. I feel that the case of Pintu Acharjya (supra) has no application in the instant case. The relevant date for consideration in this regard should be the date when the selection process started. Prior permission for filling up the vacant post was not the date when the selection process has actually started although prior permission was a relevant factor to start the selection process. The selection process starts, according to me, when the school authority notifies the same either by advertisement or by asking the concerned employment exchange to send names. As in this case on the date when the names were asked by the school authority the petitioner was a major one, hence the contention of the writ petitioner on the said score is not tenable and is rejected. ( 4 ) THE other ground being identical in both the writ petitions, I now deal with the said question. ( 5 ) THE Special Bench of the our Court in the case of Debasish Dutta (supra) has categorically held that since the recruitment rule provides for preparation of panel from the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange any deviation from the same will be violative of the statutory rules and is a nullity, hence, direction from Court, directing a party whose name has not been, rightly or wrongly, sponsored by the employment exchange to appear at the interview amounts to violation of the statutory rules and even if such order is passed by any Court, the same should be considered as honest. The said Special Bench distinguished the Excise Superintendent case reported in 1996 Volume 6, Supreme Court Cases, Page 216. According to Special Bench, in the Excise Superintendant's case there was no specific rule for appointment and hence the Supreme Court directed consideration of all candidates who came through advertisement or otherwise in addition to the sponsored candidates from the concerned employment exchange. According to Special Bench, in the Excise Superintendant's case there was no specific rule for appointment and hence the Supreme Court directed consideration of all candidates who came through advertisement or otherwise in addition to the sponsored candidates from the concerned employment exchange. However, in the changed circumstances, in my view, decision in Debasish Dutta's case (supra) has been overruled by implication by the Supreme Court as discussed hereinafter. ( 6 ) LEARNED Advocate appearing for Shri Prahlad Kumar Maji submitted that his case is totally covered by the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Debasish Dutt a (supra) which is still a good law. ( 7 ) LEARNED Advocate appearing for the Respondent No. 6 cited three decision which are as follows:-i. Bhaskar Ranjan Ghosh v. Kamal Singh and Ors. reported in 2000 (II), Calcutta High Court Notes page 246. ii. Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2000, In the Supreme Court of India, Kishore Kumar Pati v. District Inspector of Schools, Midnapore and Ors. (Unreported ). iii. Abani Mahato v. Kanchan Kumar Sinha and Ors. reported in 2000 (Vol. VII) Supreme Page 98. ( 8 ) RELYING on the aforesaid three decisions the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 6 submitted that the decision of the Special Bench had been overruled by implication. ( 9 ) IN the case of Prabhat Kumar Mondal, the learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner adopted the submission made by the counsel appearing in the other matter for the writ petitioner. In addition to the said submission it was submitted that the recruitment rules provide for the selection of candidates through employment exchange, hence order of Court directing any candidate to appear at the interview whose name had not been sponsored, was contrary to the recruitment rules and was a nullity. According to the learned counsel the Court should not direct the school authority to violate the statute. According to him, the appointment, if given to the writ petitioner would amount to violation of statutory rules which is not permitted in law. In conclusion he submitted that Court can direct a authority to act in accordance with law but not to violate the same. In support of his contention he cited two decisions reported in 1999, Calcutta Law Times Vol. I, Page 509 and 1999, Calcutta Law Times, Vol-II, Page 158. In conclusion he submitted that Court can direct a authority to act in accordance with law but not to violate the same. In support of his contention he cited two decisions reported in 1999, Calcutta Law Times Vol. I, Page 509 and 1999, Calcutta Law Times, Vol-II, Page 158. The Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 6 in the other matter adopted the submission made on behalf of the Respondent No. 6 in the case of Prahlad Kumar Maji. ( 10 ) THE point in issue had already been settled by our Special Bench in the case of Debasish Dutta (supra ). It is true that point-in-issue in the above two writ petitions were actually covered by the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Debasish Dutta (supra ). ( 11 ) THE only question which remains, is whether the said Special Bench decision is still a good law in view of the subsequent two Supreme Court decision. In the case of Kishore Kumar Pati which is an unreported decision the Supreme Court dealt with an appointment in a school in Midnapore and was pleased to hold as follows :-"the short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was justified in annuling the recruitment in favour of the appellant on the sole ground that in the absence of any sponsoring by the Employment Exchange, the petitioner could not have at all been considered for the post in question. " it transpires that the learned single judge by orders dated 16. 11. 1998 and 05. 12. 1998 directed the concerned authorities to consider the case of the present appellant as well as respondent No. 7 in interview notwithstanding the fact that their names had not been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. This view of the learned single judge cannot be said to be erroneous. Pursuant to the said order, the appellant and respondent No. 7 did appear in the interview and though the appointment was found suitable, yet Respondent No. 7 was found unsuitable. The orders of the learned single judge directing the authorities to allow the appellant and respondent No. 7 to be interviewed were not assailed and thus became final. Pursuant to the said order, the appellant and respondent No. 7 did appear in the interview and though the appointment was found suitable, yet Respondent No. 7 was found unsuitable. The orders of the learned single judge directing the authorities to allow the appellant and respondent No. 7 to be interviewed were not assailed and thus became final. In that view of the matter, in the second round of litigation, the Division Bench was totally in error to annul the appointment made in favour of the appellant after interviewing him pursuant to the orders of the learned single judge, which has attained finality, is without jurisdiction and we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench was in error in setting aside the appointment of the appellant. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 7, contended that in the writ appeal filed by him before the Division Bench, he has raised several questions which have not been answered and therefore it would be appropriate for this Court to remit the matter to the Division Bench for re-disposal. On going through the counter-affidavit and the impugned judgment of the High Court, we do not find any contention raised not being answered by the Division Bench. On the other hand, the Division Bench has disposed of the appeal on the ground that the consideration of the case of the appellant and Respondent No. 7 whose case has not been sponsored by the Employment Exchange is not sustainable in law and as we have said view is not correct. In that view of the matter, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and allow this appeal. Needless to mention that the appellant would be entitled to the salary from the date he joined pursuant to the orders passed in his favour. This appeal stands allowed accordingly. " ( 12 ) THE next Supreme Court decision in case of Abani Mahato the Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision in Kishore Kumar Pati and held the same view. ( 13 ) PARAGRAPH 4 of the said judgment in Abani Mahato is quoted below :"learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the legal decision of this Court in Kishore Kumar Pati v. District Inspector of Schools, Midnapore and Ors. ( 13 ) PARAGRAPH 4 of the said judgment in Abani Mahato is quoted below :"learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the legal decision of this Court in Kishore Kumar Pati v. District Inspector of Schools, Midnapore and Ors. dated 10th January, 2000 in which it has been held that it was not necessary that the name should have been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Be that as it may, what is important in the present case is, that the appellant herein had been directed by the High Court in an earlier proceeding to be considered for appointment and be interviewed. That judgment of the High Court dated 7th August, 1997 was not challenged and had become final. This being so, the selection which was made should not be quashed. We allow these appeals, set aside the decision of the single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and direct the respondents to take further proceedings pursuant to the panel which had been constituted by the Selection Committee. It is further made clear that the salary to the appellant will be paid only from the date he joins duty pursuant to the orders passed in his favour. Formality be completed within two months. No costs. " ( 14 ) BOTH the Supreme Court decisions are related to an appointment under the same recruitment rules which are prevailing in the instant two writ petitions. The Supreme Court did not make any distinction while applying the Excise Supreintendant's case as has been done by our Special Bench. However, the learned advocate for the writ petitioners contended the decisions in Debasish Dutta (supra) was not placed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. ( 15 ) BE that as it may, from the tenor of the two Supreme Court judgments it is absolutely clear that the decision in Debasish Dutta had virtually been overruled by the Apex Court by implication. ( 16 ) SINCE the subsequent two Supreme Court decisions had over ruled the three bench decision in Debasish Dutta I did not feel it necessary to discuss the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Bhaskar Ranjan Ghosh (supra ). ( 16 ) SINCE the subsequent two Supreme Court decisions had over ruled the three bench decision in Debasish Dutta I did not feel it necessary to discuss the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Bhaskar Ranjan Ghosh (supra ). ( 17 ) IN the result I hold that since the Respondent No. 6 had been allowed to participate in the interview pursuant to the direction of this Court, his case should be considered for appointment, if he is otherwise found eligible. ( 18 ) BOTH the writ petitions are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there should be no order as to cost. ( 19 ) MR. Haradhan Mondal appearing for the writ petitioner in the matter Prahlad Majhi prays for stay of operation of this judgment and order passed today. Since the subject matter involves questions of law including the interpretation of the decision of the Special Bench as well as the Apex Court I grant stay of operation of the order passed today for a period of two weeks after the x-mas vacation. Since both the writ petitions are disposed of by a common judgment, though no prayer is made for stay of operation of the order in the other matter being W. P. No. 10602 (W) of 1999 the same is stayed for a period of 2 weeks after the X-mass vacation. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, be supplied on usual undertakings. Petitions disposed of