M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) ). WHAT is the effect of a Peremptory Order is required to be considered in these three Misc. Civil Applications moved for reviving the main Appeals and as to whether any interim relief can be granted while the appeal dismissed as a result of the peremptory order is yet to be revived. I. Relating to Misc. Civil Application No. 298 of 2000 in First Appeal No. 4042 of 1999:the First Appeal directed against the interim award passed below Exh. 9 in Motor Accidents Claim Petition - M. A. C. P. No. 1069 of 1997 dated 21st May 1999 (under which claimants have to recover a sum of Rs. 50,000. 00 with 12% running interest from the date of application till realisation jointly and severally from all opponents) was filed in this Court by the applicant on 15th June 1999. Thereafter a Civil Application No. 10022 of 1999 dated 15th June 1999 was filed on 25th August 1999 seeking stay of the order impugned in the First Appeal. The office pointed out several objections in the appeal and when the same were not removed, the Jt. Registrar passed an order on 15th July 1999 that the Office Objections be removed on or before 12th August 1999 failing which the matter shall be placed before the Honourable Court for passing appropriate orders. Yet, the Office Objections were not removed - particularly the Objections Nos. 24 and 26, i. e. extra copy of the memo to be filed and the receipt of the deposit. The matter was, therefore, listed before the Court on 17th August 1999 on which date, the Court passed the peremptory order that the Office Objections be removed on or before 10th September 1999 failing which the matter will stand dismissed. It appears that thereafter the present Misc. Civil Application No. 298 of 2000 (Stamp No. 391) dated 10th February 2000 was filed as a Misc. Civil Application for restoration on 10th February 2000. When this Misc. Civil Application No. 298 of 2000 came up before the Court on 14th February 2000, time was sought by learned Counsel to show that even in case of peremptory order, the matter can be restored. He also wanted to produce the copy of the Computer Board showing that there was no Office Objection. When this Misc. Civil Application No. 298 of 2000 came up before the Court on 14th February 2000, time was sought by learned Counsel to show that even in case of peremptory order, the matter can be restored. He also wanted to produce the copy of the Computer Board showing that there was no Office Objection. The matter was, therefore, posted on 16th February 2000 and on 16th February 2000 the time was again sought to show that a matter which stands dismissed as a result of peremptory order can be restored - but the copy of the Computer Board was produced for the perusal of the Court and after perusing the same, it was recorded that the case was listed under the heading, removal OF OFFICE OBJECTIONS in capital Letters, of course at the extreme right hand column it was mentioned as "nil O/o". ( 2 ) THE papers available in this file of Misc. Civil Application No. 298/2000 also include two undated draft amendments - one without any documents and other with xerox copies of four documents. II. Relating to Misc. Civil Application No. 334/2000 in First Appeal No. 5986 of 1999 and Misc. Civil Application No. 2029/2000 in Misc. Civil Application No. 334 of 2000 : ( 3 ) FIRST Appeal No. 5986 of 1999 dated 27th September 1999 was filed by the applicant on 27th September 1999 against the judgment and order dated 6th August 1999 passed by the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation Act, Vadodara, whereby a compensation of Rs. 38,221. 87 and the interest thereon from 10th July 1987, i. e. date of application till the realisation at the rate of 6% was granted to the workman. A sum of Rs. 9,555. 46 was also directed to be paid to the workman against the penalty and the cost of Rs. 5,000. 00. Civil Application No. 11304 of 1999 was also filed on 27th September 1999 along with the First Appeal seeking stay. The Registry pointed out several objections. When the objections were not removed, the order was passed by the Jt. Registrar on 26th October 1999 that in case the Office Objections are not removed on or before 23rd November 1999, the matter shall be placed before the Honourable Court for passing appropriate orders. The Registry pointed out several objections. When the objections were not removed, the order was passed by the Jt. Registrar on 26th October 1999 that in case the Office Objections are not removed on or before 23rd November 1999, the matter shall be placed before the Honourable Court for passing appropriate orders. Still all the objections were not removed particularly Objection No. 26, i. e. receipt of the deposit of the amount had not been filed before the Court and it appears that even the Court Fee was paid on 23rd November 1999. Thereafter when the matter came up before the Court on 26th November 1999, the Court passed an order that the Office Objections be removed on or before 10th December 1999, failing which, the matter shall stand dismissed. Yet, the objections were not removed and the receipt of the deposit was not filed and therefore, the appeal stood dismissed on 10th December 1999 on the strength of the peremptory order dated 26th November 1999 as the appellant failed to remove the Office Objections even by 10th December 1999. The Registry then recorded on 12th January 2000 that the Appeal stood dismissed in view of the conditional order passed by the Court. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the present Misc. Civil Application No. 334 of 2000 dated 15th February 2000 was filed as an application for restoration stating therein that for reasons stated in para 2 of this Misc. Civil Application, the applicant could not deposit the amount and as such could not get the certificate under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act and the ground of poor financial condition was also pleaded. It was prayed that the appeal be restored and the delay in filing this Misc. Civil Application may be condoned. No separate application under Section 5 seeking the condonation of delay was filed. This Misc. Civil Application has been filed as, an application for restoration and even uptil the date of this application, the certificate of deposit as required under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act had not been filed. When this Misc. Civil Application, as an application for restoration, came up before the Court on 28th February 2000, it was noticed that the appeal had been dismissed on the basis of a peremptory order dt. 26. 11. 1999 passed by the Court and accordingly the appeal stood dismissed on 10. 12. 1999. When this Misc. Civil Application, as an application for restoration, came up before the Court on 28th February 2000, it was noticed that the appeal had been dismissed on the basis of a peremptory order dt. 26. 11. 1999 passed by the Court and accordingly the appeal stood dismissed on 10. 12. 1999. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, Civil Application (Stamp No. 3189/2000) No. 2029/2000 dated 10th March 2000 was filed on 10. 3. 2000 by the applicant stating therein that the applicant had deposited an amount of Rs. 52,778/through Cheque No. 261058 dated 9th March 2000 drawn on Vadodara Peoples Cooperative Bank Ltd. , that the issuance of the certificate by the Workmens Commissioner will take some time and the same shall be filed as and when it is received by the applicant and therefore, the First Appeal No. 5986 of 1999 be restored. The details of the amount as given para 2 of this Misc. Civil Application do not say anything about the amount of the interest as was directed to be paid by the Workmens Compensate Commissioner from the date of the application till the date of realisation. On 21st March 2000 when the Misc. Civil Application No. 334/2000 came up before the Court, learned Counsel submitted that he had filed Civil Application in this Misc. Civil Application. Reference was to the Civil Application No. 2029/2000 as above. On 30. 3. 2000 a further affidavit with a letter dt. 9. 3. 2000 sent by the applicant to the Judge, Labour Court was filed. ( 6 ) IT is clear that the appeals stood dismissed on the respective dates as mentioned, in the facts of these cases on the strength of the peremptory orders passed by the Court and the applications for restoration have been moved. The applications for restoration are moved when the matters are dismissed in default or for non-prosecution, but the cases in which the matter stands dismissed on the strength of a peremptory order, the question arises as to whether in such cases, any restoration application is permissible or not. It has been noticed that in large number of cases even when the matter stands dismissed as a result of peremptory order, the applications for restoration are filed by the parties after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order. It has been noticed that in large number of cases even when the matter stands dismissed as a result of peremptory order, the applications for restoration are filed by the parties after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order. The question was, therefore, posed to the learned Counsel appearing in both the matters and since this question was arising in both the matters, learned Counsel were heard on the question as to whether the applications for restoration can be filed in cases where the matters stand dismissed on the basis of peremptory orders and as to whether the application for extension of time moved after the expiry of the period fixed under peremptory order can be entertained? learned Counsel have argued that even in such cases, the restoration applications can be filed and the Court may restore the matter. In support of their arguments, learned Counsel have cited the case of Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, reported in AIR 1961 SC 882 . In this case, while making reference to Sections 148, 149 and 151 of the CPC, the Supreme Court considered that in cases where a peremptory order is passed for payment of deficit Court fee within fixed time, the Court can extend the time or not. The Supreme Court observed that where a Bench of the High Court, while deciding an appeal in favour of the appellant passed a peremptory order fixing the period for payment of deficit court-fee and the appellant made an application for extension of time before the time fixed had run out, but the application came up for hearing before a Division Bench after the period had run out, the High Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment, Section 148 in terms allowed extension of time, even if the original period fixed had expired and Section 149 was equally liberal. A fortiori, those Sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. An order extending time for payment, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed expired. The procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. An order extending time for payment, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed expired. The procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. Sections 148, 149 and 161 of CPC clothed the High Court with ample power to do justice to a litigant if sufficient cause was made for extension. In the facts of these cases, it is clear that the application for extension of time had been made before the expiry of the time fixed under the peremptory order. The only objection was that the application had come up for hearing before the Court after the period had run out and therefore, it was held that the Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order and the prayer for extension of time could not be refused merely because the application came up for hearing after the expiry of the time and in case the order extending the time for payment of the Court fee even if passed after the expiry of the fixed time could operate from the date on which the time fixed had expired and that in the context of procedural orders, the Court is not estopped from taking note of the events and circumstances which happened within the time fixed and in case a sufficient cause was made for extension of time, the Court had ample power to extend the time to do justice to a litigant where sufficient cause is made out. However, in the present two cases, even the applications for restoration themselves have been filed after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order and no application whatsoever was made for extension of time before the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order. ( 7 ) THE case of Bihar State Electricity Board and ors. v. Bhowra Kankanee Colleries Ltd. and anr. , reported in AIR 1982 SC 60 was also cited. It was a case in which the appellants failed to file the Vakalatnama inspite of the Courts instructions. ( 7 ) THE case of Bihar State Electricity Board and ors. v. Bhowra Kankanee Colleries Ltd. and anr. , reported in AIR 1982 SC 60 was also cited. It was a case in which the appellants failed to file the Vakalatnama inspite of the Courts instructions. The appeal remained pending from 1972 to 1978, but it was noticed that the letter of authority, Vakalatnama of the Advocate for the appellants had not been placed on record. An order was passed to remove this defect and the order was peremptory in character. The Supreme Court noticed that there was some laxity on the part of the appellants and the defect was not removed and the appeal was dismissed on January 2, 1978 on the ground of failure to remove the defect and non-compliance with the peremptory order made by the Court on September 13, 1975. Thereafter an application for restoration of the First Appeal was moved and in this application for restoration, again a peremptory order was passed on 10th December 1979 and it transpired that there was some failure to comply with the same and the miscellaneous application for restoration was also dismissed. A fresh application was then filed for restoration of the First Appeal. An objection was also taken that the appeal had been dismissed for non-compliance of a peremptory order and another application for restoration of the First Appeal was not maintainable and accordingly, the High Court had dismissed the same resulting in the confirmation of the order dismissing the appeal. Therefore, the appeal by Special Leave was preferred before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed in para 6 of this judgment that undoubtedly, there was some negligence, but when a substantive matter is dismissed on the ground of failure to comply with procedural directions, there is always some element of negligence involved in it because a vigilant litigant would not miss complying with procedural direction more so such a simple one as filing Vakalatnama. The appeal was directed to be decided on merits. The appeal was directed to be decided on merits. The aforesaid order was passed by the Supreme Court after noticing the fact that the appeal had migrated from Patna to Ranchi and a contention was raised that there was no notice of transfer of the appeal from Patna to Ranchi and therefore, the appeal should be restored to file and in the end, it has been said that it was a case of negligence as simple as one of not filing the Vakalatnama. ( 8 ) YET another case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ajanta Electricals, Punjab, reported in AIR 1995 SC 2172 was cited in which the Supreme Court considered as to whether an application for extension of time for filing the return of income could be filed after the expiry of the period stipulated in the notice. It was held that where a notice under Section 139 (2) of the Income Tax Act, (1961) (as it stood before its omission by Direct Tax Law) (Amendment) Act (4 of 1988) was issued requiring the assessee to file its return of income within period of thirty days from service of notice, the application for extension of time for filing the return though made after expiry of stipulated period of thirty days would be legal and valid. If Section 139 (2) is read along with Rule 13 and Form No. 6 it becomes clear that an application for extension could be made even after the period allowed originally or as a result of extension granted had expired. Keeping in mind the object of giving discretion to the I. T. O. and the consequences that were to follow from not filing the return within time, there is no justification for reading into the section any limitation to the effect that no application could be made after the time allowed had expired. The limit of thirty days was not intended to be final as discretion was given to the I. T. O. to extend that date. The I. T. O. could have been called upon to exercise that discretion for proper reasons. No fetters were placed upon the discretion of the I. T. O. as regards the number of times he could extend the date or the period for which he could extend it. The I. T. O. could have been called upon to exercise that discretion for proper reasons. No fetters were placed upon the discretion of the I. T. O. as regards the number of times he could extend the date or the period for which he could extend it. It was conceded that repeated applications could be made within the time allowed, in view of the clear indication to that effect in Form No. 6 by the use of words, "it has not been possible". It is clear that in this case, there was no restriction of peremptory nature. The only question was as to whether the application for extension of time for filing the return of income could be filed even after the expiry of the period stipulated in the notice. However, there was nothing sort of peremptory nature either with regard to the period fixed under the notice or otherwise. ( 9 ) THE case of Falck v. Axthelm, reported in 1889 Vol. (XXIV) Queens Bench Division 174 from the Court of Appeal was also cited to show the practice with regard to Time for Pleading, Extension of time of the Order for One Month "peremptory", --Particulars, Order for, Effect of -Order XIX, r. 8 and it was held that Order XIX r. 8 did not apply and that the defendant was not by reason of the order for particulars entitled to any time beyond the month given by the peremptory order. However, learned Counsel have placed reliance on the observations made by Lindley, L. J. to the effect that,"it means that the time thereby granted shall not be further extended, unless under special circumstances some further order is made varying the former order. The order cannot be varied by implication by a subsequent order, made without calling the masters attention to it. The defendant, who had got that order, subsequently applied for an order for particulars. He did not call attention on such application to the previous order for a months time peremptory; he got his order for particulars without any reference to it. It would be contrary to principle and fair dealing to construe Order XIX, r. 8, as having the effect of setting aside or altering a previous peremptory order made with regard to the time for pleading, which is inconsistent with it. It would be contrary to principle and fair dealing to construe Order XIX, r. 8, as having the effect of setting aside or altering a previous peremptory order made with regard to the time for pleading, which is inconsistent with it. " ( 10 ) THE above decisions, however, do not answer the questions:- (I) as to what should be the real remedy in cases where a matter stands dismissed on the strength of a peremptory order and as to whether in such cases, an application for restoration can be entertained even if it is filed after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order? (II) as to whether it should be an application for restoration or it should be an application seeking extension of time and even if it is an application for extension of time, in case such an application has been moved after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order, the same is to be entertained or not for extending time in appropriate cases so as to revive the matter which already stands dismissed? (III) as to whether in such cases, the Court has the power to extend the time of the peremptory order on an application made for extending the time after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order? and (IV) as to whether any interim order can be passed in such cases in favour of the applicant before the matter is revived by an order of the Court?the argument which requires consideration is that in case when no application seeking extension of time is made before the expiry of the period originally fixed by the Court under the peremptory order and an application is made after the expiry of the period of the peremptory order and even on such application if the time is extended, what will be sanctity to the peremptory order passed by the Court and the whole purpose of passing peremptory order stands defeated and frustrated. ( 11 ) IF an order is passed before hand and it has to become effective on doing or not doing of any act within the stipulated time, the order is known as per-emptory order. The word "peremptory" according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Xth Edition, at page 761, Col. 2 means as under:"1. ( 11 ) IF an order is passed before hand and it has to become effective on doing or not doing of any act within the stipulated time, the order is known as per-emptory order. The word "peremptory" according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Xth Edition, at page 761, Col. 2 means as under:"1. " (Law) final, not open to appeal or challenge; prisoners objection to proposed juror by right without need to give reason)2. (of statement or command) admitting no denial or refusal; absolutely fixed essential; (of person etc.) dogmatic, imperious, dictatorial. "the word, "peremptory" as such with certain suffixes had been given the following meaning in Websters Third New International Dictionary, Vol. II, page 1677, Col. :"peremptory: Final, decisive, to take away entirely, destroy, kill, 1. Putting an end to for precluding a right of action, debate or delay, admitting no contradiction, absolutely, final, 2. A. expressive of urgency or command imperative, 3-a (1) marked by self assurance; confident, positive; 4. of an arrogant or imperious nature; houghty, dictatorial (ordered around in the most terms);peremptory: a case, circumstance, document, or command that cannot be ignored;peremptory challenge: a challenge (as of a juror) made as of right without assigning any cause. PEREMPTORY exception or peremptory plea: A legal exception or plea attacking the cause of action or defense or its merits. PEREMPTORY instruction: An instruction charging a jury that if they agree to the truth of certain stated facts they must find for a designated party. PEREMPTORY mandamus: A final and absolute mandamus to enforce the courts judgment. "according to Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Vol. IV, the word "peremptory", at page 1982, the word "peremptory" means as under: (1) "peremptory" signifies a final and determinate act, without hope of renewing or altering. " (Cowel ). (2) A peremptory challenge of a juror is "used only in matters criminal, and alleged without other cause than barely the prisoner fancy" (Cowel, Challenge; but the Crown has also in some cases the right of peremptory challenge; see hereon Arch. Cr. (32nd ed.) 174. (3) "a peremptory DAY is when business is to be spoken to at a precise day; but if it cannot be spoken to then, the court, at the prayer of the party concerned, will give a farther day without prejudice to him". (Jacob ). Cr. (32nd ed.) 174. (3) "a peremptory DAY is when business is to be spoken to at a precise day; but if it cannot be spoken to then, the court, at the prayer of the party concerned, will give a farther day without prejudice to him". (Jacob ). (4) A peremptory mandamus requires the thing to be done absolutely, and to it nothing but a certificate of perfect obedience can be proper return; see hereon Short and Mellors Crown Office Practice (2nd ed.) 240. (5) A peremptory order for time to plead means that the order is final, unless varied by a subsequent order on special circumstances being shown for a further extension. (Falck v. Axthelm XXIV QBC 174; 59 LJ QB 161 ). In judicial Dictionary by K. J. Aiyer, 8th ed. p. 712, the word "peremptory" has been given the following meaning:"peremptory" : Final and determinate. "peremptory adjournment": An adjournment to a day when the business shall be taken up and proceeded with by the court. "peremptory challenge" : An arbitrary species of challenge to a specified number of jurors by the accused or prisoner without any reason being stated. This is privilege accorded both to the Sovereign and to the prisoner, when jurors are chosen before the commencement of a trial by jury. "peremptory day" : Same as peremptory adjournment day. "peremptory mandamus" : (See Mandamus ). "peremptory paper" : A portion of the cause list in which mention will be made of all motions to be disposed of before any other business. "peremptory undertaking" : An undertaking to proceed with the cause upon payment of costs; or to bring an action at the next adjourned or specified date upon payment of the costs. Ordinarily, adjournments are granted to a party upon an undertaking to pay the other party its costs; the case, in the next adjourned date, will not be taken up, or, the case will be decided against the party who moved for the adjournment, if the costs ordered be not paid. The payment of the costs is a condition precedent for the right of hearing to the party who applied for the adjournment. "p. Ramanatha Aiyars The Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition, 1987, at page 964, Col. The payment of the costs is a condition precedent for the right of hearing to the party who applied for the adjournment. "p. Ramanatha Aiyars The Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition, 1987, at page 964, Col. 2, the word "peremptory" as under:"peremptory": joined with a substantive, as action or exception signifies a final and determinate act without hope of renewing or altering (Tomilins Law Dic. ). IMPERATIVE, absolute, not admitting of question, delay, or reconsideration; positive, final decisive, not admitting of any alternative; self-determined, arbitrary. ANY statement of declaration is peremptory which is meant to be final and determinate, and is therefore, couched in absolute or positive language. There is no hope of further amendment or indulgence. PEREMPTORY challenge. Peremptory challenges are those which are made to the jury without assigning any reason, and which the courts are bound to respect. A peremptory challenge of a juror is "used only in matters criminal, and alleged without other cause than barely the prisoners fancy". (Cowel ). PEREMPTORY date, is when business is to be spoken to at a precise day; but if it cannot be spoken to the, the Court, at the prayer of the party concerned may give a further day without prejudice to him". (Jacob ). PEREMPTORY mandamus. "peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty or a clear and specific legal right. " ( 12 ) IT is, therefore, clear that when a peremptory order is passed by the Court, the Court passes a coercive order for the performance of a pre-existing duty in the nature of command for the obedience within a given time, failure of which is to entail a penal consequence. It is clear that even if a peremptory order is final, it is final unless varied by a subsequent order on special circumstances being shown but for a further extension. The peremptory order is, therefore, capable of being further extended. Thus, it cannot be said that once a peremptory order is passed, it is untouchable and, once it is held that the time under an order can be further extended on special circumstances being shown, such circumstances become the essence of the matter. The peremptory order is, therefore, capable of being further extended. Thus, it cannot be said that once a peremptory order is passed, it is untouchable and, once it is held that the time under an order can be further extended on special circumstances being shown, such circumstances become the essence of the matter. In a given case, even if the special circumstances are shown after the expiry of the period fixed by the Court for the purpose of extension as well as to explain as to why an application seeking extension could not be made prior to the expiry of time, the time may be extended by the Court. Usually, this type of orders are passed by the Court to get the compliance in time bound manner and, therefore, the whole purpose is that the time schedule fixed by the Court is adhered to and the order is faithfully and punctually complied with. In such cases, if any application is moved before the expiry of the time fixed by the Court seeking extension of time, there cannot be any difficulty in extending the time. However, the question which requires consideration is as to whether the courts can extend the time even in such cases where the application seeking extension has been made after the expiry of the period fixed by the court? While considering this question, we have to keep in view that such cases may also be there where it was physically impossible for a particular party to apply for extension of time within the time fixed by the court; it may be beyond the control and comprehension of a party to make such an application within time prescribed by the court. There may be cases in which a party may be helpless and stands prevented by a reasonable, sufficient and just cause from making such an application within the time fixed by the court and there may be cases in which the court may find that in the facts of a given case, it would lead to a gross injustice if the application seeking extension of time made after the expiry of period fixed by the court, is not allowed. The question that arises for consideration is, whether in such cases also the courts should be rendered powerless and a helpless spectator when even if the Court is convinced that the party could not have approached the courts for extension of time within the time fixed by the court and yet it should withhold the order granting extension of time merely because the application seeking extension of time has been made after the expiry of the period fixed by the Court. In the light of the decisions as aforesaid and the meaning and scope of the peremptory order, the following questions require a serious consideration: (1) What should be the remedy of a party whose case stands dismissed as a result of non-compliance of a peremptory order within the time fixed under such an order? Whether it should be to file the case afresh or an application for restoration or an application for extension of time granted under the peremptory order? (2) Whether any application for restoration of a matter which stands dismissed as a result of peremptory order or an application for extension of time moved after the expiry of the period fixed under the peremptory order should be entertained by the Court so as to revive the matter and in case such application is entertained, in what exceptional circumstances, the extension of time should be granted so as to revive the matter? (3) In case it is held that extension of time can be granted even if the application for extension of time is moved after the expiry of the period fixed under a peremptory order, whether the applicants in case of Misc. Civil Applications Nos. 298 of 2000 adn 334 of 2000 have made out a case for grant of such extension? (4) Whether any application such as Misc. Civil Application No. 2029 of 2000 for interim order be entertained in a matter which stands already dismissed as a result of peremptory order even before the matter is revived? ( 13 ) IN my considered opinion, all these questions are serious questions and an authoritative pronouncement on these questions is required by a larger Bench. I, therefore, direct that these matters be placed before the Honourable Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to consider the above mentioned questions and for final decision of these three Misc. Civil Applications Nos. I, therefore, direct that these matters be placed before the Honourable Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to consider the above mentioned questions and for final decision of these three Misc. Civil Applications Nos. 298 of 2000 in First Appeal No. 4042 of 1999, 334 of 2000 in First Appeal No. 5986 of 1999 and 2029 of 2000 in 334 of 2000. .