SRINIVASA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THESE Writ Petitions are filed challenging the validity and correctness of the Notification No. RD. 306. LAQ 98 dated 18. 12. 1. 998 published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 24. 12. 1998 issued by the first respondent under Section 48 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act' for short) denotifying the land bearing Sy. Nos. 51/2, 51/3 and 51/5 of Thurahalli, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, in all measuring 3 acres and 25 guntas. ( 2 ) WRIT Petition Nos. 6259 and 6260/99 are by the land owners of the lands in question and Writ Petition No. 11327/99 is by the beneficiary for whose benefit the land was sought to be acquired. For the sake of convenience the petitioners in this order as, 'the owners' and the petitioner in W. P. 11327/99 will be referred to as the 'the Housing Society'. ( 3 ) THE owners of the lands in question had consented for acquisition of their lands in favour of the Housing Society. In pursuance of the said consent, the Housing Society made an application requesting the Government to acquire the lands in question. The Government after getting a report from the three- member Committee constituted by it and after examining the records, gave a direction to the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore district to issue notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition act. On the recommendation of the Land Acquisition Officer ('lao' for short), the preliminary notification was published on 31. 12. 1992. The final notification under Section 6 (1) was published on 12. 11. 1994. The owners had entered into an agreement to sell dated 28. 11. 1991 with respondents 3 to 6 (ln W. P. 6259 and 6260/99) even prior to giving their consent for acquisition of lands in favour of the society. The respondents 3 to 5 who are agreement holders, in W. P. 6259 and 6260/99 gave a representation to the Government for deletion of the lands in question from the acquisition proceedings and the government on the basis of the representation given to it, dropped these lands from acquisition proceedings by its order dated 7. 3. 1996. The respondents 3 to 5 who are agreement holders, in W. P. 6259 and 6260/99 gave a representation to the Government for deletion of the lands in question from the acquisition proceedings and the government on the basis of the representation given to it, dropped these lands from acquisition proceedings by its order dated 7. 3. 1996. Aggrieved by the said order, the owners preferred W. P 7477/96 and this Court allowed the Writ petition by its order dated 9th September, 1998 and remitted the matter back to the Government for fresh consideration after providing an opportunity to the beneficiary Housing society. The Government after considering the matter afresh, has passed the impugned order dated 18. 12. 1998 withdrawing the lands in question from the acquisition proceedings and it is this order that is impugned in these Writ Petitions. ( 4 ) THE sole point that arises for my consideration in these petitions is: whether the withdrawal of the lands in question from the acquisition proceedings by the Government, under the impugned order, is valid in law? ( 5 ) FIRST. I take up for consideration the Writ petitions filed by the owners as the same could be disposed of following the authoritative pronouncement laid down by the Apex Court in M/s. LARSEN AND tourbo LTD. , vs STATE OF GUJARAT. The Apex Court while dealing with the question whether the land owner is entitled to notice before withdrawal from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act, laid down the law as under:"an owner need not be given any notice of the intention of the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition and the state Government is at liberty to do so. Rights of the owner are well protected by sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act and if he suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings, he is to be compensated and sub-section (3) of section 48 provides as to how such compensation is to be determined. There is, therefore, no difficulty when it is the owner whose land is withdrawn from the acquisition is concerned. " (i) Thus, it is clear that in case of withdrawal from acquisition, the only relief that the owners are entitled to is to claim compensation for the damages, if any, suffered by them in consequence of the acquisition proceedings. There is, therefore, no difficulty when it is the owner whose land is withdrawn from the acquisition is concerned. " (i) Thus, it is clear that in case of withdrawal from acquisition, the only relief that the owners are entitled to is to claim compensation for the damages, if any, suffered by them in consequence of the acquisition proceedings. Whether the owners in the present case would be entitled to such compensation, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, is a matter with which I am not presently concerned with. (ii) Section 48 of the land Acquisition Act gives liberty to the government to withdraw from the acquisition and also provides the machination for payment of compensation for the damages, if any suffered by the owner. It reads: "completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.- (1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, The Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. (2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due or the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together, with all cost reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land. (3) The provisions of Part II! of this Act shall apply, so far as may he. to the determination of compensation payable under this section. " (underlining is mine) ( 6 ) THE discretion of the State Government to withdraw from acquisition of any land, possession of which is not taken, is absolute in so far as the owners of the lands are concerned and it is not justifiable at the instance of the owners. The fact remains that despite the publication of notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, the owner continues to be in possession of the lands and is not divested of his ownership rights. The land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances, when possession of land is taken under section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act pursuant to an award passed under Section 11 of the Act. The land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances, when possession of land is taken under section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act pursuant to an award passed under Section 11 of the Act. It, therefore, follows that no prejudice is caused to the owner of the land if the land intended to be acquired is denotified and if at all any damage is suffered by the owner the same can be offset by taking recourse to sub-section 2 of Section 48. ( 7 ) THE matter, though, is on an altogether different footing when it is examined from the point view of the beneficiary of the acquisition. Therefore, it is not open for the owners to question the decision of the Government to withdraw from acquisition of the land in question, possession of which had not been taken. I will deal with the aspect whether or not possession had been taken in the present case while dealing with the Writ Petition filed by the Housing society. ( 8 ) MR. Amar Kumar, learned Counsel for the Housing Society, submitted that the possession in this case having been taken under annexure-C, notwithstanding the fact that notification under Section 16 (2) of the Act had not been issued, the Government has no power to issue the notification under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition act. The Learned Government Pleader submitted that notification under Section 16 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act has not been issued by the Government in respect of the land in question. Section 16 of the L. A Act, reads:"power to take possession.-When the Deputy Commissioner has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the government, free from all encumbrances. (2) The fact of such taking possession may be notified by the Deputy Commissioner in the official Gazette, and such notification shall be evidence of such fact. " (underlining is mine) sub-section (1) of Section 16 empowers the Deputy commissioner to take possession of the land in pursuance of the award made under Section 11 and also spells out the effect of such taking of possession by the Collector in that, the land vests in the government free from all encumbrances. " (underlining is mine) sub-section (1) of Section 16 empowers the Deputy commissioner to take possession of the land in pursuance of the award made under Section 11 and also spells out the effect of such taking of possession by the Collector in that, the land vests in the government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (2) stipulates that the fact of such taking possession may be notified by the Deputy commissioner in the Official Gazette and such notification shall be evidence of such fact. From the records produced by the Government pleader, Section 16 (2) notification has not been issued in-respect of the lands in question though it was got issued in respect of the other lands which came to be acquired- in favour of the Housing society. ( 9 ) BUT that by itself would not mean that no possession of the lands was taken. It is by now well-settled that there can be no hard and fast rule as to what act would constitute taking possession of the lands. In BALMOKAN KHATRI EDUCATIONAL AND industrial TRUST, AMRITSAR vs STATE OF PUNJAB the Apex court considered the very same question of taking possession of the land and said as under:"it is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by 17. 4. 1996 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Sri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession. is drafting the panchanama in the presence of panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. " ( 10 ) IN this regard Mr. Amarkumar relied on Annexure-C, mahazar, dated 17. 11. 1998 and contends that possession has been taken in pursuance of Annexure-C and, therefore, the State has lost its right to withdraw the lands from acquisition. Annexure 'c' reads as follows: rirordtfj ( 11 ) IT is a mahzar drawn by the villagers of Turahalli, Uttarahalli hobli, Bangalore South Taluk acknowledging the notice isued under section 12 (2) of the Act. Annexure 'c' reads as follows: rirordtfj ( 11 ) IT is a mahzar drawn by the villagers of Turahalli, Uttarahalli hobli, Bangalore South Taluk acknowledging the notice isued under section 12 (2) of the Act. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that it is a mahazar drawn up for taking possession of the land in question The assertion of Mr. Amarkumar, learned Counsel for the housing Society, that possession of the land is in fact had taken is based on this document. There is no other document in the records to which reference is made in support of the case of the Housing society that possession of the lands had been taken. Therefore, it is clear that not only the Section 16 (2) notification was not issued in the instant case but there is no mahazar drawn up, not any document is produced to show that possession of the lands was taken either by the LAO or by any official of the Revenue Department. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Amarkumar that possession of the lands had been taken in the present case is bereft of any merit. ( 12 ) THAT takes me to the next question as to whether the right provided under Section 48 of the Act gives uncurtailed powers to the Government to unilaterally withdraw from acquisition. This question has been gone into and decided by there Apex Court in m/s LARSEN AND TOUBRO LTD. , vs STATE OF GUJARAT The apex Court in so deciding the question stated as under:"a valuable right, thus accrues to the company to oppose the proposed decision of the State Government withdrawing from acquisition. The State Government may have sound reasons to withdraw from acquisition but those must be made known to the company which may have equally sound reasons or perhaps more which might persuade the State Government to reverse its decision withdrawing from acquisition. " ( 13 ) IT is based on the above ruling of the Apex Court that the matter was remanded by this Court in W. R No. 7477/96 to the government to hear the society and then issue a fresh notification. The impugned notification, Annexure-D, has now been issued afresh by the Government. " ( 13 ) IT is based on the above ruling of the Apex Court that the matter was remanded by this Court in W. R No. 7477/96 to the government to hear the society and then issue a fresh notification. The impugned notification, Annexure-D, has now been issued afresh by the Government. ( 14 ) THE grievance of the Housing Society is that the order passed by the Government does not bear the reasons which prompted it to withdraw the land from acquisition and, therefore, it is bad in law and is liable to be struck down. The respondents have produced annexure-R2 which is an order, dated 16th December, 1998, passed by the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department after remand order in W. P. 7477/96. The reasons that prompted the Government to withdraw the lands from acquisition are forthcoming in the said order and the relevant portion reads as follows:"the Hon'ble High Court quashed the notification deleting the sy. Nos. and remanded the case to the Government observing however that liberty is reserved to the Government for issuing any fresh notification but only after giving due opportunity to the house Building Co-operative Society. Accordingly, notices were issued to the House Building Society and they were personally heard on 4. 11. 1998. They had also filed their written statements. The original owners of the land were also present and they have also filed their written statements. I find from the records and from the personal representation that the original owners has entered into an agreement of sale with 4 persons and later the 4 persons also obtained a decree of specific performance from the Civil Court in respect of the concerned Sy. Nos. It is also seen that the 4 purchasers have also formed the lay out after obtaining permission for conversion to non-agricultural use under the Land Revenue act. Tho permission was given on 25. 7. 1992 which was before the date of 4 (1) notification dated 7. 1. 1993. It is also seen from the survey maps certified by the surveyor of the Special Land acquisition Officer's that the four Sy. Nos. are coming on the edge and periphery of the total land acquired on behalf of the society for which award was passed for 67. 23 acres. The land under dispute now deleted from acquisition is only 3 acres and 25 guntas. Nos. are coming on the edge and periphery of the total land acquired on behalf of the society for which award was passed for 67. 23 acres. The land under dispute now deleted from acquisition is only 3 acres and 25 guntas. It is seen that the deletion of these four survey numbers does not in any way affect the formation of the lay out by the members of the Jayanagar House Building Co-operative society. On the other hand inclusion of these Sy. Nos. will cause hardship to the occupiers of these four Sy. Nos. who have also obtained the decree of specific performance from the Civil Court. Under these circumstances, it is hereby ordered under Section 48 (1) of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act, to delete the Sy. Nos. viz,. 51/1 0. 25 acres, 51/2 0. 20 acres 51/3 1. 16 acres and 51/5 1. 04 acres from acquisition. " ( 15 ) THE order states in detail the reasons why the State government had decided to delete the lands in question from acquisition. It has to be borne in mind that the Government cannot be compelled to acquire a piece of land nor does it require the consent of the beneficiary to act under Section 48 of the Act. What is required of the State Government is to see whether the beneficiary or any one interested would be prejudicially affected. When an order made under Section 48 of the Act is bona fide and for good reasons, as in the present case, the beneficiary cannot be heard to say that the decision so arrived at by the State Government is bad in law. Therefore, the ruling in AMARNATH ASHRAM TRUST SOCIETY and ANR vs GOVERNOR OF UTTAR PRADESH and ORS. 3 cited by Mr. Arnarkumar in support of his contention that the decision of the State Government to withdraw brow the acquisition can be challenged on the ground that power has been exercised mala fide or in an arbitrary manner would not be of any aid to him. In the case on hand the excerpted portion of the impugned order leaves no room for doubt that it was for good reasons that the State government withdrew from the acquisition. The exercise of power by the State Government under Section 48 cannot be said to the either arbitrary or malafide. The contention of learned Counsel mr. In the case on hand the excerpted portion of the impugned order leaves no room for doubt that it was for good reasons that the State government withdrew from the acquisition. The exercise of power by the State Government under Section 48 cannot be said to the either arbitrary or malafide. The contention of learned Counsel mr. Amarkumar that no reasons are forthcoming in the impugned order is, therefore, without substance and has to be rejected. ( 16 ) MR. Amar Kumar next submitted that on remand, the State government while passing the order ought to have noted the contentions urged by the Housing Society, considered those contentions and should have recorded its reasons for not agreeing with those contentions and in the absence of that the exercise of power under Section 48 is bad in law. ( 17 ) THE framework of Section 48 of the Act gives full liberty to the State Government without shackling it with observance of any preconditions or procedures. The Scope and ambit of the power available to the State Government under Section 48 has been subject to the scrutiny of the Apex Court in various decisions. In SPECIAL land ACQUISITION OFFICER, BOMBAY vs GODREJ and BOYCE4 the Apex Court held that the State Government can act unilaterally and that it can withdraw from acquisition without giving any reason or for any reason whatsoever. In a slight shift from this principle the apex Court in the case of Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (supra), held that it is not enough for the Government to have sound reasons for withdrawing from acquisition but those very reasons must be made known to the beneficiary. Barring this condition, which in my view has been satisfied in the present case, the power of the State government to withdraw from acquisition has not been diluted by any of the decisions of the Apex Court. Therefore,. the contention of learned Counsel Mr. Amarkumar that the contentions raised before the State Government are not noted in the order and considered by the State Government and, therefore, the impugned order is bad in law cannot be countenanced given the framework of Section 48 which by its very nature excludes the application of any of the principles of natural justice. Amarkumar that the contentions raised before the State Government are not noted in the order and considered by the State Government and, therefore, the impugned order is bad in law cannot be countenanced given the framework of Section 48 which by its very nature excludes the application of any of the principles of natural justice. How a certain power has to be exercised would depend more on the nature of the power, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of such exercise of power. Viewed from this angle, I have no hesitation to hold that it is not required of the State Government to note the contentions raised by the beneficiary, consider them in its order elaborately and give its findings before making the ultimate order under Section 48. ( 18 ) IT was nextly urged by Mr. Amarkumar that the State government ought not to have acted at the instance of the respondents 3 to 5 who are mere agreement holders. It is not open to the Housing Society to now raise this contention as the matter has been considered afresh by the State Government on remand on the direction of this Court. It cannot be disputed that agreement holders in this case are interested persons having regard to the fact that the agreement was prior to the date of preliminary notification coupled with the fact that the owners had executed in irrevocable power of Attorney for consideration on the basis of which the Civil court has also decreed the suit filed by the Agreement Holders which remained unchallenged. Therefore', it cannot be said that the agreement holders in the present case are not persons interested. Even otherwise also it is of little relevance as to at whose instance the Government has acted under Section 48 of the Act. What is of relevance is, if the Government was justified in acting under Section 48 of the Act, where the order passed by the State Government is neither rnalafide nor arbitrary, the question at whose instance the government acted pales into insignificance and is not vital to decide the question whether the order under Section 48 is sustainable in law or not. ( 19 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, there is no merit in either of these Writ Petitions and they are, accordingly, dismissed, directing the parties to bear their own costs. ( 19 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, there is no merit in either of these Writ Petitions and they are, accordingly, dismissed, directing the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .