N. K. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER No. 3 a Co-operative Society and its two members-petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are aggrieved by the order dated 14. 9. 1998 (Annexure P/8) passed in revision by the M. P. Board of Revenue Gwalior, quashing the order dated 23. 7. 1998 (Annexure P/4) of the Dy. Registrar Cooperative Societies, shajapur, passed under Section 80 of the M. P. Co-operative societies Act. 1960 (for short, 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 Siddhnath Singh was the Director/president of the petitioner Society at the relevant time. He in the year 1982 had taken a loan of Rs. 2,000/- from the District Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. , sajapur. The loan amount was to be paid in 15 yearly instalments with interest. It is no more in dispute that 12 instalments of Rs. 274,42 + interest rs. 28. 58, total Rs. 303/- fell due on 30th April, 1997. However, this amount remained unpaid until on 1/7/1998 when debtor-respondent No. 2 repaid the whole of the balance amount of loan. The petitioner Society in its meeting dated 14. 7. 1998 which was attended amongst others, by respondent No. 2 also, passed a resolution disqualifying respondent No. 2 to be member or office bearer of the Society. The resolution was passed by taking recourse to Section 19-AA of the Act and Rule 44 of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1962 (for short, 'the Rules' ). According to the petitioner society, respondent No. 2 had incurred disqualification for membership of the Society on account of his default in payment of the aforesaid Instalment of loan. Aggrieved by this resolution, respondent No. 3 made reference under Section 80 of the Act before, the Registrar, Co-operative Society which was rejected by the Dy. Registrar vide his order dated 23. 7. 1998 (Annexure P/4 ). However, in revision the learned member of the Board of Revenue quashed this order (Annexure p/4) as also the resolution (Annexure P/3 ). The petitioners have, therefore, approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution calling in question the legality of the order Annexure P/8, ( 3 ) I have heard Shri S. S. Samvatsar, learned counsel for petitioners and shri Anwer Khan appearing with shri U. K. Nimgaonkar, counsel for respondent No. 2. ( 4 ) SECTION 19-AA. The petitioners have, therefore, approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution calling in question the legality of the order Annexure P/8, ( 3 ) I have heard Shri S. S. Samvatsar, learned counsel for petitioners and shri Anwer Khan appearing with shri U. K. Nimgaonkar, counsel for respondent No. 2. ( 4 ) SECTION 19-AA. provides that no person shall be eligible for election as a member of the committee of the Society and shall cease to hold his office as such if he suffers from such disqualification as may be prescribed. Rule 44, prescribes various grounds for such disqualification. Clause (h) of Rule 44 (1} provides for one such disqualification that if a person is or gets in default to the Society or to any other Society for a period exceeding 12 months in respect of any loan or loans taken by him. he shall incur disqualification. In the instant case, it may be noted that the loan in question was not taken bv respondent No. 2 from the petitioner-Society, but from some other Society i. e. The District Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Shajapur, Clause (h ). however, makes it clear that the default may be in respect, of a loan from the society of which the person concerned is a member, or from may other Society. It is, therefore, of no consequence that the loan in question was not taken from the petitioner-Society but from some other Society. ( 5 ) AS regards the default, it is clear from the letter dated 30. 6. 1998 (Annexure P/2) issued by the lender Bank that the amount of instalment which had become due on 30. 4. 1997 remained unpaid till 30. 6. 1998 i. e. , for a period of more than 12 months. The amount was in fact paid on 1. 7. 1998 i. e. , after 14 months. It was, however, contended by the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that there was no default as such in respect of the loan which has been repaid in full on 1. 7. 1998. It is pointed out that the last instalment of the loan was to fall due on 30th April, 1998. The entire loan amount was paid on 1. 7. 1998 i. e. , before, the expiry of the stipulated period of 12 months as envisaged under clause (h) of Rule 44 (1 ). 7. 1998. It is pointed out that the last instalment of the loan was to fall due on 30th April, 1998. The entire loan amount was paid on 1. 7. 1998 i. e. , before, the expiry of the stipulated period of 12 months as envisaged under clause (h) of Rule 44 (1 ). The Board of revenue has accepted this contention and it is on this ground precisely that the resolution of the petitioner-Society and the order of the Dy. Registrar, have been quashed. I, however, find myself unable to agree with the reasoning adapted by the Board of Revenue, Clause (h) speaks of any default for a period exceeding 12 months in respect of any loan. It does not say that the default has to be in payment of the entire loan itself. Default in payment of any instalment of a loan is very much a default in respect of that loan and would squarely be covered by clause (h ). For example, a person agrees to repay the loan in 15 yearly instalments but falls in agrees of payment of first fourteen instalments. He. however, repays the entire loan on the date when 15th instalment falls due. By such payment, he cannot be said to have cleared the loan, nevertheless, he was certainly a defaulter for the first fourteen years during which he did not pay the said fourteen instalments. Disqualification clause has been prescribed to prevent defaulters from seeking election as a member to the committee of a Society and to continue to hold his Office as such. Such a disqualification clause has to be construed strictly and a person who defaults in making payment of a loan or any part of it as per agreement is a defaulter and if such default continues for a period exceeding 12 months, he would certainly incur disqualification as prescribed under clause (h) of Rule 44 (1 ). Learned member of the Board of Revenue, in my judgment, has clearly erred in holding that on account of the lump sum payment on 1. 7. 1998 of the balance loan amount the respondent No. 2 has escaped the rigour of the disqualification clause (h ). The finding is obviously based on misconstruction of clause (h) had the same is. therefore, liable to be set-aside. ( 6 ) ACCORDINGLY, I allow this petition and quash the impugned order dated 14. 9. 7. 1998 of the balance loan amount the respondent No. 2 has escaped the rigour of the disqualification clause (h ). The finding is obviously based on misconstruction of clause (h) had the same is. therefore, liable to be set-aside. ( 6 ) ACCORDINGLY, I allow this petition and quash the impugned order dated 14. 9. 1998 (Annexure P/8) of the Board of Revenue, ( 7 ) THERE shall be no order as to the costs of this petition and the amount of security. If any deposited by the petitioners shall be refunded to them after verification. Petition allowed. .