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2000 DIGILAW 655 (RAJ)

Rajasthan Financial Corporation v. Narpat Singh

2000-05-22

ARUN MADAN

body2000
JUDGMENT : 1. These two appeals arise out of common judgment and decree dated 23.8.1997 passed by the Addl. District Judge No. 8, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil First Appeal Nos. 32/96 and 17/97 whereby first appeal of appellant Rajasthan Financial Corporation (RFC) against judgment and decree dated 29.3.1996 of the Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) No. 5, Jaipur City in Civil Suit No. 274/95 has been dismissed whereas appeal of respondent (plaintiff) was allowed. 2. These appeals have been heard and are finally disposed of at admission stage on the following substantial questions of law as raised by the appellant in the memo of appeals:- (i) Whether principles laid down in by this Court deciding Krishnadutt's case 1987 (1) RLR 346 on 24.5.1984 being prospective in nature in the facts and circumstances can be made applicable for testing the validity of penalty order dated 25.6.1983 ? (ii) Whether following procedure of detailed enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 was much prior to passing the impugned penalty order dated 25.6.1983 ? (iii) Which of the law shall be applicable either of the date of penalty order or the law which came into declaration after passing of the penalty order ? 3. The facts relevant for deciding the appeals, briefly stated, are that Narpat Singh (plaintiff) respondent in these appeals, was appointed as Dy. Manager, RFC, by order dated 19.4.1977. On 24.3.1981, the plaintiff was issued a memo to submit explanation as to certain alleged irregularities. He submitted his reply-cum-explanation on 20.4.1981. The RFC (appellant) thereafter issued a charge sheet along with statement of allegation on 10.12.1981, to which the plaintiff replied on 14.1.1982, which resulted in issuing an order dated 25.6.1983 imposing penalty of withholding the two annual grade increments with cumulative effect. Feeling aggrieved by the penalty order, the plaintiff preferred a departmental appeal but it was also dismissed on 27.8.1983. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted a civil suit challenging therein the imposition of penalty order of stoppage of annual grade increments and the appellate order dated 30.8.1983 by which the penalty order dated 25.6.1983 was confirmed. 4. The defendant (RFC) filed written statement to the plaint denying the plaintiff's claim. It had been urged in the written statement that after reply to the charge sheet was submitted by the plaintiff, departmental inquiry was conducted by Shri Shivnath Singh, Dy. 4. The defendant (RFC) filed written statement to the plaint denying the plaintiff's claim. It had been urged in the written statement that after reply to the charge sheet was submitted by the plaintiff, departmental inquiry was conducted by Shri Shivnath Singh, Dy. General Manager (Finance), and after considering the report of the inquiry officer, punishment order of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect was passed in a speaking manner with no malice by the said authority. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. The trial Court after recording the evidence led by the parties and after hearing the learned counsel, partly decreed the plaintiff's suit though holding the punishment and appellate orders as null and void being non est having been passed in violation of principles of justice and in absence of a proper inquiry, but directing the enquiry to be conducted de novo. Against the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appellant (RFC) preferred civil first appeal No. 32/96 while plaintiff (Narpatsingh) filed his appeal No. 17/97 against order of de novo inquiry before the appellate Court. The first appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 3.8.1997 dismissed defendant's appeal and allowed plaintiff's appeal setting aside the judgment of the trial Court whereby the de novo enquiry was directed. Hence, these second appeals. 6. I have given thoughtful consideration to the contentions as so advanced by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the decisions cited by them at the bar. 7. The case of the appellant RFC as so canvassed by Shri R.D. Rastogi was that prior to 1.6.1983 no procedure had been prescribed in the RFC (Staff) Regulations 1958 (for short regulations) for penalising any of its Staff members in the event of the charge relating to any of the irregularities committed by them in discharge of their duties so established by the RFC. Therefore, the RFC issued a circular dated 20.6.1983 adopting the procedure laid down by the State Govt. in Hand Book on disciplinary proceedings as a broad guideline w.e.f 1.6.1983 which envisaged a procedure to be applied in such matters. Therefore, the RFC issued a circular dated 20.6.1983 adopting the procedure laid down by the State Govt. in Hand Book on disciplinary proceedings as a broad guideline w.e.f 1.6.1983 which envisaged a procedure to be applied in such matters. This circular was issued in pursuance of the Board's decision taken in the meeting held on 3.6.1983, wherein in its minutes recorded in pursuance of the said meeting, the Board considered the proposal as to the procedure to be followed in disciplinary proceedings and decided that the procedure laid down by the State Govt. for conducting disciplinary proceedings and imposition of penalty may be adopted as broad guidelines. Similarly in its minute 271/28/83 of the meeting held on 3.6.1983 the Board considered the matter as to the Conduct Rules for RFC employees and felt that it would be desirable for the Corporation to frame its own rules and till such rules are framed, the Board approved that Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct) Rules may be made applicable to Corporation employees w.e.f. 1.6.1983. Thus, according to the RFC, on the date of imposing penalty against the plaintiff (respondent), i.e. 10.6.1983, the impugned penalty of withholding grade increments with curmulative effect was considered as minor penalty. Even under the CCA Rules of Rajasthan State Govt. the procedure contemplated in Rule 17 of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Conduct and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short the State CCA Rules) was adopted and after following such procedure, the impugned penalty order was passed against the plaintiff (respondent). 8. However, since the Division Bench of this Court in Krishna Dutt Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1987 (1) RLR 346 while deciding DB Civil Special Appeal No. 38/84 by judgment dated 24.5.1984, held the order of withholding annual grade increments with cumulative effect as major penalty, for which the procedure contemplated in Rule 16 of the State CCA Rules shall be followed, Shri R.D. Rastogi, learned counsel for the RFC vehemently contended that the Courts below while placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Krishna Dutt's case (supra), have seriously erred in holding the impugned penalty order as null and void. 9. 9. The main thrust of the contention urged by Shri Rastogi was that since the judgment of this Court in Krishna Dutt Sharma's case, 1987 (1) RLR 346 (supra) was prospective in nature inasmuch as the State CCA Rules were amended only on 18.11.1987 making the penalty of withholding of annual grade increment with cumulative effect as major one, the imposition of such a penalty which prior to 1987 was minor as per State CCA Rules, itself, and which was passed on 10.6.1983 much prior to the pronouncement of aforesaid DB judgment so also the 1987 amendment, cannot be disturbed on the principles laid down subsequently in Krishna Dutt's case (supra). In support of his contentions, Shri Rastogi cited the decisions of the Apex Court in Rangrao v. Kamlakant, 1995 (Supp1) SCC 271; Baburam v. C.C. Jacob, 1999 LabIC 2084 : 1990 (1) SCC 411 : 1990 LabIC 369; 1983 (3) SCC 284 : 1983 LabIC 1240 and the decision of this Court in M.K. Soni v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 (2) WLC 481 . 10. In replica, Shri Mahendra Shah appearing for the plaintiff contended that the law laid down by the High Court and the Apex Court is applicable being binding on the pending case before the subordinate Courts by virtue of Articles 141 and 227 of the Constitution. In this regard, Shri Shah cited the decisions in RSRTC v. Krishna Kant, 1995 (5) SCC 75 : 1995 LabIC 2241 and Secretary Irrigation v. G.C. Roy, 1992 (2) SCC 508 : AIR 1992 SC 732 . 11. Shri Shah then contended that in Krishna Dutt's case, 1987 (1) RLR 346 (supra) the Division Bench of this Court has given the interpretation that since by virtue of Rule 14(4) of CCA Rules withholding of annual grade increments with cumulative effect amounts to major penalty as such, the procedure laid down under Rule 16 of the State CCA Rules ought to have been complied with. According to Shri Shah, similar view was taken by the Apex Court in Guruwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 1990 (82) FJR 370 (SC) and R. Dyal v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 WLC 513. 12. According to Shri Shah, similar view was taken by the Apex Court in Guruwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 1990 (82) FJR 370 (SC) and R. Dyal v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 WLC 513. 12. Shri Shah lastly contended that both the Courts below decreed the suit not only on the ground of non-compliance of principle of natural justice but also non-application of mind on the part of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority besides non-disclosure of the reasons while indicting plaintiff guilty and therefore, the impugned penalty order was held not sustainable being non-speaking thereby was rightly set aside by the Courts below. He cited decisions in Ram Chandra v. Union of India, 1986 (3) SCC 103 : 1986 LabIC 885 and R.P. Bhatt v. Union of India, 1986 (2) SCC 651 : 1986 LabIC 790. 13. I have considered the rival contentions of the parties as well as the citations relied upon by them. Admittedly it has not been disputed that the State CCA Rules 1958 on adoption by the circular dated 20.6.1983 were made applicable w.e.f. 1.6.1983 to the staff members of the RFC (appellant) as a result of the Board's decision taken in its meeting held on 3.6.1983. There is no dispute that the procedure contemplated under the State CCA Rules 1958 for conducting disciplinary proceedings and imposition of penalty were to be followed as a broad guideline as per the circular dated 10.6.1983 w.e.f 1.6.1983. Similarly there is no dispute that Rule 17 of the State CCA Rules was amended only on 18.11.1987 thereby clause (aa) was inserted after clause (a) in sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 making it imperative that no penalty shall be imposed for withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect without holding any inquiry under Rule 16. 14. The controversy had arisen only when in some of judicial pronouncements, the penalty of withholding of increments with cumulative effect was held to be major punishment for which procedure under Rule 16 was to be followed and prior to the judicial verdict even under State CCA Rules, 1958 such an impugned penalty of withholding of increment with cumulative effect was deemed to be minor penalty for which procedure under Rule 17 was to be followed. In other words, there is no specific provision prior to the amendment in Rule 17 which was made applicable only w.e.f. 18.11.1987 whereby it was made imperative that an enquiry under Rule 16 should be conducted before imposing penalty of withholding of increments with cumulative effect and consequent upon amendment w.e.f 18.11.1987. Such an impugned penalty was specifically envisaged as major penalty. 15. In the instant case, the trial Court on the principles laid down in Krishna Dutt's case, 1987 (1) RLR 346 (supra) held the impugned penalty of withholding of increments with cumulative effect as major penalty requiring to follow procedure under Rule 16 for a detailed inquiry which since had not been conducted in case of the plaintiff, the impugned order of penalty was set aside directing de novo inquiry under Rule 16, while the appellate Court set aside the direction of the trial Court for conducting de novo inquiry by holding the plaintiff entitled to all monetary benefits and upheld the trial Court's judgment as to declaration of the impugned penalty as null and void. 16. In the context of the backdrop of aforesaid events the only substantial question of law involved for consideration in these appeals is as to whether the DB judgment of this Court rendered on 24.5.1984 in Krishna Dutt's case, 1987 (1) RLR 346 (supra) being prospective in nature could be made applicable for testing the validity of penalty order dated 25.6.1983 ? In other words, the questions having arisen out of the contentions urged at the bar are : (1) whether the disciplinary as well as appellate authority were justified in concluding the inquiry against the plaintiff resulting in impugned penalty as per law applicable at that time, i.e. on 25.6.1983 ? and (2) whether the law having come into operation subsequently could be made applicable retrospectively i.e. prior to 24.5.1984 (date of DB judgment) so as to review even those cases which stood decided finally much prior to application of new law and the amendment made on 18.11.1987 being prospective ? 17. Before dwelling upon the aforesaid substantial questions of law, I may have a brief resume as to what has been laid down in Krishna Dutt's case 1987 (1) RLR 346 (supra). 18. In Krishna Dutt's case, the petitioner was an officer of the Rajasthan Administrative Service. 17. Before dwelling upon the aforesaid substantial questions of law, I may have a brief resume as to what has been laid down in Krishna Dutt's case 1987 (1) RLR 346 (supra). 18. In Krishna Dutt's case, the petitioner was an officer of the Rajasthan Administrative Service. A disciplinary action was initiated against him by memo dated 8.9.1976 under Rule 17 of the State CCA Rules, 1958. Rule 17 deals with procedure for imposing minor penalties. He was furnished with statement of allegations to which he submitted his reply denying the allegations. The State Government after considering his reply passed an order dated 20.11.1968 imposing a penalty of withholding of one grade increment with cumulative effect. He challenged the said order of punishment in writ petition No. 1445/73 wherein the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition by judgment dated 20.11.1973 against which D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 38/74 was filed which came to be decided on 24.5.1984. The DB of this Court observed : (1) that a perusal of the seven kinds of penalties specified under Rule 14 shows that under clause (ii) only withholding of increment has been mentioned but it nowhere specified that withholding of increments could also be given with cumulative effect; that while in case of withholding of grade increment with cumulative effect, the Government servant is put to a financial loss for the entire period of his future service thereby putting him to loss of the withheld grade increment for the entire period of his remaining service. In this view of the matter, the DB of this Court held that such penalty of withholding of increment with cumulative effect and reduction to a lower stage in the time scale as provided as one of the penalties under clause (iv) of Rule 14 are equivalent having the same effect, and thus the penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the time scale as specified in clause (iv) of Rule 14 is a major penalty and the procedure for inquiry has to be followed as provided under Rule 16 of the Rules. On this principle, the D.B. held that the penalty imposed in Krishna Dutt's case was a major penalty and as the procedure provided under Rule 16 had not been followed, the order imposing penalty of withholding of one grade increment with cumulative effect was held to be totally without jurisdiction thereby liable to be quashed. The special leave petition against the DB judgment (supra) was also dismissed by the Apex Court. 19. After the aforesaid DB judgment, the legislature in its wisdom amended the State CCA Rules, 1958 w.e.f. 18.11.1987 by inserting clause (aa) after clause (a) in sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 making it imperative that no penalty should be imposed for withholding increments with cumulative effect without holding any inquiry as provided in Rule 16. Prior to such an amendment, even in State CCA Rules, 1958, no such rule was in existence so as to infer the penalty of withholding of increment with cumulative effect as major penalty. Even the DB judgment in Krishna Dutt's case, 1987(1) Rajasthan LR 346 (supra) is of 24.5.1984 while impugned penalty order in case of the present plaintiff was passed on 25.6.1983 much prior to the DB judgment and the subsequent amendment in Rule 17 introduced on 18.11.1987. That apart the D.B. nowhere stated that its judgment (supra) would apply to those cases which were decided prior to the said decision. Hence ratio of decision in Krishna Dutt's case (supra) cannot be construed to make applicable retrospectively so as to entail applicability of the procedure to be followed in cases of major penalty under Rule 16 of the State CCA Rules, which obviously was not the position when the penalty of stoppage of increments with cumulative effect was imposed on the respondent under penalty order dated 25.6.1983, and admittedly on the said date, it was minor penalty. Hence as per settled position of law, it has to be applied prospectively. 20. Similarly, as stated above, Rule 17 of the State CCA Rules was amended on 18.11.1987 by the legislature prospectively. It has nowhere been mentioned that it has to be applied retrospectively. It is thus abundantly clear on close scrutiny of the aforesaid amendment, that such an amendment was made effective only w.e.f. 18.11.1987. Hence it was not to apply to cases which were already decided prior to 18.11.1987. 21. It has nowhere been mentioned that it has to be applied retrospectively. It is thus abundantly clear on close scrutiny of the aforesaid amendment, that such an amendment was made effective only w.e.f. 18.11.1987. Hence it was not to apply to cases which were already decided prior to 18.11.1987. 21. The significant aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored rather has to be appreciated in true perspective in which the amendment was introduced, is that prior to 18.11.1987, no such rule was in existence and the DB judgment in Krishna Dutt's case, 1987(1) Rajasthan LR 346 (supra) is of 24.5.1984 whereas the impugned penalty imposed by the RFC is of 25.6.1983 so also appellate order dismissing appeal against the impugned penalty is of 30.8.1983. Hence there was no occasion for the Courts below to have overlooked or ignored aforesaid aspect of the matter that in the absence of legislative intent to have made amendment in the State CCA Rules, being not retrospective, how could it be made applicable retrospectively to the advantage of the employee and detriment to the employer by unsettled position which already stood well settled prior to the said amendment ? 22. Now I deal with the decisions cited by Shri Rastogi. In Baburam v. C.C. Jacob, 1999 LabIC 2084 (supra), the question which arose in appeal before the Apex Court against the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal Ernakulam was as to whether the selections made on the recommendations of the departmental promotion committee and consequential promotion of the appellant to the post of Superintendent of Customs was justified. The Apex Court held that the prospective declaration of law is a devise innovated by the Apex Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, and it is also a devise adopted to avoid uncertainty and avoidable litigation. The Apex Court also held that by the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law prior to its date of declaration are validated. This is done in the larger public interest. Therefore, the subordinate forums which are legally bound to apply the declaration of law made by this Court are also duty bound to apply such dictum to cases which would arise in future only. This is done in the larger public interest. Therefore, the subordinate forums which are legally bound to apply the declaration of law made by this Court are also duty bound to apply such dictum to cases which would arise in future only. In matters where decisions opposed to the said principles have been taken prior to such declaration of law cannot be interfered with on the basis of such declaration of law. 23. In Baburam' case (supra), the Tribunal on 22.5.1995 following the judgment of the Apex Court in R.K. Subharwal v. State of Punjab, 1995 (2) JT SC 351 : 1995 LabIC 1618 allowed the applications holding that there had been an erroneous application of the principle of reservation resulting in appointment of scheduled caste candidates in excess of the earmarked for them. Therefore, the Apex Court held as under : We are unable to agree with this view of the Tribunal. It is to be noted that the prospectivity given to Sabharwal's case was obviously on the ground that there was a doubt in regard to the position of law until the same was clarified by this Court in Sabharwal's case. The decision of the DPC was taken in June, 1994; much prior to the judgment in Sabharwal's case. It is only pursuant to the decision of the DPC, the appellant came to be promoted on 27.6.1994 which is also a date prior to the delivery of the judgment in Sabharwal's case. In our opinion, the prospectivity was given to Sabharwal's case only to see that status prevailing prior to the judgment in Sabharwal's case should not be disturbed. 24. In M.K. Soni v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 (2) WLC 481 (supra) before this Court the question was as to whether the order of punishment of (stoppage of) one grade increment with cumulative effect in an enquiry held under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, which was upheld in a review petition, was justified if copy of inquiry report was not made available to the delinquent before punishing him. Before this Court, a decision rendered by 3 Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Before this Court, a decision rendered by 3 Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, 1990 (4) JT (SC) 456 : 1991 LabIC 308 was cited wherein it has been categorically held that non-supply of the inquiry report to the delinquent officer amounts to the violation of Rules of natural justice and since the 42nd amendment to the Constitution has not brought about any change in this regard, therefore, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report and is also entitled to make a representation against it. But the Apex Court in para 17 (ruled) that this will have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground. 25. In Rangrao v. Kamlakant, 1995 Supp(1) SCC 271 (supra) the landlord appellant filed a suit for possession which ended in a compromise decree. Subsequently the notification exempting certain categories of buildings from the purview of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 issued under clause 30 of the said Order came to be struck down on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. When the decree was sought to be executed, the tenant appellant albeit the compromise, raised an objection that the decree became unexecutable since the civil Court had lost jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction in view of the decision rendered on 9.6.1985. That objection although overruled by the lower Courts was upheld by the High Court. However, allowing the landlord's appeal, the Apex Court held that when the compromise memo fruitioned into a decree on 3.1.1985 the civil Court had every jurisdiction to pass such a decree. The Apex Court then observed that it is true that notification issued under clause 30 of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 came to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution vide decision rendered on 19.6.1985 but such a decision cannot have any effect of rendering the decree passed on 3.1.1985 a nullity and no judgment of any Court can have any retrospective operation because that is the plenary power of Parliament. 26. 26. On the contrary, Shri M.K. Shah, learned counsel for the plaintiff controverting the contentions of Shri Rastogi, vehemently contended that the D.B. judgment in Krishna Dutt's case, 1987 (1) RLR 346 (supra) could be made applicable retrospectively to the instant case notwithstanding the amendment introduced in the State CCA Rules on 18.11.1987. Shri Shah also contended as to the controversy raised by the RFC with regard to the applicability of D.B. judgment in Krishna Dutt's case to the cases pending before the lower Courts that the said D.B. judgment has its binding effect by virtue of Articles 141 and 227 of the Constitution of India unless it is specifically mentioned in the judgment/decision itself that it will have prospective effect. Shri Shah cited the decisions in Secretary, Irrigation Department v. G.C. Roy, 1992 (1) SCC 508 : AIR 1992 SC 732 and RSRTC v. Krishna Kant, 1995 (5) SCC 75 : 1995 LabIC 2241. 27. In R.S.R.T.C. v. Krishnakant, 1995 LabIC 2241 (supra) the controversy was as to whether the dispute arose between the employer and workman does constitute an industrial dispute as per Section 2(k) or (2-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where it invoked recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created under the Act. The Apex Court held that the principles enunciated by its decision shall apply to all pending matters except where decrees have been passed by the trial Court and the matters are pending in appeal or second appeal, as the case may be, and all suits pending in the trial Court shall be governed by its decision. 28. In G.C. Roy's case, AIR 1992 SC 732 (supra), when the appeal was taken up for hearing by a Division Bench, the State placed reliance on a three Judge Bench decision of the Court in Executive Engineer (Irrigation) v. Abhadutta Jena, 1988 (1) SCC 418 : AIR 1988 SC 1570, wherein it was held that the arbitrator to whom the reference is made without the intervention of the Court, does not have jurisdiction to award interest pendente lite. The Constitutional Bench held that the decision in Abhadutta Jena's case does not lay down good law on this aspect. However, the present decision shall only be prospective in operation, which means that this decision shall not entitle any party nor shall it empower any Court to reopen proceedings which have already become final. The Constitutional Bench held that the decision in Abhadutta Jena's case does not lay down good law on this aspect. However, the present decision shall only be prospective in operation, which means that this decision shall not entitle any party nor shall it empower any Court to reopen proceedings which have already become final. In other words, the law declared herein shall apply only to pending proceedings. 29. I have examined the ratio of decisions (supra) with regard to arguments canvassed by Shri Shah. In my view there is an obvious fallacy in his arguments as he has lost sight of the fact that the amendment introduced on 18.11.1987 in CCA Rules and judgment rendered on 24.5.1984 in Krishna Dutt's case, 1967(1) Rajasthan LR 346 (supra) would apply prospectively or particularly when the amendment of 1987 in CCA Rules does not say anything to the contrary. 30. In the instant case, the trial Court set aside the impugned penalty only on the reason that since no inquiry was conducted under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules the penalty of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect is not sustained thereby a de novo enquiry was ordered but the appellate Court reversed the order of de novo inquiry. 31. I am unable to agree with the conclusions drawn by the Courts below. The penalty of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect was imposed against the plaintiff on 25.6.1983 much prior to the DB judgment in Krishna Dutt's case, which being prospective in nature could not be made applicable for testing validity of aforesaid penalty. 31. I am unable to agree with the conclusions drawn by the Courts below. The penalty of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect was imposed against the plaintiff on 25.6.1983 much prior to the DB judgment in Krishna Dutt's case, which being prospective in nature could not be made applicable for testing validity of aforesaid penalty. Applying the ratio of decisions cited by Shri Rastogi, referred to above, as to the prospectivity of application of law laid down in the judgment to the present case, I am of the opinion that the disciplinary as well as appellate authorities were justified in concluding the inquiry against the plaintiff resulting in the impugned penalty of stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect as per law applicable on the date i.e on 25.6.1983 and the law having come into existence subsequently by virtue of DB decision rendered on 24.5.1984 in Krishna Dutt's case (supra) could not have been made applicable by the Courts below so as to review the same, because in matters where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to decision rendered on 24.5.1984 should be interfered with on the basis of such declaration of law in aforesaid case. Thus, the Courts below were in gross error in applying the decision in Krishna Dutt's case to the plaintiff's case. For this reason, these appeals succeed. 32. As a result of the above discussion, these two appeals are allowed, setting aside the impugned judgments and decrees of Courts below dated 23.8.1997 and 29.3.1996. Consequently the plaintiff's suit stands dismissed and no de novo enquiry is called for. No order as to costs.Appeals allowed.