JUDGMENT 1. - These two special appeals arise out of a common judgment of the learned Single Judge passed on January 5, 1999 in two petitions (1) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4136 of 1998 and (2) No. 4148 of 1998, whereby the first writ petition wherein the petitioner had assailed the impugned charge sheet dated 1.6.1998 which was served upon him by the Bureau for alleged financial irregularities was dismissed while the latter writ petition was allowed setting aside the order dated 10.8.1998 transferring the writ petitioner Arun Singh from Jaipur to Chennai, directing the Bureau of Indian Standards (for short "the Bureau") to transfer the writ petitioner giving him non-sensitive posting at a place nearby Jaipur so as to enable him to attend the departmental enquiry at Jaipur whenever required to do so. 2. In order to appreciate the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, it would be relevant to briefly state the background of the writ petitioner leading to filing of the aforesaid writ petitions. Arun Singh (writ petitioner) had initially joined the services of the Bureau (respondent in writ petitions) in the year 1981. He was subsequently promoted as Deputy Director in the Bureau in the year 1986 and thereafter was transferred from Patna to Jaipur in the year 1992. Thereafter he was promoted to the post of Joint Director in the Bureau in the year 1997. 3. While the writ petitioner was serving as Deputy Director in the Bureau at Jaipur, on 22.2.1996 a preliminary inspection was carried out by him as Inspecting Officer and by his colleague P.P. Singh who was also holding the rank of Joint Director of M/s Shivagrico Implements Ltd. for grant of licence to use ISI mark on "Powrah" (pick-axe), upon which aforesaid Firm was granted licence to run business. A complaint was lodged to the Bureau by the Director of Jaipur Branch of the Bureau, alleging that the writ petitioner and his colleague P.P. Singh who conducted preliminary inspection, referred to above, signed a blank deviation/variation report (DVR) pro forma dated 22.2.1996 on which they also obtained signature of one Sunit Jain. This complaint resulted in issuing memorandum dated 1.6.1998 along with statement of two articles of charge. This complaint resulted in issuing memorandum dated 1.6.1998 along with statement of two articles of charge. The first charge levelled against the writ petitioner was that he had in collusion with P.P. Singh unduly favoured M/s Shivagrico Implements Limited by firstly signing a blank DVR pro forma dated 22.2.1996 and then making wrong recommendation for grant of licence in his Inspection report dated 11.3.1996 even when the said Firm did not possess pre-requisites required for obtaining BIS licence. Second charge against him was that he colluded with P.P. Singh the group leader, to unduly favour the said firm for the grant of an "open" licence covering all varieties of "powrahs" whereas only "unhardened" variety had been tested independently by the Central Laboratory resulting in pecuniary gains to the firm. By these acts of the writ petitioner under aforesaid two charges, he is alleged to have failed to maintain absolute integrity, displayed lack of devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bureau employee thereby violating the provisions of sub-rules (i), (ii) and (iii) of Rule 3(1) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (for short, "CCA Rules"). The inquiry accordingly commenced. During the course of inquiry, the Bureau in its wisdom thought it proper to transfer the writ petitioner from Jaipur to Chennai by an order dated 10.8.1998 (Ann. 1 to his second writ petition) with the object to shift him from sensitive posting at Jaipur to a station of non-sensitive posting at Chennai so as to enable him to participate in the departmental enquiry impartially. P.P. Singh aforenamed colleague of the writ petitioner was also issued charge sheet and the departmental inquiry against him had also commenced, P.P. Singh was also transferred from Jaipur to New Delhi. In these circumstances, the writ petitioner filed two writ petitions (supra). In first petition, he challenged his transfer order while in second petition he assailed the charge sheet (supra). In both the writ petitions, the Bureau filed reply thereto. These two writ petitions were heard and disposed of by the learned Single Judge by common judgment dated 5.1.1999 whereby he dismissed first writ petition declining to set aside the charge sheet while allowing the second writ petition quashing the transfer order as indicated above. In both the writ petitions, the Bureau filed reply thereto. These two writ petitions were heard and disposed of by the learned Single Judge by common judgment dated 5.1.1999 whereby he dismissed first writ petition declining to set aside the charge sheet while allowing the second writ petition quashing the transfer order as indicated above. Hence these two appeals have been preferred one by the Bureau (Special Appeal No. 119/99) and another by the writ petitioner (Special Appeal No. 100/99). 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that before effecting the transfer, the competent authority should have examined the Rules in their true perspective that the authority, i.e. Director General of the Bureau (respondent in the writ) had taken a decision to transfer him from Jaipur to Chennai under the signatures of one Shri R.L. Khurana, the then Director (Human Resources Development) who was an authority subordinate to him, hence the transfer order stood vitiated. It was further contended that the transfer had been communicated per Fax under extra-ordinary circumstances without there being any administrative exigency with a positive direction to relieve him w.e.f. 14.8.1998, which according to him is in complete negation of transfer policy adopted by the Bureau. It has further been alleged that the respondent No. 2 had arbitrarily discriminated the writ petitioner qua immediate superior Shri P.P. Singh, who too had been transferred from Jaipur to Delhi, with mala fide intention to harass and vitimise him by not adhering to the policy of the Bureau as applicable to group A officers of which category he is a member. As per transfer policy of the Bureau, an officer on a particular station becomes due transfer after completing six years of service, which admittedly the writ petitioner has completed at Jaipur. 5. As per transfer policy of the Bureau, an officer on a particular station becomes due transfer after completing six years of service, which admittedly the writ petitioner has completed at Jaipur. 5. The elements of mala fide and bias which have been attributed to the Bureau's officers who are respondents in the writ petitions, are that though the writ petitioner had completed six years of service and had also been promoted at Jaipur, yet the Bureau was not justified in passing the impugned transfer order by not treating him at par qua his colleague P.P. Singh since even if he was to be transferred, he should not have been discriminated qua the latter as the bone of contention is that both were facing departmental inquiries following the charge sheets served upon them at Jaipur, while P.P. Singh has been transferred to a place at shorter distance from Jaipur i.e. New Delhi, the writ petitioner has been transferred to a far-off place i.e. Chennai resulting in great inconvenience to him and this fact alone is suggestive and attributive of mala fides and discrimination adopted by the Bureau qua two similarly placed officers. 6. In this regard we are of the view that it is not the nearer of distance from the place of original posting in cases of transfer which would be a relevant factor to be reckoned with in cases of transfer of two similarly placed officials of a particular department as that would neither vitiate the transfer already made nor it would improve their case for reversal of transfer in any manner. 7. Yet another ground on which the transfer order has been assailed by the writ petitioner is that if at all it has to be construed that he has been transferred on the ground by shifting from sensitive posting of Jaipur to non-sensitive posting of Chennai, such a transfer is punitive which cannot be imposed unless the allegation of misconduct on the basis of the memo of charges has been proved and established on the basis of evidence against the writ petitioner which obviously could not have been done since the departmental inquiry initiated against him was pending at the relevant time when the transfer order was passed. It has further been alleged that the impugned order of transfer suffers from malice in fact so also in law since if it was to be done, it should have been issued at least one month in advance so as to facilitate him for preparing on transfer by arranging tickets, luggage packing, locating suitable accommodation, arranging admissions of his children to reputed schools to mitigate hardship arising out of the transfer, whereas he was hardly given any time to do so before proceeding on the transfer. 8. In reply to the show cause notice in the writ petition, the respondent Bureau contended that the transfer policy has been laid down only for the guidance of the administration, inasmuch as the writ petitioner has admittedly completed six years of service at Jaipur and his transfer was recommended on the advice of Chief Vigilance Officer in view of the fact of departmental inquiry which was pending and also looking into seriousness of the charges it was considered appropriate for transferring not only Arun Singh but also another delinquent officer of the Bureau namely P.P. Singh. Moreover, according to the Bureau, the writ petitioners has failed to establish or point out any relevant material from which it may be inferred that there was any malice or bias on the part of the Bureau officers in passing the transfer order and that apart the transfer policy is only for guidance of the administration and it is always open to the administrative authority in appropriate cases for the reason of administrative exigency. 9. In our view, the writ petitioner has failed to make out any case which would call for interference contrary to what has been contended above by the respondents since he had failed to place any material on record from which prima facie inference could be drawn against the Bureau for making out even a remotest case for interference which would establish that the concerned officials of the Bureau against whom mala fides have been attributed for having acted in any prejudicial manner against the writ petitioner while transferring him from Jaipur to Chennai. The law is well settled that the allegations of bias, prejudice or malice before they can be established successfully, have to be substantiated by cogent and reliable evidence which ultimately the writ petitioner has failed to establish and prove on record. 10. The law is well settled that the allegations of bias, prejudice or malice before they can be established successfully, have to be substantiated by cogent and reliable evidence which ultimately the writ petitioner has failed to establish and prove on record. 10. Prima facie we are of the view that it is not open to any employee or highly placed official of a particular department to assail his transfer from one station to another in the absence of factual foundation duly substantiated by evidence which admittedly the writ petitioner has failed to satisfactorily explain on record. It is always open to the department to effect the transfer of a particular employee or officer from one station to another and the department is not obliged to consult such official against whom departmental inquiry is pending on the ground of financial irregularities etc. as in the instant case since it is always appropriate and in the interest of justice for both the parties, if transfer is effected for sensitive posting of Jaipur to non-sensitive posting of Chennai, as has been done in the instant case and also in the case of another officer P.P. Singh who has also been transferred from Jaipur to Delhi pending inquiry. 11. Main object of the Bureau in our view was rightly to effect the transfer of both the delinquent officials i.e. writ petitioner as well as P.P. Singh by transferring them to different stations so as to rule out any possibility of their either tampering with the evidence or to win over the witnesses or for any other considerations which may not hamper the fair inquiry. This would altogether rule out chance of bias and mala fide or any other reason for which neither preferential treatment nor any bias can be attributed against the Bureau. 12. This would altogether rule out chance of bias and mala fide or any other reason for which neither preferential treatment nor any bias can be attributed against the Bureau. 12. As has already been stated above, admittedly Arun Singh had completed six years of service at Jaipur before his transfer was affected to Chennai and the departmental inquiry has also been pending on the date when the order of transfer was passed on the request and advice of the Chief Vigilance Officer who in his wisdom had rightly considered not only to recommend transfer of the Arun Singh but also of another delinquent officer P.P. Singh at different stations keeping in view the seriousness of the charges on the basis of which the departmental inquiry had been initiated and was pending after serving upon them the charge sheets. Hence in our view it is not open for the writ petitioner to assail or challenge the transfer order on any of grounds of alleged bias, malice or discrimination whatsoever and rather the interest of justice will be fully served if the petitioner is transferred to Chennai pending enquiry. In our view, no prejudice would be caused to him by his transfer to Chennai, which undoubtedly has been done on the recommendation of the Civil Vigilance Officer and on the basis of the material against him as per memo of charge sheet resulting in initiation of departmental inquiry. 13. The law is well settled that it is always open to the competent authority to make reasonable classification between two similarly placed officials provided the purpose and object of classification has reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by it. If classification is based on analysis, it is not open to the affected official just as in the instant case to challenge the same on the ground of discrimination nor it can be said to be violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India in any manner whatsoever since in the instant case, purpose of classifying two such similarly placed officials of the Bureau i.e. writ petitioner and his colleague P.P. Singh who were charged with alleged financial irregularities which have yet to be established in the enquiry and hence could not be made subject matter of challenge either in the writ petition or by way of this appeal. Hence it had become necessary not only in the interest of justice but also for the Bureau to have a fair and impartial inquiry with a view to meet the ends of justice so as to transfer the affected delinquent officials who are facing inquiry. It is a trite law that transfer of an official from sensitive place to a non-sensitive one is always justiciable and hence not open to challenge either on the ground of mala fides or bias or discrimination etc. Such transfers as a matter of fact are in public interest hence not open to challenge. From perusal of findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in para 19 of the impugned order, we are surprised to note that after having discussed relevant material on record and pleadings of the parties though the learned Single Judge has observed that the writ petitioner has been transferred after having completed six years of his service at Jaipur for the reason of administrative exigency viz. on the basis of recommendations of Chief Vigilance Officer from sensitive posting of Jaipur to non-sensitive posting at Chennai which is also borne out from the Bureau's plea taken in counter-affidavit filed by Shri P.S. Das, Director General of the Bureau specifically denying the allegations made against him yet the learned Single Judge has made such observations regarding mala fide intentions of the Bureau's officials at whose instance transfer order was passed and against whom allegations were made for giving dissimilar treatment to similarly placed and charged persons namely P.P. Singh, though charge sheet has been sustained by dismissing first writ petition No. 4136/98, yet surprisingly enough second writ petition No. 4148/98 assailing the transfer order has been allowed in part and transfer order has been quashed with the observations that the Bureau shall be at liberty to transfer the writ petitioner by giving him non- sensitive posting at nearby place from Jaipur so as to enable him to attend departmental inquiry without much trouble by extending this undue concession for which there is no rationale nor any legal basis or factual foundation, whatsoever as has been done by the learned single Judge in the instant case. Hence the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as regards the aforesaid transfer are not sustained at law. Hence the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as regards the aforesaid transfer are not sustained at law. We are of the view that since there was enough evidence and material on record, on the basis of which prima facie view could be drawn to sustain transfer order and rather the learned single Judge should not have interfered with transfer order so lightly in a manner as has been done in the instant case. Though the learned single Judge in para 18 of his order has observed:- "Nature of evidence to establish mala fide has to be strong and convincing", yet we are surprised to note that once such conclusion has been drawn, whether impugned order of transfer could be quashed in the absence of reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved by it ? The transfer order can neither be said to be perverse nor it can be said to be suffering from any malice. On the contrary, the Bureau was within its rights to have transferred the writ petitioner from Jaipur to Chennai because nearness of distance for place of posting is no criteria to recall the transfer order on the ground of alleged discrimination nor such a transfer can be construed as punitive and is rather a preventive measure from vigilance angle as well, as has been so appreciated even by the learned single Judge as per his observations made in para 16 of the impugned judgment. Therefore, the transfer order dated 10.8.1998 deserves to be sustained. In our view, it would be in the interest of justice of the writ petitioner to face pending inquiry instituted by the competent authority and the record of the inquiry could conveniently be made available by the Bureau authority to the writ petitioner for inspection even at his place of posting, where he should have taken the charge immediately if already not done so. 14. 14. In Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, 1991 (Supp)(2) SCC 659 : 1991 Lab IC 860 : 1993(3) SCT 564(SC)., the competent authority issued order transferring some of teachers of primary school in Bihar and that transfer order was challenged by the transferred teachers on the ground that it amounted to undue hardship and that the transfers suffered from mala fides on the part of the competent authority since they had been disturbed by being transferred to place of postings which were far away from their family station. Their request to the place of their husband's posting was accorded by District Education Establishment Committee but the transfer orders came to be assailed by the affected persons before the High Court. The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution interfered with transfer order by entertaining writ petitions. It was held by the Apex Court that the Court should not interfere with transfer order which has been made in public interest and for the reasons of administrative exigency unless transfer order is made in violation of any mandatory or statutory rules on the ground of mala fide. Government servant holding transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other and rather he is liable to be transferred from one place to another. The Apex Court observed that the transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights and if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order; instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department, and that if the Courts continue to interfere with day to day transfer orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with transfer orders. Accordingly the appeals were allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court was set aside by the Apex Court with the direction that the appellant should be placed to the places to which they had been transferred under the orders impugned before the High Court. 15. Accordingly the appeals were allowed and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court was set aside by the Apex Court with the direction that the appellant should be placed to the places to which they had been transferred under the orders impugned before the High Court. 15. In State of U.P. v. V.N. Prasad, 1995 Supp(2) SCC 151 the High Court at interlocutory stage of the writ petition filed by V.N. Prasad, Principal, B.R.D. Medical College, Gorakhpur challenging transfer order, had stayed operation of transfer order. The transfer order was challenged on the ground of mala fide besides others urged by the writ petitioner. In appeal the Apex Court observed that at the stage at which the matter was brought to engage the attention of the High Court, there was no prima facie material to establish any mala fides which required strong and convincing evidence. It further observed that presumption is in favour of the bonafides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material. Consequently interlocutory order of the High Court staying the operation of the transfer order was held to be unjustified and thereby the same was quashed. 16. In Transport Commissioner, Madras v. A. Radha K. Moorthy, 1995(1) SCC 332 : 1995 Lab IC 1749, the judgment of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal allowing original application of the respondent and quashing the memo of charges communicated to him was challenged in appeal by the Transport Commissioner. The Apex Court held that as regards legality of the charges on the basis of initiation of the inquiry, by an officer subordinate to the appointing authority it deserves acceptance. However, the Apex Court held that the correctness of the charges are not subject to judicial review prior to conclusion of the departmental inquiry and even after the conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the scope of judicial review is restricted to charges based on no evidence, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It also observed that it is not open for the High Court to examine procedural correctness of the decision making process and therefore the order of the Tribunal insofar as it had gone into discussion regarding truth and correctness of the charges was held to be unsustainable in law. 17. It also observed that it is not open for the High Court to examine procedural correctness of the decision making process and therefore the order of the Tribunal insofar as it had gone into discussion regarding truth and correctness of the charges was held to be unsustainable in law. 17. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 (Supp)(1) SCC 222 : AIR 1991 SC 1260 : 1991(2) SCT 397 (SC), on the aspect of sustainability of the charge where plea of mala fide had been taken by the delinquent by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution it was held by the Apex Court that though administrative authority has wide discretion but yet action taken on the basis of sufficient material which prima facie justifies initiation of the inquiry, mala fides get relegated to the background since the action taken on the basis of ample material on record justifying impugned action against the delinquent, deserves to be sustained. However exercise of discretion is not a power to act ad-arbitratrium; it is not a despotic power, nor hedged with arbitrariness and the determination of plea of mala fide involves two questions (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power. The action must therefore be proved to be made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. The Apex Court further observed that it must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case, and if it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand. 18. Applying the ratio of decisions (supra) to the instant case, the action of the Bureau authority in issuing order of transfer of the writ petitioner from Jaipur to Chennai as well as issuing charge sheet against him both cannot be said to have been suffering from either improper exercise of jurisdiction to achieve the same for ulterior purpose nor any element of bias or any oblique motive can be attributed to the Bureau authority in having passed such orders and initiating such disciplinary action against the writ petitioner. There is no material on record on the basis of which it can be inferred that administrative action on the part of the Bureau authority is either contrary to the conditions or requirements valid for exercise of such administrative power under the statutory rules. Thus keeping in view facts and circumstances brought on record, no arbitrariness muchless any mala fide can be attributed to the Bureau either in having issued charge-sheet on the basis of preliminary inquiry which can neither be said to be unfair nor suffering from any jurisdictional error. Hence in our opinion, in all fairness the transfer order and the charge-sheet cannot be said to have been suffering from arbitrariness or discriminatory qua P.P. Singh. We are restrained from making any observations as regards sustainability of the charge-sheet served on the writ petitioner at this stage without going into truth and correctness thereof, as it may not affect fairness of the inquiry which is yet to be finalised against the delinquent, lest it may prejudice his defence. 19. The charge-sheet was issued on or about 10.6.1998 and on account of the pendency of the petitions having been filed by the writ petitioner and in view of the aforesaid appeal before this Court, the departmental inquiry might have been delayed in its conclusion. Therefore, the interest of justice will be met if the proceedings in the pending inquiry against the writ petitioners are expedited by the authority of Bureau in accordance with law provided the delinquent co-operates. 20. As a result of the above discussion. Special Appeal No. 119/99 is allowed and the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge passed in Writ Petition No. 4148/98 insofar as it quashed transfer of the writ petitioner (Arun Singh), is hereby quashed and set aside. Special Appeal No. 100/99 filed by Arun Singh is dismissed. The impugned judgment of learned single Judge declining to quash the charge-sheet issued against Arun Singh is upheld. There will be no order as to costs.Order accordingly. *******